4 Me. 471 | Me. | 1827
delivered the opinion of the court.
In the construction of a deed, the entire instrument is to be ¡regarded ; and, if it may be, every word is to have effect, and none be rejected ; and it is to be so understood, if possible, that all the parts may agree together. Plow. 160, 161. These and other rules have been devised, as best adapted to give effect to the legal intention of the parties ; which is the general governing principle in the exposition of deeds and other instruments.
But for the particular description of one piece of land, in the deed of Cotton B, Brooks to James Wyllie, Jun. it would have been altogether plain and intelligible ; conveying three parcels of land in Portland, being the same which passed from James Wyllie to the grantor ; reference being made to his deed, in which each parcel is described by metes and bounds. The words of the deed in question, express three parcels or lots of land in Portland. To restrict its operation to one parcel, would be giv
That words are tobe taken most strongly against the grantor, is an ancient principle of the common law ; the operation of which, however, is in modern times, very properly restrained, where it would not accord with the apparent intention of the
It has been urged in argument by the counsel for the tenant, that more general words in an instrument are to be restrained by other expressions, more limited, in the same instrument. This principle is unquestionably a sound one ; and may be resorted to wherever the object, intent and design of the parties require, as they often do, this limitation. But it cannot apply in the case before us. Giving the words of reference the meaning which, from an inspection of both deeds, the sense plainly requires, the deed from Brooks is to be construed, as if the description in the deed to him had been inserted therein ; and taken both together, the second and third pieces are described as particularly as the first. Judgment on the verdict,.