111 Va. 41 | Va. | 1910
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is the second time this case has been before this court. In the opinion upon the former writ of error, the circumstances under which the death of the plaintiff’s decedent occurred, as they then appeared from the record are stated, and upon the case then made it was held that-the verdict of the jury against the railway company could not be sustained, and the cause was remanded for a new trial. See 107 Va. 408-411, 59 S. E. 398. Upon the next trial there was a demurrer to the evidence and judgment for the plaintiff again. To that judgment this writ of error was awarded.
The duty of a railway company to a person who, in conformity to a custom acquiesced in by the carrier, goes to a railway station to assist a passenger in entering or leaving the train is declared. It was held that such a person is an invitee to whom the carrier owes the duty of ordinary care to see that he is not injured, and that, if he enters the train and his purpose is known, it is the duty of the carrier to give him a reasonable time within which to leave it, but if his purpose is not known and there are no circumstances to put the carrier upon notice, then the carrier is not bound to hold the train till he has had time to alight, or to notify him before the train starts.
Upon the former writ it was not shown that the railway company had notice that the deceased was merely assisting
Upon" all material points the evidence of the railway company is directly in conflict with that of the plaintiff, and upon most of them preponderates. While upon the whole evidence the jury, as it seems to us, ought to have found a verdict for the defendant, vet as the evidence was conflicting the verdict of the jury cannot be interfered with, if there was sufficient evidence to sustain it.
We do not think the act of the brakeman, as testified to by the plaintiff’s witnesses, makes out a case of negligence against the railway company. As was said in the opinion of the court on the former writ of error, it was the brakeman’s duty to have attempted to protect the plaintiff’s intestate from damage incident to his stepping off a moving train, and if perchance disaster attended his efforts in that regard, the master cannot be held answerable in damages for the fortuitous result.
The case made by the evidence, it may be conceded, shows that the railway company was negligent in failing to give Paris a reasonable time within which to leave the train. The fact remains, however, that in attempting to alight from a moving train he was the author of his own wrong.
Negligence, whether contributory or otherwise, is a mixed question of law and fact. If the facts be doubtful, or about which reasonable men may differ, their determination becomes a question for the jury; but where the facts are undisputed, the law applicable to them is a question for the court.
The decided cases with reference to alighting from moving ■trains are almost without number. Many of them deal with passengers alighting from street cars, and it is almost universally held that to alight from a slowly moving street car is not negligence per se. Where a passenger is invited to alight by an officer of the train, or is told that he may do so in safety, the cases hold that circumstance to justify his ac
In Richmond & Danville R. Co. v. Morris, 31 Gratt. 200, it appears that it was night when the train arrived at the station B.; that Morris had fallen asleep, and when approaching the station the conductor awakened him, telling him that they were at B. The train went a short distance beyond the freight house and reception room without stopping, arid when the engine reached the frog on the west side of the freight house and reception room it stopped, and the conductor seeing Morris still in the caboose asleep, again aroused him. The train stopped about a minute, and Morris could then have gotten off whilst the train was not in motion. The conductor then went to the other end of the car, and looking back saw that Morris did not get up. He returned, shook Morris and told him to get up, or get off, he was at B. Immediately after waking Morris the last time, the conductor went out at the end of the caboose with his lantern in his hand and stood on the stationary platform about two and a half feet from the platform of the car; the train commenced backing, and Morris got up and walked out to the end of the car and jumped off, not knowing, as he said, which way the car was going, and the caboose car and several others passed over him, injuring him severely. The point where Morris jumped off was opposite the platform, which extended thirty-five steps
It is obvious, we think, that the case just cited was a far stronger one in behalf of the passenger than the one under consideration. The court rightly characterized the conduct of the conductor as culpable negligence, and held that this negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to Morris; but Morris was in a place of safety, and in attempting to alight from a moving car was held to have brought the injury upon himself, and was therefore not entitled to relief. Judge-Burks, who delivered the opinion of a unanimous court, cites the case of Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147, 62 Am. Dec.
Continuing, Judge Burks says further: “It is to be borne in mind, however, that if a passenger is induced to leap from the carriage, whether by coach or railway, by a well founded apprehension of peril to life or limb, induced by occurrences which might have been guarded against by the utmost care of the carriers, he is entitled to recover for any injury he may -sustain thereby, although no injury would have occurred if he had remained quiet.”
In Jammison v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 92 Va. 327, 23 S. E. 758, 53 Am. St. Rep. 813, it was held, that if a passenger train fails to stop at a station to which a pas■senger has purchased a ticket, it is the duty of the passenger to retain his seat until he arrives at the next station
The person injured in this case was upon the train where he had the right to be as an invitee. He was in a place of safety. Had he elected to remain upon the train, his right of action was complete for whatever inconvenience he had suffered, or-might suffer, as the direct consequence of the railroad company’s negligence. But when he undertook to alight from the train, the negligence of the railroad company had ceased' to operate, and it was the voluntary act of Paris which became the "proximate cause of his injury.
As was said by this court in C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Wills, 68 S. E. 395, ante, “the direct and efficient cause of the-injury for which this suit was brought was the alighting from the train while in motion. In that act the railroad company had no part.”
If it were conceded that Paris was not guilty of negligence in alighting from the train, we do not perceive that his case would be strengthened, for his act of alighting was the proximate cause of the injury. In order to recover he must show negligence upon the part of the railroad company as the proximate cause of the injury for which he sues. He cannot recover merely because he was not guilty of a negligent act; and in this cáse the negligence of the railroad company had ceased to operate — was exhausted — and his alighting from the train, whether under conditions that convict him of negligence or not is immaterial. If the act of the railroad was a mere condition and not the proximate and efficient cause of the injury, and if Paris in alighting from the train, under the cir
It has often been held that the act of a responsible agent, ■intervening between the negligence of the railway company and the injury sued for, relieves the railway company of responsibility. If the intervening act of a third person has •that effect, how much more where the person injured was .himself the author of his own wrong.
But it is said that if this view prevail, and a person injured while leaving a moving train under circumstances similar to those under consideration is denied the right to recover for such injury, and is left to compensation for damages for the .inconvenience, loss of time and the labor of travelling back, -which are the direct consequences of the act of. the railroad • company, the recovery in many instances would , not ade- ■ quately redress the wrong suffered. To this we reply that experience does not warrant the apprehension that courts and juries may not safely be trusted to do full justice to the citizen in such controversies; and that, even if this -were not -o. the difficulty or the inability to obtain full compensation for -an admitted wrong cannot be made the basis for a recovery ¿against a railroad company in excess of just compensation for the injury which its negligence had occasioned, measured by ■the ascertained and established rules of law in such cases.
There is another view, which we think is not without •merit. Where an injury is inflicted by a negligent act, it is the duty of the party injured by reasonable care to diminish the consequences of the wrong he has suffered, in the interest ■of the wrongdoer. This is not merely good law but good morals, and flows from that rule which has the highest possible sanction, that we should do unto others as we would have ■others do unto us.
Where a passenger has been wrongfully carried beyond his .-station, or has not been given a reasonable time to leave a
For a full discussion of the doctrine of remote and proximate cause, we refer to C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Wills, supra, and the authorities there cited. As was said in that case, there is no evidence that any agent of the company directed, advised, encouraged, or even had knowledge of the intention of plaintiff’s intestate to alight from the train, except the brakeman, whose conduct was held not to fix negligence upon the railroad company. There was in this case, as in that, the intervening act of a responsible agent, that agent being the plaintiff’s intestate himself; and while the railroad company was guilty of negligence in not giving a sufficient time for Paris to alight from the train, it cannot be said that the injury for which he sues was the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, of that negligent act.
For these reasons we are of opinion that the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed, and this court will proceed to enter such judgment as the circuit court ought to have rendered.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I cannot concur in the opinion of the court, in so far as it holds that the plaintiff’s intestate in attempting to get off the traiii was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law; nor in the general rule laid down in that opinion, that it is per se negligence in every case for a person to attempt to get off a moving train, except under the circumstances pointed out in the opinion. Whether or not the conduct of plaintiff’s intes
It is the province of the jury, as was said in B. & O. Ry. Co. v. Griffith, 159 U. S. 603, 611, 16 Supt. Ct. 105, 108, 40 L. Ed. 274, “to note the special circumstances and surroundings of each particular case, and then to say whether the conduct of the parties in the case was such as would be expected of a reasonably prudent man under a similar state of facts.”
“Negligence,” said Judge Burks in Carrington v. Ficklin, 32 Gratt. 670, 676-7, “cannot be conclusively established by a state of facts upon which fair-minded men may well differ.”
I do not understand, as stated in the majority opinion, that it is per se negligence in this State to get on or off of a moving train, except in cases under the circumstances pointed out in that opinion. Neither the Jamison case. 92 Va. 327, 23 S. E. 758, 53 Am. St. Rep. 813, nor the Morris case, 81 Gratt. 200, cited as settling the rule in this State, involved that question. In the first-named case, the plaintiff ’was not injured in attempting to get on or' off a moving train. The Morris case was a case of gross negligence on the part of the passenger, and while there may be language used in both cases broad enough to sustain the state
In the Morris case, the court says that time sufficient was given the person “according to the proof, to leave the car while the train was standing; and after he was cautioned the last time, if he had at once followed the conductor, who stepped on to the platform with the lantern in his hand, he might have reached the platform with equal convenience and safety, or if on tarrying longer and finding the train in motion, when told to get off he should either have declined, as he had the right to do, to obey the direction, or if he chose' to take the risk of getting off under the circumstances, he should have gotten off on the stationary platform, which as shown was alongside of the train. Such would have been the dictates of common prudence. He did not heed them, but according to his statement he got up, walked to the end of the car and ‘jumped off,’ not knowing nor seeking to know in which direction the train was moving. This would seem to be something more than the want of ordinary prudence and caution. It appears to be gross negligence — extreme recklessness.”
It is clear that a case like that did not call for any expression of opinion which would control a case like this.
Neither did the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the Aspell case, 23 Penn. St. 147, 62 Am. Dec. 323, cited and relied on in the majority opinion in this case and in the Morris ease, require a decision of the question involved iq this case. In that case, when the passenger, as Judge Black says in his opinion, “was about to jump, the conductor and the brakeman entreated him not to do it, warned him of his danger, and assured him that the train
Not only was the language used in that case not necessary to its decision, but In a later case in the same court — Johnson v. West Chester, &c. Ry. Co., 70 Penn. St., 357, where the passenger attempted to get on a moving train, in which the trial court had instructed the jury that, “If the train was distinctly running on the track when the plaintiff attempted to enter, he was guilty of negligence and could not recover,” that instruction was held to be erroneous, and that “it was for the jury to say whether the danger of boarding the train when in motion was so apparent as to make it the duty of the passenger to desist from the attempt.” The language of Judge Agnew in delivering the unanimous opinion of the court in that case is so apt I cannot do better than quote it as expressing my views, especially as the earlier decision of that court in the As yell case is quoted and relied on to sustain the majority opinion in this case.
In that case the plaintiff had not been given sufficient time to get on the train before it began to move. “Now, though the train,” says the court, “was distinctly in motion, so that a bystander, cool and unconcerned, could see it visibly running on the track, are we to say, as a matter of law binding on the jury, that a passenger having a right to go on the train and seeing himself about to be left improperly by the wayside, is guilty of culpable negligence if he should essay to reach his destination, no matter how slow the motion in runping might be or how little danger was apparent to him? He may be guilty of negligence, but of this the jury should judge under the circumstances. He may not set his life or limbs on the
In Filer v. N. Y. Central R. Co., (a steam railroad), 49 N. Y. 47, 10 Am. Rep. 327, cited with approval by this -court in the case of Newport, &c., Co. v. McCormick, 106 Va. 517, 521, 59 S. E. 281, in which last-named case it was held that it was not per se negligence to step from a moving street car, it was said by the Court of Appeals of New York: “That there was more hazard in leaving a car it is at rest is self-evident. But whether it is imprudent while in motion, although moving very slowly, than when and careless to make the attempt depends upon circumstances; and where a party by the wrongful act of another has been placed in circumstances calling for an election between leaving the cars or submitting to an inconvenience and further wrong, it is a proper question for the jury, whether it was a prudent and ordinarily careful act or whether it was a rash and reckless exposure of the person to peril and hazard.”
The rule laid down in those cases seems to me to be the correct one, sustained by the better reason and in accord with the weight of authority. See New York, P. & N. Ry. Co. v. Cuilbourn, 69 Md. 360, 16 Atl. 208, 9 Am. St. Rep. 430, 1 L. R. A. 541; Doss v. M. K. & T. R. Co., 59 Mo. 27, 37, 21 Am. Rep. 371; Strand v. C. & W. R. Co., 64 Mich. 216, 219, 31 N. W. 184; Cent. Railroad, &c. v. Miles, 88 Ala. 256, 261-2, 6 South, 696; Cumberland Valley R. Co. v. Mangans, 61 Md. 53, 60-63, 48 Am. Rep. 88; Carr v. Eel River, &c. R. Co., 98 Cal. 366, 33 Pac. 213 (note), 21 L. R. A. 363-365; Mills v. Ry. Co. 94 Tex. 242, 59 S. W. 874, 55 L. R. A. 497; L. & N. R. Co. v. Crunk, 119, Ind. 542, 21 N. E. 31, 12 Am. St. Rep. 443; Atchison, &c. Ry. Co. v. Holloway, 71 Kan. 1, 80 Pac. 31; Sanders v. Southern Ry. Co., 107 Ga. 132, 32 S. E. 840;
The plaintiff’s intestate in this case, according to the plaintiff’s evidence, had the right to be upon the train; he was told that the train would remain there long enough for him to find his daughter a seat and deposit her baggage and get off; he was diligent in what he had to do on the train, and in his effort to leave it. He was going down the steps of the coach almost in the very act of getting off on the station platform, in the daytime, when the train, by the wrongful and unlawful act of the defendant, began to move slowly. Whether under these circumstances it was negligence to attempt to get off of the train was, in my judgment, a question about which reasonably fair-minded men might differ, and was therefore a question for the jury and not for the court.
Reversed.
Whittle J., concurs with Buchanan, J.