17 Mo. 213 | Mo. | 1852
delivered the opinion of the court.
Suppose the majority of directors of a bank should, by a
“ An action for an assault and battery committed on a corporation aggregate in their corporate character, would be a novelty in judicial proceedings ; - and yet it appears to be as contrary to reason and common sense, that they should be the agents in such a trespass, as it is that they should be the objects of it.” Malicious prosecution — false imprisonment — -slander,
In New York, the code says the complaint shall contain “ a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, without unnecessary repetition,” and the plaintiff can unite several causes of action in the same complaint, when they are of the same nature. How unite them ? By mixing them up in one undistinguished and undistinguishable mass ? Clearly not; reason forbids this. Tt needs not the results of centuries of experience to show us how inconvenient this would be. See 6 Howard’s Practice Rep. 298.
In New York, where they have greatly improved the code since it was first adopted, they require each distinct cause of action to be set down with precision and, particularity ; and if the plaintiff fails to make the proper statements, they will be stricken out as redundant. He is not .permitted to throw the burden of analyzing his complaint, and of separating the causes of action, on the court; nor is the defendant required to do this at his peril. See the case above cited.
Now under our statute, where the plaintiff is permitted to put in his petition as many causes of 'action as he may have, no matter what may be their nature or origin, there is still greater necessity for him to mark each cause distinctly ; separate each cause from its neighbor with proper marks and with proper distinctness, or “ the person of common understanding” may not be able to know what is intended; indeed the most
These observations are necessary in order to make plaintiffs more particular and more careful. We have already decided, that multifariousness and duplicity are defects under our law yet; we have not said that they can be reached by a demurrer, nor will we ; but then there is a remedy for such defects.
In this case, we cannot say the action is brought to recover a sum of money; nor can we call it an action for malicious prosecution, nor false imprisonment. It is one sui generis. It'was among the first brought under our new code, and it is not to be wondered at, for really our oldest and best lawyers find themselves hesitating — pausing to know what to do.
Upon the whole of the matter set forth in the petition, it is to be seen, that if such things did take place as therein charged against the bank, its servants or agents or officers may be responsible to the persons injured, and against such the law affords a remedy.