166 F. 663 | 8th Cir. | 1909
Lead Opinion
This was an action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff through a falling of the boom of a derrick or loading jack which he and other servants of the defendant were using in hoisting sLeel rails from the ground to a flat car. The derrick was securely mounted upon the near end of an ad
Preliminarily, it should be said that the court rightly charged the jury that there could be no. recovery by the plaintiff unless the defendant was guilty of some of the negligence charged, that the burden of proving such negligence was upon the plaintiff, that no inference or imputation of negligence could arise out of the fact that the pin gave way on the occasion in question, that the defendant was not bound absolutely to provide a safe pin, but only to exercise ordinary care to provide a reasonably safe one, and:
“Mark you, that the claim of negligence is that this pin which hold that rod. which ran from the end of the boom to the top of the mast, was of insufficient size and strength to withstand the strain which would naturally be brought: against it in the lifting of the rail from the ground to the car. This is the first claim of negligence. Now, gentlemen of the jury, you have heard*666 the evidence as to the size of that pin, as to the character of that apparatus, and as to the way in which the work was done; and the first question for you to ask yourselves when you get to the jury room is this: Did the defendant company exercise ordinary care in the furnishing of that apparatus as to the pin? Would an ordinarily prudent man have furnished an apparatus with a pin of that size and strength to do that work? Or would an ordinarily prudent man have said, that pin is not of sufficiefit size and strength to stand the strain which- will naturally be brought against it by the lifting of these rails? If in answering that question, you say that an ordinarily prudent man would have said that the pin was not of sufficient size and strength to withstand that strain, then the defendant company has been guilty of negligence in furnishing the derrick with that pin on top of the mast; that is, if you say that an ordinarily prudent man, performing the duty of furnishing a reasonably safe appliance, would have said that that pin would not be reasonably safe, considering the work that the apparatus had to do, and the strain which would be brought upon it, then the defendant would be guilty of negligence in furnishing the derrick with that pin.
“You must be satisfied that the necessary facts have been proved here by a fair preponderance of the evidence before there can be any recovery. You must not speculate; it must not be a matter of speculation or of guess; but you must be satisfied in your own minds by a fair preponderance of the evidence of these facts which it is essential should be established in order to entitle the xslaintiff to recover. If you are not so satisfied, it is not for you to speculate, as to how this accident happened. You must find out how it did happen; and then, after finding out how it did happen, .if you are satisfied, under the instructions I have given you, that the defendant was negligent, * * ⅜ you will ascertain what tlie plaintiff should recover.”
In various ways the defendant objected that there was no evidence to justify a finding that the pin was not of sufficient strength and size, and the principal question now to be considered is whether these objections were well taken. The contention is that there was no evidence from which the jury could determine the character of the pin required, the strength- of the pin used, or the amount of strain to which it was subjected, and, therefore, that they could not say that the pin was insufficient without going outside the evidence and indulging in mere conjecture. At the same time thfe admission is actually or tacitly made that, if an expert in mechanics or in the construction and operation of appliances like the derrick in question had also given testimony to the effect-that the pin used was not sufficient to withstand the strain placed upon it in the hoisting of the rails, the question of its sufficiency should have been submitted to the jury.
It must be conceded that the case made by the evidence is close to the line which marks the separation of evidence from conjecture, but can it be said, upon a careful consideration of all that the proofs tended to establish, that it is on the forbidden side of the line? Of course, jurors are not restricted to a consideration of the facts directly proven, but may give effect to such inferences as reasonably may be drawn from them. Nor are they expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observation and experience of the affairs of life, but, on the contrary, to apply them to the evidence or facts in hand, to the end that their action may be intelligent and their conclusions correct. Thayer’s Treatise on Evidence, 194, 263, 277, 296; Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 663, 664, 21 L. Ed. 745; Head v. Hargrave, 105 U. S. 45, 49, 26 L. Ed. 1028; The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 110, 131, 17 Sup. Ct. 510, 41 L. Ed. 937; Bank
But it is urged that the evidence made such a finding inadmissible, because it conclusively proved that th-“ nail had been used as a pin for seven or eight months, during which it was shown to be quite adequate to the strain put upon it. The record does not sustain the contention. How long the nail had been used as a pin was not shown, save as its rusty condition may have warranted an inference that it had been in the spindle, with the incident exposure to the weather, for some time. At most that would have been only a permissible inference to be drawn by the jury, and not a necessary or conclusive one, because the nail may have been rusty when it was placed in the spindle. And for another reason the asserted proof of demonstrated adequacy was not conclusive. It consisted of statements that the derrick was used “off and on” from early in March until late in October following, that it was taken out on the road at times and then returned, that it was not in use all the time, but only occasionally, and that the extent of its use from early in June until late in October, so far as known by one of the crew, was seven or eight days. But there was no proof that during the periods of use, whatever they may have been, the nail was not appreciably yielding to the cutting or grinding action, indicated by the ends of its severed parts, which was incident to the uplift of the guy rod and the swinging of the boom from side to side when the derrick was in use.
It is also urged that such a finding was inadmissible, because there was no evidence of what pins were used by other owners and operators of like derricks. The contention must fail, because it proceeds upon a theory which gives undue and controlling influence to the conduct of others. Without question it would have been permissible to show what pins were used by other owners and operators of like derricks, for that would have been some evidence of what could have been, and ought to have been, done by the defendant; but evidence of that character was not indispensable, because the ultimate and controlling test of the exercise of reasonable care is, not what has been the practice of others in like situations, but what a reasonably prudent person would ordinarily have done in such a situation. The law is not so unreasonable as to afford no test .where there has been no practice by others with which the conduct in question can be compared; nor does it permit common sense and reason to lose their sway because, through ignorance, inattention, or selfishness, an unreasonable practice has prevailed. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. McDonough (C. C. A.) 161 Fed. 657, 665, and authorities there cited; Nyback v. Champagne Lumber Co., 48 C. C. A. 632, 638, 109 Fed. 732; Dawson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 52 C. C. A. 286, 288, 114 Fed. 870; Gilbert v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 63 C. C. A. 27, 32, 128 Fed. 529; 1 Labatt, Master and Servant, § 50.
It follows that the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). This case involves the liability of the master for the breach of its duty to its servant to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the selection, arrangement, and care of a simple machine which it furnished. In my opinion this liability is measured by the following- rules of law which I think have been established by decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court.
The limit of the duty and of the liability of the master is the exercise of ordinary care to furnish and keep in repair reasonably safe machinery. That duty is discharged and that liability ceases when the master has exercised ordinary care to furnish such machinery and appliances as persons of ordinary intelligence, prudence, and caution commonly supply under like circumstances. Washington, etc., Ry. Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554, 570, 10 Sup. Ct. 1044, 34 L. Ed. 235; Southern Pacific Company v. Seley, 152 U. S. 145, 153, 14 Sup. Ct. 530, 38 L. Ed. 391; Patton v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 179 U. S. 658, 664, 21 Sup. Ct. 275, 45 L. Ed. 361; Mississippi River Logging Co. v. Schneider, 20 C. C. A. 390, 393, 74 Fed. 195, 198; H. D. Williams Cooperage Co. v. Headrick, 159 Fed. 680, 682, 86 C. C. A. 548, 550. “The defendant was not a guarantor of the safety of its machinery, and was only bound to use ordinary care and prudence in the selection, arrangement, and care thereof, and had a right to use and employ such as the experience of trade and manufacture sanctioned. * ⅜ ⅜ Neither individuals nor corporations are bound as employers to insure the absolute safety of ihe machinery or mechanical appliances which they provide for the use of their employés, nor are they bound to supply the best, the safest, or newest of those appliances for the purpose of securing the safety of those who are thus cm-plovcd.” Washington, etc., Ry. Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554, 569, 570, 10 Sup. Ct. 1044, 1049, 34 L. Ed. 235.
The true test of ordinary care is that degree of care which persons of ordinary intelligence and prudence commonly exercise under similar circumstances. If the care used in a given case rises to or above that standard, there is no actionable negligence; if it falls below it, there is such negligence. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Daniels, 152 U. S. 684, 691, 14 Sup. Ct. 756, 38 L. Ed. 597; Southern Pacific Co. v. Hetzer, 68 C. C. A. 26, 35, 135 Fed. 272, 281, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 288; Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Egan, 159 Fed. 40, 45, 86 C. C. A. 230, 235; H. D. Williams Cooperage Co. v. Headrick, 159 Fed. 680, 682, 86 C. C. A. 548, 550; Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 416, 417, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 485; Washington, etc., Ry. Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554, 569, 10 Sup. Ct. 1044, 34
“The duty of the defendant towards him was the exercise of reasonable care in furnishing and keeping its machinery and appliances, about which he is required to perform his work, in a reasonably safe condition. It was the defendant’s duty also to use like ordinary care in selecting competent fellow servants and in a sufficient number to insure that the work would be safely done; and this duty was discharged by the defendant if the care disclosed by it in these several matters accorded with that reasonable skill and prudence and care which careful, prudent men, engaged in the same kind of business, ordinarily exercise.”
I do not assent to any direct or indirect departure from these rules. While it may be theoretically true that the measure of care required of a master is that which an ordinarily prudent man would have used under like circumstances, the best evidence what that degree of cafe was and the true standard of its measurement is the degree of care which ordinarily prudent, cautious, and rational employers ordinarily exercise under like circumstances. Where there is substantial and undisputed evidence what degree of care such employers commonly exercised in similar circumstances, and no evidence that the master failed to exercise that degree of care, it is not in my opinion permissible for the jury to speculate or opine that a reasonably prudent man would have exercised a higher degree of care than such men actually did exercise, and to char'ge the defendant with damages because he failed to reach such a speculative, variant, and uncertain standard. Southern Pacific Co. v. Hetzer, 135 Fed. 272, 68 C. C. A. 26, 35, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 288; Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. v. Egan, 159 Fed. 40, 45, 86 C. C. A. 230.
In the case at bar, however, there was no evidence what degree of care ordinarily cautious, prudent, and rational employers commonly exercise in the selection and care of such a machine as that in use at the time of the accident; and upon the ground that in the absence of such evidence, and in view of the proof of the size of the pin and of the size of the hole in which it was placed, of the character of the machine and of its work, I do not dissent from the conclusion that it was permissible for the jury in this case to find what degree of care an ordinarily prudent man would have exercised under like circumstances, and that the defendant failed to use that care.