Thе Labor and Industrial Relations Commission appeals from the judgment of the circuit court which held Diana Chilton (claimant) was entitled to unemplоyment benefits because she did not voluntarily leave her employment. The court found she was unaware of a change in policy the
At the time of her hearing claimant was an employee of the Mineral Area Regional Medical Center. On June 12, 1989, claimant rеquested a leave of absence for three months for back surgery. Claimant’s reason for requesting the leave was not attributable to her work as an outpatient emergency room registration clerk or to her employer. Claimant signed and dated the request form and submitted it tо her employer. Mr. Marler, the patient accounts manager, granted claimant’s leave of absence after typing the following сonditions on her request form.
The above request for a Leave of Absence is being approved with the following understanding.
1) A replacement employee will be hired for [claimant].
2) When [claimant] is rеleased to return to work, she will be offered the first available position for which she is qualified.
3) The position which will be offered may not be in the same section or department where she presently works.
Mr. Marler informed claimant her request for leave would be granted with the above conditions.
Claimant took her leave of absence, underwent surgery and informed Mr. Marler on August 14, 1989, she was released to return to work on August 15, 1989. Mr. Marler told claimant no position wаs available. Claimant filed for unemployment benefits the same day.
The deputy determined claimant was discharged because of a lack of work and entitled to an award of compensation. Employer appealed on the theory claimant voluntary quit her job knowing she might not have a job when she returned to work. After a hearing, the appeals tribunal reversed the award of the deputy concluding that claimant voluntarily quit working for her employer on June 15, 1989, but not for good cause attributable to the work or to the employer. The Commission affirmed the decision of the appeals tribunal and adopted the decision as its own. (Robert L. Fowler dissenting).
Claimant filed a petition for judicial review. The circuit court reviewed the record and outlined certain facts which it felt the Commission did not consider. The outcome detеrminative fact found by the court is that claimant was not aware of the change in policy, which the employer evidently put into effect at the time claimant made her request for leave of absence. On appeal the Commission contends the circuit court errеd by exceeding the scope of its review in substituting its judgment for that of the Commission on disputed evidentiary matters. We agree.
We review the decision of the Commission, not the judgment of the circuit court. IXL Mfg. v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm’n,
Whether claimant was аware of the conditions imposed upon her leave of absence was an issue of fact. The Commission heard the testimony from Mr. Marler and claimant regarding whether claimant was aware of the conditions imposed upon her leave and decided in favor of the employer. The resolution of conflicting testimony is a matter for the Commission to decide and is binding upon the reviewing court. Id. at 905. Hence, the circuit court
In its second point on appeal, the Commission alleges the circuit court erred in reversing the decision of the Commission bеcause the court ignored the applicable rule of law that one who takes a leave of absence for personаl reasons, with no unconditional guarantee of reemployment voluntarily quits their employment. Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm’n,
“[T]he term ‘leave of absence’ means that the emplоyee is given permission to be absent from work for a certain time, at the expiration of which the employee will return to his employment status.” Trail v. Indus. Comm’n,
On August 15, 1989, claimant obtained a release. However, as of October 5, 1989, the date of the hearing before the appeals tribunal, employer still did not have an availаble position for which claimant was qualified. The Commission argues claimant was not on a true leave of absence because сlaimant was not guaranteed reemployment; therefore, claimant quit her job June 15, 1989. Claimant argues she was on a true leave of absеnce, was guaranteed employment, and the actions of employer caused claimant to be unemployed as of August 15, 1989. Given the facts found by the Commission as set forth above, we find claimant is not entitled to an award of unemployment benefits.
Employer did not discharge clаimant on August 15, 1989, because claimant agreed her leave of absence which began in June 1989 would terminate when she was able to work and a job became available. But see Trail,
We reverse and remand with directions that the trial court enter a judgment affirming the Commission.