119 F.2d 459 | D.C. Cir. | 1941
The question is whether, as the District Court held, the District of Columbia is exempt from garnishment proceedings for the collection of a private judgment.
The Act of Feb. 21, 1871, created “a government by the name of the District of Columbia, by which name it is hereby constituted a body corporate for municipal purposes, and may contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, have a seal, and exercise all other powers of a municipal corporation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the provisions of this act.”
Affirmed.
The judgment debtor is a nurse at Gallinger Hospital and is paid by tbe District of Columbia.
D.C.Code, 1929, Tit. 24, Secs. 123, 287, 31 Stat. 1259, 1360.
56 A.L.R. 601, 602.
16 Stat. 419, D.C.Code of 1929, p. 469.
Derr & Thompson v. Lubey, 1 MacArthur (8 D.C.) 187.
Pottier & Stymus Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 3 MacArthur (10 D.C.) 4; Brown v. Finley, 3 MacArthur (10 D.C.) 77.
20 Stat. 102, D.C.Code of 1929, p. 477.
Columbia Brick Co. v. District of Columbia, 1 App.D.C. 351.
Cf. United States v. Cooper Corporation, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. — (March 31, 1941), holding that the United States
309 U.S. 242, 245, 246, 247, 60 S.Ct. 488, 490, 84 L.Ed. 724.