871 F. Supp. 2d 229 | S.D.N.Y. | 2012
OPINION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT
Facts..........................................................................236
The Complaint..................................................................236
Proceedings to Date .............................................................237
Discussion......................................................................238
I. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Motion...................................238
II. RICO—Section 1962(c)..................................................238
A. Alleged Extraterritorial Application...................................239
1. Chevron’s Allegations and the Norex Decision ......................240
2. Answering the Extraterritoriality Question.........................241
a. Emphasis on the Enterprise..................................241
b. Emphasis on the Alleged Racketeering Activity.................243
3. Application to this Case..........................................245
B. Sufficiency of Pattern Allegation'—The Single Scheme Argument.........246
C. Sufficiency of Predicate Act Allegations................................247
1. Extortion......................................................247
2. Mail and Wire Fraud............................................249
3. Money Laundering..............................................251
4. Obstruction of Justice and Witness Tampering......................251
D. Causation..........................................................252
III. RICO Conspiracy—Section 1962(d) .......................................254
IV. Common Law Fraud....................................................254
A. Chevron’s Allegations...............................................254
B. Reliance...........................................................255
1. First-Party Reliance 255
2. Third-Party Reliance 256
V. Tortious Interference with Contract.......................................257
VI. Trespass to Chattels....................................................258
VII. Unjust Enrichment.....................................................259
VIII. New York Judiciary Law § 487...........................................260
IX. Civil Conspiracy........................................................262
Conclusion......................................................................262
Last year, an Ecuadorian trial court entered a multibillion dollar judgment ("the Judgment")
Facts
The Complaint
The amended complaint in this case contains more than 432 paragraphs of allegations, supplemented by a 56-page, single-spaced appendix that sets forth specific details amplifying assertions in the body of the pleading. For purposes of this motion to dismiss, they all are assumed to be true, and the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of all inferences reasonably drawn from them.
In most instances, a decision ruling on a motion to dismiss would begin with a summary of the allegations of the complaint. In this case, however, that is unnecessary to the disposition of this motion, as most of Chevron’s factual allegations are set forth in the Court’s findings with respect to an earlier motion for a preliminary injunction.
Although there is more to the case, Chevron’s claims include assertions that Steven Donziger, a New York lawyer, and others based in the United States, here conceived, Substantially executed, largely funded, and significantly directed a scheme to extort and defraud Chevron, a U.S. company, by, among other things, (1) bringing a baseless lawsuit in Ecuador; (2) fabricating (principally in the United States) evidence for use in that lawsuit in order to obtain an unwarranted judgment there; (3) exerting pressure on Chevron to coerce it to pay money not only by means of the Ecuadorian litigation and Judgment, but also by subjecting Chevron to public attacks in the United States and elsewhere based on false and misleading statements, (4) inducing U.S. public officials to investigate Chevron on the basis of false claims,
The amended complaint contains nine causes of action:
Counts 1 and 2 assert substantive and conspiracy claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The details of their allegations are described extensively below. Broadly speaking, however, they allege that the Donziger Defendants, the Stratus Defendants, some of the other defendants (but not the LAPs),
Counts 3 through 5 assert claims against all defendants for fraud, tortious interference with contract, and trespass to chattels relating to the allegedly unlawful scheme described above.
Count 6 asserts claims against all defendants for unjust enrichment on the ground that defendants have been and will be enriched as a result of the Judgment.
Count 7 asserts a state law claim for civil conspiracy against all defendants, alleging that they conspired to commit the substantive state law violations.
Count 8 asserts that the Donziger Defendants violated Section 487 of the New York Judiciary Law.
Count 9 sought a declaration that the Judgment was unenforceable and unrecognizable “on, among others, grounds of fraud, failure [by Ecuador] to afford procedures compatible with due process, lack of impartial [Ecuadorian] tribunals, lack of personal jurisdiction, [and] contravention of public policy.”
Proceedings to Date
In March 2011, this Court preliminarily enjoined the LAPs and others from, among other things, seeking enforcement or recognition of the Judgment outside Ecuador.
“the procedural device [Chevron] has chosen to present those claims is simply unavailable: The [New York Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments Act (“Recognition Act”) ] nowhere authorizes a court to declare a foreign judgment unenforceable on the preemptive suit of a putative judgment-debt- or.”17
The prayer for declaratory relief, the Circuit held, was of no avail because, in its view, a declaration of the enforceability or recognizability of the Judgment could not be had because the Recognition Act (1) “does not authorize a court to declare a foreign judgment null and void for all purposes in all countries,”
Accordingly, Counts 1 through 8 remain and were unaffected by the appellate decision. They are the only claims relevant to the Donziger Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Discussion
I. Legal Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations set forth in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor.
II. RICO — Section 1962(c)
Chevron brings its substantive RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), which makes it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any enter
The Donziger Defendants assert that the RICO claim should be dismissed because (1) it would require an impermissible attempt to apply the statute extraterritorially, and Chevron (2) fails to allege a pattern of racketeering activity, (3) does not sufficiently plead predicate acts, and (4) fails to allege that its injuries were caused by the predicate acts.
A. Alleged Extraterritorial Application
The extraterritoriality argument stems from Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,
It first referred to the principle that U.S. legislation presumptively has no extraterritorial application in the absence of Congressional intent that it be so applied, and concluded that the presumption against extraterritorial effect had not been rebutted because the Exchange Act is silent as to extraterritorial effect.
It then passed to the issue whether the plaintiffs’ proposed application of the statute on the facts before it would have been extraterritorial. It reasoned that the “focus” of Section 10(b) was to afford a remedy for deceptive conduct “in connection with the sale of any security registered on a [U.S.] national securities exchange or any security not so registered” and ultimately held that “only transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities” are actionable under the statute.
Morrison thus requires consideration of two questions; whether the presumption against extraterritorial application applies to RICO and, if it does, whether applying RICO to all or part of Chevron’s claim in fact would be extraterritorial.
The first requires no extensive analysis. The Second Circuit has held that RICO, like the Exchange Act, is silent as to extraterritorial application and, in consequence, that the presumption against extraterritorial application governs in RICO cases.
1. Chevron’s Allegations and the Norex Decision
This of course is not a “foreign cubed” case. The RICO claims at issue here rest on allegations that Steven Donziger, a New York lawyer, and others based in the United States, here conceived, substantially executed, largely funded, and significantly directed
The Donziger Defendants contend that the extraterritorial question is answered, favorably to them, by Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc.
In Norex, a Canadian plaintiff alleged that the defendants had engaged in a rack
The allegations of the amended complaint here are entirely different. Unlike the Norex complaint, the scheme alleged here was conceived and orchestrated in the United States to injure a U.S. plaintiff, involved a predominately U.S. enterprise, and was carried out in material respects, though by no means entirely, here. Norex therefore does not control. Indeed, as the Circuit in Norex found it unnecessary to articulate an approach to deciding whether application of RICO in a given situation is extraterritorial, beyond drawing a conclusion with respect to the particular complaint before it, that case sheds no light on the pivotal question before this Court.
2. Answering the Extraterritoriality Question
The few other cases that, since Morrison, have addressed the question whether given applications of RICO would be extraterritorial have taken different approaches.
a. Emphasis on the Enterprise
Cedeño
As an initial matter, the suggestion that “RICO evidences no concern with foreign
From a practical perspective, it is well to bear in mind that foreign enterprises have been at the heart of precisely the sort of activities- — committed in the United States — -that were exactly what Congress enacted RICO to eradicate. Many will recall, for example, that a RICO count in perhaps the largest criminal conspiracy case ever tried in this district, the so-called “Pizza Connection” case, rested on a decision by members of the Sicilian Mafia to begin shipping narcotics to the United States and their development of a distribution network in this country.
Second, the emphasis on whether the RICO enterprise is domestic or foreign simply begs the question of how to determine the enterprise’s character. Citizenship or legal status is not a viable approach, as it would produce absurd results. The term “enterprise” is defined to include, among other things, any individual,
To be sure, the domestic or foreign character of an enterprise might be determined differently, as for example by focusing on where the enterprise operates, where it makes decisions, where its assets (if it has any) are located and so on. Indeed, one court that focused on the RICO enterprise in determining whether application of RICO in the case before it would have been extraterritorial employed a “nerve center” test, considering “where [its] decisions [we]re made.”
All of this is not to say that the location of the enterprise never might be relevant to the question whether the application of the statute, given the allegations of a given complaint, would be extraterritorial in whole or in part. But its relevance, if any, would depend upon the facts.
b. Emphasis on the Alleged Racketeering Activity
Another court that has dealt with the question of whether a proposed applica
“These cases do not indicate that RICO is inapplicable merely because some of the participants in the enterprise reside outside the United States. As relevant to the allegations in the present case, RICO makes it unlawful for ‘any person’ associated with ‘any enterprise’ engaged in interstate commerce to participate in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The focus of the statute is the racketeering activity, i.e., to render unlawful a pattern of domestic racketeering activity perpetrated by an enterprise. See U.S. v. Philip Morris, 783 F.Supp.2d at 29.”
“In the present case most of the participants in the activities that are the subject of the RICO claim, including the Meisels defendants, reside in Canada. However, the racketeering activity of the enterprise with which the Meisels defendants allegedly were associated, was directed at and largely occurred within the United States. The goal of the enterprise, according to plaintiffs’ allegations, was to extract money from CGC and the other plaintiffs through a phony loan scheme. Defendants, including the Meisels defendants, allegedly used telephone, mail, and email communications directed to potential borrowers in the United States. An agent of the Hutchens and participant in the alleged scheme, Mr. Luistermans, was dispatched to Colorado to inspect property that was to be used as collateral for the loans. A Colorado lawyer was engaged to assist with the loan process. Similar conduct was directed at plaintiffs in Florida and Illinois.”
“These facts are a far cry from those of Norex and Cedeño, where the actors, victims and conduct were foreign, and the connection to the United States was essentially incidental. Philip Morris is a closer case, but again, the court found that the English company’s conduct in the U.S. was not the basis for the alleged RICO liability. In the present case, the conduct of the enterprise within the United States was a key to its success.”
“Accordingly, while I agree that RICO does not apply extraterritorially, I do not agree that this case, as alleged, involves an extraterritorial application of the statute.”60
This approach has much appeal, as it would afford a remedy to a U.S. plaintiff who claims injury caused by domestic acts of racketeering activity without regard to the nationality or foreign character of the
3. Application to this Case
As noted previously, the RICO violation alleged in this case consisted of the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. The scheme (1) allegedly was conceived and orchestrated in and from the United States (2) in order wrongfully to obtain money from a company organized under the laws of and headquartered in the United States, and to cover up unlawful and improper activities, and (3) acts in its furtherance were committed here by Americans and in Ecuador by both Americans and Ecuadorians. Assuming that the amended complaint alleges a domestic pattern of racketeering activity,
This conclusion is entirely consistent with Morrison, Norex, and the statute itself. Accordingly, insofar as the Donziger Defendants’ motion seeks dismissal of the RICO claims under Morrison, their motion must be denied.
B. Sufficiency of Pattern Allegatiortr— The Single Scheme Argument
Among the elements of a legally sufficient RICO claim is that the defendant have (1) committed two or more acts, (2) constituting a “pattern” (3) of “racketeering activity.”
First, the amended complaint alleges far more than extortion. It alleges (1) multiple acts of mail and wire fraud for the purpose of deceiving “Chevron, various courts of law, and the greater public” with respect to Chevron’s liability and responsibility for the alleged degradation of the environment in Ecuador,
Second, our Circuit long has “interpreted [pattern of racketeering activity] to mean ‘multiple racketeering predicates— which can be part of a single ‘scheme’— that are related and that amount to, or threaten the likelihood of continued criminal activity.’ ”
“basis in RICO or its legislative history for the proposition that a RICO violation cannot be established without proof of more than one scheme, episode, or transaction ... The statute defines racketeering activity in terms of criminal ‘acts,’ see §§ 1961(1)(A), (B), (C), and (E), or ‘offenses,’ see § 1961(1)(D); it similarly defines pattern in terms of ‘acts’ of racketeering activity, see § 1961(5). There is no mention of schemes, episodes, or transactions. We doubt that Congress meant to exclude from the reach of RICO multiple acts of racketeering simply because they ... further but a single scheme.”76
The Donziger Defendants effort to sweep the myriad alleged offenses in violation of several federal statutes into nothing more than attempts in the service of a single extortion and thus to amalgamate what the RICO statute quite plainly treats as separate acts of racketeering activity is without merit.
C. Sufficiency of Predicate Act Allegations
1. Extortion
Chevron alleges that the Donziger Defendants and others have committed acts of extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act.
The Donziger Defendants contend that these allegations are insufficient because: (1) “Chevron has failed to allege that the RICO Defendants have actually obtained any money or property from Chevron,”
First, as previously noted, the Hobbs Act proscribes attempted extortion. The amended complaint adequately alleges that the Donziger Defendants have attempted to extort money from Chevron by seeking to instill fear of consequences more unpalatable than making the desired payments. The fact that the RICO Defendants have not succeeded in obtaining the desired payoff is immaterial to the question whether Chevron sufficiently has alleged Hobbs Act extortion as a RICO predicate act.
The second argument also is unpersuasive. The Second Circuit has stated that the Hobbs Act “does not limit the definition of extortion to those circumstances in which property is obtained through the wrongful use of fear created by implicit or explicit threats, but instead leaves open the cause of the fear.”
Chevron does not allege a scheme that consisted of the allegedly baseless Lago Agrio litigation, either in and of itself or in combination with allegedly false and defamatory statements. Rather, it alleges that the RICO Defendants are executing a multi-faceted, extortionate scheme that has included not only bringing the Lago Agrio litigation, but also intimidating of Ecuadorian judges, fabricating evidence, making false statements to U.S. courts, Congress, the SEC, and the media, and bringing false criminal charges, all for the purpose of coercing Chevron “into paying to stop the campaign against it.”
2. Mail and Wire Fraud
The elements of mail and wire fraud are three: (1) the formation of a scheme to defraud victims (2) of money or other property (as the object of the scheme), and (3) the use of the mails or interstate or foreign wire communications in furtherance of the scheme.
The amended complaint asserts that the RICO Defendants engaged in a scheme or artifice to defraud Chevron and others “by manufacturing evidence, colluding with ... Cabrera to submit ... manufactured evidence, and then holding out the Cabrera Report as independent and neutral when it decidedly was not,” all for the purpose of coercing Chevron to make a multi-billion dollar payment.
The Donziger Defendants argue that the alleged mail and wire fraud predicate acts are insufficient because Chevron fails to allege that: (1) anyone relied on them to Chevron detriment,
The first of these arguments is patently incorrect as a matter of law. Although our Circuit and others previously had held that reliance was a necessary element of mail or wire fraud, the Supreme Court more recently has held in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.
The Donziger Defendants’ second argument — viz. that Chevron has not adequately pleaded injury as a proximate conse
S. Money Laundering
Section 1956(a)(2)(A) of the Criminal Code,
Chevron alleges that the RICO Defendants “knowingly caused the transportation, transmission, and/or transfer of funds to and from the United States ... with the intent that those funds be used to promote the carrying on of unlawful activity” including acts of extortion and mail and wire fraud.
As the Court has concluded that the extortion and mail and wire fraud predicate acts are pleaded sufficiently, the Donziger Defendants’ argument is without merit.
A Obstruction of Justice and Witness Tampering
The last two categories of alleged predicate acts are obstruction of justice and witness tampering. Chevron alleges that the RICO Defendants obstructed justice in violation of Section 1503 of the Criminal Code
The Donziger Defendants argue that these predicate acts are pleaded insufficiently because they allege no more than efforts to cover up the alleged conspiracy to extort money from Chevron.
But Chevron does not allege that the RICO Defendants’ submissions to U.S. courts regarding the independence and bona fides of the Cabrera Report or their alleged witness tampering were designed only to “hide [their] involvement in a [RICO] scheme.” Rather, it alleges that the instances of obstruction of justice and of witness tampering were designed to (1) dissuade U.S. courts from ordering Section 1782 disclosure in connection with the Ecuadorian litigation, (2) persuade Dr. Charles Calmbacher to decline to testify at a U.S. deposition, and (3) suborn a false affidavit by Mark Quarles
D. Causation
The amended complaint alleges essentially two types of injuries in consequence of the alleged RICO violations.
First, it asserts that “Chevron [has been] injured in its business and property by reason of’ those violations and that the injuries include,
“but are not limited to damage to Chevron’s reputation and goodwill; the impairment of Chevron’s interest in executed contracts ...; and the attorneys’ fees and costs to defend itself [a] in objectively baseless, improperly motivated sham litigation in Ecuador and [b] in related litigation in the U.S., including the attorneys’ fees and costs associated with exposing the RICO Defendants’ pervasive fraud in the Section 1782 proceedings.”122
It therefore seeks to recover treble “damages according to proof at trial.”
Second it alleges that “these injuries ... will continue” and that “Chevron ... is entitled to ... a preliminary and permanent injunction that enjoins Defendants [and others] acting in concert with them ... from commencing, prosecuting, or advancing in any way ... any attempt to recognize or enforce the [Judgment] ... in the United States or abroad ....”
The Donziger Defendants seek dismissal of the RICO claims because, they argue,
As an initial matter, the suggestion that the damages claim is wanting because Chevron supposedly has not adequately alleged reliance by anyone on any misrepresentations or omissions that have been part of the fraudulent scheme that underlies the mail and wire fraud predicate acts is misguided. A RICO damages plaintiff need allege only that it has suffered “an injury directly resulting from some or all of the activities comprising the violation.”
The injunction claim is an even easier question. The Court of course is aware that the question whether a private plaintiff may obtain injunctive relief under RICO remains open in this and most other circuits.
For these reasons, Chevron’s allegations satisfy civil RICO’s causation requirement. Chevron therefore adequately alleges its substantive RICO claim.
III. RICO Conspiracy — Section 1962(d)
The Donziger Defendants argue only that the RICO conspiracy claim brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) should be dismissed because Chevron failed sufficiently to allege its substantive RICO claim.
IV. Common Law Fraud
A. Chevron’s Allegations
Chevron alleges that the Donziger Defendants and others “knowingly misrepresented, omitted, and/or concealed material facts ... in their representations” to it, U.S. courts, the Lago Agrio court, federal and state agencies and officials in the United States, Chevron’s stockholders, investors, analysts, and the media, to obtain favorable rulings from U.S. and the Lago Agrio courts, pressure U.S. officials to investigate Chevron, and propagate false information to harm Chevron.
The elements of a common law fraud claim are “ ‘a material, false representation, an intent to defraud thereby, and reasonable reliance on the representation, causing damage to the plaintiff.’ ”
1. First-Party Reliance
Chevron asserts that its fraud claim is valid on the basis of first-party reliance because it relied on the defendants’ alleged false representations to its detriment.
The amended complaint, to be sure, contains a single, conclusory allegation that Chevron relied on the alleged misrepresentations and material omissions.
2. Third-Party Reliance
The Donziger Defendants do not argue that Chevron fails sufficiently to allege that third-parties relied on the allegedly false representations or that such reliance injured Chevron.
Both Smokes-Spirits.com and Cement & Concrete held that injury as a result of reliance by third parties is not actionable in New York. As Smokes-Spirits.com merely relied upon Cement & Concrete for that proposition,
As an initial matter, as another judge of this Court has pointed out, the New York Court of Appeals has held not once, but three times, that a claim for common law fraud may rest on third-party reliance.
We thus are faced with old but square holdings by the New York Court of Appeals supporting fraud claims based on third-party rebanee and a division of more modern authority at the intermediate appellate level albeit with the balance favoring the same position. In addition, New York unquestionably permits recovery based on reliance by third parties on false and deceptive statements in areas including tortious interference with contract.
There is little doubt that this Court is in the undesirable position “of choosing between dueling pronouncements of New York law made by two Courts to whom [it is] obliged to defer.”
V. Tortious Interference with Contract
The elements of a claim for tortious interference with contract are: “(1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party, (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that contract, (3) the defendant’s intentional procurement of the third party’s breach of that contract, and (4) damages.”
The Donziger Defendants argue that this claim is time-barred because any alleged interference began in 1999 (when Ecuador enacted the Environmental Management Act of 1999 (“EMA”), which allowed a private right of action to sue for environmental damages)
Chevron’s attempt to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations by asserting that any tortious interference is ongoing fails because “tortious interference with contract is not a continuing tort.”
VI. Trespass to Chattels
In substance, Chevron alleges that the Donziger Defendants’ “fraudulent litigation” and the corresponding “misleading media campaign”
The essential elements of trespass to chattels are “(1) intent, (2) physical interference with (3) possession (4) resulting in harm.”
Second, Chevron does not allege that the Donziger Defendants physically interfered with possession of its property.
VII. Unjust Enrichment
Chevron alleges that the Donziger Defendants and others have been and, unless enjoined, will be enriched unjustly by the Judgment and its proceeds.
A plaintiff seeking damages on an unjust enrichment claim must allege that “(1) defendant was enriched; (2) the enrichment was at plaintiffs expense; and (3) the circumstances were such that equity and good conscience require defendants to make restitution.”
The Donziger Defendants argue that Chevron fails to allege that they have been enriched at its expense because they have yet to collect or receive benefits from the Judgment.
As the Donziger Defendants have not recovered on the Judgment to date, the unjust enrichment claim is premature at best. “The essence of [an unjust enrichment] claim is that one party has received money or a benefit at the expense of another.”
Moreover, any enrichment received by the Donziger Defendants to date — allegedly from litigation funding agreements
VIII. New York Judiciary Law § 187
Section 487 of the New York Judiciary Law
The first fails for the simple reason that Chevron explicitly alleges that Donziger is an attorney and that he and his law offices and professional corporations violated Section 487 by engaging “in an intentional pattern of collusion, wrongdoing, and deceit with the intent to deceive ... multiple federal courts” and “actively participated in the preparation and filing of multiple court submissions to” this and other courts “which included false and misleading statements.”
The second argument is equally deficient. As an initial matter, the statute itself provides that an attorney who violates it “forfeits to the party injured treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action.”
Next, the Donziger Defendants rely for this argument on a single district court decision,
Finally, even a collateral attack on a prior judgment may be made under Section 487 in “a separate lawsuit ... where the alleged perjury or fraud in the underlying action was ‘merely a means to the accomplishment of a larger fraudulent scheme.’ ”
IX. Civil Conspiracy
Chevron’s seventh claim for relief charges all defendants with civil conspiracy to commit the various state law torts alleged in the complaint. The Donziger Defendants seek its dismissal, contending that New York does not recognize an independent tort of civil conspiracy vel non.
New York in fact does not recognize an independent tort for civil conspiracy.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Donziger Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint [DI 302] is granted to the extent that so much of the third claim for relief as is premised on detrimental reliance by Chevron and the fourth through sixth claims for relief all are dismissed, provided, however, that the dismissal of the claim for damages asserted in the sixth claim for relief is dismissed only as premature. The motion is denied in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
. An appellate court in Ecuador affirmed the Judgment in all material respects in January 2012. D1384.
. These other individuals and entities included are: Pablo Fajardo Mendoza ("Fajardo"), Luis Yanza ("Yanza"), Selva Viva Selviva CIA, Ltda ("Selva Viva"), and the Amazon Defense Front ("ADF"). Chevron alleges also that various "co-conspirators" were part of the RICO enterprise, but they are not named as defendants.
. DI 206, Ex. 16.
. As these motions to dismiss were filed before the Court severed Count 9, they include arguments related to that cause of action. The Court, however, considers only those arguments related to the other eight counts because they are all that remain pending in this action.
. These include the following:
Decisions in proceedings brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1782: In re Chevron Corp., 709 F.Supp.2d 283 (S.D.N.Y.2010), aff'd sub nom., Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir.2011); In re Chevron Corp., 736 F.Supp.2d 773 (S.D.N.Y.2010); In re Chevron Corp., 749 F.Supp.2d 135, fuller opinion, In re Chevron Corp., 749 F.Supp.2d 141, on reconsideration, 749 F.Supp.2d 170 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom., Lago Agrio Plaintiffs v. Chevron Corp., 409 Fed.Appx. 393 (2d Cir.2010).
Other decisions: Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F.Supp.2d 581 (S.D.N.Y.2011) ("Donziger I") (granting preliminary injunction), rev’d, Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.2012); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 800 F.Supp.2d 484 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (“Donziger II") (granting separate trial and expedited discovery on claim for declaratory judgment).
.Donziger I, 768 F.Supp.2d at 594-626.
. See supra note 2.
. Amended Complaint [DI 283] (“Cpt.”) ¶¶ 1-2, 342; see id. ¶¶ 339-87.
. Id. ¶¶ 388-409.
. Id. ¶¶ 410-13. 11
.Id. ¶¶ 414-19.
. Id. ¶¶ 420-26.
. Id. ¶ 430.
. Donziger I, 768 F.Supp.2d at 581.
. Id.
. DI 279.
. Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 240.
. Id. at 245.
. Id. at 246.
. Id. at 234.
. See, e.g., Levy v. Southbrook Int’l Invs., Ltd.., 263 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir.2001) (citing Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.1994)), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1054, 122 S.Ct. 1911, 152 L.Ed.2d 821 (2002).
. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-68, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
. E.g., Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir.2007); Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir.2000).
. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Bank of N.Y., 676 F.Supp.2d 229, 249 (S.D.N.Y.2009).
. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
. Spool v. World Child Int’l Adoption Agency, 520 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir.2008) (citing DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
. See DI 303, at 2-16.
. - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010).
. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
. Id. at 2881-83.
. Id. at 2884.
. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir.2010) ("Our Court’s precedent holds that ‘RICO is silent as to any extraterritorial application.’ While
. Cpt. ¶ 1 (alleging that defendants "sought to extort defraud, and otherwise tortiously injure plaintiff Chevron by means of a plan they conceived and substantially executed in the United States.”); id. ¶ 2 ("The enterprise's ultimate aim is to create enough pressure on Chevron in the United States to extort it into paying to stop the campaign against it.”).
. Id. ¶3.
. E.g., id. ¶ 145 ("Back in the United States, preparations were well underway for drafting Cabrera’s report.”); id. ¶ 151 ("While Stratus was the primary coordinator of the ... Cabrera Report, other members of the U.S.based team of experts ... also contributed to the report without attribution in the report or disclosure to Chevron.”); id. ¶¶ 353-56.
. Id. ¶ 214.
. Id. ("And they have taken this pressure campaign to U.S. state and federal agencies, seeking their falsely induced assistance in this racketeering scheme.”); id. ¶216.
. Id. ¶¶ 273-77, 291-300, 311-16.
. Id. ¶¶ 1, 7-17.
. Id. ¶ 18.
. See DI 303, at 2-6.
. Id. at 33.
. See Note, Life After Morrison: Extraterritoriality and RICO, 44 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1385, 1402 (2011) (Norex did not "offer[] much guidance as to what might constitute domestic application.”).
. Cedeño, 733 F.Supp.2d at 471.
. Id. at 473-74.
While the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by non-precedential summary order, it declined to decide whether the district court’s focus on the location or character of the enterprise had been correct. Cedeño, 457 Fed.Appx. at 37-38.
.The same may be said of the cases in other districts that have taken a similar approach. See Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1349-50 (S.D.Fla.2012); In re Le-Nature’s Inc., No. 09-MC-162, 2011 WL 2112533, at *3 (W.D.Pa. May 26, 2011); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F.Supp.2d 883, 914-15 (C.D.Cal.2011); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771, 2011 WL 843957, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011).
. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(c).
. To the extent that the district court in Cedeño sought to justify its approach on the theory that RICO prohibits the use of a pattern "as a conduit for committing a pattern of predicate acts” and thus makes the enterprise its focus, 733 F.Supp.2d at 473-74, this Court respectfully disagrees. While a § 1962(c) violation necessarily involves the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and in that sense involves the enterprise as a "conduit,” § 1962(c)'s focus unmistakably is on the racketeering activity or, at least, on the racketeering activity in relation to the enterprise. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922-23 ("It is the purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States ... by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.”) (emphasis added). Thus, a determination of the extraterritorial versus domestic character of the application of the statute to a § 1962(c) claim that concentrates on the enterprise to the exclusion of the pattern of racketeering activity would be inappropriate.
. See generally United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1148-49 (2d Cir.1989).
. Indictment, Count 16, ¶ 1, United States v. Badalamenti, SS 84 Crim. 236(PNL).
. 18U.S.C. § 1961(4).
. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 2011 WL 843957, at *5-6.
. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 1191-94, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (discussing well-established nature of nerve-center test and adopting it to determine a corporation's principal place of business for the purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction); Kubin v. Miller, 801 F.Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y.1992).
. See, e.g., DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 307 (2d Cir.2001); Bennett v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 770 F.2d 308, 314-15 (2d Cir.1985).
. Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir.1994).
. 824 F.Supp.2d 1193 (D.Colo.2011).
. 783 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.D.C.2011).
. CGC Holding Co., 824 F.Supp.2d at 1209-10; see also Philip Morris USA, 783 F.Supp.2d at 29 (declining to sustain RICO claim on theory that foreign defendant liability could be premised on its domestic conduct notwithstanding Morrison on the ground that the theory never previously had been advanced rather than on ground that the theory would have been insufficient).
. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 556, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1047 (2000) (quoting Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 479 (2d Cir.1991).
. See supra note 50.
. This is not to say that the CGC court's formulation perhaps should not be refined. For example, by upholding the sufficiency of the complaint on the ground that the victims were domestic and the alleged racketeering activity "was directed at and largely occurred within the United States,” the test would introduce a perhaps unnecessary element of subjectivity — what "largely” occurred in the United States to one person nevertheless also may "largely,” "significantly,” or "materially” have occurred abroad. Moreover, what Morrison prohibits is the extraterritorial application of the statute. The application of the statute to patterns of racketeering activity therefore perhaps must be limited to patterns that are entirely domestic in nature, a qualification not addressed in CGC. But see TianRui Grp. Co. v. ITC, 661 F.3d 1322, 1329-30 (Fed.Cir.2011) (Morrison permits reliance upon foreign conduct "to establish an element of a claim alleging a domestic injury and seeking a wholly domestic remedy.”). But it is unnecessary to address these details for purposes of this motion.
. The Donziger Defendants do not argue that Chevron has failed to allege the existence of a domestic pattern of racketeering activity save insofar as such an argument is subsumed in their broader contention that Chevron has alleged no pattern at all because all acts in furtherance of the alleged attempted extortion constituted "only a single predicate act.” DI 303, at 5. That argument is rejected below. Accordingly, the question whether Chevron sufficiently has alleged a domestic pattern of racketeering activity for other reasons is not before the Court.
. The alleged RICO enterprise is an association in fact consisting of both Americans and foreigners. The Americans include the Don
.As this resolves this aspect of the motion before the Court, there is no need to speculate about whether the result would be the same if the character of the alleged enterprise were different, if the alleged acts of racketeering activity would amount to a pattern only if foreign acts were aggregated with domestic, if Chevron alleged no injury consequent to a domestic pattern of racketeering activity, or if various other circumstances existed. Nor need the Court address the questions whether and to what extent that Chevron, if it prevails, would be entitled to relief with respect to alleged injuries caused only by foreign acts. Such matters must await further factual development.
. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 100 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir.1983)).
. DI 303, at 5 (quoting Linens of Europe, Inc. v. Best Mfg. Inc., No. 03 Civ. 9612(GEL), 2004 WL 2071689, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
. Id.
. Cpt. ¶¶ 353-57.
. Id. ¶ 358.
. M ¶¶ 359-65.
. Linens of Europe, Inc., 2004 WL 2071689, at *18.
. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1016 (2d Cir.1991)); see also United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 374-75 (2d Cir.2006).
. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240-41, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989) (declining to require pleading or proof of multiple schemes to establish RICO pattern).
. United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir.1989) (en banc).
. To be sure, the Court is entirely mindful that the presence of two or more acts of racketeering activity, simpliciter, does not suffice to make out a pattern. There are other requirements. See, e.g., H.J., Inc., 492 U.S. at 240-43, 109 S.Ct. 2893. But the Donziger Defendants have not argued that these other requirements are not satisfied by the amended complaint. See DI 303, at 6-8.
. 18U.S.C. § 1951.
. Cpt. ¶ 347; see id. ¶¶ 348-51.
. Id. ¶¶ 239, 243.
. DI 303, at 11.
. Id. at 8 (quoting Cpt. ¶ 2).
. Id. at 9-11.
. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 530-31 (2d Cir.1989) (evidence sufficient to warrant conviction of predicate Hobbs Act offense in RICO prosecution despite lack of evidence that payments made or fear actually instilled where evidence supported finding that attempt was made to obtain payments by instilling fear).
. United States v. Abelis, 146 F.3d 73, 83 (2d Cir.1998).
. Id.; see also United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 332-33 (2d Cir.2006); United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 951 (2d Cir.1987) (en banc) (fear of economic loss is sufficient to sufficient basis for extortion charge).
. Cpt. ¶ 2; see also id. ¶¶ 68-70, 200, 213-15, 220, 246.
. Id. ¶ 214.
. DI 303, at 9-11.
. E.g., von Bulow v. von Bulow, 657 F.Supp. 1134, 1145 (S.D.N.Y.1987) ("In concluding that a RICO claim may not be maintained ... the Court need not address the situation where allegedly unjustified suits form a part of some more extensive scheme of racketeering activity, such as extortion.”); see also United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1205-08 (11th Cir.2002); Conte v. Newsday, Inc., 703 F.Supp.2d 126, 137-38 (E.D.N.Y.2010).
. E.g., Cpt. ¶¶ 3-4, 74, 200-37, 246-59, 260-65, 347.
. See, e.g., Calabrese v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 283 F.Supp.2d 797, 809-10 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (holding that extortion allegations that included an "agreement involving] the use of misrepresentations, threats and lawsuits in order to obtain the monies” were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 202 F.Supp.2d 239, 247 n. 3, rev’d on other grounds, 322 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.2003) ("While some lower courts have held that the threat of civil litigation or even the initiation of unjustified civil lawsuits does not constitute a Hobbs Act predicate act under RICO ... none of these cases ... involved, as here, the perjurious obtaining of a criminal charge in order to induce physical fear immediately used to try to extort economic concessions.”); cf. United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 122-24 (1st Cir.1988) (holding that extortion was properly pleaded where defendant threatened defamation if not paid money).
. City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d 425, 445-46 (2d Cir.2008), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Hemi Group LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 130 S.Ct. 983, 175 L.Ed.2d 943 (2010); see also Fountain v. United States, 357 F.3d 250, 255 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Dinome, 86 F.3d 277, 283 (2d Cir.1996)).
For ease of expression, references to the mails in the balance of this paragraph applies equally to use of wires.
. United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir.1980); see United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 420 (2d Cir.1991) ("[I]t is enough to show defendants contemplated doing actual harm, that is, something more than merely deceiving the victim.”).
. See United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir.2000) ("[T]he prosecution need not show that the scheme in fact resulted ... in a loss to the person who is the target of the plan.”).
. Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 312-14, 16 S.Ct. 508, 40 L.Ed. 709 (1896).
. E.g., United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 39 (2d Cir.1989) ("defendant need not actually intend, agree to or even know of a specific mailing to 'cause' mail to be sent as long as he or she ‘does an act with knowledge that the use of mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such can reasonably be foreseen' ") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1035 (2d Cir.1986) ("sufficient that appellants knew that the use of interstate mail and wire services was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the scheme”).
. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 400, 94 S.Ct. 645, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974).
. E.g., United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir.1978); United States v. Eskow, 422 F.2d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959, 90 S.Ct. 2174, 26 L.Ed.2d 544 (1970).
. Cpt. ¶ 353.
. Id. ¶¶ 354-56.
Chevron attached to its amended complaint a list of almost two-hundred alleged acts of mail and wire fraud by the RICO Defendants. Id., Ex. B.
. DI 303, at 11-15.
. Id. at 12-15.
. 553 U.S. 639, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 170 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2008).
. Id. at 649, 128 S.Ct. 2131.
. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A).
. Id. § 1961(1)(B).
. Id. § 1956(a)(2)(A).
. Id. § 1956(c)(7)(A).
. Cpt. ¶358. Ill
. DI 303, at 16-17.
. 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
. Cpt. ¶¶ 361-65.
. 18 U.S.C. § 1512.
.Cpt. ¶¶ 361-65.
. Id. ¶¶ 360, 362.
. DI 303, at 15-16.
. Id. at 16 (quoting Phila. Reserve Supply Co v. Nowalk & Assocs., Inc., Civ. A. No. 91-0449, 1992 WL 210590, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 25, 1992)).
. The affidavit allegedly was submitted to this Court.
. Cpt. ¶ 360; see id. ¶¶ 311-23, 362-65.
. Id. ¶ 376.
. Id., prayer for relief ¶ 1.
. Id. ¶¶ 377, 379, prayer for relief ¶ 5.
. DI 303, at 11-13.
. Id. at 14.
. Id. at 14-15.
. Id. at 15.
. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir.1987); see also Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1347 (2d Cir.1994) (stating that Marshall & Ilsley “appears to be a correct reading of § 1964(c),” but not so holding).
. It is "well-settled that legal fees may constitute RICO damages when they are the proximate consequence of a RICO violation.” First Capital Asset Mgmt. v. Brickellbush, Inc., 218 F.Supp.2d 369, 382 (S.D.N.Y.2002), aff’d, 385 F.3d 159 (2d Cir.2004). Moreover, the amended complaint alleges that Donziger stated that the scheme was designed to “increase the cost to Chevron” in order "to get the price up” and to "increase the cost ... of [Chevron’s] sullied reputation.” Cpt. ¶214.
. Cpt. ¶¶ 190-98, 325-26.
. Likewise, it remains to be seen whether critical acts upon which Chevron relies are domestic or would be predicate acts only by
.Compare, e.g., Nat'l Org. For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir.2001) (injunction available to private RICO plaintiff), rev'd on other grounds, Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. For Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 154 L.Ed.2d 991 (2003), and Motorola Credit Corp., 202 F.Supp.2d at 243, with Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.1986) (injunction not available to private RICO plaintiff), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103, 107 S.Ct. 1336, 94 L.Ed.2d 187 (1987), Trane Co. v. O’Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 28-29 (2d Cir.1983), and Bernard v. Taub, No. CV 90-0501(ADS), 1990 WL 34680, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1990).
. DI 303, at 17.
. See, e.g., Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. v. McNulty, 640 F.Supp.2d 300, 321 (S.D.N.Y.2009).
. Cpt. ¶¶ 389-91.
. Id. ¶ 389.
. Id. ¶¶ 392-93.
. Chanayil v. Gulati, 169 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 970-71 (2d Cir.1987)).
The parties have briefed the questions relating to the sufficiency of Chevron’s common law claims under New York law. DI 303, at 17, 21, 24; DI 324, at 24, 29, 32. They thus have accepted, at least for purposes of this motion, that New York law governs or that there is no conflict between the law of New York and that of any otherwise applicable jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir.1991) (noting that the parties consented to applying New York law by arguing on the bases of New York law in their respective filings); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank. N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir.1981) (in the absence of authority to the contrary, courts apply the law of the forum state).
. DI 303, at 18-20.
The Donziger Defendants do not argue that Chevron fails to plead its fraud claim with the requisite amount of particularity. Indeed, any attempt to do so would be futile. E.g., Cpt. ¶¶ 109-21, 185-88, 246-59, 304-10, 392.
. Cpt. ¶¶ 392-93.
. Id. ¶ 392.
Conclusory allegations of reliance are insufficient where contradicted by specific, inconsistent allegations. See, e.g., Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1095 (2d Cir.1995) (upholding dismissal where "attenuated allegations” supporting the claim were "contradicted both by more specific allegations in the Complaint and by facts of which [the court] may take judicial notice”).
. Cpt. ¶ 3 (discussing the "sham litigation in Lago Agrio, Ecuador,” "the fabricated evidence” including the Calmbacher and Cabrera reports, and the "fake damage assessment”); id. ¶¶ 4, 69, 101, 109, 128-29, 156, 325, 337 (demonstrating that Chevron believed that these alleged fraudulent and false statements were not true).
. DI 303, at 17-20.
. Id.
. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 541 F.3d at 454; Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Lotto, 148 F.3d 194, 196 (2d Cir.1998) ("[A] plaintiff does not establish the reliance element of fraud ... by showing only that a third party relied on defendant's false statements....”).
. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940).
. Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir.1999).
. Garelick v. Carmel, 141 A.D.2d 501, 529 N.Y.S.2d 126, 128 (2d Dep’t 1988); Escoett & Co. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 31 A.D.2d 791, 296 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1st Dep’t 1969).
. N.B. Garments (PVT.) Ltd. v. Kids Int’l Corp., No. 03 Civ. 8041(HB), 2004 WL 444555, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2004) (citing Eaton, Cole & Burnham Co. v. Avery, 83 N.Y. 31, 33-34 (1880) (third party reliance is sufficient to sustain a cause of action for common law fraud), Rice v. Manley, 66 N.Y. 82, 87 (1876) (same), and Bruff v. Mali, 36 N.Y. 200, 205-206 (1867) (same)).
. Levesque v. Kelly Commc'ns, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 7045(CSH), 1993 WL 22113, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1993).
. N.B. Garments, 2004 WL 444555, at *3.
. Compare Litvinov v. Hodson, 74 A.D.3d 1884, 1885, 905 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401 (4th Dep't 2010) ("fraud may be found where a false representation is made to a third party, resulting in injury to the plaintiff”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Ruffing v. Union Carbide Corp., 308 A.D.2d 526, 528, 764 N.Y.S.2d 462, 465 (2d Dep’t 2003) (same); Buxton Mfg. Co. v. Valiant Moving & Stor., Inc., 239 A.D.2d 452, 657 N.Y.S.2d 450 (2d Dep’t 1997) (same); Desser v. Schatz, 182 A.D.2d 478, 581 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1st Dep’t 1992) (same), with Garelick, 141 A.D.2d at 502, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 128 (“complaint must set forth all of the elements of fraud including the making of material representations by the defendant to the plaintiff”); Escoett, 31 A.D.2d at 791, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
. Litvinov, 74 A.D.3d at 1885, 905 N.Y.S.2d at 401; Ruffing, 308 A.D.2d at 528, 764 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
. See, e.g., Cohen v. Davis, 926 F.Supp. 399, 403-04 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (denying motion to dismiss tortious interference with contract claim where plaintiff alleged that she was terminated because others relied on false statements about her).
. N.B. Garments, 2004 WL 444555, at *3.
. See, e.g., Chung v. Wang, 79 A.D.3d 693, 694, 912 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (2d Dep’t 2010).
. Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 70 A.D.3d 88, 108, 890 N.Y.S.2d 16, 30 (1st Dep’t 2009), leave to appeal denied, 15 N.Y.3d 703, 2010 WL 2572017 (2010).
. Cpt. ¶ 397; see id. ¶¶ 396-402.
. Id. ¶ 398.
. DI 303, at 21.
The amended complaint alleges that Ecuador enacted the EMA with help from the Donziger Defendants and other alleged co-conspirators. See id. ¶¶ 58, 63.
. DI 303, at 21.
. DI 324, at 29.
. Spinap Corp., Inc. v. Cafagno, 302 A.D.2d 588, 588, 756 N.Y.S.2d 86, 87 (2d Dep't 2003); see also Bloomfield Bldg. Wreckers v. City of Troy, 41 N.Y.2d 1102, 1103, 396 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 N.E.2d 1130 (1977).
. Cpt. ¶ 398; see id. ¶¶ 58-67.
. As the Court holds that this claim is untimely, it does not consider the Donziger Defendants’ other argument in favor of dismissing the tortious interference claim.
. Cpt. ¶ 405.
. Id. ¶ 407.
. Sweeney v. Bruckner Plaza Assocs. LP, No. 23941/00, 21 Misc.3d 1129(A), 2004 WL 5644706, at *4 (Sup.Ct. Bronx Co. July 12, 2004); Sch. of Visual Arts v. Kuprewicz, 3 Misc.3d 278, 281-82, 771 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807-08 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co.2003).
. Black’s Law Dictionary 229 (7th ed.1999) (defining "chattel”).
. Id. ("Money is not to be accounted Goods or Chattels, because it is not of it self valuable ....”) (quoting Thomas Blount, Nomo-Lexicon: A Law-Dictionary (1670)); see also Meisels v. Schon Family Found., No. 22024/09, 28 Misc.3d 1205(A), 2010 WL 2674049, at *2 (Sup.Ct. Kings Co. June 28, 2010) ("Money can be the subject of conversion when it can be described, identified, or segregated in the manner that a specific chattel can be and when it is subject to an obligation to be returned.”).
. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Fed. Express Corp., 571 F.Supp.2d 330, 333 (D.Conn.2008) (noting that forms of intangible property, such as goodwill and reputation, do not fit within the definition of a chattel); see also Scenic Aviation, Inc. v. Blick, No. 02-CV-01201, 2003 WL 26060445, at *10 (D.Utah Aug. 4, 2003) ("Scenic has not established the loss of chattel, it only alleges the loss of goodwill, employees and customers, which is insufficient to prove this claim.”).
. Cpt. ¶¶ 403-09; see Sch. of Visual Arts, 3 Misc.3d at 281-82, 771 N.Y.S.2d at 807-08.
. See Chord Assocs., LLC v. Protech 2003-D, LLC, No. 07-CV-5138, 2010 WL 3780380, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2010).
. Cpt. ¶¶ 410-13.
. CBS Broadcasting Inc. v. Jones, 460 F.Supp.2d 500, 506 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (quoting Kidz Cloz, Inc. v. Officially for Kids, Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 164, 177 (S.D.N.Y.2004)).
. See, e.g., DI 303, at 24.
. DI 324, at 32.
. Kaye v. Grossman, 202 F.3d 611, 616 (2d Cir.2000) (emphasis added).
. Compare Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dukoff, 674 F.Supp.2d 401, 413 (E.D.N.Y.2009) (finding an unjust enrichment claim on an unpaid insurance benefit was ripe because "courts have held that a party may hold a property interest in an insurance policy”), with In re Calloway, 423 B.R. 627, 629-30 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.2010) (statute that reduced judgment creditor’s available recovery did not "take any vested property interest of the judgment creditor” because "under New York law, a judgment does not create any vested property interest”).
. See Axel lohnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 830 F.Supp. 204, 211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1993) ("[N]o cause of action for unjust enrichment lies for hypothetical future liabilities.”); Schwartzbaum v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., No. 09 Civ. 3848, 2010 WL 2484181 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2010), report and recommendation adopted in part rejected on other grounds, 2010 WL 2484116 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2010); see also Scaramuzza v. Sciolla, No. Civ. A. 04-CV-1270, 2004 WL 2063062, at *5 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 14, 2004) (characterizing unjust enrichment as "a retroactive equitable remedy,” and noting that "[i]t is well established that an unjust enrichment action will fail based on the allegations of future benefits”).
. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 18, at 246-47 (2011).
. Cpt. ¶¶ 328-30.
. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, §§ 47-48, at 129-69.
. See, e.g., id. § 48, at 144 ("If a third person makes a payment to the defendant to which (as between the claimant and defendant) the claimant has a better legal or equitable right, the claimant is entitled to restitution ... as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.”).
. Bazak Intern. Corp. v. Tarrant Apparel Grp., 347 F.Supp.2d 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (quotation omitted).
. N.Y. Jud. Law § 487.
. Id.
. Cpt. ¶ 422.
. DI 303, at 25-26.
. Id. at 26.
. Cpt. ¶¶ 422-23.
. N.Y. Jud. Law § 487(1).
. Seldon v. Bernstein, No. 09 Civ. 6163(AKH), 2010 WL 3632482, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2010).
. Hansen v. Werther, 2 A.D.3d 923, 767 N.Y.S.2d 702 (3d Dep’t 2003); Yalkowsky v. Century Apts. Assocs., 215 A.D.2d 214, 626 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1st Dep't 1995).
. Yalkowsky was a suit against a landlord and the landlord's attorney that sought collateral relief with respect to a prior Civil Court judgment, in part on the ground that the lawyer had violated § 487 in the prior action. In affirming dismissal of the claim as against the lawyer, the court noted that the relief sought' — vacatur of the prior judgment — was available only "by moving pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate the civil judgment due to its fraudulent procurement, not [in] a second plenary action collaterally attacking the judgment in the original action.” 626 N.Y.S.2d at 182-83.
Hansen held that an independent action would not lie under § 487 where the plaintiff had made the same § 487 claim against the same attorney in a prior action, but the prior action had been dismissed, and the complaint in any event failed to state a violation of the statute 2 A.D.3d at 923, 767 N.Y.S.2d at 702-03, certainly not the situation here. Any broader comments were dicta.
. Cpt., prayer for relief ¶¶ 7-8.
. Dupree v. Voorhees, 24 Misc.3d 396, 402, 876 N.Y.S.2d 840, 845 (Sup.Ct. Suffolk Co.2009).
. Specialized Indus. Servs. Corp. v. Carter, 68 A.D.3d 750, 751-52, 890 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (2d Dep’t 2009) (citation omitted).
. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Meridian Distrib. Servs., Inc., 155 A.D.2d 642, 642, 548 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (2d Dep’t 1989).
. See, e.g., Alexander & Alexander of N.Y. v. Fritzen, 68 N.Y.2d 968, 969, 510 N.Y.S.2d 546, 503 N.E.2d 102 (1986) (allegations of conspiracy permitted to connect the actions of separate defendants with an otherwise actionable tort); Ferguson, 155 A.D.2d at 642, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 234; Reo v. Shudt, 144 A.D.2d 793, 794-95, 534 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (3d Dep’t 1988).
. E.g., Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 401 (2d Cir.2006).