97 Iowa 25 | Iowa | 1896
I. The record in this ease is somewhat lengthy and complicated. We shall endeavor to state the material facts, as gathered from the pleadings and evidence: The Des Moines Driving Park is a corporation, and was organized in 1891. It acquired by purchase about one hundred and twelve acres of land, part of which was conveyed to it by F. M. Hubbell, which consisted of certain large lots of official plats. Another part consisted of certain lots and blocks in the recorded plat of what was known as “Haines Park,”, the title to which was acquired by the driving park from another source, and also certain lots and blocks in the recorded plat of what was known as “West End.” Part of the entire tract above described had been platted as a part of West End and of Haines Park; but in March, 1892, the driving park vacated said plats, and the land covered by the descriptions by lots and blocks as conveyed to the driving park, as well as what had, before said vacation, been streets and alleys, was all embraced within the inclosure hereafter mentioned, and altogether constituted the one hundred and twelve acres, — the driving park. In 1892 this entire tract was, by the driving park, fenced in a common inclosure, A race track was constructed; an
II. As we understand this record, the appellants, Pelton, Laird, Jubb Bros., Des Moines Savings Bank, and F. C. Hubbell, claim liens, in the order in which we have named them, prior and superior to all other liens growing out of the statements filed, upon all of the property of the Des Moines Driving Park which was formerly embraced in what was known as “Haines Park” and “West End,” and especially as to so much thereof within said Haines Park and West End as was formerly embraced within the streets and alleys of said additions, which said additions, or the plats thereof, so far as the same are embraced within the driving park, have been vacated. The only matter in controversy on this appeal is as to whether appellants or appellees have the prior lien upon so much of the driving-park property as was formerly embraced within Haines Park and West End. Appellants claim that their liens upon said property are prior and
VIII. Appellees contend that they had a lien upon these streets and alleys superior to that of Hub-bell and the bank, by force of the statute, itself, and that the lien of the material man or laborer is good, as against a subsequent lien holder or purchaser, to the same extent that it is good against the owner. It is not disputed that the statute (chapter 100, Acts Sixteenth General Assembly) made all of the driving-park property subject to the appellees’ lien. But, to avail themselves of that right, they must pursue the course pointed out by the statute.' And a failure so to do, by not filing the statutory statement, will defeat
IX. Our conclusion, then, briefly stated, is that as to the appellant lien claimants Pelton, Laird and Jubb Bros., the decree below was correct, for reasons heretofore given; that, as to appellants Hubbell and the Des Moines Savings Bank, the decree of the lower court was in all respects correct, except that it erroneously found that appellee lien holders had a prior lien upon the ground formerly platted as streets and alleys, and embraced in Haines Park and West End, to the liens of Hubbell and the bank. The liens of appellants the Des Moines Savings Bank and E. C'.