271 N.W. 256 | Neb. | 1937
These are companion cases in equity, in which identical issues are involved, and they differ only as to parties and amounts in suit. By stipulation of the parties, these cases were consolidated and heard as one case, upon a common record, though separate decrees were entered. The trial court denied plaintiffs any relief, and dismissed their actions, stating no reasons for his determinations, and plaintiffs have appealed upon a common record.
In this opinion we will consider the case of Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company (Charles P. Megan, Trustee, substituted) v. Otto J. Bauman, County Treasurer, et al., No. 29938. Our discussion here is applicable to case No. 29939, and the conclusion arrived at equally determinative thereof.
The petition before us challenges the correctness and regularity of certain proceedings taken by the city of Omaha in 1932-1933 in connection with the school districts thereof in the assessment, levy and collection of the respective taxes in suit for the benefit of each. The form in which these attacks of plaintiff are cast, as well as the reasons offered in support thereof, are varied and extended. However, analysis discloses that these objections all relate to, and grow out of, a course of official'procedure which we infer has continued for a number of years past, and which may be illustrated by the following:
Speaking generally, the prayer of the petition is for the recovery of the sum of $11,814.80 city and school district taxes, so placed on the assessment roll of 1933, heretofore paid by the petitioner under protest to the defendant county treasurer; for an injunction restraining further collection of certain city and school district taxes, in addition to those paid under protest, alleged to be thus illegally levied and assessed on plaintiff’s property; and also for a mandatory injunction directed to the taxing officers involved requiring the correction of their taxing methods to comply with plaintiff’s theory of the law governing that procedure.
As to the recovery by plaintiff of the sum of $11,814.80 alleged to have been unlawfully collected by the defendant county treasurer, the record discloses that this is the aggregate of payment of taxes made by plaintiff “under protest,” as provided by section 77-1923, Comp. St. 1929. -Within thirty days after each payment- the plaintiff herein filed with the proper officer a statement in writing, duly verified, setting forth the amount of taxes thus paid under
These admitted facts invoke the application of the following controlling principles:
(1) The propriety of this removal is unchallenged by the parties to this cause.- It has been actually accomplished. Under these circumstances this court does not see fit sua sponte to challenge the rightfulness of the proceeding, or to determine- that these causes of action under consideration do not appear to be removable. Rather we will adopt the contrary view, and, for the purposes of this case, will assume but not determine that the causes of action were properly removed. Therefore, we are within the scope of the rule often announced, as stated in Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U. S. 239, 244-245, viz.:
“If á case be a removable one, that is, if the suit, in its
It follows that the district court of the United States in and for the district of Nebraska, Omaha division, has authority to hear, determine, and render- judgment in the causes thus removed to it, to the exclusion of every other court. It also appears that this rule extends to and' includes within it any independent suit commenced subsequent to such removal to the federal court. Palmer v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 222 Fed. 461.
(2) The record also affirmatively discloses that the jurisdiction of the district court of the’ United States for the district of Nebraska, Omaha division, had attached to the controversy, so far as the causes of action involving the recovery of the $11,814.80 were concerned, prior to the filing of the plaintiff’s petition in the present' case. These facts bring the case within the principle ■announced by this court in Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald & Mallory Construction Co., 44 Neb. 463, 62 N. W. 899, viz.:
“It is a rule recognized alike by state and federal tribunals that the court which first acquires jurisdiction of the subject of an action will retain such jurisdiction until the final determination of the controversy.”
■ In Taylr v. Taintor, 16 Wall. (U. S.) 366, 370, the rule is stated in this language:
1 “Where a state court and a court of the United States may each take jurisdiction,- the tribunal- which first gets it holds it to the exclusion of the other, until its- duty- is
See, also, Sharon v. Sharon, 84 Cal. 424, 23 Pac. 1100; Patterson v. Veasey, 295 Fed. 163; Burke Construction Co. v. Kline, 271 Fed. 605; Ward v. Foulkrod, 264 Fed. 627; State v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 100 Neb. 268, 159 N. W. 410.
Therefore, it follows that this court will not entertain jurisdiction to determine plaintiff’s right of recovery as to the taxes paid by it under protest, and that the action of the trial court in denying a recovery therefor is approved.
The other demands of plaintiff in this proceeding, not embraced in the recovery of the moneys so paid “under protest,” must be determined by a proper construction of enactments applicable thereto.
It is a general rule: “In seeking to ascertain the legislative intent where the language of a statute is ambiguous, the courts will take into consideration all the facts and circumstances existing at the time of, and leading up to, its enactment, such as * * * the state of the existing law,” etc. 59 C. J. 1014.
This court announced this principle in the following form: “The legislature must be presumed to have had in mind all previous legislation upon the subject, so that in the construction of a statute we must consider the preexisting law and any other acts relating to the same subject.” Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 104 Neb. 93, 175 N. W. 531.
With these principles in view, we note that, “An act entitled ‘An act incorporating metropolitan cities, and defining, regulating, and prescribing their duties, powers, and government,’ ” was passed with an emergency clause, and was approved March 30, 1887. Laws 1887, ch. 10. This was the first creation of metropolitan cities in this state.
By section 10, ch. 7, Laws 1891, as subsequently enacted, pertaining to metropolitan cities and as part of the laws controlling city assessments, it was provided: “The valuation of such property to be taken from the last previous assessment book or books of the assessor, assessing property for and within metropolitan cities, as by him returned and assessed. The city clerk shall annually make a copy of such assessment for the purposes of taxation as herein provided and said assessor shall permit the making of the copy hereby contemplated.”
In State v. Mayor and City Council of the City of Omaha, 39 Neb. 745, 58 N. W. 442, this law of 1891 was construed as requiring estimates of metropolitan school districts to be filed with the city council, and it was held that the power to determine the amount necessary to be raised by taxation and the levy required for that purpose was left with the city council, and an injunction to control their discretion was denied.
• ' The next act which substantially changed the tax laws of ■ cities of the metropolitan class was chapter 10, Laws
The next important change in the municipal revenue laws occurred when chapter 14, Laws 1905, was passed, with an emergency clause, and which went into effect on the day of its approval, viz., April 3, 1905. It repealed the provisions of law providing for a city tax commissioner, the annual listing and assessment of property by that officer and his deputies, the review and equalization thereof by city officials, and the extension thereof in a separate city tax list, etc. Among the powers vested by it in metropolitan cities was: “In addition to the powers herein granted, cities governed by this act shall have power by ordinance: * * * To levy any tax or special assessment authorized by law.” Section 144.
Section 143 provided in part: “When by this act the power is conferred upon the mayor and council to do and
Section 144a-provided: ’ “The city council of such city is hereby' authorized, . directed and required -to levy and collect the number of miles (mills) reported and demanded by the board of education of metropolitan school districts as now and heretofore required by the law governing such school districts and nothing herein contained shall be -construed to in any manner repeal, amend or abridge such school law.” s ■ 1
Section 145 reads in part: “It shall be the duty of the council to annually certify by resolution- to the county clerk of the county in which such city is located, a gross sum to be raised by taxation for. all municipal-purposes for the ensuing calendar year upon all taxable property within the limits of the city. * * * The council shall certify such sums before the’ county board of equalization has made .a levy for county taxes.- The council shall also certify the levy required by the board of education of such metropolitan school district and any other sum to the said ■ county clerk as may be required by this act or by general law.” , In section 146 the following appears: “The city council shall annually, in the first week in January after .the .levy provided for in the above section, set -aside- the following funds to be designated specific funds.”
Section 160 provided for the following powers: “All general taxes of the city on personal and real property in such city shall be levied, and collected as follows: The city council shall annually certify to the county clerk the amount of general tax required for the ensuing year and shall so certify in the time and in the manner required by the general revenue law of the state. The county board shall fix the rate of levy necessary to raise said amount on said property as assessed by the county officers and the state board of equalization and returned to the county clerk. The general taxes of such city shall be entered and collected as a part of the consolidated tax of such county.”
It is stated in section 163: “All general municipal taxes upon real estate shall be a first lien upon the real estate upon which it is levied and take priority over all other encumbrances and liens thereon.”
Section 166 provides: “No warrant other than the warrant of the county clerk, issued to the county treasurer, under the general revenue law shall be necessary for collection of the general taxes levied for such cities.”
Section 185 provided for the relevy of any tax which was rendered invalid by any defect, error or irregularity.
Section 216 reads as follows: “The provisions of this act shall not be so construed as to impair or aifect the validity of any tax or special assessment heretofore made or levied under the acts by this act repealed, but all such taxes and special assessments shall be and remain as valid and binding as if this act had not been passed, and shall be collected and enforced in the manner provided, or which may hereafter be provided by law for collecting and enforcing the same. Nothing herein shall be so construed as to prevent further and additional provisions being made for the collection of any tax or special assessment heretofore levied or made.”
■ It appears that these provisions were subsequently aihended, but only in minor particulars. Thus, for instance, in 1921 the words, “the number of mills which the city desires to be levied on each dollar” valuation, were by chapter 116 of Laws 1921 substituted for the words, “a
In substance, the general scheme of municipal taxation established by the act of 1905 thereafter continued unchanged, and many of its special provisions hereinbefore set out were incorporated in the Compiled Statutes of 1929 as sections 14-110, 14-501, 14-514, 14-548, 14-549, 14-554.
It follows, therefore, that the facts and circumstances existing at the time and leading up to the enactment of chapter 14, Laws 1905, and the construction and interpretation thereof as made thereafter by the municipal authorities become important in the interpretation of the controlling statutory provisions in the instant case.
It seems we are committed to the view that the construction of statutory provisions of doubtful meaning given them by those whose duty it was to enforce them, and which construction the legislature has by its continued noninterference for a number of years acquiesced in, will be approved, unless as thus construed they contravene some provision of the Constitution, or are clearly wrong. State v. Bryan, 112 Neb. 692, 200 N. W. 870. See, also, 36 Cyc. 1140; State v. Holcomb, 46 Neb. 88, 64 N. W. 437; State v. Sheldon, 78 Neb. 552, 111 N. W. 372; Rohrer v. Hastings Brewing Co., 83 Neb. 111, 119 N. W. 27; Elmen v. State Board of Equalization and Assessment, 120 Neb. 141, 231 N. W. 772.
The act of 1905, possibly for the purpose of effecting a saving of taxpayers’ money, clearly evidences, the legislative intent to completely dispense with the city tax commissioner, the listing and valuation of property for taxation for any purpose between the 15th day of September and the 15th day of November of each year, the review and equalization of such assessment by city officials, and the making of a city tax list, all at the expense of the city.
However, by, this act the power to determine, levy and certify to the county commissioner the general taxes upon personal and real property was vested in the city council. The corresponding dates of required payment of such taxes
If it be conceded that the several provisions of the law of T905, defining and vesting the right to levy taxes in cities of the metropolitan class, when construed together, create an ambiguity as to some details to be observed in carrying such powers into effect, such fact does not destroy the clear public duty to levy and collect such taxes. Express provisions in the statutes already quoted provide for that contingency. Therefore, we must conclude that, the right to levy the taxes by the municipal authorities being clearly conferred, the power of the municipality, in an appropriate manner, to supply “the -details necessary for the full exercise of such power” must be admitted. Laws 1905, ch. 14, sec. 143, now Comp. St. 1929, sec. 14-110.
But, in the natural progress of events the interpretation of this 1905 law was presented to the municipal authorities in December, 1905. The saving clause thereof, above quoted (section 216),-had continued the full force and effect of the levy made in February, 1905. This levy of February, 1905, so continued, was made on the listing and valuation as made by the city tax commissioner and deputies between September 15, 1904, and November 15, following. The pro
As to the questioned levies of city taxes which are not included in the causes of action removed to. the federal district court, the procedure followed by the taxing authorities,-so far as disclosed by the-record and the facts as found in plaintiffs briefs, appears to have been in substantial conformity with the provisions of the act of 1905 as thereafter continued by subsequent -amendments and reenactments, and which are now in force.
The form of the action, as well as the issues as framed by the pleadings, imposed upon the plaintiff the burden of establishing the invalidity of the city taxes challenged, and this it has failed to do.
In this connection, we do not overlook the provisions of chapter 134 of the Laws of 1933. Assuming, but not determining, the validity of this enactment, its provisions are limited to dates of payment, dates of delinquency, and interest on city taxes, etc. Neither expressly nor by necessary implication does it in any manner alter the prescribed course of procedure in the determination of valuations, the securing of a listing of assessable property, and the making of the proper levy thereon. These remain unchanged, and since 1906 there has been provided by law but one annual levy of city and school district taxes. The effect of chapters 134 and 135 of the Laws of 1933, so far as applicable to the matters here under consideration, must be deemed as an act of grace on the part of the sovereign, extending the time for. payment and delinquency of city levies of taxes to the respective dates expressed in these new enactments.
There being no proof in the record of the making of a double levy and assessment in any one year, this act of grace may not be made the basis of an attack on taxes in their origin properly annually levied and assessed.
Therefore, it follows that the actions of the district court for Douglas county in denying the relief prayed for and in dismissing this proceeding, as well as that of Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company v. Bauman, No. 29939, were, in all respects, correct and its judgments are
Affirmed.