Chesrow v. GalianiChesrow v. Galiani
—Order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Luis Gonzalez, J.), entered on or about November 22, 1995, which denied defendant’s motion seeking partial summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ first and second causes of action insofar as they seek damages allegedly incurred more than 21/2 years prior to the commencement of this action, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted.
The complaint alleges that defendant dentist committed medical malpractice in failing to diagnose and treat plaintiff Ann Chesrow for periodontal disease. Her husband, plaintiff
Although conceding that x-rays taken as early as May 1986 indicate that plaintiff Ann Chesrow had sustained bone loss, defendant testified in the course of his examination before trial that his records make no mention of any discussion with his patient regarding this condition. He further stated that he performed no periodontal probing to determine the extent of the disease, devised no course of treatment to alleviate the condition and made no referral to a periodontist. Ms. Chesrow was last seen for treatment by defendant on December 23, 1991. This action was instituted on March 24, 1993.
Defendant moved to dismiss such part of the action against him as seeks damages for injuries resulting from treatment received more than 21/2 years before plaintiffs instituted this lawsuit. In denying defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment, Supreme Court held that issues of fact are presented with respect to the applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine.
Plaintiffs contend, as they did in opposition to defendant’s motion, that he should be estopped to plead the Statute of Limitations pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ decision in Simcuski v Saeli (
Plaintiffs’ theory of estoppel is unavailing. In Simcuski v Saeli (supra, at 454), the Court of Appeals emphasized that, in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to defeat a defense predicated on the Statute of Limitations, the defendant’s conduct must be shown to transcend mere negligence and to comprise "the purposeful concealment and misrepresentation of the fact and consequences of the malpractice.” This subject was revisited in Rizk v Cohen (
Application of the continuous treatment doctrine is likewise unsupported by the facts of record. In her bill of particulars, plaintiff Ann Chesrow indicated that, during the period from mid-1988 through mid-1991, she received treatment from defendant in virtually every month, and in some instances, on several occasions during the month. While the record demonstrates that a dentist-patient relationship extended over the course of 16 years and that Ms. Chesrow showed signs of periodontal disease as early as 1986, there is no indication that she was ever treated by defendant for this condition (see, lazzetta v Vincenzi,
As noted in Rizk v Cohen (73 NY2d, supra, at 103), "neither the 'continuing nature of a diagnosis’ (McDermott v Torre,
Finally, with respect to Robert Chesrow’s derivative cause of action for loss of consortium, CPLR 214-a tolls the limitations period only for the aggrieved patient and not for a spouse or