Chicago Title Insurance v. MazulaChicago Title Insurance v. Mazula
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Dawson, J.), entered March 16, 2006 in Clinton County, which denied plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment.
Mugglin, J. This is the second of two related actions. Plaintiff issued a policy of title insurance for Wolodymyr Bula and Leanne Bula insuring the title to certain land in the Town of Beekmantown, Clinton County, when they purchased the property from defendant. The conveyance included a right-of-way to Lake Champlain, purportedly 66 feet in width. In reality, the right-of-way was only 15 feet in width. The Bulas obtained an appraisal establishing resultant damages of $26,800. Plaintiff paid the
Predictably, plaintiff commenced this action against defendant. Defendant answered and asserted a third-party claim against her attorney, which is not here in issue. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment submitting, in addition to copies of Supreme Court‘s two decisions and defendant‘s aforesaid affidavit, evidence that the Bulas received a partially failed title, the Bulas were damaged in the amount of $26,800, it paid the Bulas $20,000, and, pursuant to the title insurance policy, it became subrogated to the Bulas’ right to receive that amount. Having thus demonstrated prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the burden shifted to defendant to produce evidence in admissible form demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]; Spiratos v County of Chenango, 28 AD3d 863, 863 [2006]; Macri v Smith, 12 AD3d 896, 897 [2004]). Defendant‘s counsel, having pleaded plaintiff‘s lack of standing as an affirmative defense, reminded Supreme Court during oral argument that plaintiff had assigned its rights to the Bulas. When the court inquired about a possible reassignment, plaintiff‘s attorney demurred and the court denied its motion for summary judgment.
We reverse. While Supreme Court could take judicial notice of the existence of the first action over which it presided (see Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 2-209, at 45 [Farrell 11th ed]), it should take such notice of the entire action and not confine itself to only one aspect thereof, i.e., the existence of an assignment. Unfortunately, plaintiff‘s counsel did not remind
Peters, J.P., Rose, Lahtinen and Kane, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, motion granted and summary judgment awarded to plaintiff in the amount of $20,000.