Chiara v. DernagoChiara v. Dernago
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
On May 7, 2005, the defendant Sean P. Dernago was driving a box truck owned by his employer, the defendant Connecticut Shellfish Co. (hereinafter Shellfish), when he was involved in a three-vehicle collision on the George Washington Bridge. The plaintiffs, who were passengers in one of the other vehicles involved in the collision, commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the accident. Although the causes of actiоn asserted by the infant plaintiff were settled during a trial on the issue of liability, the claims asserted by the plaintiff Venetia K. Chiara (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) were submitted to a jury.
The evidence at the trial оn the issue of liability demonstrated that, several hours before the accident, Dernago drove a Shellfish company truck to a Hooters restaurant in Paramus, New Jersey, and spent approximately two hours there. During that time, he discussed Shellfish‘s product with the restaurant manager and consumed multiple beers. Although Dernago could not remember the exact number of beers he drank at the restaurant, he stated that it was probably no more than 10. After he left the restaurant, he stopped at a nearby Red Lobster restaurant to make a delivery and then drove toward the Bronx to make another stop. Shortly after Dernago drove onto the George Washington Bridge, he veered from his lane more than once, rear-ended a pickup truck, and effectively “launched” the pickup truck into the plaintiffs’ vehicle. After the accident, Dernago approached the plaintiffs’ vehicle “talking basic
After a trial on the issue of damages, the Supreme Court provided the jury with appropriate instructions on рunitive damages. In this regard, it charged the jury that it may award punitive damages against Dernago if it found, by clear and convincing evidence, that his acts were wanton, reckless, and representative оf a high degree of immorality. The jury found that the injured plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the significant limitation of use category of
The defendants separately moved to set aside the verdict on the issue of damagеs and for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of damages as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial on that issue. They argued thаt there was insufficient evidence supporting the jury‘s determination that the injured plaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of
“Before granting a motion pursuant to
Here, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendants’ separate posttrial motions which were to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of damages and for judgment as a matter of law. The injured plaintiff presented the testimony of her treating physician, who stated that the injured plaintiff sustained injuries to her cervical spine as a result of the subject accident. The treating physician based his opinion on the absence of symptoms prior to the accident, the intervening act of a traumatic injury, and his subsеquent physical findings. Further, he examined the injured plaintiff less than two months after the accident, approximately three years after the accident, and once again less than one week bеfore he testified at trial. On each occasion, he made the same findings that the plaintiff had a significantly decreased range of motion with respect to her cervical spine. Although the рhysician conceded that an MRI film showed degeneration in the injured plaintiff‘s cervical spine, he stated that it also showed disc herniations which were caused by the accident. Based on the foregoing evidence and the other evidence presented at trial, a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion that the injured plaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of
Furthеrmore, the jury‘s finding that the plaintiff sustained a serious injury under the significant limitation of use category of
Contrary to Dernago‘s contention, the jury‘s award of punitive damages in the sum of $70,000 against him was supported by clear and convincing evidence (see Randi A. J. v Long Is. Surgi-Ctr., 46 AD3d 74, 86 [2007]). Whereas compensаtory damages are intended to assure that the victim receives “fair and just compensation commensurate with the injury sustained,” punitive damages are meant to “punish the tortfeasor and to detеr this wrongdoer and others similarly situated from indulging in the same conduct in the future” (Ross v Louise Wise Servs., Inc., 8 NY3d 478, 489 [2007]; see Sharapata v Town of Islip, 56 NY2d 332, 335 [1982]; Walker v Sheldon, 10 NY2d 401, 404 [1961]; Western N.Y. Land Conservancy, Inc. v Cullen, 66 AD3d 1461, 1463 [2009]). Evidence that a defendant was driving while intoxicated is insufficient, standing alone, to justify the imposition of punitive damages (see Rodgers v Duffy, 95 AD3d 864, 866-867 [2012]; D‘Angelo v Litterer, 77 AD3d 1373, 1374 [2010]; Trudeau v Cooke, 2 AD3d 1133, 1134 [2003]; Deon v Fortuna, 283 AD2d 388, 389 [2001]). Howevеr, driving while intoxicated may support an award for punitive damages where there is additional evidence that the defendant engaged in “wanton and reckless” conduct evincing heedlessness and аn utter disregard for the safety of others (Schragel v Juszczyk, 43 AD3d 1375, 1375 [2007]; see Parkhill v Cleary, 305 AD2d 1088, 1089 [2003]; Taylor v Dyer, 190 AD2d 902, 903 [1993]; Sweeney v McCormick, 159 AD2d 832, 834 [1990]; see also Deon v Fortuna, 283 AD2d at 389). An evaluation of whether punitive damages are warranted must be made “on a case-by-case basis taking into account the nature of the actor‘s conduct and the level of his intoxication” (Sweeney v McCormick, 159 AD2d at 834). Here, a determination that Dernago‘s conduct was wanton and reckless is supported by evidence that he consumed numerous beers and attained а blood alcohol content of at least .172 of one percent by weight, over twice the legal limit, before driving his company‘s box truck onto the George Washington Bridge, and causing a multi-vehicle accident by rear-ending a pick-up truck. Dernago was essentially incoherent at the scene of the accident, and could not even recall undergoing a field sobriety test. Under all of the circumstances, the jury‘s award of punitive damages was entirely appropriate to punish
Rivera, J.P., Sgroi, Maltese and LaSalle, JJ., concur.