225 S.W.2d 299 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1949
Affirming.
Appellee recovered damages against appellant for personal injuries suffered by her when run over on the latter's railroad tracks near Paintsville. The principal issue on this appeal is whether or not the company was entitled to a directed verdict. This in turn depends on whether appellee was a trespasser or a licensee at the place of the accident. *726
Appellee was struck on appellant's tracks at a point approximately a half a mile northeast of the Paintsville city limits. Between the City and the place of the accident is a small community known as Greentown. Several hundred yards northeast of the Greentown community is a highway crossing with a road leading north about a quarter of a mile to a mining settlement known as Thealka. The accident happened about 100 yards southwest of the crossing between it and Greentown. The point was at the intersection of the mine spur track from Thealka with the main line of appellant.
At Thealka there are residences, a main office, commissary, post office, and school building. The population there is about 400. Greentown consists of 30 or 40 residences. Within theimmediate vicinity of the accident there are only three houses widely separated. The countryside is hilly, and a steep bluff arises north of the tracks opposite the place of the accident.
Appellee was run over by a long freight train which rounded a sharp curve and struck her from behind. There is evidence the operators of the train were not keeping a lookout and failed to give a warning of its approach. If appellee was a trespasser, the observance of these duties was not required.
The evidence indicates the track at this point was used by a substantial number of people every day. Estimates range up to four or five hundred persons daily passing in the vicinity, though an appreciable number of these apparently used a paralleling highway and a path along the side of the tracks. Appellant practically admits a substantial use of the tracks by members of the public. The narrow issue in the, cage is whether or not the place of the accident was thickly settled, or if not, its proximity to two communities and the nature of its use were sufficient to impose special duties on appellant.
The principal case relied upon for reversal is Louisville
N. R. Co. v. Adams' Adm'x,
In all of the cases dealing with this question, the most important consideration has been, and necessarily should be, the use of the track at the place of the accident. As pointed out in Louisville N. R. Co. v. Arrowood's Adm'r,
Looking at the question from another angle, the word "community" is quite elastic and may cover a comprehensive region. It is obvious there could be no extensive use of railroad tracks except in an area where a substantial number of persons are congregated. In the present case, taking into consideration the concentrations of populations in Paintsville, Greentown and Thealka and the travel between these points, we could accurately say that the general vicinity was a thickly populated community.
If appellant's contention was sustained, we would *728 be required to say that appellant would owe no duties to pedestrians on its tracks if a city or thickly settled community was not built right down to the rails at the point of the accident. No case decided by this Court as gone that far, nor would such a decision be justified. In view of the basis of legal liability, the emphasis in all cases must be upon the extensive use rather than the immediate surrounding topography. Considering the proof in this case, we are of the opinion that an issue was presented for the jury's determination, and therefore appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict.
Complaint is also made of Instruction No. 1 on the grounds that the jury: (1) should not have been required to find that at least 150 persons daily used the tracks for pedestrian travel, and (2) should not have been allowed to determine whether or not the place of the accident "was a thickly settled area." In certain respects this instruction was more favorable to appellant than the law requires, and it contained nothing which could be considered prejudicial error.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.