Childers v. Childers, et al.Childers v. Childers, et al.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Opinion of the Court by Fair McEvers, Chief Justice.
Jennifer M. Gooss, Hazen, ND, for plaintiff and appellee; submitted on brief.
Emily M. Ramage, Williston, ND, for defendant and appellant; submitted on brief.
[¶1] Austin Childers appeals from a second amended judgment modifying his child support obligation. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the district court to make further findings on whether Austin Childers voluntarily changed employment for the purpose of reducing his child support obligation and to explain its decision regarding the effective date of Austin Childers‘s modified child support obligation.
I
[¶2] Austin Childers and Annika Childers were married and have one minor child together, V.L.C. The district court entered a divorce judgment and an amended judgment in 2022 awarding Annika Childers primary residential responsibility and setting Austin Childers‘s monthly child support obligation at $2,308 based on his net monthly income of approximately $14,280.
[¶3] On August 20, 2024, Austin Childers moved to modify primary residential responsibility, amend the parenting plan, and modify child support. After Austin Childers filed his motion, he changed employment from Petroleum Experience, Inc. to R&A Services, Inc. (“R&A“) in December 2024, resulting in an income reduction. At the evidentiary hearing held on April 2, 2025, the North Dakota Child Support Enforcement Agency (“the State“) appeared as a real party in interest.1 At the outset of the hearing, the parties stipulated on record to provide, after the hearing, any income information requested by the State, and to allow the State to calculate child support. The district court received into evidence three of Austin Childers‘s paystubs from R&A. The court issued a memorandum opinion which denied modification of primary residential responsibility and did not address modification of child support.
[¶5] Annika Childers moved for reconsideration and relief from the June 24, 2025 order, arguing additional information about Austin Childers‘s income was necessary to calculate child support. In support of her motion, Annika Childers attached an exhibit including an email from the State, in which the State requested up to five years of tax returns from Austin Childers to calculate child support. After further consideration, on August 28, 2025, the district court ordered Austin Childers to provide his personal tax returns, W-2s, and business tax returns for R&A for the previous five years, or fewer years if Austin Childers had been self-employed for a shorter period.
[¶6] The State filed two child support guidelines worksheets with child support calculations for the district court to consider, based on the information submitted by Austin Childers. The first calculation was based on Austin Childers‘s paystubs from R&A submitted at the hearing, showing a monthly child support obligation of $923 based on a gross annual income of $86,150, net monthly income of $5,631, and a deduction for a child living with Austin Childers. The second calculation was based on Austin Childers‘s 2024 wages from his previous employer, showing a monthly child support obligation of $2,391 based on an imputed gross annual income of $280,272, net income of $194,702, and a deduction for a child living with Austin Childers.
[¶7] Annika Childers alleged in a sworn statement that Austin Childers had previously told her he was going to start a company for tax purposes and to save
[¶8] The district court entered its order for second amended judgment modifying Austin Childers‘s child support obligation and adopting the imputed income calculation of $2,391 per month, to take effect October 15, 2025. The court entered a second amended judgment. Austin Childers timely appealed.
II
[¶9] Austin Childers argues the district court erroneously relied on supplemental filings in deciding to impute his income. Annika Childers argues in response that the parties specifically stipulated to address the issue of child support using supplemental information.
[¶10] The issue of child support was raised in the district court by both parties in separate motions for reconsideration. Neither party addressed on appeal the standard of review for motions to reconsider. As we recently noted, “North Dakota does not formally recognize motions to reconsider.” Richardson v. Richardson, 2022 ND 185, ¶ 3, 981 N.W.2d 907. However, we have also recognized:
If properly written and argued, this Court treats requests for reconsideration as motions to alter or amend a judgment under
N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(j) or motions for relief from a judgment underN.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) . Denial of a motion to reconsider will not be reversed on appeal unless the district court abused its discretion. A district court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner; its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination; or it misinterprets or misapplies the law.North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure 59(j) allows a party to seek reconsideration of a district court‘s judgment. This rule can be used to present previously unavailable evidence, but should not be used to reexamine facts nor reconsider evidence already presented.
Id. (cleaned up).
[¶11] Relying on Larson v. Larson, 1998 ND 156, 582 N.W.2d 657, and Adams v. Adams, 2016 ND 169, 883 N.W.2d 864, Austin Childers argues that a party may not supplement the record after the parties have rested, the hearing is concluded, and the court has issued its memorandum opinion. Austin Childers points to the district court‘s June 24, 2025 order, where the court originally relied on Larson and Adams in declining to consider the evidence Annika Childers presented regarding Austin Childers‘s alleged self-employment. The court concluded the evidence was not presented at the hearing and did not fall within the parties’ stipulation. The order directed child support calculations to be “determined from only . . . the income information forwarded to [the State] pursuant to the parties’ . . . stipulation” and not “the information Annika filed in response to the motion for reconsideration.”
[¶12] In Larson, the district court held evidentiary hearings to address a motion to modify child support. 1998 ND 156, ¶¶ 3-4. After the parties submitted post-hearing briefs, the court issued a memorandum decision. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Months after the court issued its decision, the father filed documents with the court raising arguments and presenting evidence not raised or presented at the hearings. Id. ¶¶ 6, 13. The father did not move to reopen the record for additional evidence. Id. ¶ 6. The district court considered the additional evidence and issued an
[¶13] Adams involved two separate appeals. In Adams v. Adams, 2015 ND 112, ¶¶ 2-11, 863 N.W.2d 232 (“Adams I“), the district court initially entered a divorce judgment and later entered an amended supplemental judgment dividing the marital estate. The ex-wife appealed, and we affirmed the amended supplemental judgment. Id. ¶¶ 1, 22. In the second appeal—Adams, 2016 ND 169 (“Adams II“)—the ex-husband submitted new evidence to the court pertaining to a portion of the amended supplemental judgment previously affirmed in Adams I, and the district court made additional findings relating to a previously affirmed provision. Adams II, ¶¶ 20-21. We reversed and remanded, concluding the court erred by making findings contrary to our affirmance of the amended supplemental judgment in Adams I. Id. ¶ 21. We further concluded the ex-husband did not employ the proper procedure for presenting additional evidence as the ex-husband should have instead moved to reopen the record or sought relief from the judgment after it was entered. Id.
[¶14] Here, Annika Childers filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court‘s June 24, 2025 order. Upon reconsideration, the court found the parties were aware additional evidence relating to child support calculations was to be submitted after the evidentiary hearing because the parties specifically stipulated at the hearing to supply income information to the State upon request. On August 28, 2025, the court entered an order on Annika Childers‘s motion, finding:
Prior to the commencement of testimony, the parties entered into a stipulation to the effect the State, as real party in interest, could complete a calculation of child support based upon out of court submissions of their respective income information to and as requested by counsel for the State. Plaintiff has submitted as Exhibits 1 and 2 to her motion for reconsideration, e-mails exchanged between counsel on the subject of child support.
After initial submissions, counsel for the State prepared calculation, which both parties indicated were acceptable. However, counsel for Plaintiff subsequently asserted Defendant was self-employed; and counsel for the State first indicated she was unaware of that self employment and then said, “If we could get 5 years of returns, that would be ideal. If he‘s been self-employed for a shorter period of time, then whatever number of years to reflect that self employment income.”
The order further stated:
[T]he Court can clarify what the Court expected from the aforementioned stipulation, that the State as real party in interest could complete a calculation of child support based upon out of court submissions of their respective income information to, and as requested by counsel for the State.
For that purpose, the Court can, and does, order Defendant, to the fullest extent that he has the legal or practical ability to do so, to provide his personal tax return, W-2 and the tax return for R&A Services, Inc. for the time frames counsel for the State indicated, i.e., 5 years of returns; or, if he‘s been self-employed for a shorter period of time, then whatever number of years to reflect that self employment income.
[¶15] The district court, noting that Austin Childers denied being self-employed and resisted attempts to subpoena his tax returns, ordered Austin Childers to provide the tax and wage information requested by the State. The court‘s August 28, 2025 order and findings within imply the court considered the supplemental filings to fall within the intended scope of the stipulation. The court‘s findings on the stipulation also indicate it recognized its reliance on Larson and Adams II was misplaced. Unlike in Larson and Adams II, the evidence submitted after the hearing related to an issue for which the parties had specifically stipulated to produce documentation at a later date. Because both parties anticipated supplemental filings and brought motions to procedurally bring the issue to the district court‘s attention, the reasoning in Larson and Adams II does not apply.
[¶16] Austin Childers also challenges Annika Childers‘s self-employment argument as untimely because it was not addressed in his cross-examination at the evidentiary hearing. This argument is without merit, as Austin Childers‘s
[¶17] The district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the supplemental filings.
III
[¶18] Austin Childers argues the district court erred by imputing his income. Specifically, he argues the record does not support a finding that he voluntarily changed employment to reduce his child support obligation or a finding that he was self-employed for imputation purposes. He further argues the court failed to make findings on whether he changed employment for the purpose of reducing his child support obligation and on consideration of the factors in
[¶19] We review child support determinations under a mixed standard of review:
Child support determinations involve questions of law which are subject to the de novo standard of review, findings of fact which are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, and may, in some limited areas, be matters of discretion subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if, on the entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Updike v. Updike, 2022 ND 99, ¶ 5, 974 N.W.2d 360 (quoting Schrodt v. Schrodt, 2022 ND 64, ¶ 19, 971 N.W.2d 861 (cleaned up)). “[T]he [district] court is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to enable the appellate court to understand the factual determinations made by the [district] court and the basis for its conclusions of law.” Rothberg v. Rothberg, 2006 ND 65, ¶ 14, 711 N.W.2d 219. “A court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned decision, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Datz v. Dosch, 2014 ND 102, ¶ 22, 846 N.W.2d 724.
[¶21] The district court‘s order for second amended judgment found:
Austin voluntarily left his employment at Petroleum Experience, Inc. in December 2024, choosing to be employed at R&A Services, Inc., owned by his wife, resulting in a significant reduction in income.
Following receipt of the documentation, the State put together two child support guidelines worksheet[s]. The first was based solely on Austin‘s paystubs, which resulted in a child support obligation of $923 per month, based on a net monthly income of $5,631. . . . The second was based on imputing income to Austin, which resulted in a child support obligation of $2,391 per month, based on a net monthly income of $16,225.
The court concluded, “Based on Austin‘s voluntary change in employment resulting in a substantial reduction of income, his monthly gross income is to be imputed pursuant to [
[¶22] Austin Childers argues the district court erred in considering evidence that he was self-employed to impute income. The court did not find Austin Childers was self-employed. The court‘s reliance on
[¶23] Austin Childers also relies on Olson v. Olson, 520 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1994), to argue “parents are permitted to make reasonable employment decisions, even if those decisions result in reduced income.” In Olson, this Court adopted a “rule of reason,” stating:
If the obligor‘s voluntary change in employment and earnings is reasonable under all of the circumstances, including the best interests of the children, then additional income cannot be imputed based on earning capacity, and child support should be computed upon actual net monthly income. If, however, an obligor with an established earnings history voluntarily, without good reason, places himself in a position where he is unable to meet his child support obligations, income compatible with his prior earnings history may be imputed in calculating child support under the guidelines.
Id. at 574. Austin Childers‘s reliance on Olson and the “rule of reason” is misplaced. In Logan v. Bush, 2000 ND 203, ¶ 14, 621 N.W.2d 314, this Court concluded Olson was decided before the promulgation of
[¶25] The district court found Austin Childers voluntarily changed employment resulting in an income reduction and exercised its discretion to impute his income. The court did not make a specific finding on the purpose for this change—i.e., whether Austin Childers changed employment to reduce his child support obligation.
[¶26] Section 75-02-04.1-07(7) of the North Dakota Administrative Code defines a “voluntary change in employment” for purposes of this subsection as: “a change made for the purpose of reducing the obligor‘s child support obligation,” which may include a number of factors, if relevant. Austin Childers argues the district court erred by not making findings on these factors. The rule allows courts to take the factors into consideration; however, the language of the provision does not require that courts make findings on the factors. See
[¶27] In Toppenberg v. Toppenberg, the district court found a father voluntarily moved to a different state but did not expressly find whether the move was “for
[¶28] Here, the district court cited
[¶29] The district court‘s findings are insufficient for us to conduct a meaningful review on whether child support should be imputed. We reverse in part and remand for additional findings of fact on whether Austin Childers‘s change of employment resulting in a reduction of his income was for the purpose of reducing his child support.
[¶30] Austin Childers argues the district court failed to apply the calculation method required under
[¶31] Because we are reversing and remanding for additional findings regarding imputation, we need not address this issue. The district court on remand may consider the argument and, if it deems necessary, make additional findings of fact.
V
[¶32] Austin Childers requests we reverse and instruct the district court to adopt the State‘s non-imputed calculation to take effect August 20, 2024.
[¶33] A district court has discretion in setting the date a modified child support obligation takes effect, and the decision will not be overturned on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. Bickel v. Bickel, 2020 ND 212, ¶ 23, 949 N.W.2d 832. A modified child support obligation should generally take effect from the date of the motion to modify unless the court has good reason to set a different date. Geinert v. Geinert, 2002 ND 135, ¶ 10, 649 N.W.2d 237. The court retains discretion to set a later effective date, but its reasons for doing so should be apparent or explained. Id.
[¶34] Austin Childers filed the initial motion to modify child support on August 20, 2024. He later requested the district court to use the three paystubs from his new employment to calculate his child support as reflected on the child support guidelines worksheet filed by the State. His request to use the August 20, 2024 date is questionable. Even if the court had adopted his requested calculation, he did not begin earning the lower income until December 2024 at the earliest, when he left employment at Petroleum Experience, Inc. The court ordered the modified child support obligation to take effect on October 15, 2025. The court offered no
VI
[¶35] We affirm the district court‘s ruling to allow supplemental evidence. We reverse and remand for the district court to make additional findings of fact on whether Austin Childers‘s change of employment resulting in a reduction of his income was made for the purpose of reducing his child support obligation. We further reverse and remand for the court to explain its decision to set an effective date of any child support modification.
[¶36] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J.
Jerod E. Tufte
Jon J. Jensen
Douglas A. Bahr
Mark A. Friese