Kristеn Rene SIMLER, Appellant, v. Marcell CHILEL, Appellee.
No. 20140513
Supreme Court of Utah.
Filed June 1, 2016
2016 UT 23
¶ 30 Under our current approach to the occupation element of boundary by acquiescence, a claimant must occupy his or her land up to a visible line in a manner that provides the nonclaimant with notice. Under the mutuаl acquiescence element, a nonclaimant‘s occupation up to a visible line is unnecessary, and the nonclaimant can acquiesce through silence or indolence alone. As discussed in the previous section, our early boundary by acquiescence cases did not clarify the legal significance of the nonclaimant‘s occupancy, though some early cases looked to the nonclaimant‘s occupancy as evidence of acquiescence.57 To the extent these early cases required mutual occupancy to satisfy the occupation element of boundary by acquiescence, we recognize that subsequent caselaw has abandoned this approach and here disavow any such requirement.
¶ 31 Therefore, to ensure clarity in future cases, our boundary by acquiescence doctrine requires a claimant to show: (1) a visible line marked by monuments, fences, buildings, or natural features treated as a boundary; (2) the claimant‘s occupatiоn of his or her property up to the visible line such that it would give a reasonable landowner notice that the claimant is using the line as a boundary; (3) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary by adjoining landowners; (4) for a period of at least 20 years.
¶ 32 In this case, the facts show that Ms. Fautin occupied her property up to the fenсe for over twenty years, thereby satisfying the occupation element of our boundary by acquiescence doctrine. Mr. Anderson, on the other hand, failed to visit or inspect his property for a twenty-six-year period. Had he done so, he could have timely objected to the fence.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Conclusion
¶ 33 For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision. The occupation element in our boundary by acquiescence doctrine does not require a claimant to prove occupancy on both sides of a visible line. Instead, a claimant must show occupation uр to a visible line on his or her property only. Since Ms. Fautin occupied her property up to the fence for over twenty years, she satisfied the occupation element.
Ronald E. Dalby, John P. Lowrance, Salt Lake City, for appellee
Justice Durham authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Himonas, and Justice Pearce joined.
Justice Durham, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 Marcell Chilel unsuccessfully sued Kristen Simler in small claims court for
¶ 2 We conclude that the Utah Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in small claims cases in a trial de novo in district court, and that Ms. Simler properly asserted that right. We do not reach the merits of Ms. Simler‘s discovery arguments as they were not properly preserved below. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
¶ 3 The parties were allegedly involved in an automobile collision in October 2012 in Salt Lake City, Utah. Ms. Chilel asserted that she suffered physical injuries resulting from the alleged collision, for which she received medical treatment. Ms. Chilel filed a small claims suit against Ms. Simler in the Salt Lakе Justice Court, claiming general and special damages totaling $10,000.
¶ 4 The small claims trial took place on March 27, 2014, in the Salt Lake Justice Court. Both parties were present and represented by counsel, and each party presented testimony and evidence. Ms. Chilel testified, among other things, that she had been involved in at least two other automobile accidents in close temporal proximity—one ten days prior to the alleged accident at issue, and another about three months later, in January 2013. Ms. Chilel claimed that she sustained similar physical injuries in all three accidents. Another witness at the small claims hearing—an insurance claims representative for Ms. Simler‘s insurеr—stated that according to the insurance claims database, Ms. Chilel was involved in a fourth accident in March 2013, for which she also claimed similar physical injuries.
¶ 5 Despite requests from Ms. Simler‘s insurer for authorizations to obtain additional medical documentation, at the small claims trial Ms. Chilel and her counsel presented medical documentаtion only for the period between the alleged accident at issue (Ms. Chilel‘s second accident) and the third accident in January 2013—a three-month period of time. The pro tempore small claims judge ultimately entered a judgment of “No Cause of Action.”
¶ 6 Ms. Chilel filed a notice of appeal of the judgment and requested a trial de novo in the Third District Court. Ms. Simler filed an answer, which also included a motion for a jury trial and jury demand. Ms. Simler paid the appropriate statutory jury demand fee. Additionally, Ms. Simler served on Ms. Chilel one interrogatory and one request for production of documents.
¶ 7 Ms. Chilel filed a motion to strike Ms. Simler‘s answer, jury demand, and the discovery requests based in part on rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Small Claims Procedure and
¶ 8 Ms. Simler filed a petition for permission to appeal the district court‘s order, and we granted interlocutory reviеw. Ms. Simler claims first that
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 9 Questions of law—whether constitutional or statutory—are reviewed for
ANALYSIS
¶ 10
¶ 11 We do not reach Ms. Simler‘s arguments that the preclusion of pretrial discovеry in small claims cases at the trial de novo stage violates her constitutional rights to due process, uniform operation of laws, and open courts, because Ms. Simler did not adequately preserve these claims below.
I. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN A SMALL CLAIMS TRIAL DE NOVO
¶ 12
¶ 13 We conclude that small claims cases were cognizable at law at the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution and the right to a jury trial does exist in small claims cases at the trial de novo stage. We also conclude that Ms. Simler properly sought to avail herself of her right to a jury trial when she filed and served her jury demand and paid the required statutory fee in the district court, and that she preserved this issue in her memorandum in opposition to Ms. Chilel‘s Motion to Strike.
A. Small Claims Cases Were Cognizable at Law at the Time of the Adoption of the Utah Constitution
¶ 14 The Utah Constitution was created by Convention on May 8, 1895, and went into effect on January 4, 1896—the same day Utah became a state.
The territorial laws of Utah provided for a defendant‘s demand for a jury in cases before the Justice of the Peace Courts.3
¶ 15 When Congress enabled the adoption of the Utah Constitution, it stated that “all laws in force made by [the Utah Territоry] at the time of its admission into the Union shall be in force in said State, except as modified or changed by this Act or by the constitution of the State.” Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107, § 19 (1894). The Enabling Act also converted the existing territorial courts into state courts. Id. § 17. At the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution, then, the provisions of the territorial laws allowing for jury demands in Justicе of the Peace Courts remained in effect.
¶ 16 In 1896, after Utah was admitted to the Union, the Utah Governor appointed a commission “to revise, codify, and annotate the laws of the state.” Richard W. Young, et al., Preface to 1898 UTAH REV. STAT., at iii. Despite the fact that at that time the laws were rewritten “in great part” and “many changes” were made, id., the 1898 Utah Revised Statutes also contained numerous provisions discussing a defendant‘s demand for a jury in justice courts.4 It was not until 1992, when the Utah legislature amended then-section 78-46-5 of the Utah Code, that a jury trial was disallowed in small claims cases. See Jury Use and Management Act, ch. 219, § 12, 1992 Utah Laws 821.
¶ 17 It is clear that at the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution, small claims cases were indeed cognizable at law. That alone satisfies the standard initially set forth in Zions Bank. See Jones, 2015 UT 60, ¶ 43, 355 P.3d 1000 (“[The] constitutional right to a jury trial . . . extends only to cases that would have been cognizable at law at the time the constitution was adopted.” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Moreover, jury demands in small claims justice cоurts were explicitly provided for in Utah‘s statutes for over a century. Supra ¶ 16. Therefore,
B. Ms. Simler Properly Asserted and Preserved Her Right to a Jury Trial
¶ 18 Rule 38(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure5 provides that a party may make a jury demand by (1) “paying the statutory jury fee” and (2) “serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than 14 days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the party.” The statutory fee for a civil jury demand is $250.
¶ 20 Additionally, Ms. Simler preserved her constitutional arguments with respect to her right to a jury in her Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff‘s Motion to Strike Answer, Jury Demand, and Discovery Requests. Specifically, Ms. Simler argued that “to deprive Defendant of a trial by jury in this de novo appeal would infringe on her constitutional rights and deprive her of due process.” This allowed the district court the opportunity to rule on this issue and therefore preserved it. See Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶ 20, 322 P.3d 728 (“We generally will not consider an issue unless it has been preserved’ in the court below. Preservation turns on whether the district court ‘has an opportunity to rule on [an] issue.‘” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
II. MS. SIMLER DID NOT PRESERVE HER DISCOVERY ARGUMENTS
¶ 21 Ms. Simler argues on appeal that the preclusion of all pretrial discovery in the district court infringed on her constitutional right to due process, open courts, and uniform operation of laws, as guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. However, unlike her jury-trial arguments, Ms. Simler did not properly preserve her constitutional arguments with respect to discovery. Ms. Simler assеrts that she preserved this issue “by serving discovery requests . . . which were eventually stricken by the district court.” This does not amount to presentation to the district court of a constitutional challenge to the rule.
¶ 22 Ms. Simler‘s opening brief further argues that she preserved the issue through her Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff‘s Motion to Strike Answer, Jury Demand, and Discovery Requests. However, a careful reading of that pleading shows that, while Ms. Simler raised the question of the constitutionality of the jury issue, she did not address the constitutionality of the discovery issue. The only arguments she raised went to the reasonableness and proportionality of the discovery and the relationship between discovery and the streamlinеd nature of the small claims process. We therefore decline to address Ms. Simler‘s constitutional issues as being inadequately preserved. See Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 08, ¶ 20, 322 P.3d 728.
CONCLUSION
¶ 23 We conclude that