*1 negligence, plausible not a malpractice and rights. constitutional for violation of
action
The district court was unreasonable appointed denying Snipes counsel. See (7th Haas, F.2d
Farmer v. Cir.1993) (“We judge] not whether [the ask right denying appointment of coun- [in
was reasonable.”). sel], but whether he was
III. district court is Af-
The decision of the
firmed. ROVNER,
ILANA DIAMOND Circuit
Judge, concurring.
Snipes reply did not to defendants’ sum- and,
mary judgment motion even in his late
filing, regarding Dr. Eh- offered no evidence Snipes’
rhardt’s decision to treat toenail with- administering Snipes there-
out anesthetic.
fore failed to raise a factual as to Dr. state or the
either Ehrhardt’s mental I
propriety of his treatment method. would the matter there and refrain from our
leave procedures about
own evaluation of medical expertise. we are without evidence or
which
CHICAGO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and WGN Broadcasting Company,
Continental
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants,
v. ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL BASKETBALL dant-Appell
Defen ant, Cross-Appellee. 95-1341, 95-1376,
Nos. 95-
3935 and 95-4021. Appeals,
United States Court Circuit.
Seventh
Argued 1996. June Sept.
Decided 1996.
Rehearing Suggestion Rehearing 7, 1996.*
En Banc Denied Oct.
*Judge Cummings participate in the con- banc. did not rehearing suggestion sideration of the en *2 Co., IL, Chicago, for
une WGN Continental Inc., Broadcasting, in No. 95-1341. McCambridge (argued), R. Darrell J. John Graham, Faber, Irving C. Michael P. Con- way, Bergen, Christopher B. Charles S. Wil- son, Elden, IL, Chicago, Grippo Charles J. & Sennet, Co., IL, Chicago, for Tribune WGN Inc., Broadcasting, in No. 95- Continental 1376. Hanlon, Jr., Katten,
James E. Muchin & Zavis, McCambridge (argued), John R. Dar- Graham, Conway, rell J. Michael P. Charles Wilson, Bergen, Christopher Grippo B. S. & Elden, IL, Sennet, Chicago, Charles J. Trib- IL, Co., Chicago, for une WGN Continental Inc., Broadcasting, in No. 95-3935. Hanlon, Jr., Katten, James E. Muchin & Zavis, McCambridge (argued), R. Dar- John Graham, Faber, Irving rell P. J. C. Michael Conway, Bergen, Christopher B. Charles S. Wilson, Elden, IL, Grippo Chicago, & Sennet, Co., IL, Chicago, Charles J. Tribune Inc., Broadcasting, for Continental WGN No. 95-4021. Goldstein, Cardoza,
Marc J. Michael A Ruskin, Krane, Bradley Stephen I. C. Steven Solomon, Rauchberg, D. Ronald S. Howard Ganz, Landrey, Stephen L. Francis D. L. Weinstein, Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Men- delsohn, Wolf, City, York Christopher New Dennis, Proskauer, Rose, L. Warren Goetz & Mendelsohn, DC, Washington, James C. Schroeder, Fahner, Tyrone C. Andrew S. Marovitz, Rooney, Matthew A L. Herbert (ar- Hanlon, Jr., E. Joel G. Chefitz James Zarov, Muench, Mayer, John E. Brown & Libowsky, gued), Stephen D. Laura Keidan Platt, IL, Handler, Chicago, E. Carole Pros- Martin, Betman, Ronald S. Robert K. Niew- kauer, Rose, Mendelsohn, Ange- Goetz & Los Zavis, IL, Katten, ijk, Chicago, Muchin & les, CA, Jeffrey (argued), A Mishkin Nation- Chicago Sports Professional Ltd. Partner- Ass’n, al Basketball Office of the General ship, in Nos. 95-1376. Counsel, City, New York for National Bas- Ass’n, in (ar- ketball No. 95-1341. Hanlon, Jr., E. Joel G. Chefitz James gued), Stephen Libowsky, Laura Keidan D. Zarov, Platt, Mayer, L. Herbert Brown & Martin, Betman, Robert K. Niew- Ronald S. D, Goldstein, Washington, Marc J. Michael Fleishman, Katten, ijk, Wendy Muchin & Cardoza, Ruskin, Bradley I. Steven C. Zavis, IL, Chicago, Chicago Professional Krane, Solomon, Stephen D. Ronald S. Sports Partnership, in Ltd. No. 95-3935. Ganz, Rauchberg, L. Howard Francis D. Katten, Weinstein, Proskauer, Hanlon, Jr., Landrey, Stephen E. Muchin & L. James R; Zavis, Rose, Mendelsohn, City, McCambridge (argued), Dar- & New York John Goetz Faber, Wolf, Dennis, Graham, Christopher Irving rell Charles S. Warren L. Pros- J. C. Wilson, kauer, Rose, Mendelsohn, Washing- Bergen, Christopher Grippo B. & Goetz & Elden, IL, Sennet, ton, DC, Schroeder, Chicago, Tyrone Charles J. Trib- James C. C. television, Wile, Fahner, “superstation” carried on Kenneth E. Andrew S. Maro- cable Muench, systems popularity vitz, nationwide. The Bulls’ Rooney, A. E. Matthew John sys- makes WGN attractive to these cable Platt, IL, Chicago, Mayer, Brown & Carole tems; large audience makes at- WGN Handler, Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Men- E. *3 tractive to the Bulls. Since 1991 the Bulls delsohn, CA, Angeles, Jeffrey A. Los Mish- by injunction and WGN have been authorized Buchanan, (argued), kin Richard W. National games per year. or to broadcast 25 30 754 Ass’n, Basketball Office of the General Coun- (1991). F.Supp. in- 1336 We affirmed that sel, City, for National Basketball New York see 961 F.2d junction in and the Ass’n, in No. 95-1376. proceeded district court to determine wheth- Ruskin, Cardoza, Bradley A. I. Michael carry games er could even more WGN —and Solomon, Rauchberg, Stephen D. Ronald S. impose whether NBA could a “tax” on Proskauer, Rose, Weinstein, Stephen L. audience, games broadcast to national Mendelsohn, City, & New York Chris- Goetz paid superstations for which other have Wolf, Dennis, Proskauer, topher Warren L. pretty penny league. holding After Rose, Mendelsohn, DC, Washington, & Goetz receiving stipulations trial and 512 nine-week Sehroeder, Marovitz, C. Andrew S. James fact, 30-game the district court made a Zarov, May- Rooney, A. Herbert L. Matthew (1995), permanent, F.Supp. allowance 844 er, Platt, IL, Chicago, E. Brown & Carole excessive, and held the NBA’s fee 1995-2 Handler, Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendel- 71,253. para. appeal. Both Trade Cas. sides sohn, CA, Angeles, Jeffrey Los A. Mishkin games per The Bulls want to broadcast 41 Buchanan, (argued), Richard W. National WGN; year over the NBA contends that the Ass’n, of the General Basketball Office Coun- fix antitrust laws allow it to a lower number sel, City, New York for National Basketball (15 20) proposed. and to collect the tax it Ass’n, in No. 95-3935. sides, apologies to With both we conclude Goldstein, Cardoza, they through Mare J. Michael A. must suffer still more liti- Ruskin, Krane, gation. Bradley Stephen I. Steven C. Solomon, Rauchberg, D. Ronald S. Howard opinion rejected league’s Our 1992 de- Ganz, Landrey, Stephen L. L. Francis D. Act, Sports Broadcasting fense based on the
Weinstein,
Rose,
Proskauer,
Men-
Goetz &
§§
im-
15 U.S.C.
but our rationale
delsohn,
Wolf,
City, Christopher
New York
plied that
the NBA could restructure its
Proskauer, Rose,
Dennis,
L.
Warren
Goetz &
advantage of that
contracts to take
statute.
Mendelsohn,
DC,
Washington,
James C.
America, Inc.,
NCAA
F.Supp. 771
878
Wood,
(4th
Reason,
Antitrust
Diane P.
part,
bility unnecessary, judge so that a new colleges up which made the NCAA dispute could resolve the reviewing after entirely entities, separate were economic exhibits, transcript, stipulations, and en- competing many with each other in areas tertaining argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 63. unrelated to their athletic encounters. There events, judgment At all of the district is, course, a sort of continuum of economic vacated, court is and the ease is remanded integration, points with entities at different proceedings opinion. consistent with this along warranting differing the continuum lev- Pending proceedings further in the district els of antitrust concern. At one end are agreement among parties, court or having loose alliances of economic actors in- respect Bulls and league’s WGN must (like NCAA), dependent concerns (and contract’s) the NBC limitations on the anticompetitive agreements nature of whose maximum superstation number of telecasts. “quick is obvious from a look.” At the other fully-integrated end are entities which the *9 CUDAHY, Judge, concurring: Circuit participants economic interests of the are so Although agree I majority’s completely with the aligned scrutiny that antitrust of “quick conclusion that the look” policies unnecessary except doctrine does is where apply facts, complex to these I must of the is In Sherman Act violated. the significant indicate some differences in mat- range organizations center is the broad of NBA) ters that (generally are reached in the separate course of the like the whose con- Thus, majority opinion. arriving in individually at its stituents are owned but are conclusion that a analysis closely full Rule of Reason completely economically but not tied required, majority is the organizations. seems to be extra- to their These entities are policies highly agreements, forgiving for anticompetitive should more capable of analysis necessary big highly compensated in full Rule of is skilled and counsel Reason cooperation is not productive corporate pro litigants eases se ensure that than for Single anticompetitive conduct. mistaken for appointed perhaps qualifica of counsel lesser aside, certainly enough con- entity is certainly there is to me. earlier tion unclear Our efficiency the cern here the in this did opinion case states “the NBA market competitor in entertainment the the not contend the district court that analysis. require full of Reason Rule single entity, NBA is a let that it is alone entity Chicago as a matter of law.” point, I think it was a more clear-cut On Sports Partnership Ltd. v. Na Professional Judge the appropriate Will to examine Ass’n, tional Basketball 961 F.2d fee for the broad- size of the NBA’s WGN (7th Cir.1992), denied, 954, 113 cert. connection, In this the games. casts of Bulls (1992). 409, also L.Ed.2d 334 We rejects majority of fairness considerations that: stated that, core like” asserts “The “and the Maj. output.” Op. at question in antitrust is a creative rather than Characterization is prevails view that 597. Under the reductive Appellate ac- exact endeavor. is review matters, grating in antitrust somewhat cordingly The district court deferential. efficiency aphorism appears If to be correct. trial, evidence, held a and con- heard welfare) (or is the and end- consumer be-all cluded that the best characterization of the all, how to be better no matter seems NBA is the we have third mentioned: taking more is But these distributed. production venture in the still me principles given, is difficult for but more like a cartel the sale of output disjoined how can be understand output. this is the charac- Whether best the circumstances of this from cost under sports professional terization of is a sub- fact, Judge In as a fact case. Will found ject that has courts divided and scholars that, may proposed well at “[the fee] NBA’s years, making for some it hard to charac- output and distri- some future date decrease judge’s clear terize choice as WGN_” games on Dist. bution of Bulls error. Fact, Findings of Law and Ct. Conclusions argued Id. at 672. No one seems to have But, Opinion, App. particularly NBA at 77a. the basic NBA has structure output currently since constrained to 30 think, changed opinion. since that I there- games, whatever market rather than fore, that, despite opinion dicta in our earlier produce, would it is difficult to ascertain speculating “[p]erhaps parties will high enough to whether the reduce fee join fully [regarding issue more output competitive below the level. Since entity proceedings status NBA] magnitude is not clear to me court,” come in still to the district id. at justified Judge adjustment Will’s was an- question is a real reach there whether we can alone, I titrust would include considerations entity fascinating though it this issue with other matters to be consid- issue— may be. ered on remand. However, assumption on the that the “sin- said, issue, single entity That I turn (and entity” question may gle be reached majority is de- where discussion remand) a presumably will be reached on serving of as to comment both substance number of will considerations be relevant. procedure. My proce- first reservation is Assuming goal as I must that sole dural and concerns whether this issue or, efficiency put way, antitrust another majority be reached at all. The announces wealth, the maximization of total societal my exception precedent an —without “single whether a is a knowledge the usual rules of waiver —from *10 entity” turns on whether the of the appeal. exception ac- actions applies, issues on The cording majority, league potential have to lessen economic to to “defendants the complex Why competition among separately we cases” without elaboration. owned compete significant teams.1 The fact that teams on the competition economic between is more or less irrelevant to them. Br. ease, floor whether NBA at 25-27. If this is the they compete economically only (2) argument goes, is type drop concerns —it (cid:127) (1) competition germane only type economic which is out and concerns Type remain. (1) course, concerns, analysis. course, principle, antitrust In a of exactly those sports league actually single § appropriate analysis could be a firm single of a firm. individual uni- teams could be under are, however, single There flaws in this ownership management. fied Such a entity argument. assumption underly- The would, course, subject scrutiny firm be ing league sports it is that are a different and only § 2 of under the Sherman Act and not product more desirable than disorganized a point under 1. From the of view of wealth independently arranged collection of maximization, league a independently- reason, between teams. For this it is con- teams, likely if it owned is no more than a joining sports tended that teams into a single firm to management make inefficient league is efficiency-enhancing and desirable. decisions, should be treated a enti- as I accept premise.2 will perhaps It is ty. single entity question thus would true, argued by many the NBA and com- boil down to “whether member clubs of a mentators, sports that are different from sports league legitimate economic inter- many joint ventures because the individual own, independent league ests of their of the cannot, teams even in principle, produce the Sports Leagues and each other.” Revisited product league sports. However, the fact — sports at 127. It league, follows that a no cooperation necessary is produce structure, ownership matter what its can league imply basketball does not make inefficient if decisions the individ- league necessarily will produce product gain ual teams have some chance of economic the most efficient potential fashion. is There expense league. for inefficient decisionmaking regarding the joint product “league basketball” even form Another of the same when the individual engage teams in no eco- a league whether more like activity nomic outside of league. This joint firm or efficiency like venture. With potential arises because the structure of the criterion, joint the sole venture warrants league is such that league all “owners” of the (1) scrutiny for at least two reasons — must be “owners” of individual teams and possess venture could power market with decisions are made a vote of the teams. (es- respect jointly produced product This means will not necessar- sentially act like a monopoly ily make efficient decisions about the number (2) power) or the fact the venturers or, of teams generally, fielded more com- competitors remain might in other arenas petitive Thus, among balance teams. way either distort product fact that required several teams are to make managed or allow the venturers to use the necessarily imply does not that the joint product as a smoke-screen behind which makeup current is the most competition cut deals to reduce in the desirable or “efficient” one. other arenas. convincing “single The most entity” argument involving justification the NBA is that The NBA’s for its restriction produce only joint product the teams of of Bulls broadcasts centers on the need to “league basketball” and that competitive there is thus no among maintain a balance teams. See, Jacobs, e.g., (1989); Roberts, 1. Sports Gary Michael S. Sports Leagues R. Professional Leagues, Single-Entity Theory: Antitrust and the the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse Section I Quo, the Status 67 Ind.L.J. 25 Defense of Regulate Intraleague Rivalry, Restraints on (1991); Roberts, Gary R. The Antitrust Status of (1984), UCLA L.Rev. 219 for discussions of this Revisited, Sports Leagues 64 Tul.L.Rev. 117 issue. (1989); Grauer, Myron C. The Use and Misuse of the Term "Consumer Once More to the Welfare”: Bay Chicago 2. But the Green Packers and the Single Entity Sports Mat on the Issue Status played, presumably Act, Bears Leagues before enthusiastic Under Section 1 the Sherman crowds, (1989); Goldman, before there Sports, Tul.L.Rev. 71 Lee was National Football Anti- trust, Single Entity Theory, League. and the 63 Tul.L.Rev. *11 only league the club can needed to ensure that individual exist when a balance is Such quality unequally among league provides high entertainment revenues are distributed optimize as to com- throughout participation so on club the season the member clubs based of games generating forms entertainment. petition other in the the revenue.” only not the contribu- Competitive Sports Leagues balance is Act at 297- and the Sherman value bas- of NBA disproportionate tor to the entertainment 99. When teams receive ketball, enjoyment league of Fan generated however. of the share broadcast revenues opportunity the to depends on both sports by games, own such situation exists. the identify favorite team and with local or analysis tricky, of is howev- The this issue quality play. of watching of the best thrill er, since decisions about how to allocate the would single owning firm all of teams broadcasting by are the revenues made arrange for the number of teams presumably league. It that “member clubs of a be efficiently to maximize fan and their locations any legitimate indepen- not league do have is, league There enjoyment of the season. league prod- in the dent economic interests however, expect the cur- no to reason ownership “each uct” and team has an inter- necessarily make such team will rent owners every game” (including equal in an est efficiently, given their individual decisions priori ownership interest the broadcast of in the financial health economic interests every Sports Leagues rights game). to Re- their own teams. assumption If this cor- visited 135-36. is far-flung want surprising not fans It’s rect, arrangements then whatever for reve- superstars supersta- to watch the Bulls’ on league nue the decides to make distribution broadcasting argues that the tion. The NBA be, salespeople like will bonuses to successful ,dis- Bulls to these fans will of more ordinary firm, presumptively in an efficient. among competitive balance teams. turb the however, If, rights initially broadcast inure that, However, speculate since can also one participating particular teams the two viewing become more of a televi- has if, certainly case, as game and is the some activity, activity an “in the sion than flesh” games are more attractive to than oth- fans might prefer these fans have a ers, presumed cannot be to have (like fewer, composed of better teams allocating made decisions broadcast those Bulls). case, league policies If this were efficiently. revenues up of the teams designed to shore all current course, point, would be inefficient. The of analogy, within the context of an ordi necessarily speculation not that this cor- firm, nary salespeople is to allow the to vote rect, of teams but that the efficient number get. bonuses is to on the each Each sales (or, generally, competitive the efficient incentive, course, person pro has some balance) may be obtained as a matter not efficiency mote the overall firm on given league ownership course current salary, which his or her the value perhaps framework. stock, depends of his or her firm and there larger thus retain to award bonuses most The team owners fore However, productive salespersons. This would be the case in this economic interests. compete ways salesperson even if for the revenues scenario each has two did not compete league. maximizing personal increasing do for broad- of the Teams wealth — revenues, conflicting efficiency “A cast however. eco- overall of the and redistribut ing an firm.3 nomic interest between income within the The result of valid, however, single favoring entity 3. Those treatment if law firms should be treat- do, fact, compare sports leagues frequently them to law ed as entities. If law firms firms, making argument sports leagues potential some same inefficiencies entities, firms, sports leagues are like law law firms are as because of diverse econom- See, economically sports leagues partners, therefore entities. ic interests of the Grauer, e.g., Myron Recognition sports leagues C. solution to treat the Nation correct is still Single analogy League Entity al Football Under Sec ventures. A mere law firms is Implications seeking convincingly tion Sherman Act: invoked those Model, arguments purely Consumer 23- defend their (rather on economic Mich.L.Rev. Welfare (1983); precedential) grounds. Maj. Op. argument than at 597-98. This
605 might really expect vote not be to distribute bonuses in the courts to aid in con- the them potential vincing competition The that most efficient fashion. for consumers if the exists particularly really If type inefficiency great of is does this not. consumers want eco- when, NBA, teams, competition sports as with the the is “the nomic between only game independent ownership then preserva- in town” so that team does not if option going independent of elsewhere it is not tion of economic have interests is receiving likely sports league. revenues commensurate with its an efficient choice for a league product.4 choice, joint ventures, to the But that with other contribution overall as event, any brings team group In of owners who with it attendant do antitrust risks. games all might ways. share revenues from all The NBA cannot it both not do make decisions that not maximize well Relating all to the majority’s of this treat- profit of the as a whole.5 issue, single entity ment of the I two see demonstrates, problems First, majority analysis. As this discussion deter- noted, mining potential already divorcing for as question whether the inefficient of decisionmaking joint single entity within a ownership survives ven- from the of independent likely messy because of is ture economic to lead to and inconsistent partners extraordinarily application of interests of antitrust law. The line bottom reason, complex inquiry For confusing. sepa- be that the into whether simple, way if courageous, by not out of the rate economic interests maintained might legal pre- joint problem participants enterprise likely be to establish in a sumption single entity that a cannot exist be no easier than a full Rule of Reason single ownership. analysis. To without avoid the complexities attempted of and confusions Second, majority’s some of the discussion analysis, might simply one ordain that com- independent of puzzling. interests is that economic
binations lack diverse inter- majority that contends the district court opt joint ownership should of ests a sin- cooperation sepa- among “concluded that all enterprise gle problems. antitrust avoid rately incorporated firms is by forbidden 1 hand, judges may play the other want On Act, except of the Sherman to the extent resisting simplify- economist the extent Maj. 598, Copperweld permits.” Op. citing ing assumptions. Copperweld Independence v. Corp. Tube event, 752, 771, leagues 2731, sports argue Corp.,
In 104 467 U.S. S.Ct. (1984). they must maintain 628 ownership Copperweld 81 L.Ed.2d separate ownership parent corporation the teams because en- concluded that a and its appearance competitiveness wholly-owned subsidiary “complete hances de- have a leagues unity manded fans. But cannot interest” and hence should be treat- reverse, them, Applying logic the same there law firms not be treated should as precedent treating sports considerable entities either. leagues joint Collegiate as Nat'l ventures. Athletic Regents ssoc. v. Bd. the Univ. A homa, Okla hypothetical example taking 4. The team 85, 2948, 468 U.S. 104 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d rights suggest, broadcast does seem to elsewhere (1984); League, 70 Sullivan v. National Football however, rights are at broadcast bottom denied, 1091, (1st 1994), F.3d 34 1099 Cir. cert. property participating given of the teams in a 1252, U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 131 L.Ed.2d - Indeed, game. if the team does not own (1995); Angeles 133 Los Memorial Coliseum rights partici- broadcast which it League, Comm’n v. National 726 Football F.2d pates, it is hard to understand what it means 1381, Cir.1984), denied, (9th 1388-90 cert. 469 own a team at all. 990, 397, (1984); L.Ed.2d 105 S.Ct. 83 331 NFL, League North American Soccer v. 670 F.2d Hovenkamp, 5. See Herbert Exclusive Ven Cir.1982), Joint 1249, (2d denied, 1252 rt. 459 U.S. ce Policy, tures Co Antitrust 1995 1074, (1982); 103 L.Ed.2d 74 639 (1995), general lum.Bus.L.Rev. for a discussion Inc., Football, v. Pro 593 F.2d Smith ways act in which ventures can (D.C.Cir.1978); National Levin v. Basketball (or, inefficiently by excluding Ass’n, either members (S.D.N.Y.1974). F.Supp. members) Therefore, over-including perhaps, by ex here might argue equally one well broadcasts, (superstation cluding products per leagues been treated have never and, haps?). that law entities to the extent firms are like revenues, how do not decree entity. court firm’s Here ed NBA, will Thus their con- because that revenue be shared. simply concluded pose cooperation antitrust *13 separately- flict or does cooperation between involved ventures, other teams, analy- either. on the subject to antitrust issues Joint owned was hand, subject Fact, scrutiny pre- antitrust are Findings of Conclusions sis. Dist.Ct. cisely separate economic interests App. This because Opinion, NBA at 34a. of Law and decisionmaking, poten- deciding joined all in with the cry from that are is a far conclusion separately incorporated tial for distorted results. among cooperation is, firms forbidden. long individually As as are owned teams majority’s propor- and revenue not shared fixed agree I also cannot tion, “unity independent eco- interest” the teams both retain analysis type major make in con- entity status. The nomic interests and decisions required single case, a states, Maj. is the there is Op. “[e]ven at that cert. Where this ity argument sports leagues many competing strong inter should single firm contains joint than sin- opinion goes on to cite the com be treated as ventures rather ests.” gle potential divi there remains a salary and bonuses between entities because petition for However, example. league policy satisfy made managers will be as an sion independent of some Copperweld unity about of inter economic interests when talks teams, context, entity group I think it rather than maximize single in the ests Thus, unity performance league. economic overall of the must be taken to mean Cop games if possible, more Bulls were broad- interests of decisionmakers. See But, cast, profits if might at 2740- increase. perweld, diverse revenue from the broadcast of Bulls single firm does not evidence 41. Bulls, goes disproportionately world be outside economic interests made not vote for final the owners the other members cause decisions stockholders, only care about this more efficient result. who Only the firm. be performance of overall may, course, There be cases which be this is case can firms cause in a independent ownership partners of the profit- in the to behave canonical assumed any pose possibili- venture does not real maximizing The diverse interests fashion. decisionmaking. ty of inefficient This would majority opinion as seem mentioned compete in parties be the case if the did not analysis as is the irrelevant the antitrust if all other arena and revenues were rivalry teams in the NBA. on-court between part- proportions among in fixed shared however, Thus, general, plausible In case Copperweld refers to conduct ners. when “deprives marketplace proposition of the inde- can be made for the that inde- presumptively decisionmaking pendent ownership that com- should pendent centers of assumes,” single entity. This preclude it does not to “deci- treatment as a petition refer mean, course, certainly “all independence is does not sionmakers” whose economic really cooperation among separately incorporated only potential. The antitrust issue is whether, by § 1 of cooperative firms is forbidden as result some Sherman venture, Act,” Maj. Op. It economic interests which remain at 598. would mean jus- cooperation ordinarily As must their decisions. that such be coordinate notes, under Rule of Reason. Justifica- Copperweld officers of tified “[t]he pursu- might not than the separate firm are not economic actors tion be difficult ing separate interests....” Id. elusive search for treatment enti- economic Therefore, joint decisionmaking ty- is of no Employees or divisions
antitrust concern. firm, hand, may remain
within on the other pursuing separate
separate economic actors they do make the
economic interests but opera- governing
final decisions the firm’s They may compete
tions. shares
