Chester G. HAWLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.; George A. Korb, Defendants-Appellees

JONES, Circuit Before KENNEDY Judge. CONTIE, Circuit Judges, and Senior one of executives be KENNEDY, Judge. Circuit were, however, large There terminated. appeals Hawley G. Plaintiff Chester persons of other in other number judg- of the District order were also terminated. Dresser of defendants ment n.o.v. in favor George A. (“Dresser”) and Korb Industries Jeffrey a member the Plaintiff was of For the age case. in this discrimination early of plaintiff’s Pension Because Plan. reasons, the following we REVERSE Dis- termination, agreed to transfer Dresser n.o.v., AF- judgment of Court’s order trict This Plan. him to the Galion Pension awarding order a new its alternative FIRM plan plain- transfer to the Galion increased trial, order AFFIRM the District Court’s $170,159. pension by Dresser was tiff’s damage award from the granting offsets By obligated not to make this transfer. benefits, RE- pension and for increased plan, was plaintiff the terms of the Galion for a new to the District Court MAND plan eligible participate the Galion trial. he had not worked at a Galion 30, date, April as division of 1976. On I. Jeffrey plans were frozen the Galion and Jeffrey the Manufactur- joined Plaintiff to a employees and all were transferred engineer. in 1946 as an In ing Company pension plan. Dresser 1972, president par- vice became trial, jury At found that Dresser and Jeffrey company, Galion Manufactur- ent plaintiff in viola- willfully Korb terminated acquired In ing Company. Dresser Employ- Age tion of the Discrimination president Jeffrey Galion. Plaintiff became (“ADEA”), 29 et ment Act U.S.C. § Dresser’s Con- of the Galion Division of seq. damages, On the issue (“CEG”) Group on Equipment struction and found Dresser Korb were not 1, 1976, promoted in 1977 he May and was $170,159, entitled to offset of which was president the CEG itself. pension the enhanced bene- attributable to president In became the vice Korb The District Court fits received. report. plaintiff would of Dresser to whom as a of law award ruled matter later, Korb Three months demoted $46,451, representing would be offset president planning for the to vice CEG re- pension increased benefits pay. Plaintiff was with reduction early of an retirement sub- ceived because replaced president by Hilton. James pension sidy defrayal of his benefits present This demotion is unrelated to age taking until instead of benefits at age claim. discrimination The court discharged. 62 when he was diffi- Dresser suffered severe economic judgment entered measure, cost-cutting culties in As a $384,116, plus This amount of interest. opted to restructure president Dresser’s damages compensatory amount included organization and a level of remove $192,058 damages in the liquidated pri- management. system Under Dresser’s same amount. management at the operating or to judgment Dresser and Korb moved manage- to the reported divisions senior alternative, or in a new trial. On n.o.v. headquarters through ment at an interme- 31, 1990, ruled the District Court October management Group. diate level of called sup- there insufficient evidence eight of In Dresser dismantled its port finding plaintiff’s termination including Groups, twelve the CEG. Six of judg- vacated the was willful. court Groups, eight planning officers of these damages liquidated and held that if ment including plaintiff, were terminated. judgment appeal, reversed on its control, Groups under the two Korb’s receive trial. defendants a new would positions elimi- top twelve executive were executives, April 25,1991, the held eleven On District Court nated. Of twelve these sup- insufficient evidence Dresser were found new within Plaintiff, plaintiff’s port finding termination reorganization. after the place ADEA. The court also the decision not to him in a new violated the over- finding the defendants plaintiffs turned the was motivated $170,159 agree entitled offset. were not We the District Court that the held that if its The court reduction in force caused the elimination of appeal, defendants would reversed on plaintiffs job evi- there was no on a new trial these issues well. receive that age dence a factor in the restruc- turing of company. appeal: Plaintiff raises three issues erred in the District Court If plaintiff prevail, tois it must be judgment n.o.v. on the ADEA claim and failing on the basis that was a factor evidence holding that there was insufficient place plaintiff position. to in another The finding Dresser and jury to sustain the that plaintiff pro evidence that a showed was ADEA; the willfully Dis- Korb violated the many ductive employee and that he had damage in reducing trict erred the Court years experience plan in engineering, $170,159; District by award and the ning and offered administration. Plaintiff reducing damage by the award erred in testimony Pflaumer, planner that Mr. a in $46,451. given Group, planning another was another position after time plaintiff the that was II. discharged. Plaintiff also testimo offered notwithstanding the Judgment verdict Mitchell, ny that plaintiffs John one raises issue of whether there was a CEG, planning assistants in for the was question for to jury of fact decide. given job reorganization. another after the Chappell Corp., 803 F.2d v. GTE Products testimony Plaintiff offered from also 261, denied, (6th Cir.1986), cert. 480 265 the jury which could have inferred that the L.Ed.2d U.S. 107 S.Ct. plaintiffs age in the defendants considered (1987). granted Judgment n.o.v. should be Hilton, decision to fire him. James who only if could not differ reasonable minds boss, that, Hawley’s on was testified based conclusions drawn be plaintiff, he a conversation he had with Co., Toth v. 749 F.2d evidence. Yoder thought that was so close to retire- (6th Cir.1984). determining being ment that not termi- he would mind whether the evidence is insufficient as a point nated. testified one Korb support judgment, matter a of law a to ter- was involved decision light court must view the plaintiff. jury con- minate The could have against most to the party favorable whom influenced cluded that the defendants were j.n.o.v. made. Id. the motion for is by concerning plaintiff’s Hilton’s belief evidence, weigh court not consider does willingness terminated, to be a belief which witnesses, credibility or substitute part itself was based jury. its for that of the Schrand Co., Federal Electric F.2d Pacific legitimate non-dis- Defendants offered (6th Cir.1988). This 154-55 Court is terminating plain- for criminatory reasons bound the same of review. standard Id. argue that employment. tiff’s Defendants employ- brings Hawley’s an decision A action the to terminate position prove age finding ADEA ment him under the must was without another determining employer’s solely on the difficul- a factor in the deci was based economic experiencing. The evi- sion that was adverse to him. Kraus v. ties Dresser was Containers, Inc., an experienced that Dresser Corrugated Sobel 915 dence showed Cir.1990). Where, operating Wit- 229-30 loss of million in 1983. $81 here, force, posi- plain planning a after there is a reduction in nesses testified that eliminated, age planning a would be tiff either show that factor tions were must or, responsibility eliminating position, top his where some executive planning positions, therefore new employees are shifted to other each division and stated position, positions not created. As qualified for another he was above, the elimi- given position, a no evidence that he was not new inap- plaintiff’s ADEA claim was anything had n.o.v. on plaintiffs nation of argue evi- propriate there was sufficient age. Defendants to do with similarly plan- situated as could in- dence from which the other executives assigned jobs plaintiff’s age other factor was a ners were ferred law, accounting, indus- special skills in dis- the defendants considered relations, personnel charging trial relations him. qualified for such not violation of the ADEA occurs A willful positions. predominant factor when legitimate non- offered Once defendants Schrand, employer's decision. eliminating for discriminatory reasons in- given proper The jury at 158. reas- employment and plaintiffs required to find struction on what was position, burden signing him to another ADEA. willful violation of the We believe by preponder- prove shifted to provides the above evidence sufficient those reasons of the evidence ance could have con- basis from discrimination. pretext were a predomi- plaintiff’s was the cluded Green, 411 Douglas Corp. v. McDonnell factor in decision terminate nant 1817, 1825, U.S. S.Ct. Therefore, inappropriate it for him. was (1973). plain- that We believe L.Ed.2d 668 grant judgment the n.o.v. District Court to question fact the presented a of for tiff willfully on the violat- whether defendants jury The found to could have jury decide. ed the ADEA. explanation pretextual. We defendants’ that the District Court as to agree the with III. found executives who were eleven other that, The if its District Court held non- positions, established other defendants appeal, n.o.v. reversed on judgment was discriminatory why they to were reasons as would entitled to a new trial defendants be positions plaintiff was placed and in other on the issues whether defendants violat However, jury found the could have not. ed ADEA whether such viola and reducing objec- that costs been sole applies This tion was willful. Court tive, younger other possibly and two one reviewing of discretion standard abuse employees reassigned who were would grant Portage of a new trial. conditional plaintiff as- have terminated been II Bryant Corp., Petroleum signed positions they which were to the to (6th Cir.1990). A court district plan- points Plaintiff to two transferred. evidence, weigh not must but should not reas- ners who were terminated but jury merely set aside a verdict signed planning positions, Mitchell to other conclu jury could drawn different Mitchell, plaintiffs subor- and Pflaumer. sions. Id. dinate, planning posi- given a different was judgment the motion for younger than plaintiff. was tion. Mitchell n.o.v., court all of the evi- reviewed to also transferred another Pflaumer was Although disagree con- with its dence. we are unable to find planning position. We to be clusion that there was evidence record, par- but the Pflaumer’s agree evi- to the we that jury, submitted arguments treated him as a jury ties’ final position dence of the to find another failure plaintiff’s employee. Viewing younger very for of his plaintiff because thirty-seven years employment circumstantial, solely slight and while organization positions, in several the fact positions to other evidence that the which positions found for Mitch- that other were openings were executives were transferred Pflaumer, ell and and Hilton’s belief very plaintiff could not fill was retire, which ready plaintiff could was to argu- plaintiff termination, strong. As conceded at oral plaintiff’s have inferred ment, only age dis- direct evidence of when no other was which resulted misinterpretation was Hilton’s him, crimination was not his lack found for based something plaintiff had to mean said he was close to skills but on the fact that retiring object not plaintiff would retirement We hold CEG, plaintiff plan remained pension time opinion was at some Hilton’s and that Jeffrey participated, he had conveyed Korb. testified plan, not to an- of his and was entitled to move plaintiff advised Korb after told Jeffrey plan. plans The and Galion termination; did remember this Korb not 30, 1976, April were frozen as The evidence showed conversation. plan employees participated in the Dresser plaintiff many persons younger than were 1,May 1976. Perkins testified that during reorganization also terminated plaintiff did not work for Galion Although there was and retrenchment. eligible May until not testimony Mitchell and Pflaumer were participate plan. in the Galion planners, them were the references to passing since did not hold merely The found that if had not plaintiff. the level of Mitchell at been terminated and had continued to work arguments not mentioned in the even Dresser, that Dresser trans- would have jury. to the Defendants established plan. him to the Plaintiff ferred Galion all executives at the same level as seeking plan had been switch to that reassigned experi- had skills or prior to years seven his termination. Indeed, plaintiff did ence that not have. granted judgment Court n.o.v. on District testimony in his own conceded this issue, concluding a matter of law Supreme if not all of them. The most under the terms and conditions of the acknowledged has that a district Jeffrey plans, Galion judge grant the discretion to a new has plan. eligible participate Galion appears against the trial if the verdict to be held that the be- The court weight Byrd of the evidence. v. Blue that fore the court was Dresser made 525, 540, 356 78 Ridge Cooperative, U.S. plaintiff to transfer to the Galion decision 893, 902, (1958). 2 L.Ed.2d 953 See S.Ct. plan so that he would receive the benefit American Ins. Co. v. also General $170,159 pay. increased The Life as severance (6th Bank, 821, 136 Nat’l F.2d 823 Central concluded the defendants court thus that Cir.1943). is clear District It that $170,159 to a offset from were entitled mistake had Court was convinced that a pay award. back been committed. pay purpose The of an ADEA back not believe the District Court We do employee restore is “to award granting discretion in defen- abused its enjoyed if the quo he would have status espe- The dants a new trial. evidence is discharge taken discriminatory had not “significant” was a cially weak place.” v. Libbey-Owens-Ford McMahon overwhelming weight of the factor. The Cir.1989). 1073, Co., 870 F.2d 1079 part in the played evidence was damages. pay is limited to actual Back position. place plaintiff in another failure to Therefore, plaintiff enti- ADEA is not an includes a pay award

tled to a back IV. pension benefit he would employed. Id. had he remained received argues that the District Plaintiff Theological Andover See Linn v. Newton ordering judgment n.o.v. erred in a Court 1, (1st Cir.1989); School, 9 Guth- 874 F.2d eligi on of whether the issue Co., 202, 210 Penney rie v. J.C. 803 Plaintiff ble the Galion Pension Plan. (5th Cir.1986). eligible testified at trial he was properly plan that the District Court hold participate Galion We this issue. by granted judgment n.o.v. on of the CEG were covered members CEG, partic- plaintiff was working Prior to on the Whether entitled plan. Galion ipate plan have been in the Galion should had worked a division covered of law He the court a matter Jeffrey plan. president determined as became 1,1976. Perkins, to the not have May Bettylu and should been submitted Galion testimony Manager pension admin- jury. of Pension Administra The Dresser’s overwhelmingly clear that tion, made it a member of the istrator testified 726 appellee’s enrollment in district court erred in not entitled to

plaintiff was finding judgment The n.o.v. plan. jury's other- motion the Gabon supported by the evidence. is not wise judgment notwithstanding the verdict A to be drawn the evi- only conclusion is question freely is of law that reviewa Dresser dence is that switched by judg appeal. ble on The issue raised plan so that would receive the Galion sufficient ment n.o.v. whether as a form of pension benefits additional question to raise a of fact for pay. agree We District severance 511, Kiledjian, v. 511 F.2d jury. O’Neill $170,159 by plain- received that the may (6th Cir.1975). judgment A n.o.v. 513 pension benefits should be tiff increased only if, granted upon viewing be the totali pay back award. offset from ty evidence most favor admissible motion, opposing ably party to the V. trier fact could draw but one reasonable granted a direct The District Court Inc., Spiegel, Hill 708 F.2d conclusion. v. were entitled to that defendants ed verdict (6th Cir.1983)(cited v. 237 Ridenour $46,451, in representing an an offset of (6th Cir.1986)). Co., Lawson plaintiffs pension value of crease in the Thus, re n.o.v. can be subsidy early retirement because of an if, viewing after the evidence versed subsidy. payment Perkins testi a deferred drawing all reasonable inferences age 65, plaintiff retired at fied plaintiff, this court concludes favor of the pension received less benefits would have “points strongly so the evidence than he entitled to receive minds favor of the movant that reasonable This offset directed after his termination. could not come to a different conclusion.” proper by the Court was so District Corp., 586 F.2d Morelock NCR not receive award that would (6th Cir.1978), denied, 441 cert. 1104-05 damages. greater his actual We than U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d District Court did not err hold that the (1979). this offset. granting defendants Co., 696 In Blackwell Electric v. Sun (6th Cir.1983), 1176 this court noted VI. in an case proof that the burden of ADEA the Accordingly, jury’s we reinstate ver- in accordance with the should be allocated willfully violated the dict that defendants Dept. in Supreme Court’s decision Texas discharging AF- ADEA in we Burdine, 248, U.S. Comm. v. 450 Affairs FIRM order the District Court’s (1981). L.Ed.2d 101 S.Ct. 207 new trial. We AFFIRM the defendants a However, case, present district the granting defen- District Court’s orders or not court elected not to decide whether $170,159 $46,451 dants’ offsets of case, in appellant prima made out a facie award, pay back and REMAND the deciding only appellant that the did stead a action District for new trial to the by preponderance of the not establish remaining the issues. discharged he evidence that was Therefore, age. Appendix in at 66. Joint CONTIE, Judge, Senior Circuit present posture, only need review we dissenting. appellant the district court’s decision that following reasons, respectfully I burden, For the carry and not failed to his ultimate Age dissent. The Discrimination in Em- each the elements articulated in Bur- ployment Act makes unlawful the dis- dine. employee

charge of his of an 623(a)(1). Appellant argues 29 U.S.C. § I. successfully his carried ultimate employer’s successfully carry the ulti- proving prof- that the In order to burden of case, age in pre- erred for his mate an discrimination reason termination was burden by preponder- age prove, text for must discrimination and that evidence, employer’s discriminatory dence of statements made of the anee discharge by supposedly were for influenced the articulated reasons age for intentional discrimination. termination decision. There is little merit pretext 803 F.2d Corp., Products Chappell appellant’s v. GTE in either contentions. Cir.1986), denied, cert. 919, 107 94 L.Ed.2d 690 S.Ct. U.S. A. ways in which a (1987). There are three can that a defendant’s establish Appellant argues first that he pre- termination were job for the reasons report” job “direct executive whose (1) showing the reasons by textual: Appellant was discontinued. contends fact; (2) they if have a basis no basis in fact he was the oldest “direct fact, showing they not the by were report,” age evidence that at motivating discharge; factors or actual appellee’s pre- force reduction was a work factors, showing (3) if were Appellant discrimination. ar- text jointly insufficient to motivate they were gues other eleven executives con- that the discharge. Id.; LaMontagne Ameri group tained this retained Products, Inc., 750 F.2d can Convenience managed find other appellee, posi- who (7th Cir.1984). 1414-15 However, this is tions for them. not an recognized Chappell, As this circuit of what occurred accurate characterization find it difficult to meet plaintiffs often fact, group of executives. within this persuasion ultimate their burden Lewis, counterpart appellant’s at the Sam cases, “though they even discrimination job group, lost his six ME & FG also only to ‘a’ and not show completed working months later after determining employer’s factor ‘the’ specific project. years on a Lewis was Chappell, personnel decision.” old, appellant, appellee and like could Carmen, 266, citing Cuddy v. 694 F.2d position Ap- him. find other Joint Moreover, (D.C.Cir.1982). 853, 859 an Moreover, pendix one at 611-12. member has ADEA who been terminated reports,” group of “direct J.M. reorganization pursuant corporate to a or Wurstra, reassigned to a has force reduction a more demand work Ap- general counsel for another division. supporting charges of ing burden of dis legal training, pellant, could not who lacked employee crimination than does position. reassigned to this Of have been terminated for reasons. Riden reports” reas- other “direct who were Indeed, our, in these 791 F.2d at 57.1 signed, has met his burden of appellant cases, rely must employee an on additional qualified any to fill proving that he was evidence, or evidence statistical reassigned positions. Therefore it those “employer statements indicative made age inferred that was determi- cannot be motive,” discriminatory v. Gen- Barnes management appellee’s re- factor native (6th Inc., F.2d Cir. Corp, Instead, can structuring. this evidence 1990), as circumstantial evidence appellee treated only demonstrate determining factor. also See Riden equal similarly persons in an man- situated 57; our, 791 F.2d at LaGrant &Gulf ner. Co., 748 Western Manf. However, not be limit- bar, inquiry our should Cir.1984). appellant at In the case appel- as reports,” ed to twelve “direct types on two of evidence an effort relies Rather, must focus on suggests. his lant we termination was to demonstrate employees within the (1) level that he was the all executive pretextual: evidence CEG, oldest, or not were “direct report” whether only, and “direct execu planning posi- terminated; (2) reports” and also employee level evi tive part pany. employee is not eliminated reduction" was described An 1. A "work force or re- she is a work force reduction when circuit a situation that "occurs when Barnes, discharge.” employer placed or her after his considerations cause an business positions at 1465. one or more within com- eliminate reassign him eight failure to was sufficient to within all of existed tions which liquidated. appellee raise an inference of discrimination. How- groups which ever, “[wjhere employer an reduces his First, there were nine execu- in the CEG reasons, for economic it incurs workforce reorganiza- before personnel tive level duty employee to transfer to another of these executives Five occurred. tion Ridenour, position company.” within the positions to other within reassigned were 57; Barnes, F.2d at 896 F.2d at 1469. Dresser, these executives were Four of Therefore, appellee’s failure to find a new appellant 62. terminated, including position appellant for the cannot raise an However, other executives who the three inference of discrimination this case. ages, are as fol- jobs, and their lost their However, existed, duty even if such a 50; Landis, 41; and Cleary, L.J. lows: P.T. clearly appellee demonstrates that Herbert, 431. Appendix at E.L. 33. Joint reassignment employ- implemented younger than executives were These three Indeed, regard ees without execu- repo- executives who were three of the five younger appellant, Thus, tives who were than the there is no numerical evi- sitioned. suggests younger many that the decision to than executives who dence which Instead, by age. positions it liquidate reassigned, motivated also had their were restructuring addition, was made appears planners that the In those eliminated. any age-related factors. independent of reassigned specialized possessed who were skills, accountancy marketing such as “[p]er- Secondly, the district court held experience, perform which enabled them to telling evidence introduced haps the most appellant qualified. jobs for which was not demonstrating the utter lack of in this case fact, appellant completely has failed to of discrimina- of evidence even a scintilla identify joba which he would have been eight that six of the execu- tion is the fact capable performing. In the absence of holding group planning positions were tives showing, such a could not infer a Appendix at terminated.” Joint discriminatory simple motive from the fact age group planners of the six who appellee that the found new for ranged terminated from 61 to were employees appellant. other but not the Al- ages planners while the of those who were Moreover, though appellant many years reassigned and 48. of ser- were 55 permanently planners company, reas- vice with the that alone would two signed specialized skills possessed position which him to a for not entitle appellant Appellant lacked. failed to dem- unqualified, nor would the fact that he qualified onstrate that he was was not offered a that was subse- positions, yet reassign- denied these quently given employee to a less-senior skills, Thus, specialized and not ment.2 Thus, raise an inference of discrimination. factor which deter- appears to be the comparisons numerical based on planners. mined the fates of the Without similarly employees, situated there is no more, attempt to meet his appellant’s bur- appellee’s evidence that work force reduc- proof by relying den of on numerical com- subsequent reassignments tion and were a short, parisons as a could not falls pretext age discrimination. appellant infer from that was this evidence against of his discriminated because B. Appellant argues that he nevertheless Appellant also relies on evidence should offered one of these new have been made a statement to officials at positions, productive and hard- Hilton as he was a corporate headquarters appellant working employee many years of ser- with appellee’s mind termination he was company, vice to the and that “wouldn’t placed, Appellant nor he demonstrate 2. contends that one of his subor- Mitchell was does dinates, Mitchell, reassigned, qualified job. he to fill that The fact J.R. was and that was job appellant’s appellee’s subordinate was offered a new failure to offer him this raises an However, more, enough support appel- position, to inference of discrimination. without not specifies type job lant never of into which an inference of discrimination. not communicate to our cor- age.” Appellant’s comment] retirement so to [the close that, porate my in until dispute not office after discussion Brief at It is Reply made com- appellant Hawley this about his termination.” Id. at point, at Mr. some However, Thus, appears to 584; timing Hilton. id. ment to see also at 721. if, when, uncertainty comment, as to and corporate relayed be some of to head- cor- relayed information to the this quarters Hilton decision made after the initial to porate headquarters decision before precludes reorganize corporation, to Appellant argues was made. restructure relying support on it to an infer- from the could infer evidence ence of bias. made presented that the statement was Nevertheless, likely that did it is Hilton prior appellant. to terminate to the decision input implementing this de- have some into may have Thus, argues, statement liquidate group management. to level cision eventually bearing on who was had some trying reassign included to His contribution relies, Appellant part, in terminated. displaced executives to new with- following: Thus, organization. appellant ar- question put to Q. Line 2. The gues that, fact, the termination in this decision to terminate you: Who made the First, comprised parts. case was of two mean, Hawley. persons? I what Chet begun by the termination was the decision could your recall answer? Or you Do corporate headquarters liqui- to made your you read answer? management. of How- date various levels I read the an- [by A. Should Korb]: ever, appellant’s termination was not actu- “That have been a Jim swer? would complete unsuccessfully ally until Hilton Hilton, George Korb, Murphy-type Jack find a for him. It was tried to new decision.” appellant reassigned not be only once could Appendix 652-53. Since Joint at job his termination became a new and input into the decision to terminate had Therefore, Hilton knew effective. knowledge appellant’s of statement retirement, appellant appellant’s view retirement, appellant argues about reassign him— argues that failure age likely into the decision to ter- entered hence his termination —was driven and However, him. it is clear from the minate However, part by age considerations. presented trial that the decision reasons, following I not do believe in re- to initiate a work force reduction any inference of discrimination sponse economic losses came to severe appel- by reassign raised Hilton’s failure up higher in the chain from a source much lant. Hilton, organization, who was First, of the execu the characteristics president, merely group did not influence reassigned across were not cut tives who The record demonstrates this decision. ages younger appellant. than decision made Jack Mur- —some that this Furthermore, reassigned those who president, early Dresser’s phy, qualifications possessed specialized decided that the entire summer Appellant was appellant lacked. unable liqui- have to be group structure would single job he was point to a for which Appendix at 626. This is dated. Joint Secondly, fill. qualified to the comment appellant’s termi- which led to decision retirement, originally regarding made nation, it is that it was made evident support a is too to alone appellant, abstract conditions, irre- response economic Chappell, finding of discrimination. spective age-related characteristics 2. It is clear that F.2d at n. which com- individual executives regarding or comment every statement group time prised the structure. At the age is of an intent person’s probative George specifically decided Korb Foods Young v. General discriminate. appellant’s position, testi- Korb eliminate Cir.1988), (11th 840 F.2d Corp., knowledge of yet he did not fied that denied, 109 S.Ct. addition, 488 U.S. cert. at 623. In comment. Id. Hilton’s single (1989). A reference testified, L.Ed.2d repeatedly, he “did 102 more, retirement, without appellant’s appel- to meet sufficiently probative under ADEA. proof burden of lant’s weight carries

Finally, argument little required to find employer is not

because employment for executives who

substitute displaced of a work force Barnes, 1469-70;

reduction.

Ridenour, Reyn- 57; Sahadi v. 791 F.2d at Chemical,

olds

Cir.1980). appel- no evidence that

Since relayed to comment to Hilton was

lant’s

corporate headquarters before the decision made, or that this isolat-

to restructure was contributed in

ed comment could have manage- implement

way to the decision to liquidation, I

ment-wide would hold that grant decision to

district court’s proper there was no

n.o.v. was could infer that appellant mo-

appellee’s termination by age.

tivated reasons, I hold

For the above would also properly granted court district respect to issue of

judgment n.o.v. with discrimination.

willful

Joseph and Ella J. FLACCHE Plaintiffs-Appellants, Flacche, M. LIFE COMPANY

SUN ASSURANCE (U.S.), CANADA Defendant

OF

Appellee. 91-3462.

No. Appeals,

United Court of States Circuit.

Sixth 7, 1992.

Argued Feb. March

Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Chester G. HAWLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.; George A. Korb, Defendants-Appellees

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: May 20, 1992

Citation: 958 F.2d 720

Docket Number: 91-3468

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.