Lead Opinion
Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer must pay a death benefit to the dependents of an employee who dies as a result of a work-related injury. (Lab. Code, § 4701, subd. (b); all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.) In cases of partial dependency, the death benefit is “four times the amount annually devoted to the support of the partial dependents” subject to a statutory cap linked to the date of the decedent’s fatal injury. (§ 4702, subd. (a)(4) (hereafter § 4702(a)(4)).) This amount, like all questions relating to dependency, is to be determined in accordance with the facts as they exist at the time of the decedent’s injury. (§ 3502; Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1982)
The income used as the basis on which to calculate the amount annually devoted to the partial dependents’ support may be easily ascertained when the time of injury occurs while the decedent was employed and receiving a paycheck, and wages are the sole source of support. Here, we are asked to decide how a surviving spouse’s partial dependency death benefit should be computed when the amount of support contributed by the decedent at the time of injury includes income that is not lost as a result of his or her death.
The Court of Appeal concluded the partial dependency death benefit must be based on the amount of support lost or otherwise affected by the decedent’s death, and cannot include income and investments which did not terminate or change as a result of death. Because we find the limitation imposed by the Court of Appeal’s construction unsupported by the statutory language of section 4702(a)(4), and the entire statutory scheme of which that provision is a part, we conclude the Court of Appeal erred in adopting such a post mortem approach to calculating the death benefit in this case.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The parties in this matter have litigated numerous issues in the 11 years since the death benefit application was first filed, all but one of which are now resolved. The undisputed facts and procedural history relevant to the remaining question presented for this court’s review are as follows.
The decedent, Harvey Steele, worked as an insulator for Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (Chevron), and was exposed to asbestos from 1951 through September 15, 1975. On September 28, 1976, he was diagnosed with parenchymal asbestosis due to asbestos inhalation. He filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits and, in November 1981, was assigned a permanent disability fating of 63 percent for the asbestosis injury.
Lucille Steele, decedent’s wife, applied for a workers’ compensation death benefit on December 2, 1987. Chevron paid Mrs. Steele a total of $8,041 in death benefits at the rate of $119 per week through February 1989, but terminated payments while contesting Mrs. Steele’s claim that the date of injury for the mesothelioma was August 12, 1987. On June 7, 1989, the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) determined the date of injury for the mesothelioma was August 12, 1987. Adopting the report and recommendation of the WCJ, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Board) denied Chevron’s petition for reconsideration of the date of injury finding. Chevron challenged the Board’s order in a petition for a writ of review. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order of the Board in a published opinion. (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1990)
On remand from the Court of Appeal, the case went forward on the question of dependency. In a November 1990 decision, the WCJ found in relevant part that Mrs. Steele was partially dependent on decedent at the time of injury, and awarded her a death benefit in the amount of $63,600. Relying on Mrs. Steele’s testimony at a June 13, 1989, hearing, and taking into account that both Mr. and Mrs. Steele were retired at the time of injury, the WCJ computed the amount of the death benefit on the basis of income from decedent’s Social Security benefits and Army pension, and decedent’s one-half community property interest in income from investment accounts, interest from a savings account, and mortgage payments received from a debtor. The WCJ did not include in the calculation the $3,350 received in 1987 from the sale of land and the $30,108.50 withdrawn in 1987 from an executive life annuity funded by decedent’s lump-sum retirement benefit. Mrs. Steele and Chevron each sought reconsideration of the WCJ’s findings. The Board granted both petitions and, on July 22, 1991, issued an opinion rescinding the WCJ’s findings and award. In addition to making other findings not relevant here, the Board awarded to Mrs. Steele the applicable statutory maximum death benefit of $70,000, but failed to state its reasons for doing so.
Chevron again sought judicial review of the Board’s decision after reconsideration, this time contesting the computation and amount of the partial
In a March 6, 1995, opinion following remand by the Court of Appeal, the Board determined Mrs. Steele was partially dependent on decedent at the time of injury and entitled to a death benefit of $64,657.92. Relying on the testimony of Mrs. Steele given at the June 13,1989, hearing before the WCJ, the Board found all of decedent’s income at the time of injury was used for the couple’s mutual support and concluded that, at the time of injury, decedent was contributing the following annual amounts to Mrs. Steele’s support: $8,646 in Social Security benefits, $756 in Army pension benefits, $418.26 in interest received in 1987 from a savings account funded by decedent’s Social Security benefits, $2,159.47 and $2,209.70 representing decedent’s one-half community property share of investment income from the Franklin Fund and Dean Witter, respectively, and $1,975.05 representing decedent’s one-half community property share of mortgage payments received from a debtor. In its brief on remand, Chevron argued that the determination of the extent of Mrs, Steele’s partial dependency should be based on the amount of support she lost as a result of decedent’s death, pointing out that some of the support contributed by decedent to Mrs. Steele at the time of injury continued after decedent’s death. The Board rejected Chevron’s argument, finding no support for such an approach in the Labor Code or in the relevant decisional law.
Chevron petitioned the Board for reconsideration, asserting the Board erred in basing Mrs. Steele’s death benefit on investment income which was not lost after decedent’s death. On May 18, 1995, the Board issued an opinion and order denying reconsideration, and Chevron sought review in the Court of Appeal. Granting Chevron’s petition for a writ of review, the Court of Appeal once again annulled the Board’s order, concluding the Board erred in its partial dependency determination by including in the calculation community income Mrs. Steele continued to receive after decedent’s death. The Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the Board with directions to redetermine Mrs. Steele’s death benefit by verifying the amount of support lost or otherwise affected by decedent’s death. The court opined that, subject to verification on remand, the death benefit calculation should
Mrs. Steele sought review of the Court of Appeal’s determination that the partial dependency death benefit must be based on income lost as result of the decedent’s death, and we granted her petition for review.
n. Discussion
A. Overview of the Statutory Scheme
Article XIV, section 4 of the California Constitution vests authority in the Legislature to create and enforce a system for workers’ compensation making “adequate provisions for the comfort, health and safety and general welfare of any and all workers and those dependent upon them for support to the extent of relieving from the consequences of any injury or death incurred or sustained by workers in the course of their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party . . . .” Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer is liable for a death benefit to the dependents of an employee who dies as a result of a work-related injury. (§§ 3600, 4701, subd. (b).) Except in certain situations not applicable here, the death benefit is a dependent’s exclusive remedy against the employer for the employee’s work-related death. (§ 3602.)
The death benefit is based on the number and type of dependents. (§ 4702.) A dependent must be either a good faith member of the employee’s household or family, or related to the employee in one of the ways listed by statute, for example, a spouse, child, parent, or grandchild. (§ 3503.) Dependency can be total or partial. (§ 4702.) Under the statutory scheme, certain dependents are conclusively presumed to be totally dependent. (See, e.g., § 3501, subd. (a) [employee’s minor child or mentally or physically incapacitated child].) If a conclusive presumption of total dependency does not apply, the individual claiming entitlement to a death benefit must establish either total or partial dependency in fact. (ARCO, supra,
The identity of dependents, whether their dependency is total or partial, and the extent of partial dependency are “determined in accordance with the facts as they exist at the time of the injury of the employee.” (§ 3502; Massey v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993)
In order to substantiate partial dependency, the death benefit claimant must prove the actual dollar amount annually devoted by the decedent to his or her support. (ARCO, supra,
In the case of a partially dependent surviving spouse, the death benefit calculation involves “the actual amount which the deceased spouse devoted to the community and to the surviving spouse.” (ARCO, supra,
B. Determination of the Amount Annually Devoted to the Partial Dependents’ Support
In the decision below, the Court of Appeal directed the Board to recalculate Mrs. Steele’s death benefit based on the actual loss of annual support from decedent at the time of injury, excluding from the computation any income that did not terminate or change as a result of decedent’s death. In the Court of Appeal’s view, it is the loss of annual monetary support to the dependent and the marital community that controls the calculation of death benefits under the statutory scheme. The court reasoned that because the death benefit depends on the extent of actual dependency, the only way the amount annually devoted to the support of the dependent can be reasonably and consistently determined is to identify support at the date of injury that terminated with the death of the decedent. The court found further support for its construction of section 4702(a)(4) in this court’s observation in Spreckels, supra,
In reaching its conclusion in this case, the Court of Appeal read into the statutory provision governing the calculation of Mrs. Steele’s death benefit a limitation as to the type of income on which the amount devoted to the
On its face, section 4702(a)(4) speaks of an “amount annually devoted to the support of the partial dependents,” and by its terms places no further qualifications on the type of income on which the death benefit calculation may 'be based. Although a court is not required to apply the literal meaning of a provision if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988)
Nor is the Court of Appeal’s limiting construction of section 4702(a)(4) consistent with the principle that when provisions of the workers’ compensation laws relating to death benefits are susceptible of an interpretation either beneficial or detrimental to the dependent, or an ambiguity appears, they must be construed favorably to the dependent. (Department of Corrections v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979)
Finally, the Court of Appeal’s construction of section 4702(a)(4), which requires a postdeath inquiry into whether or not income terminated with the death of the decedent, is contrary to the specific and unambiguous command of section 3502 that questions of dependency “shall be determined in accordance with the facts as they exist at the time of the injury of the employee.” As the decisions of this court and other Courts of Appeal have recognized, the clear statutory directive of section 3502 is that the time of injury, rather than the date of death, governs the dependency determination. In Granell v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1944)
The statutory command that the time of injury, rather than the date of death, controls the dependency determination also underlies the decision in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Chavez (1936)
Chevron argues decisions of this court support a construction of section 4702(a)(4) requiring the partial dependent to establish a loss of support resulting from the decedent’s death. More specifically, Chevron points to language in several cases expressing the view that the Legislature’s purpose in providing for a workers’ compensation death benefit was to compensate for the loss of support resulting from the employee’s death. In Spreckels, supra,
Although the cases Chevron relies on as support for the Court of Appeal’s construction of section 4702(a)(4) speak of a “loss of support” as the purpose underlying the workers’ compensation death benefit generally, a close review of these decisions discloses neither was concerned with the question of statutory construction presented here.
In Spreckels, supra,
In another case cited by Chevron, ARCO, supra,
Contrary to Chevron’s argument, nothing in these cases can be taken as an endorsement by this court of the Court of Appeal’s loss of support construction of section 4702(a)(4). It is axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court. An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered. (People v. Banks (1993)
Chevron argues finally that the term “support” in section 4702(a)(4) relates only to an employee’s earnings from employment and does not include income from investments or savings.
In Great Western Power, the decedent had been working for the employer for only a few months at the time the fatal injury occurred. Prior to his employment there, the decedent engaged in contracting work and earned wages hiring out himself and his team of horses. (191 Cal. at pp. 732, 736.) During the four-and-a-half-month period preceding his fatal injury, the decedent also had income from sales of furs, livestock, and milk. (Id. at p. 734.)
The court annulled an award of death benefits to the decedent’s dependent family members, finding the Industrial Accident Commission erred in determining the amount devoted by the decedent to their support. (Great Western Power, supra, 191 Cal. at pp. 733-738.) Relying on the reasoning of Spreckels, supra,
Great Western Power affirms that, under the applicable statutory framework, the partial dependency death benefit is based on the amount decedent was devoting to the dependents at the time of injury. The measure of support is an amount ascertainable at a single point in time, the time of injury, and multiplied accordingly to reach the annual rate of contribution. Although the decedent’s earnings from employment undoubtedly provide a meaningful and ascertainable measure of his contribution to the dependents’ support, nothing in the reasoning of Great Western Power suggests the death benefit calculation is limited to income that is employment-derived. Like the Spreckels decision on which it relied, Great Western Power focused on the requisite temporal connection between the support devoted by the decedent and the time of injury, not on the character of the income itself. Notwithstanding Chevron’s contrary contention, so long as the decedent’s income is capable of measurement as a rate of contribution at the time of injury, it may properly be included as part of “the amount annually devoted to the support of the partial dependents” within the meaning of section 4702(a)(4), regardless of whether or not it derives from the employment relationship.
Chevron also finds support for its argument that only earnings from decedent’s employment constitute support within the meaning of section 4702(a)(4) in certain language in ARCO, supra,
Nor are we persuaded that because the partial dependency death benefit statute previously referenced “average annual earnings,” it should be interpreted as if it still did. As originally enacted in 1937, section 4702 provided that the death benefit in a case of total dependency was “three times the
At a minimum, the elimination of the phrase “average annual earnings” from the total dependency formula renders the partial dependency formula ambiguous. As discussed above, when provisions of the workers’ compensation laws relating to death benefits are ambiguous, they must be construed favorably to the dependent. (See ante, at pp. 1192-1193.) Although section 4702(a)(4) can arguably be read to impose an “earnings” limitation, the statutory language does not compel such an interpretation. Moreover, such an interpretation is extremely harsh, especially in cases of death from employment-related injuries, like mesothelioma, that occur after retirement, when the employee is no longer receiving any earnings from employment.
III. Conclusion and Disposition
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeal, annulling the order of the Board, is reversed, except to the extent the Court of Appeal reversed the statutory penalty the Board had imposed on Chevron. (See ante, p. 1189, fn. 1.) The matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal with instructions to reinstate the Board’s order and award with the exception of the statutory penalty.
George, C. J., Kennard, J., Baxter, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.
Notes
The Court of Appeal also reversed a statutory penalty the Board had imposed on Chevron. (See § 5814.) Mrs. Steele did not seek review of this aspect of the Court of Appeal’s decision, and, accordingly, we have no occasion to address it here.
Former section 9, subdivision (c)(2) read in relevant part: “ ‘In case the deceased employee leaves no person wholly dependent upon him for support, but one or more persons partially dependent therefor, the said dependents shall be allowed ... a death benefit which shall amount to three times the annual amount devoted by the deceased to the support of the person or persons so partially dependent.’ ” (Spreckels, supra,
Chevron did not raise this argument prior to its briefing in this court and promptly abandoned it at oral argument. Nonetheless, since our dissenting colleague advances a similar argument, we proceed to address it here.
In Great Western Power, the decedent’s industrial injury and death occurred on the same day, September 17, 1920. (Great Western Power, supra, 191 Cal. at pp. 733-734.) Although the court was imprecise in using the terms “time of injury” and “time of death” interchangeably, it is clear from its reliance on Spreckels that the court understood the time of injury, rather than the time of death, to be the focal point of the partial dependency determination. (Id. at p. 736.)
The Workers’ Compensation Act is designed to “accomplish substantial justice . . . expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character.” (Cal. Const., art. XIV, § 4.) “Enactment of the workers’ compensation statutes represented a trade-off between the interests of employers and employees: ‘The employer accepted no-fault liability in exchange for a fixed and ascertainable liability. The worker gave up the possibility of tort damages for limited benefits payable without the need for litigation.’ [Citation.]” (Riley v. Southwest Marine, Inc. (1988)
Dissenting Opinion
I dissent.
In what the majority explain as an attempt to avoid a harsh result for the applicant in this matter, they construe Labor Code section 4702, subdivision (a)(4), to provide for a partial dependency death benefit that was not contemplated by the Legislature. Their construction of the provision not only overlooks important historical and contextual evidence of what the statutory text was intended to mean, but results in an anomaly that is inconsistent with the policies underlying our workers’ compensation scheme.
For the reasons discussed below, I conclude that in a case of partial dependency, the Labor Code provides for a death benefit of four times the amount of earnings from employment annually devoted to the support of the partial dependent at the time of the decedent’s injury. (Lab. Code, § 4702, subd. (a)(4).)
I
A brief summary of the relevant background is as follows.
Decedent Harvey Steele, an employee of defendant Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., (hereafter Chevron), filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits after
In December 1987, decedent’s wife, Lucille, applied for a workers’ compensation death benefit. In June 1989, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (hereafter the board) ordered that the date of injury for the purposes of the death benefits was August 12, 1987. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order. (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1990)
In March 1995, the board determined that Lucille, also retired, was only a partial dependent at the time of her husband’s diagnosis with mesothelioma; it was undisputed that she was receiving both Social Security and pension benefits. The board awarded her a death benefit of $64,657.92. It computed the amount based on decedent’s Army pension, Social Security benefits, interest from a savings account, and his community property interest in investment income and in mortgage payments from a debtor.
The Court of Appeal annulled the board’s order, concluding that the amount of death benefit should be based only on the amount of support Lucille lost as a result of decedent’s death. Thus, it concluded, the death benefit should be based only on decedent’s Social Security benefits and Army pension, which terminated at the time of decedent’s death.
We granted review; I would now reverse.
II
It is undisputed that decedent’s wife was a partial dependent at the time of the injury, i.e., the date when decedent was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Accordingly, the extent of her dependency must be determined by the facts as they existed at that time. (Lab. Code, § 3502.)
Labor Code section 4702, subdivision (a)(4), in relevant part provides: “[T]he death benefit. . . fl[] . . . ft[] [i]n the case of no total dependents and
The provision refers to a benefit for partial dependents of “four times the amount annually devoted to the support of the partial dependents.” (Italics added.) The critical question, then, is “amount” of what? The Court of Appeal concluded that the “amount” consisted of income from any source whatsoever that was “lost” as a result of the employee’s death. Thus, it could be based on decedent’s Army pension and possibly his Social Security benefits—because those benefits would terminate with his death—but could not include any income that would continue to be received by the partial dependent. The majority reject that view, concluding that the “plain meaning” of the phrase “amount annually devoted to the support” necessarily includes all income from any source whatsoever, including investment income and interest from savings, regardless of whether the partial dependent will continue to receive that income after the employee’s death.
I disagree. The phrase “amount annually devoted” is not susceptible of either the Court of Appeal’s or the majority’s broad reading.
The statutory phrase, “amount annually devoted to the support of the partial dependents,” has not changed since 1937, when the statute was first enacted. The original form of the statute was: “The death benefit shall be a sum sufficient to equal: ft¡] (a) In a case of total dependency, three times the average annual earnings of the deceased employee. [^] (b) In a case of partial dependency only, three times the amount annually devoted to support of the dependents by the employee.” (Stats. 1937, ch. 90, § 4702, p. 284.) In context, the term “amount” clearly, though implicitly, meant the “amount of earnings” annually devoted to support of the dependents”—not the amount of all income from any source whatsoever, or even the amount of income from any source whatsoever that was “lost” as a result of the employee’s death.
We so interpreted the statute in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra,
In Power Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1923)
Spreckels S. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1921)
To be sure, Labor Code section 4702, subdivision (a), was subsequently amended to provide, in the case of total dependents, for a fixed amount— i.e., one set by statute and not based on annual earnings. (See Stats. 1955, ch. 956, § 6, pp. 1852-1853.) That does not, however, change the meaning of the provision relating to partial dependents which continues to refer to “the amount annually devoted to the support of the dependents.”
The majority acknowledge the fact that “ ‘the amount annually devoted to support of the dependents’ ” meant, as originally enacted, “ ‘the amount of earnings annually devoted to support of the dependents’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1198). They conclude, however, that subsequent amendments to the statute with regard to benefits for total dependents have “[a]t a minimum” resulted in an ambiguity that must be resolved favorably to decedent’s wife here. This is unpersuasive. There is no ambiguity when the provision for partial dependents is, as it must be, read in the context of its legislative history. As we stated in Nickelsberg v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1991)
The majority also assert that their construction of the term “amount” to mean amount of income from any source whatsoever is supported by the general principle, derived from Labor Code section 3202, that the workers’ compensation law must be liberally construed in favor of extending benefits. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1192.) But, like the “plain meaning” rule, that principle does not permit us to ignore the historical and contextual evidence of the statutory language whenever there is any dispute concerning the meaning of a provision. “ ‘[A] rule of construction ... is not a straitjacket. Where the Legislature has not set forth in so many words what it intended, the rule of construction should not be followed blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent.’ ” (People v. Jones (1988)
Moreover, as the majority read it, the provision computes the level of a benefit based on investment income unrelated to employment. They point to no other provision in the Workers Compensation Act that has a similar effect. Rather, other workers’ compensation benefits are calculated based on the employee’s earnings. (See Lab. Code, §§ 4653, 4654, 4658, subd. (a)(2).) Indeed, under Labor Code section 4702, subdivision (b), “[t]he death benefit in all cases shall be paid in installments in the same manner and amounts as temporary total disability indemnity would have to be made to the employee . . . .” Temporary total disability payments are based on average weekly earnings during the period of such disability. (Lab. Code, § 4653.) They are thus ordinarily calculated based on wage loss.
Nor does the majority’s approach appear consistent with the purpose of the workers’ compensation laws: the partial dependents of an indigent employee unemployed at time of an injury resulting in death will receive nothing, while the partial dependents of an affluent employee also unemployed at the time of an injury resulting in death but who has income from independent sources will receive a benefit tied to how much he or she received from those sources. Moreover, under the majority’s reasoning this peculiar result must apply not only in the relatively rare case of postemployment injury, e.g., from latent disease caused by industrial exposure to asbestos, but equally in the more usual case of an employee dying from an injury on the job. I doubt that this is what the Legislature intended.
In the case of death from an employment-related injury, like mesothelioma, that occurs after retirement—i.e., when the employee is no longer receiving any earnings from employment—construing the provision to refer to “the amount [of earnings]” is a potentially harsh result for partial dependents. That is, while a total dependent would presumably be entitled to the
The Legislature, of course, may not have intended to create a gap in coverage for partial dependents in the case of latent illness. But it is a problem for the Legislature to fix. “[T]he adjustment of workers’ compensation death benefits is properly and primarily a legislative function.” (Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra,
Chin, L, concurred.
The Court of Appeal, in addition, reversed a penalty for alleged unreasonable termination of death benefits by Chevron. Review was not sought on that issue.
Any death benefit in this matter must be based on “the actual amount which the deceased spouse devoted to the community and to the surviving spouse” at the time of the injury leading to death. (Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1982)
The Court of Appeal correctly relied on our explanation in Spreckels, supra,