Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Corporation of the Fine Arts BuildingChicago Title & Trust Co. v. Corporation of the Fine Arts Building
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Stone
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is certiorari to the Appellate Court for the First District to review a judgment of that court reversing a decree of the circuit court of Cook county, heard on appeal from an order of the probate court of that county allowing a certain claim against the estate of Winfield Scott Thurber, deceased, and a decree, also entered by that court, declaring said claim and other claims to be liens on the property of said estate by virtue of a certain lease in which deceased was lessee.
The defendant in error leased a six-story building, described as 208 Michigan boulevard, in the city of Chicago, to the Bissell-Cowen Piano Company for a term of ten years from April 30, 1909, for a rental of $2166.67 per month. One of the provisions of the lease is as follows: “The lessor shall have a first lien upon the interest of lessee under this lease and upon lessee’s property now or hereafter located in said premises, to secure the payment of all moneys due under this lease.” This lease was assigned by the Bissell-Cowen Piano Company, with the consent of the defendant in error, to the Æolian Company. On January 27, 1913, the Æolian Company assigned the lease to Thurber. All these assignments
The rent under the lease for the month of September, 1913, was due and unpaid at the time of Thurber’s death, and a claim was filed and allowed by the probate court as
On December 24, 1914, the defendant in error filed its petition praying that the claims for rent theretofore allowed ($8391.68) be decreed to be first and prior liens upon the personal property of the deceased located within Cook county at the time of his death by virtue of the terms of the lease; that the same be paid before other claims, including the widow’s award; that the claim for rent for the months of October, November and December, 1914, amounting to $6550.01, be paid as costs and expenses of administration and made a first and prior charge against all the assets of the deceased; that the rent accruing thereafter as long as the executrix occupied or controlled the building, and the rent accruing in the future, be allowed as part of the costs and expenses of administration; that the executrix pay to the petitioner all rents in her possession collected from sub-tenants. On June 24, 1915, the date of the allowance of the claim above mentioned for $8042.77, the probate court heard this petition and decreed that all the claims allowed, amounting to $16,434.45, be given priority under the
The estate perfected two appeals to the circuit court: One from the order of June 24, 1915, allowing as of the seventh class the sum of $8042.77 as rent after the year for administration had passed; and the other from the decree granting priority to the three claims, amounting to $16,434.45.
It was admitted by the plaintiff in error in the circuit court, and likewise here, that the first claim for rent for the month of September, 1913, due and unpaid at the time of the death of Thurber was properly allowed as a claim of the seventh class by the probate court, and that the claim as allowed by the court in the sum of $6225.01 as a claim of the seventh class was properly allowed, and that these two claims should stand as found. No appeal was perfected from either of these claims. Plaintiff in error contended in
The circuit court held that the claim upon which an allowance of $8042.77 was made was a contingent claim when filed, and that although it was filed before the close of the period for filing claims it was not an absolute debt provable against the estate of the deceased, arid denied said claim. That court also held that the terms of the lease were not sufficient to give to the landlord a lien on the property of the estate sought to be made subject thereto. The circuit court made no attempt to pass upon the priority of the claims as expenses of administration, expressly holding that such matter was not in the record and was not passed upon.
The claimant appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District, and that court held that it was not necessary to pass upon the holding of the circuit court that the claim for rent after the period for filing claims was a contingent claim, and also held that it was not necessary to pass upon the holding of that court that the lease was not sufficient to grant a lien, for the reason that (as it held) $16,434.45, the total of the three claims allowed, were proper charges against the estate as expenses of administration and allowable as such. The Appellate Court reversed the decree of the circuit court and remanded the cause, with directions to that court to enter judgment for the sum of $16,412.77 as expenses of administration. It appears from the record that neither the probate nor circuit court had that issue before it. The original petition was for a lien under the lease and not for a re-classification. Neither the estate nor its creditors have had an opportunity to appear and be heard on what constitutes a proper allowance as expenses of administration. The questions
The functions of an administrator or executor are to close up the estate for which he is acting. He has no authority, as such officer, to conduct a retail store business. Such is beyond the scope or functions of his office. (Grace v. Seibert, 235 Ill. 190; Smith v. Preston, 170 id. 179.) The record does not disclose any authority from the probate court to conduct the business of the deceased further than is found in an order entered October 1, 1913, which authorized the executrix to conduct the business for a period not to exceed sixty days. It is urged that this authorization was extended indefinitely by a subsequent order of November 13, 1913. That order directed that the executrix “proceed to sell that part of the personal property consisting of the stock of merchandise,” etc., “at public or private sale, as provided by law, for not less than the appraised value,” etc. We are unable to agree with the contention of counsel for defendant in error that this was an extension of authority to conduct business. On the contrary, that order, in effect, directs the closing out of this stock. It is an order to sell, with no authorization to buy to replenish the stock as contemplated in conducting a retail business. It follows that the order of November 13, 1913, did not extend the authority of the executrix beyond the period of sixty days.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the question as to whether the probate court had authority to authorize an extension
What, under all the circumstances of this case, would constitute a proper allowance as expenses of administration is not before this court. There has been no hearing on that matter. No evidence has been offered upon that subject in the probate or circuit court, other than that of the occupancy of the premises by the executrix, which would enter into the determination of that question. The petition of defendant in error in the probate and circuit courts asked that a lien be declared for the sum of $8391.68 arising out of the contract of lease of the deceased. While the petition prayed that installments of rent accruing after October 1, 1914, be declared expenses of administration of the estate, yet the probate court made no disposition of that question, and the defendant in error, as such petitioner, appears to have taken no appeal from the decree of the probate court but followed the appeal of the executrix in the circuit court and there defended the decree giving priority, under the lease, to this item for rentals. The decree was based solely on the ground that a lien was given by the lease. It is evident that this was the theory upon which the case was tried in the probate and circuit courts, and that the other creditors of the estate have not had their day in court or a hearing on what would be proper expenses of administration.
There is a broad distinction between a lien for installments of rent which arises out of a lease, and the classification of a claim as expenses of administration. The former arises out of the contract of the deceased, while the latter arises wholly out of the action of the representative. The former is a claim against the estate of the deceased, while the latter is a claim against the representative. (Smith & Co. v.
We are of the opinion that the record does not afford any basis for the holding of the Appellate Court, and without passing upon what would in the present case constitute proper items of expenses of administration, as that matter must be passed upon by the probate court, we are of the opinion that the Appellate Court erred in finding, from this record, that said amount should be classified and allowed as expenses of administration and given priority as such.
The defendant in error contended in the Appellate Court that the circuit court erred in holding that the lease did not create a lien on the property of the deceased in the premises in question at the time of his death. Section 12 of the lease provides as follows: “That lessor shall have a first lien upon the interest of lessee under this lease and upon lessee’s property now or hereafter located in said premises, to secure the payment of all moneys due under this lease.” It is contended by the defendant in error that the language, “lessee’s property now or hereafter located in said premises,” is a description of the property of the estate sufficient to create a lien against such property: Regarding such a lien this court said in Borden v. Croak, 131 Ill. 68: “The lien claimed is one where the property is left in the possession of the debtor, and it is therefore in the nature of a mortgage rather than a pledge and is to be governed by the rules of law applicable to chattel mortgages.” Also: “The question, then, is whether a contract for the sale or mortgaging of subsequently acquired chattels will be specifically enforced in equity where no chattels are specifically described, the only description being that contained in the general word ‘property.’ It is undoubtedly the rule that the equitable title to goods, as well as to land, is confined to specific property and does not extend to goods which are undetermined. As said by the Lord Chancellor in Holroyd v.
The rule that the description must be sufficiently specific to afford third persons the means of identifying the property refers to chattel mortgages as well as to mortgages of land.
It is evident that a lessee has no authority to bind the goods and chattels of his assignee under a lease as he has
But it is contended this is a covenant to pay rent and therefore- a covenant that runs with the land. We do not think so. This court held in Purvis v. Shuman, 273 Ill. 286: “The test whether a covenant runs with the land or is merely personal is whether the covenant concerns the thing granted and the occupation or enjoyment of it, or is a collateral and personal covenant not immediately concerning the thing granted. If a covenant concerns the land and the enjoyment of it, its benefit or obligation passes with the ownership; but to have that effect the covenant must respect the tiling granted or demised and the act to be done or permitted must concern the land or estate conveyed. An illustration of the rule is found in Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio and Mississippi Railway Co. 94 Ill. 83. * * * The court said that in order that a covenant may run with the land its performance or non-performance must affect the nature, quality or value of the property demised, independent of collateral circumstances, or must affect the mode of enjoyment.” The covenant in question was not a covenant
It follows from the foregoing that the provisions of the lease were not sufficient to create a lien on the property of the deceased, and the circuit court did not err in so holding.
The remaining question in the case is whether the claim of $8042.77 allowed for rent after the period of administration was passed was a valid charge against the estate or was a contingent claim and not so provable.
On September 26, 1914, defendant in error filed in the probate court a claim for rent, as follows: “To rent not due but to accrue for the premises 202 Michigan boulevard, Chicago, 111., for the period October 1, 1914, to April 30, 1919, at the rate of $2166.67 a month, $119,166.67.” While this claim was filed three days before the expiration of the year fixed by the statute for the filing of claims, the claim is for rent not due until after the year for filing claims was passed. There appears to have been no hearing on this claim until June 24, 1915, when, as we have seen, $8042.77 was allowed as a balance due to March 31, 1915, as a seventh-class claim, and on the same day decreed to be a lien on the property of the estate on the premises by virtue of the lease. It is contended by plaintiff in error that rent not due at the death of the testator and unearned during the period for filing claims was a contingent claim and should not have been allowed. The defendant in error contends that as the executrix continued in occupation after the year for filing claims, this entitled the landlord to have this claim allowed for the period of occupation, and that, in any event, it was not a contingent claim.
It is well settled in this State that claims dependent on a contingency which may or may not ripen into a liability cannot be proved and allowed under section 67 of the Administration act. Said section refers only to claims on which
Is this claim for the rentals covering the balance of the term a contingent claim? We are of the opinion that it is. There are different contingencies in a lease of this character, the happening of which is not within the control of either party to it, which may defeat all right to recover rents, as where the building shall be so injured by fire as to be untenantable, then, unless it be repaired in thirty days, the
While it appears from the record here that the estate was not closed when this claim was filed, it further appearing that the executrix’s report of account has not yet been approved nor the estate closed, yet so far as the right to have this claim allowed and paid out of the assets inventoried is
As the claim for $119,166.67 for unaccrued rentals is a contingent claim, there is no authority, under the statute, for its allowance. The allowance of any part of such a claim was an allowance under the terms of the lease. That such allowance was so made is evidenced by the fact that the probate court allowed the sum of $8042.77 as a seventh-class claim. Any allowance of this claim as a liability under the lease must have been made by authority of section 67. The allowance of any portion “of this claim under said section was, as we have seen, erroneous. We are of the opinion that the circuit court did not err in holding said item of $8042.77 to be a claim which cannot be allowed to participate in the distribution of the assets inventoried.
As we understand the record, the claim of $2166.67 for rent for the month of September, 1913, and the claim of $6225.01 balance for the year of administration, having been allowed as seventh-class claims and no objection thereto being made by the “estate, by the records of the probate and circuit courts stand allowed as seventh-class claims. The question what should be allowed as expenses of - administration may properly be brought before the probate court for determination.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Appellate Court will be reversed and the decree of the circuit court will be affirmed.
Judgment of Appellate Court reversed.
Decree of circuit court affirmed.