55 Ill. 185 | Ill. | 1870
delivered the opinion of the Court:
There is but one question.of any considerable importance presented by the record in this case.
It is simply, whether a railroad company, which, by our statute, and the common law, is a common carrier of passengers, in a case where the company, by their rules and regulations, have designated a certain car in their passenger train for the exclusive use of ladies, and gentlemen accompanied by ladies, can exclude from the privileges of such car a colored woman, holding a first, class ticket, for no other reason except her color.
The evidence in the case establishes these facts—that, as was the custom on appellants’ road, they had set apart in their passenger trains a car for the exclusive use of ladies, and gentlemen accompanied by ladies, and that such a car, called the “ ladies’ car,” was attached to the train in question. The appellee resided at Eockford, and being desirous of going from that station to Belvidere, on the road of appellants, for that purpose purchased of the agent of the appellants a ticket, Avliich entitled the holder to a seat in a first class ear on their road. On the arrival of the train at the- Eockford station, the appellee offered and endeavored to enter the ladies’ car, but was refused permission so to do, and was directed to go forward to the car set apart for and occupied mostly by men. On the appellee persisting on entering the ladies’ car, force enough Avas used by the brakeman to prevent her. At the time she attempted to obtain a seat in that car, on appellants’ train, there were vacant and unoccupied seats in it, for one of the female witnesses states that she, with two other ladies, a few moments afterwards, entered the same car at that station, and found two vacant seats, and occupied the same. No objection Avhatever Avas made, nor is it insisted any other existed, to appellee taking a seat in the ladies’ car, except her color. The appellee Avas clad in plain and decent apparel, and it is not suggested, in the evidence or otherwise, that she was not a woman of good character and proper behavior.
It does not appear that the company had ever set apart a car for the exclusive use, or provided any separate seats for the use of colored persons who might desire to pass over their line of road. The evidence discloses that colored women sometimes'^ rode in the ladies’ car, and sometimes in the other car, and there was, in fact, no rule or regulation of the company in regard to colored passengers.
The case turns somewhat on what are reasonable rules, and the power of railroad companies to establish and enforce them.
It is the undoubted right of railroad companies to make all reasonable rules and regulations for the safety and comfort of passengers traveling on their lines of road. It is not only their right, but it is their duty to make such rules and regulations. It is alike the interest of the companies and the public that such rules should be established and enforced, and ample authority is conferred by law on the agents and servants of the companies to enforce all reasonable regulations made for the safety and convenience of passengers.
It was held, in the case of the Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Whittemore, 43 Ill. 423, that, for a non-compliance with a reasonable rule of the company, a party might be expelled from a train at a point other than a regular station.
If a person on a train becomes disorderly, profane or dangerous and offensive in his conduct, it is the duty of the conductor to expel such guilty party, or at least to assign him to a car where he will not endanger or annoy the other passengers. Whatever rules tend to the comfort, order and safety of the passengers, the company are fully authorized to make, and are amply empowered to enforce compliance therewith.
But such rules and regulations must always be reasonable, and uniform in respect to persons.
A railroad company can not capriciously discriminate between passengers on account of their nativity, color, race, social position, or their political or religious beliefs. Whatever discriminations are made, must be on some principle, or for some reason, that the law recognizes as just and equitable, and founded in good public policy. What are reasonable rules is a question of law, and is for the court to determine, under all the circumstances in each particular case.
In the present instance, the rule that set apart a car for the exclusive use of ladies, and gentlemen accompanied by ladies, is a reasonable one, and the power of the company to establish it has never been doubted.
If the appellee is to be denied the privilege of the “ ladies’ car,” for which she was willing to pay, and had paid, full compensation to the company, a privilege which is accorded alike to all women, whether they are rich or poor, it must be on some principle or under some rule of the company that the law would recognize as reasonable and just. If she was denied that privilege by the mere caprice of the brakeman and conductor, and under no reasonable rule of the company, or, what is still worse, as the evidence would indicate, through mere wantonness on the part of the brakeman, then it was unreasonable, and therefore unlawful. It is not pretended that there was any rule that excluded her, or that the managing officers of the company had ever given any directions to exclude colored persons from that car. If, however, there was such a rule, it could not be justified on the ground of mere prejudice. Such a rule must have for its foundation a better and a sounder reason, and one more in consonance with the enlightened judgment of reasonable men. An unreasonable rule, that affect^ the convenience and comfort of passengers, is unlawful, simply because it is unreasonable. The State v. Overton, 4 Zab. 435.
In the case of the West Chester & Philadelphia R. R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Penn. 209, it was admitted, that no one could be excluded from a carriage by a public carrier on account of color, religious belief, political relations or prejudice, but it was held, not to be an unreasonable regulation to seat passengers so as to preserve order and decorum, and prevent contacts and collisions arising from well known repugnances, and therefore a rule that required a colored woman to occupy a separate seat in a car furnished by the company, equally as comfortable and safe as that furnished for other passengers, was not an unreasonable rule.
(Under some circumstances, this might not be an unreasonable rule. )
At _all_events, public carriers, until, they do furnish separate seats equal in comfort and safety to those furnished for other travelers, must be held to have no right to discriminate between passengers on account of color, race or nativity, alone.
We do not understand that the appellee was bound to go forward to the car set apart for and occupied mostly by men, when she was directed by the brakeman. It is a sufficient answer to say, that that car was not provided by any rule of the company for the use of women, and that another one was. This fact was known to the appellee at the time. She may have undertaken the journey alone, in view of that very fact, as women often do.
The above views dispose of all the objections taken to the instructions given by the court on behalf of the appellee, and the refusal of the court to give those asked on the part of the appellants, except the one which tells the jury that they may give damages above the actual damages sustained, for the delay, vexation and indignity to which the appellee was exposed, if she was wrongfully excluded from the car. If the party in such case is confined to the actual pecuniary damages sustained, it would, most often, be no compensation at all, above nominal damages, and no salutary effect would be produced on the wrong doer by such a verdict. But we apprehend, that if the act is wrongfully and wantonly committed, the party may recover, in addition to the actual damages, something for the indignity, vexation, and disgrace to which the party has been subjected.
It is insisted, that the damages are excessive, in view of the slight injury sustained.
There is evidence from which the jury could find that the brakeman treated the appellee very rudely, and placed his hand on her and pushed her away from the car. The act was committed in a public place, and whatever disgrace was inflicted on her was in the presence of strangers and friends. The act was, in itself, wrongful, and without the shadow of a reasonable excuse, and the damages are not too high. The jury saw the witnesses, and heard their testimony, and with their finding we are fully satisfied.
Perceiving no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Sheldon, having heard this cause in the court below, took no part in this decision.
Bbeese, J. I am not prepared to assent to all the reasoning and conclusions of the above opinion, and I am further of opinion the damages are excessive.
