CHEVRON CHEMICAL COMPANY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. FIRST BRANDS CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. DELOITTE & TOUCHE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 91-0470
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
Oral argument January 15, 1992. - Decided March 31, 1992.
483 N.W.2d 314
Petition to cross review granted. Petition to review granted.
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was orally argued by David L. DeBruin and submitted on the briefs of Kravit, Lammiman & De Bruin, S.C. by David L. DeBruin and Ralph A. Weber, of Milwaukee.
Before Moser, P.J., Sullivan and Fine, JJ.
The American Fuel & Supply Co., Inc. (AFSCo), a company that distributed motor oil, automotive supplies,
In early 1986, Deloitte discovered that, as a result of AFSCo’s “rebilling” policy, the 1985 audit was in error. “Rebilling” was a procedure by which AFSCo allowed unsold products to remain in the possession of its distributors, although AFSCo records showed the products had been returned to AFSCo. Subsequently, AFSCo would send new (second) payment statements to those distributors for the previously distributed products already in their possession. As a result of the rebilling practice, Deloitte’s printed financial statement contained an error of approximately $900,000. Because of this error, AFSCo was shown as making a profit for the year 1985, although in fact it was in deficit. Chevron relied upon the 1985 financials in its subsequent decisions to extend credit to AFSCo for the purchase of various products.
When Deloitte determined that AFSCo’s rebilling practice had resulted in the generation of an incorrect audit report, it urged AFSCo to recall the report. When AFSCo refused, Deloitte indicated its intent to withdraw the 1985 audit and to so advise any entity known to be relying upon them. However, following a meeting at
AFSCo filed for bankruptcy on April 23, 1987. On January 30, 1989, Chevron began this action alleging both negligence in the Deloitte audit of the 1985 financials and misrepresentation based upon Deloitte’s failure to notify Chevron of Deloitte’s withdrawal of its report. Larry Plotkin, AFSCo’s president, sole shareholder and director, and guarantor of AFSCo’s obligations to Chevron, filed for bankruptcy on October 14, 1989. On September 25, 1990, Chevron was granted partial summary judgment on the misrepresentation claims.2 However, on October 1, 1990, Chevron’s motion for summary judgment on its claim of negligent misrepresentation was again denied. After a five-week trial, the jury found that (1) Deloitte was not negligent in the audit of the 1985 financials,3 (2) Deloitte did not act with intent to deceive Chevron or induce its reliance on the 1985 financials,4 (3) Deloitte was not negligent in failing to notify plaintiffs of the withdrawal of the audit
On motions after verdict, the trial court granted Chevron judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict on negligent misrepresentation. The trial court also changed the jury’s answer to the question on intentional misrepresentation, on the grounds that there was no credible evidence to support the jury’s findings. In addition, the trial court held in the alternative that judgment would be granted as a sanction for the misconduct of Deloitte’s counsel, pursuant to
We first address the issue of negligent misrepresentation. Because we determine that the trial court’s refusal to grant summary judgment for Chevron on the issue of negligent misrepresentation was an error corrected by its subsequent judgment, we need not address the issues of intentional misrepresentation or sanction for attorney misconduct.8
The defendant has failed to identify any element of the negligent misrepresentation claim that remained for determination by the jury. . . . On the undisputed facts in this case as set forth in the Court’s decision on September 25, 1990, Touche was negligent as a matter of law in failing to notify plaintiff of the withdrawal of their opinion.
This court reviews a question of law de novo, without deference to the decisions of the trial court.11 However, we are free to acknowledge a correct statement and application of the law by a trial court. At the summary judgment hearing prior to trial, the trial court correctly stated that under Wisconsin law, negligent misrepresentation has four elements:
a representation of fact made by the defendant, - the representation of fact is untrue,
- the defendant was negligent in making the representation of fact, and
- plaintiff’s belief that the representation was true and reliance thereupon to plaintiff’s damage.12
We examine the materials submitted13 to the trial court, as the trial court did,14 and agree that sufficient facts were undisputed to establish that three of the above elements of negligent misrepresentation had occurred.
In general, “accountants’ liability to third parties should be determined under the accepted principles of Wisconsin negligence law.”17 In the context of negligent misrepresentation, Wisconsin law defines a failure to exercise ordinary care as either (1) “mak[ing] misrepresentation under circumstances in which a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence ought reasonably to foresee that such misrepresentation will subject the interests of another person to an unreasonable risk of damage,”18 or (2) failing to use “the care that is usually exercised by persons of ordinary intelligence and prudence engaged in a like kind of business or profession,” a standard that is applied to a “person in a particular business or profession.”19
Under either standard, Deloitte’s conduct falls short. At the summary judgment hearing, the trial court had in fact already held, using the foreseeability standard applied to “a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence,” that:
Statements made by [Deloitte’s] own employees indicate that [Deloitte] was aware that creditors were relying on these statements. On the undisputed facts in this case, plaintiffs, as major trade creditors, were persons whose reliance on the 1985 opinion and 1985 financial statements was reasonably foreseeable at the time the error was discovered by [Deloitte].
Again, we agree. Clearly, if Deloitte’s employees were already “aware that creditors were relying on [Deloitte’s] statements” they could also “foresee” such reliance.20 Alternatively, but equally clearly, “the care that is usually exercised by persons of ordinary intelligence and prudence engaged in a like kind of business or profession” encompasses knowledge of and obedience to the Wisconsin Administrative Code. The Wisconsin Administrative Code states that the confidentiality normally required of professionals does not prohibit disclosure of subsequently discovered facts:
The prohibition against disclosure of confidential information obtained in the course of a professional engagement does not apply to disclosure of such information when required to properly discharge the certified public accountant’s or public accountant’s responsibility according to the profession’s standards. The prohibition would not apply, for example, to disclosure, as required by section 561 of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, of subsequent discovery of facts existing at the date of the auditor’s report which would have affected the auditor’s report had he been aware of such facts.21
On appeal, the parties’ and amicus curiae briefs have presented extensive argument on the duty of accountants following a subsequent discovery of facts that would have altered an earlier audit report. Much of this argument has focused upon a professional standard22 promulgated for the guidance of auditors throughout the nation, which purportedly differentiates duties of accountants when clients cooperate in, or resist, disclosure of previously unreported facts. This professional standard provides the following directions to auditors.
When the auditor has concluded, after considering [that his report would have been affected if the undisclosed information had been known to him and that there are “persons currently relying or likely to rely on the financial statements”23], that action should be taken to prevent future reliance on his
report, he should advise his client to make appropriate disclosure of the newly discovered facts and their impact on the financial statements to persons who are known to be currently relying or who are likely to rely on the financial statements and the related auditor’s report. When the client undertakes to make appropriate disclosure, the method used and the disclosure made will depend on the circumstances. . . .
[W]hen it appears that [revision of the statements will cause delay] appropriate disclosure would consist of notification by the client to persons who are known to be relying or who are likely to rely on the financial statements and the related report that they should not be relied upon, and that revised financial statements and auditor’s report will be issued upon completion of an investigation.24
Significantly, AU § 561 also directs the auditor with a cooperating client to “satisfy himself that the client has made the disclosures specified.”25 However, when the client is not cooperative, AU § 561 provides the following directions:
If the client refuses to make the disclosures specified in paragraph .06, the auditor should notify each member of the board of directors of such refusal and of the fact that, in the absence of disclosure by the client, the auditor will take steps as outlined below to prevent future reliance upon his report. The steps that can appropriately be taken will depend upon the degree of certainty of the auditor’s knowledge that there are persons who are currently relying or who will rely on the financial statements and the auditor’s report, and who would attach importance to the information, and the auditor’s ability as a practical
matter to communicate with them. Unless the auditor’s attorney recommends a different course of action, the auditor should take the following steps to the extent applicable: . . . .
c. Notification to each person known to the auditor to be relying on the financial statements that his report should no longer be relied upon.26
The Wisconsin legislature has considered the possibility of adoption of “standards established by technical societies and organizations of recognized national standing”27 and provided procedural safeguards when such an adoption occurs.28 We note that
Thus, based upon the correct law and the undisputed facts as presented at the time of the summary judgment hearing, it would have been correct for the trial court to have granted summary judgment at the time requested. We are reluctant to categorize this decision as clear error on the part of the trial court. We note that at this hearing, the trial court had excluded certain of defendant’s materials, i.e., those which had not been submitted in a timely matter, and also that at the post-verdict motion hearing, the trial court observed that “[t]he defendant has failed to identify any element of the negligent misrepresentation claim that remained for determination by the jury.” Thus, we view the decision to go forward with trial, rather than dispose of the mat-
We now turn to the damage award. Question 17 of the special verdict reads as follows: “If your answer to Question No. 16 [determination of Deloitte’s negligent misrepresentation] is yes, then answer this question: What sum of money will fairly and reasonably compensate Chevron for damages sustained as a result of [Deloitte’s] failure to notify it of the withdrawal of their opinion on AFSCo’s 1985 financial statements?” Chevron moved the trial court to change the answer of question number 17 from the jury’s “N/A” to $1,646,106, pursuant to
A party may move the court to change an answer in the verdict, pursuant to
The final issue is the total amount of money owed to Chevron by AFSCo, which was disputed at trial. Chevron presented evidence that over $1,646,000 was owed to them by AFSCo. This amount included “invoice for carry-over inventory” ($188,932) and “interest” ($676,106) and excluded credits for amounts paid by AFSCo in bankruptcy ($170,630) and “net unapplied credits” ($31,577). The jury heard testimony that placed various sums of money at issue. First, there was the application of $240,000 paid to Chevron by AFSCo, which was characterized by Deloitte as payments on account and by Chevron as cash on delivery sales, occurring after Chevron ceased credit shipments. Next, there was a dispute over the shipment of a single truckload of material. Finally, there was conflicting evidence on AFSCo’s agreement to pay an annual eighteen percent interest on the unpaid balance. Where issues of material fact are heard by a jury acting in the capacity of fact-finder, the trial court may not substitute its own determination for that of the jury on post-verdict motions.35
Because the trial court was correct in finding for Chevron on the issue of negligent misrepresentation, and because this cause must now be remanded to the trial court for the determination of damages we need not address the issues of intentional misrepresentation or sanction for attorney misconduct.39
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and cause remanded with directions.
The torts of intentional and negligent misrepresentation share three common elements: “(1) The representation must be of a fact and made by the defendant; (2) the representation of fact must be untrue; and (3) the plaintiff must believe such representation to be true and rely thereon to his damage.” Whipp v. Iverson, 43 Wis. 2d 166, 169, 168 N.W.2d 201, 203 (1969). The tort of intentional misrepresentation requires two additional elements: (1) “the defendant must either know the representation is untrue or the representation was made recklessly without caring whether it was true or false“; and (2) the defendant must have made the representation “with intent to deceive and induce the plaintiff to act upon it to the plaintiff’s pecuniary damage.” Ibid. Negligent misrepresentation, on the other hand, adds the following to the three core elements of “misrepresentation“: (1) the defendant must have had either a legally-imposed “duty of care or a voluntary assumption of a duty“; and (2) the defendant must have failed “to exercise ordinary care” either in making the representation or in ascertaining the underlying fact. Id., 43 Wis. 2d at 170, 168 N.W.2d at 204. Silence, in the face of a duty to
One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(1) (emphasis added); see also Ollerman v. O’Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 26, 288 N.W.2d 95, 99-100 (1980). The crux of this case is thus whether Deloitte & Touche had a duty to disclose to Chevron the problems with American Fuel & Supply Company’s 1985 financial statements. This issue is a question of law that we determine de novo. See id., 94 Wis. 2d at 27, 288 N.W.2d at 100.
In Wisconsin, “duty” is an element of negligence. A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 484, 214 N.W.2d 764, 767 (1974). Under ordinary tort law “[a] defendant’s duty is established when it can be said that it was foreseeable that his act or omission to act may cause harm to someone,” and, if negligent, a defendant is “liable for unforeseeable consequences” and to “unforeseeable plaintiffs.” Id., 62 Wis. 2d at 484, 214 N.W.2d at 766. Here, however, we are concerned with professional malpractice, a species of tort law where this state has long recognized that the parameters of duty, the breach of which is negligence and can subject the professional to civil liability, are best set by the particular profession.1 The majority ignores this long-standing
principle. Absent some compelling interest that the majority opinion does not articulate, and absent legislative action, accountants, like the other professions, should be permitted to determine the appropriate standards of care applicable to their profession; as with the other professions, they are best able to appreciate the ramifications of any legal principle that has the potential to impose on them civil liability.
The Accounting Examining Board has adopted the following rule:
The prohibition against disclosure of confidential information obtained in the course of a professional engagement does not apply to disclosure of such
information when required to properly discharge the certified public accountant’s or public accountant’s responsibility according to the profession’s standards. The prohibition would not apply, for example, to disclosure, as required by section 561 of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, of subsequent discovery of facts existing at the date of the auditor’s report which would have affected the auditor’s report had he been aware of such facts.
Section 561 of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 makes a distinction between an accountant’s responsibility under two different scenarios: first, where the client co-operates; second, where the client does not co-operate. Where the client co-operates, the correction should be issued to all those persons whom the accountant knows are either “currently relying or who are likely to rely” on the inaccurate statements. Section 561.06 (emphasis added). Where the client will not co-operate, the correction should be issued “to each person known to the auditor to be relying on the [inaccurate] financial statements.” Section 561.08(c) (emphasis added). If the client does not cooperate, section 561.08 specifically notes: “The steps that can appropriately be taken will depend upon the degree of certainty of the auditor’s knowledge that there are persons who are currently relying or who will rely on the [inaccurate] financial statements.” Mere “foreseeability,” however, is not enough.2
Although there is evidence in the record that would have supported a jury’s finding that Deloitte & Touche knew that Chevron was relying on the inaccurate financial statements, there is also evidence to the contrary. Additionally, there is no evidence that would support a finding that Deloitte & Touche had the “intent to deceive” Chevron, and “induce” Chevron to act upon the inaccurate 1985 financial statements to Chevron’s “pecuniary damage,” all of which is a prerequisite to imposition of liability for intentional misrepresentation. See Whipp, 43 Wis. 2d at 169, 168 N.W.2d at 203. Accordingly, under our standard of review, we must reverse.
Notes
Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304, 319, 401 N.W.2d 816, 822 (1987). See also D’Huyvetter v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, 164 Wis. 2d 306, 331, 475 N.W.2d 587, 596 (Ct. App. 1991), review dismissed, 475 N.W.2d 585 (1991), which restates the “elements of a cause of action in negligence” from Green Spring Farms as “the elements of a claim for negligent misrepresentation” with only a minimal reference to the specific details of misrepresentation.[The] theory of negligent misrepresentation[ ] requires a showing that defendant made a misrepresentation of fact upon which the plaintiffs relied to their detriment. The specific elements of a cause of action in negligence are: (1) a duty of care or a voluntary assumption of a duty on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of the duty (which involves a failure to exercise ordinary care in making a representation or in ascertaining the facts); (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an actual loss or damage as a result of the injury.
- On August 20, 1986, James Wagner, the Deloitte manager on the AFSCo account stated that “there is a set of financial statements out being used by [AFSCo’s] vendors and lenders that has an error in it.”
- During a September 5, 1986 conference call between Deloitte personnel and Wagner, William Pennow (a Deloitte partner and Wagner’s superior) and Robert Mannix (assistant general counsel for Deloitte), Deloitte “stated that unless AFSCO notified its creditors and vendors of the existence of the error in the financial statements, Touche would withdraw their opinion and give notice to its creditors and vendors whom they knew were relying upon the financial statements that their opinion had been withdrawn.”
- On September 10, 1986, AFSCo agreed to notify the secured creditor (a lender) but refused to notify vendors. Wagner and Jay Lieberman, the Deloitte partner having responsibility for AFSCo as a client stated that “they did not believe it would be acceptable to leave the vendors without notification.”
- In a written confidential memo, Wagner stated that Deloitte “must withdraw their opinion, and ‘send a letter to the
vendors or creditors that we know have received the financial statements telling them that . . . the opinion should no longer be relied upon.’ ” - Wagner and Pennow told Mannix that they could determine the major creditors, but not specifically who had received copies of the financial statements.
- The address of Chevron was contained in the work papers of Deloitte.
