24 Me. 458 | Me. | 1844
Lead Opinion
.This is an action against an indorser of a promissory note, who contends, that he has not been seasonably notified of its having been dishonored by the maker. The note became due in the city of New York, on the twenty-ninth day of November. The mail closed there, daily, at six o’clock in the morning for Bangor, the residence of the defendant. According to the evidence, it seems, that the notice of the dishonor of the note was not put into the postoffice at New York until the latter part of the next day, being the BOth of November; and therefore not in season to go before the morning of the first of December. The question is, was this reasonable notice. It is not a little singular, that a question of this kind should, to this day, have remained in doubt.
It was said in the books, formerly, that where the parties lived in different towns, between which a regular post was established, the notice of dishonor should be despatched by the next post. It was next held that it should be sent by the next practicable mail; and, subsequently, as early as by the mail of the next day; and this has been supposed by some, to mean by such mail, however early in the morning it might start. In Goodman v. Norton, 17 Maine R. 381, it was held that the notice of dishonor must be put into the postoffice on the day of the demand upon the maker; or in season to be sent by the first mail of the succeeding day. The circumstances in that case were almost, if not quite, identical with those in the case before us. The mail in that case left New York, daily, at six o’clock in the morning. On the 27th of November a note fell due, and was dishonored. Notice of the nonpayment was not put into the postoffice till the next day, and after the morning’s mail left. Although there was testimony in that case, that notice, so given, was according to the usage of the banks in that city; yet the indorser was held to be discharged. And in Beckwith v. Smith, 22 Maine R. 125, Mr. Justice Shepley, in delivering the opinion of the Court, recognized the same principle as the rule of law. These
It must be admitted to be of infinite importance, in this commercial age, that decisions, in reference to what constitutes due notice of the dishonor of bills of exchange, and promissory notes, should be the same throughout communities, which are in the habit of circulating and interchanging such paper j so intimately connected as it is with extended negotiations in trade. All laws affecting commercial pursuits should, as near as may be practicable, partake of the character of international law. Between the United States and Great Britain, a uniformity of usage, in whatever concerns negotiable paper, is highly important. In both countries the principles of the law •merchant are derived from one and the same source. In the United States, in an especial manner, it is all important, that there should be the same rule prescribing what shall be legal notice in the case of dishonored paper. If the decision of this Court has failed of conforming to what, in the other States, would meet with sanction in their judicial tribunals, it will be highly proper that we should take the earliest opportunity to consider further of the subject. It is evident that the tendency has been, of late, so to extend the lime for giving notice, that some approximation, at least, may be made to the establishment of a rule in such cases, which shall be readily understood, and easily applied ; and as nearly applicable to all cases as possible.
In Whitwell & al. v. Johnson, 17 Mass. R. 449, Mr. C. J. Parker says, “ After some doubts, and looking into authorities, we are satisfied, that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show, that notice to the indorser was put into the mail on the same day the note became due.” And,, again, he says, in the same case, “ the next clay is early enough. And if there should be two mails a day, whether the notice goes by the first, or the second of those mails, we think is immaterial, provided it was put into the postoffice early enough to go by a.
In Kent’s Commentaries, (vol. 3, p. 106,) the author lays down the law to be, “ That if the third day of grace be on Thursday, and the drawer and indorser reside out of town, the notice may indeed be sent on Thursday, but must be put into the postoffice on Friday, so as to be forwarded as soon as possible thereafter.” And again, (same page) “ It seems to be now settled, that each party, into whose hands a dishonored bill may pass, shall be allowed one entire day for the purpose of giving notice.” And it was so held in Bray & al. v. Hadwin, 5 M. & S. 68. In a note in Kent’s Commentaries, (vol. 3, p. 107, 4th Ed.) the author says, “ The rule in Lenox v. Roberts, 2 Wheat, 373, was laid down too strictly, when it stated that the demand of payment should be made upon the last day of grace, and notice of the default be put into the postoffice early enough to be sent by the mail of the succeeding day.” And, although this decision was spoken of with approbation in the Bank of Alexandria v. Swan, 9 Peters, 33; yet “ that the decision only is, that notice need not be put into the postoffice on the day of the default.” And again, (same page) “ That this principle will sustain the rule as now generally, and best understood in England, and the commercial part of the United States, that notice put into the postoffice on the next day, at any time of the day, so as to be ready for the first mail that goes thereafter, is due notice.”
In Story on Bills, <§> 288, it is laid down, “ That if the post or mail leaves the next day after the dishonor, the notice should be sent by that post or mail, if the time of its closing or departure is not at too. early an hour to disable the holders from a reasonable performance of the duty.” And again, (§ 290) “ He, the holder, is always allowed by law a whole day for this purpose.” Under this last section, in a note, he makes a long extract from Chitty on Bills, in which this passage occurs. “ Another reason is, that the holder ought not to be required, omissis omnibus aliis negotiis, to occupy himself immediately in forwarding notice to the prior parties, when by
The authorities, cited on the part of the counsel for the defendant, are numerous, tending to show that the notice to drawers and indorsers, not resident in the places where the holder of their dishonored paper may live, should bo given as early as by the mail of the next day, and some of them, such as the dictum in the last extracts from Chitty, and the cases of Goodman v. Norton, and Beckwith v. Smith, seem to go the length of holding that notice; should be given by the mail of the next day, however early it might start. But, the question pending in the reported cases, generally, was whether the notice should be sent the same day, or by a mail of the succeeding day, and did not present the question whether it should be sent by the mail of the next day, however early it might start, or by a later mail, or a reasonably practicable mail.
A majority of the Court is, therefore, brought to the conclusion, that the weight of the more modern authorities, both in England and America, is decidedly in favor of a rule of a more convenient and reasonable operation. It may not go to the extent of allowing at least twenty-four hours for the purpose of despatching notice, though it might tend to certainty and precision if such were the case. It seems to be without question, that it extends to the allowance of a convenient time after business hours of the next day after the dishonor, shall have commenced, to prepare and despatch notice. To the decision of this cause it is not necessary to consider whether the rule should extend further or not. The notice was mailed in season to go by the next mail, which left after the business hours of the day, succeeding that of the dishonor, had commenced.
The action, therefore, as agreed by the parties, must stand for trial upon other grounds.
Dissenting Opinion
The following reasons for his dissent were given by
It is without doubt desirable, that there should be an uniformity in the decisions of judicial tribunals
Mr Justice Bayley, in his treatise, states the rule to be, that “to such of the parties, as reside in the place, where the presentment was made, the notice must be given at the farthest, by the expiration of the day following the refusal; to those, who reside elsewhere, by the post of that or the next post day.” Bayley on Bills, 2d Am. Ed. 262. Mr. Chitty, in his treatise, says, “ the rule is now well settled, that the holder must, in order to subject all the parties to actions at his suit, give or forward all his notices to every one of the indorsers and to the drawer, whose residence he can ascertain, on the day after the bill or note was dishonored.” Chitty on Bills, 8th Am. Ed. 514. And on page 516 he says, “when the parties do not reside in the same place, and the notice is to be sent by the general post, then the holder, or party to give the notice, must take care to forward notice by the post of the next day after the dishonor, or after he received notice of such dishonor, whether that post sets off from the place, where he is, early or late.” These are the two most approved treatises on the subject. They are the hand books of the merchants, the bankers, and the notaries of Great Britain and of the United States; and being their guides, they shew the actual and accustomed course pursued in both countries. These persons cannot be expected to obtain their information from the numerous judicial decisions, which are the sources of information for professional men. And that course must be expected to be pursued, although there may be found opinions not in accordance with those rules. It would be a little remarkable, if the two treatises most approved and generally used by the mercantile community should be found to agree in
The cases will now be examined, which have been supposed to authorize the party, in certain cases, to postpone sending the notice until the post departing on the second day after the bill has been dishonored, or intelligence of it has been received. In the case of Haynes v. Birks, 3 B. & P. 599, the bill was presented by the bankers of the plain tiff in London and dishonored on Saturday, October 1. On Monday the 3d, the bankers sent intelligence of it to the plaintiff, residing at Knightsbridge, who gave notice to the defendant, residing at Tottenham Court Road, on Tuesday the 4th. Lord Alvanley said, “ it was impossible for the bankers on Saturday night to give notice to the plaintiff, since the bill was not presented till between nine and ten o’clock. On Sunday, of course, they were not bound to do so. And on Monday they did apprise the plaintiff of the non-payment.” Except that he did not account Sunday to be a business day, he insisted upon a more strict performance in theory, than the rule, as before stated, required ; for he said the plaintiff “ certainly was bound to write by the two-penny post on Monday, and supposing him to have done so, the defendant would only receive his letter on Tuesday.” Jn the case of Bray v. Hadwen, 5 M. & S. 68, the plaintiffs, residing at Tavistock, paid into their bankers at Launceston a bill on London, which was dishonored. Their bankers received notice of its dishonor at Launceston on Sunday morning at half-past eight o’clock, July 17. The post left that place for Tavistock at twelve o’clock on the Monday and Tuesday following. The bankers put a notice for the plaintiff into the postofficc at Launceston, on Monday, after the post for that day had departed, which was conveyed by the post of Tuesday. It was insisted, that they should have sent by the post of Monday. The decision was, that the bankers were not obliged to open their letter on Sunday; and as they wrcre to be considered as receiving intelligence, of the dishonor on Monday, the notice sent by the post of the following day was in season. And this was strictly in conformity
The case of Bancroft v. Hall, 1 Holt, 476, is not opposed to the rule. It was decided by Mr. Justice Bayley on a different ground from that of extending the time for giving notice. The bill was presented and dishonored in London, and the plaintiff, residing in Manchester, received intelligence of it on May 24; and on that day despatched a letter by a private hand to his agent in Liverpool, where the defendant resided, requesting him to give the notice. This letter was received by the agent in the afternoon of the 25th, who “ went about six or seven in the evening to the counting house of Hall, but after knocking at the door and ringing a bell, no one came to receive a message. The merchants’ counting houses at Liverpool do not shut up till eight or nine. The 26th was Sunday ; and notice was not in fact given till the morning of the 27th.” Mr. Justice Bayley said, “Here the notice reaches Liverpool on the 25th. No expedition could have brought it earlier.” He also said, “ It was the defendant’s fault, that he did not receive notice on the 25th; which he might have done, if he had kept his counting house open till eight or nine, which are the customary hours of closing at Liverpool.” This is but a decision, that the plaintiff had performed his duty by causing his agent to call at his place of business during business hours to notify him on the 25th. The case of Firth v. Thrush, 8 B. & C. 387, instead of being opposed to it, distinctly affirms the rule. The bill was dishonored on August
And such was decided to be the rule of law in the United States, by the Supreme Court in the case of Lenox v. Roberts, 2 Wheat. 373. In the case of the Bank of Alexandria v. Swan, 9 Peters, 33, that case was named as stating the rule correctly. And ■ this last case is in conformity to and not opposed to the rule. The note was presented by the notary of the bank, and was dishonored, at Alexandria on August 25, 1829. The jury found a special verdict, which states, “we find, that the 26th day of August, 1829, and long before the closing of the mail of that day at Alexandria, that Benjamin C. Ashton, on behalf of the said bank, put into the postoffice at Alexandria, a letter written by him, addressed to the defendant at Washington.” The letter being produced, was found to be post marked at Alexandria on the 26th. And no one is at liberty to allege, contrary to the special verdict, that the notice was not sent by the mail of the day following the day of dishonor.
The decided cases shew, that the same rule prevails in the State of New York. It was so laid down in the case of Smedes v. Utica Bank, 20 Johns. R. 382. In the case of Mead v. Engs, 5 Cow. 303, the rule is even more strictly stated. In the case of Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263, the point
The same rule appears from the decided cases to have prevailed in Massachusetts. The point particularly presented in the case of Williams v. Johnson, 17 Mass. R. 449, was, whether it was necessary, that the notice to the indorser should have been put into the postoffice on the day of the dishonor, or on the day following, in season for the mail of the day. The decision was, that it would be in season to place it in the office on the day following that of the dishonor, “provided it was put into the postoffice early enough to go by a mail of that day.” In the case of Shed v. Brett, 1 Pick. 401, it is said, that notice may be given immediately after the paper has been dishonored, “ though it is not necessary, it should be given until the day after, or if the indorser is in another town, by the next mail after the day, on which the demand is made.”
It does not appear that any such question was presented or decided in the case of Chouteau v. Webster, 6 Metc. 1.
The rule was decided to be the law in this State in the cases of Goodman v. Norton, 17 Maine R. 381, and in Beckwith v. Smith, 22 Maine R. 125.
The rule of law is differently stated by Chancellor Kent. 3 Kent, 106. He requires the notice to be put into the office on the day following the day of dishonor, or that of the receipt of intelligence of it; but does not require to be put into the postoffice jn season to be conveyed by the post of that day. And in a note he states, that to be the rule “ now generally and best understood in England and in the commercial part of the United States.” The origin of this opinion may be found in a note to that page, where he says, “ In Hawkes v. Salter, 4 Bing. 715, and Bray v. Hadwen, 5, M. & S. 69, and Geill v. Jeremy, 1 Moo. & Mal. 61, it was held, that the holder had in such case [if the demand be made on Saturday,] the whole of Monday to write the notice, and that a letter by the Tuesday morning’s post was sufficient.” These cases have already been examined, and the first one only has appeared to sustain the position. And the position, that the notice need not be sent until the post of the second day after the day of dishonor, or the day of the receipt of intelligence of it, is very objectionable; as well as opposed to the uniform current of authority, a single case excepted. If it were adopted and applied between the cities of Boston and Portland, the effect might be to permit the holder to delay sending a notice to the indorser until the fourth post after the paper had been dishonored. Apply the position to a supposed case. The mail leaves Boston for Portland twice each day, at seven o’clock, A. M. and at three o’clock, P. M. The bill is presented and dishonored in Boston at twelve o’clock on Monday, the notice, if, put into the postoffice in Boston too late on
Mr. Justice Story, in the case of Mitchell v. Degrand, 1 Mason, 180, said, “ when a bill is once dishonored the holder is bound to give notice by the next practicable mail, to the parties whom he means to charge for the default.” And the case of Lenox v. Roberts, was referred to in a note as authority. In section 290 of his treatise on bills, he states the rule as Bayley and Chitty do, with the exception of making, in section 291, the day allowed to each party to consist of twenty-four hours after the bill has been dishonored, or intelligence of it received. In a note, where he doubtless felt at liberty to suggest improvements in the law, after quoting the language of Chitty, stating the rule, he says, “ it appears to me, that the rule is not so strict, as it, is laid down in this last passage of Mr. Chitty; and that it would be more correct to say, that the holder, is entitled to one whole day to prepare his nolice, and that therefore it will be sufficient, if he sends it by the next post, that goes after twenty-four hours from the time of the dishonor. Thus, suppose the dishonor to be at four o’clock P. M. on Monday, and the post leaves on Tuesday at nine or ten o’clock, it seems to me, that the holder need not send by that post, but may safely wait, and put the notice into the post-office early enough to go by the post on Wednesday morning at the same hour. I have seen no late case which imports a different doctrine ; on the contrary they appear to me to sustain it. But as I do not know of any direct authority, which positively so decides; this remark is merely propounded for the consideration of the learned reader.” These two very distinguished jurists, will not claim to be exempted from liability to error. While they agree, that the holder has one whole day merely to write or prepare his notices, they disagree us to what shall be considered a whole day. One holding it to be the natural day following the day of dishonor or notice of it;
The rule, as propounded for consideration by Mr. Justice Story, to consist of a day of twenty-four hours after the dishonor or notice of it, would be liable to this further objection: that the indorser, after having received notice, would often be
The proposed change, which would require notice to be forwarded by “the next practicable mail,” or “at a convenient time after business hours of the next day,” instead of by the post of the next day, is suited to introduce much more inconvenience, than it can obviate.
Is the Court to determine, what was a convenient time after business hours, or which was the next practicable mail, and to do it in each particular case; or is there to be an attempt to make a general rule ? If such an attempt be made, is there reason to expect, that any certain and uniform rule can be adopted, and prevail throughout the several States? Business hours, and that, which may be considered to be a practicable or convenient time for forwarding notices by the post, may be very different in different places, and different among different classes of business men in the same place. Banking corporations and houses often establish hours of business differing from those of individuals in the same place. Is the rule to be varied, and conformed to the business habits of each
The result of this examination is a conviction, that the rule, as before stated by Bayley and Chitty, is fully established; that it has become the settled law in England and in the United States; that in the application of it in practice, the Lord’s day is not, to be accounted a day of business or taken into the account ; that the rule, that each party has a day to give notice, was never intended to be, and should not be construed so as to be in conflict with any other established rule; that no modern case has been found, which has actually decided the rights of parties upon a different doctrine; and that the only opinions opposed to these positions are those of Chief Justice Best, and Chancellor Kent; Mr. Justice Story, suggesting one rather for consideration, than as exhibiting the law, at the same time admitting, that it is unsupported by any decided case.