622 N.E.2d 692 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1993
Plaintiff-appellant Children's Medical Center ("CMC") appeals from a summary judgment rendered in favor of defendant-appellee Tammy L. Ward, Administrator of the Estate of Montay Sibert. *506
We conclude that R.C.
Ward averred that after Montay's death, in May 1990, she received three computer-generated billing statements from CMC. The record shows that these billing statements included CMC's name, address, the amount due, indicated the patient's name as "Montay Sibert," and indicated the "Responsible Party" as Tammy Ward. Ward further averred that during Montay's life, she regularly received these billing statements and would routinely forward them "directly to the guardian of Montay Sibert's estate for payment."
The amounts due on the three bills were $43,000, $9,000, and $6,843.69. Ward averred that Montay Sibert had been treated extensively by CMC since his birth for various medical conditions, and she characterized CMC's past billing statements as "statements for medical services."
Ward also averred that "shortly after his death," she had notified employees of CMC that Montay had died. There is no evidence of written notification to CMC of either Montay Sibert's death or the appointment of an executor for his estate.
CMC brought an action against Ward, as the Administrator of the Estate of Montay Sibert, seeking payment of the three bills at issue. Ward filed a counterclaim of wrongful death and medical malpractice against CMC and Valerie A. Woodmansee, D.O. The counterclaim is not material to this appeal.
The trial court found that "Tammy Ward reported the death of Montay Sibert to employees of The Children's Medical Center." The trial court also stated, in its order sustaining Ward's motion for summary judgment, that "[t]here is no evidence before the Court that the plaintiff sent any bills to Tammy Ward after the death of Montay Sibert other than the bills in May and June of 1990."
The trial court held that the three computer-generated billing statements did not constitute proper presentment of claims against an estate under R.C.
From the judgment of the trial court, CMC appeals.
"The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant administratrix, in regard to claims made against an estate, on the basis of improper presentment of claim, where the evidence before the court established that the administratrix received actual notice of the claims in writing prior to the filing of suit, and within the time limits imposed by statute."
As a threshold issue, we must determine whether the trial court was correct in observing that CMC's complaint was fatally flawed for failing to state that the claims were presented to Ward, as Administrator of the Estate of Montay Sibert, and that the administrator rejected the claims. Rejection by an administrator has been held to be a condition precedent to bringing an action on a claim. Morgan v. City Natl. Bank TrustCo. of Columbus (1964),
"In the absence of any prior demand for allowance, the executor or administrator shall allow or reject all claims * * * within thirty days after their presentation, provided that failure of the executor or administrator to allow or reject within that time shall not prevent him from doing so after that time and shall not prejudice the rights of any claimant."
R.C.
"Any person whose claim has been presented, and not thereafter rejected, is a creditor as that term is used in Chapters 2113. to 2125. of the Revised Code."
It is doubtful that an executor can both reject and allow the same claim. Therefore, a challenge to the form of a presentment must be considered a rejection, at least by implication. There is no reason to consider an implicit rejection to be anything but a final rejection because an executor has no affirmative duty to notify a potential claimant that a submitted bill is improperly presented. Generally, it is the responsibility of the claimant to ascertain who and where the executor is, and executors or legal representatives of the estate have no duty under R.C.
Silence by an executor, in response to a submitted bill, does not save an improperly presented claim from being time-barred. On the other hand, if the claim is properly presented, silence by an executor should not bar the claimant from joining the class of creditors of the estate, or prevent the creditor from suing on the claim.
Additionally, as one Ohio court has commented, "[f]or obvious reasons, a fiduciary should not be permitted to accept a claim within the statutory period, hold it indefinitely, and then raise the statute of limitations as a defense because of some claimed defect in its form." Gladman v. Carns (1964),
We conclude that an executor with actual knowledge of a legitimate debt of the estate, who personally receives a proper statement of that debt under R.C.
R.C.
Another ancillary issue, raised by CMC, is whether CMC received sufficient notice of the decedent's death and whether a lack of written notice to CMC would either extend the statutory presentment period, or revive the claim. We do not reach this issue here because we find that the claim was properly presented.
Ward is entitled to summary judgment only if she can establish, through evidentiary material permitted by Civ.R. 56(C), that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that it appears from the evidence before the trial court that reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to CMC, the nonmoving party, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in its favor. Harless v. WillisDay Warehousing Co. (1978),
The standard of review in this court is de novo, since the propriety of summary judgment is a question of law. We must determine whether the moving party, Ward, has sustained her burden by establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place CommunityUrban Redev. Corp. (1990),
R.C.
"All creditors having claims against an estate * * * shall present their claims in one of the following manners:
"(1) To the executor or administrator in a writing;
"* * *
"(3) In a writing that is sent by ordinary mail addressed to the decedent and that is actually received by the executor or administrator within the appropriate time specified in division (B) of this section. * * *
"(B) All claims shall be presented within one year after the death of the decedent * * *."
The time requirement of R.C.
The Ohio Supreme Court has further recognized that:
"The purpose and object of the law requiring the presentation of claims against an estate to the executor or administrator is manifestly to secure an expeditious and efficient administration of an estate by promptly providing such a fiduciary with the necessary information relating to the existence, amount and character of all indebtedness of the estate." Fortelka v.Meifert (1964),
In Fortelka, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that the method of presentment contemplated by R.C.
This court has previously agreed with Fortelka in PeoplesNatl. Bank v. Treon (1984),
While Ohio law is strict on the time and notice elements of presentment, the form of the presentment has been less rigidly considered. In meeting one of the *510
three requirements of R.C.
We agree that R.C.
Of further significance is the fact that Ward knew of the decedent's debts to CMC, and that the billing statements included the name and address of the creditor, the name of the decedent debtor, the name of the administrator, and the precise amounts due. This information satisfies the particularity and efficiency requirements of Fortelka and Carns, supra, and comports with the nature and purpose of R.C.
We find CMC's presentment valid under R.C.
Because the form of presentment was adequate under the statute, no genuine issue as to any material fact remains. Construing the evidence most strongly in favor of CMC, the nonmoving party, we find that Ward is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
CMC's sole assignment of error is sustained.
Judgment reversedand cause remanded.
BROGAN and WOLFF, JJ., concur.