68 N.J.L. 385 | N.J. | 1902
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This writ of error brings up for review an adjudication of the Supreme Court upon certiorari affirming an assessment of taxes levied upon lands of the prosecutor below situate upon the beach and bounded by Annapolis, Riehpiond and Atlantic avenues in Atlantic City. The dimensions of the land are three hundred by three hundred and forty-four feet, which include an entire block in that section of the city. It is valued in the assessment at $15,000.
The tax was sustained in the Supreme Court on the ground, as stated in the syllabus, that the prosecutor was authorized by its charter to hold property not exceeding in value $30,000; that it owns and uses exclusively for charitable purposes certain buildings whereon the same are erected, valued in excess of that sum, and has been and is exempted from all taxation thereon; that it is not entitled to the exemption claimed, it being in excess of its grant to exemption, which is limited to property the value of which does not exceed $30,000. The grounds of the conclusion are fully presented by the learned justice who delivered the opinion of the court, to which reference should be had, and they need not here be restated.
It must be observed that the special act incorporating the prosecutor (Pamph. L. 1873, p. 984) contained no provision exempting its property from taxation, nor did the supplement to said act, approved February 9th, 1875 (Pamph. L., p. 19 of previous acts), which enlarged the amount of property authorized to be held by the prosecutor to $100,000, embody in it any exemption from taxation. This latter act seems to have been overlooked in the court below, but it does not affect the question under discussion, because the affidavits show that the property of the prosecutor included in the previous exemption referred to was worth $200,000. The opinion holds that the act entitled “An act concerning.corporations constituted for benevolent and charitable purposes” (Pamph. L.
To give the effect suggested to- the third section of the act of 1890 it would have to be regarded as operating to repeal the exempting clause of the general act of 1866, so far as the prosecutor and other like corporations are concerned. And it would be a repeal by implication only, which is not favored by the courts. There are no repealing words in the act of 1890, and, when these are absent, a strong presumption arises that no repeal was intended or it would have been expressed. McNeeley v. Woodruff, 1 Gr. 353; Plum v. Lugar, 20 Vroom 557. The act of 1890 does not say that such corporations, whose capacity to hold property are thereby increased," shall not enjo}'- the immunity from taxation they may be entitled to under the General Tax law, but only that they shall not
The right to' this exemption cannot be based upon the fact that the prosecutor has a house and buildings at Ohio avenue used exclusively for charitable purposes, for, as the case shows, the prosecutor has already obtained and enjoys complete *immunity from taxation for its buildings and lands there situate. And such exemption can only be extended under the statute to' the land on which the buildings are
The main house and buildings of the prosecutor are located at Ohio avenue, a mile away, in an easterly direction, from the property in question. This latter property was used altogether as a camp for boys over twelve years of age. It was used to accommodate the overflow from the 'main house at Ohio avenue, and consisted of two sleeping tents, one dining tent and a one-story frame structure used for a kitchen and laundry. The boys, who averaged about thirty-six in number, and the help employed, occupied tents which were used from July 1st to September 1st and then taken down for the balance of the year. The camp occupied a strip of land about one-eighth of the depth of the lot.. Its management and direction emanated from the main house at Ohio avenue, from whence many of the supplies were sent and where the records and expense accounts of the camp were kept. The property was not bought for the purpose of the camp, but with the object of selling the property at Ohio avenue and moving the institution to the newly-purchased lot, but after having the latter for a year the society decided to use it for the care of the boys it could not take care of in fhe main institution. This property is valued at $60,000 and upwards, and at the time the evidence was- being taken the society was -offering for sale its property at Ohio avenue for $200,000, with a view to such removal. On May 20 th, when the tax 'was assessed, there was nothing upon the land except the structure used for a kitchen and laundry, which was vacant.
In considering the question here raised we might ask what is a building in the sense of the statute. According to Webster, a building is defined as “that which is built; a fabric or edifice constructed, as a house, a church,” &e. This