Chick v. Willetts, 2 Kan. 384

Chick v. Willetts

2 Kan. 384 | Kan. | 1864

By the Court,

Crozikr, O. J.

Two questions are presented by tho record: First, Which law, the twentieth section of the code, or the second section of the “ amendatory act,” prescribes tho limitation ; and Second, When an action upon a promissory note, secured by a mortgage on real estate, is barred by the statute of limitations, has the mortgagee any remedy upon the mortgage ? These are the facts: On the sixth day of April, 1858, at Kansas City, in the State of Missouri, the defendant executed to the plaintiffs his promissory note, payable one day after date. Afterwards, and on tho 12th day of August of that year, the defendant, to secure the payment of the note, executed, in this State, a mortgage upon some lots in Topeka, which mortgage contained a stipulation that if default was made in the payment of the note for two years from the date of the mortgage, that instrument might be foreclosed, &c. On August 13,1863, a suit was instituted upon the note and *389mortgage, and the facts, as above stated, being admitted, judgment was rendered for the defendant. To reverse that judgment this proceeding is instituted.

The note having been made in Missouri, would, under the act of February 10, 1859, have been barred in two years from the passage of that act, if there were nothing else to be considered. By a stipulation in the mortgage, the time of payment was deferred two years from Aiigust 12, 1858.

The mortgage having been made in this State, was the arrangement, with reference to our statute of limitations, a Kansas or Missouri contract ? Although no change was made upon the face of the note, yet the'danse of the mortgage referred to was effective to change its terms as if written across its face. The time of its payment, with reference to the land, was extended two years. Its payment, as against the land, could not be enforced before that time; nor would the limitation laws begin to run against it until the expiration of that time. These changes in the original contract were effected by the paper which was executed in this State. The contract evidenced by the mortgage is essentially different from that set out in the note, and must control it. Therefore, the contract, as it stood, after the making of the mortgage, was a Kansas contract, and would not be barred in two years.

The statutes of limitation of this State are wholly unlike the English statute, and differ materially from the limitation laws of those States which -have adhered to the common law forms of action and modes of procedure. Those statutes apply, in terms, to the form of the action at law, and contain no provisions concerning an equitable proceeding. If a party had concurrent remedies, one at law, the other in equity, courts of equity applied the limitation prescribed for the action at law. But in all other cases, they were said to act merely in analogy to the statutes, and not in obedience to them,

*390In this State, the case is entirely different. The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity is abolished; and the statutes of limitation apply equally to both classes of cases. They were made to apply to the subject matter, and not to the form of the action. - In England and the States referred to, a limitation different from that prescribed for simple contracts in writing, was prescribed for specialties. Here, “ an action upon a specialty, or any agreement, contract or promise in writing,” must be brought within three years; and it matters not what the relief demanded may be, whether such as could formerly be obtained only in a court of law, or such as might have been afforded by a court of equity exclusively.

Mortgages here differ essentially from mortgages at common law, and in the States referred to. At common law, a mortgage was a conveyance with a defeasance, and gave the mortgagee a present right of possession. Upon it, even before the conditions were broken, he might enter peaceably or bring ejectment. If the condition was broken, the conveyance became absolute. If the money was paid when due, the estate revested to the mortgagor; if not so paid, the estate was gone from him forever. After a time, the law of mortgage was so modified that the legal title was not considered as having passed until the condition was broken. At a later day, another still more important innovation was made. While it was considered that, upon condition broken, the mortgagee became invested with the legal title, and was entitled to possession, yet, in that condition of things, his title was subject to a defeasance. The rents and profits operated as cancellation, pro tanto, of his conveyance; and when they reached a sum sufficient to reimburse his original investment, with such use as the law allowed, the legal title reverted to the mortgagor, and he woxild be entitled to the possession; and he had a right to facilitate this operation by payment of the money,' and upon application to a court of equity,. *391his title would be disencumbered of the cloud the mortgage cast upon it. This right of the mortgagor was called “ the equity of redemption,” and, considering the then prevalent theory of mortgages, the phrase was peculiarly appropriate and expressive. The title had passed, but he had a right to redeem; and it is among the highest glories of equitable jurisprudence, that at so early a day the means of enforcing thiB right were supplied. Some of the States still adhere to the common law view, more or less modified by the real nature of the transaction; but in most of them, practically, all that remains of the old theories is their nomenclature. In this State, a clear sweep has been made by statute. The common law attributes of mortgages have been wholly set aside; the ancient theories have been demolished; and if we could consign to oblivion the terms and phrases—without meaning except in reference to those theories—with which our reflections are still embarrassed, the legal profession on the bench and at the bar would more readily understand and fully realize the new condition of things. The statute gives the mortgagor the right to the possession, even after the money is due, and confines the remedy of the mortgagee to an ordinary action and sale of the mortgaged premises; thus negativing any idea of title in the mortgagee. It is a mere security, although in the form of a conditional conveyance; creating a lien upon the property, but vesting no estate whatever, either before or after condition broken. It gives no right of possession, and does not limit the mortgagor’s right to control it—except that the security shall not be impaired. Ho may sell it, and the title will pass by his conveyance—subject, of course, to the lien of the mortgagee.

If we are right in these views as to our statute of limitations, and the operation of a mortgage under our law, the English cases and cases in New'York and Ohio, cited by counsel for plaintiffs, have no application to the case at *392bar. Tlie statutes of limitation under wbicli they were made, maleo distinctions between notes and mortgages which do not exist here; and the operations of notes and mortgages there and here are totally different. The decisions are not authorities in this case, for the reason that they are not applicable, and cannot be made so. If our limitation law omitted mortgages, and our law of conveyances gave the right of possession to the mortgagee, some of them would be in point; hut as neither of these conditions exist here, they throw no light ujion tho questions under consideration in tlie case at bar.

Our conclusions arc, that the twentieth section of the code prescribes the limitation to an action on tlie note or mortgage, and as the three years expired on the 12th day of August, 1863, a suit commenced on tho 13th was too late.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concurring.