177 Ga. 525 | Ga. | 1933
Lead Opinion
Mrs. Earl Horton, suing for herself individually and as next friend of her children, who are minors, filed an equitable petition, in which Cheves-Green & Co. Inc., Mrs. Clifford Mitchell, administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Prances J. Horton, Mrs. Annie Williams, and Columbus Mutual Life Insurance Company are named as defendants, alleging in substance as follows: Petitioners are the widow and surviving children, respectively, of Earl Horton, who died intestate in the City of Atlanta on December 37, 1933, being at the time of his death entitled as an heir to a one-fourth undivided interest in a certain lot and building located
Oheves-Green & Co. Inc. filed general and special demurrers, which were overruled, and it excepted to that judgment.
The court did not err in overruling the demurrers. After the amendments were filed, the petition was not subject to the special demurrers. The allegations in the petition clearly show that Earl Horton was non compos mentis at the time that he signed the notes and the loan deed referred to, and that the defendant company through its agent had notice of his mental incapacity to make a valid contract. Horton had never been adjudicated to be insane so as to render the contract void; but it was voidable, and could be so declared in a suit brought by him, or, as in this case, by his heirs.
One ground of the general demurrer is that there is no offer upon the part of the petitioners to make restitution. If Horton was non compos mentis, as is alleged in this petition, and this was known to those making the loan, an offer to make restitution was not a prerequisite in order to maintain such a suit as this in equity. Counsel for plaintiffs in error urge the decision of Fields v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 170 Ga. 239 (152 S. E. 237), where it was held as follows: “It is a condition precedent, for a mentally incompetent to relieve himself from a contract made during his incapacity, to restore the benefits received by him if such benefits are still in his possession or control. In other words, he must place the grantee, in all respects, as far as possible, in statu quo.” For that ruling authorities were cited. But in that case it was further held: “If one contracts with another who is mentally incompetent, with knowledge of such incómpetency, failure to make restitution by the incompetent will not prevent cancellation1 of such contract.” It was then ruled that the allegation of knowledge of the incompetency of the maker of the paper on the part of the grantee in the deed was not sufficiently definite, clear, and certain, but that ruling did not modify in any respect the ruling stated in the sentence just quoted. In their brief counsel for plaintiffs in error say that the principle announced in headnote 6 (a) of the Fields case was ruled in Whiteley v. Downs, 174 Ga. 839 (164 S. E. 318).
Judgment affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially. I concur in the judgment of affirmance in this case, but I can not concur in the holding of the majority that in case the house and lot in question are sold by the receiver or disposed of under the orders of a court of equity, the heirs of the estate of Earl Horton should account to the holder of the notes and the loan deed for any part of the funds arising from a sale of the property by the receiver or under an order of the court of equity coming to them and which is in excess of the value of Earl Horton’s interest in the estate of his mother.