In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants Ian Rajiu Sahai and Amy N. Sahai appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lebowitz, J.), entered September 22, 2011, which denied their motion to vacate a judgment of the same court entered July 16, 2010, which, upon an order of the same court dated March 30, 2007, granting the plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for leave to enter judgment against them on the issue of liability upon their default in appearing or answering, and after an inquest, was in favor of the plaintiffs and against them in the principal sum of $1,050,000, and for leave to serve a late answer.
Ordered that the order entered September 22, 2011, is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly denied the appellants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate a default judgment entered against them. The affidavits of the plaintiffs’ process server established, prima facie, that the appellants were properly served with process pursuant to CPLR 308 (2) (see Bank of N.Y. v Segui,
In support of the appellants’ motion to vacate their default, the appellant Amy N. Sahai denied, in an affidavit, that she received any mailing concerning this action and, although she admitted that her relatives were present at the address where process was served, she claimed that she did not live at that address and that none of her relatives fit the description in the affidavits of service. The appellants failed to submit any documentary evidence to support the claim of Amy N. Sahai that she did not reside at the subject premises at the time that she was served, and they failed to submit an affidavit from a relative at that address denying receipt of a copy of the summons and complaint or stating that the appellants did not live there (see Foster v Jordan,
Similarly, the appellants were not entitled to relief pursuant to CPLR 317. While, under CPLR 317, it was unnecessary for the appellants to offer a reasonable excuse for their defaults (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co.,
The appellants’ remaining contentions are not properly before this Court, as they are being raised for the first time on appeal (see Waterman v Weinstein Mem. Chapel,
