Chеryl D. Christopher, Appellant, v. Adam‘s Mark Hotels, a division of HBE Corporation, Appellee.
No. 97-2842
United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
March 5, 1998
Submitted: January 13, 1998
Before BOWMAN, MORRIS S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and JONES,1 District Judge.
BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
Cheryl Christopher sued Adam‘s Mark Hotels seeking damages for employment discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
I.
We must view the record in the light most favorable to Christоpher, the nonmoving party, and give her the benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Miller v. National Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 628 (8th Cir. 1995). Christopher applied for a sales secretary position at Adam‘s Mark in Kansas City, Missouri on May 10, 1995. She submitted a resume and emрloyment application indicating that she possessed a Master‘s Degree in Computer Science, that she was highly skilled and experienced in the use of WordPerfect (the word processing program utilized at Adam‘s Mаrk), and that she had taught WordPerfect at the college level. Christopher was interviewed the same day she applied but did not identify herself as an individual with a disability at the time. She was hired that day for the position.
Christopher reрorted for work the next day, May 11, 1995. Christopher took part in Adam‘s Mark‘s orientation program, at which she was asked to complete several forms. One was a Supplemental Information Form, which contained questions аbout medical condition and history. In response, Christopher wrote that she had experienced a bipolar breakdown and that she had been hospitalized for bipolar dysfunction. The supplemental form was plаced in Christopher‘s personnel file in accordance with company procedures.
Just a few days after Christopher‘s employment began, Windsor recommended that Christopher be terminated. Sometime after Christopher‘s orientation but before her termination, Windsor reviewed Christopher‘s pеrsonnel file. Based upon Windsor‘s recommendation, Don Russell, Director of Human Resources, agreed that Christopher should be terminated. It was Russell‘s practice to review employees’ files prior to terminating them. On Mаy 17, 1995, Russell terminated Christopher.
II.
We review de novo a decision to grant summary judgment. See Hase v. Missouri Div. of Employment Sec., 972 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 906 (1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant establishes “that there are no material facts in [genuine] dispute and that, as a matter of law, the movant is entitled to judgment.” Oldham v. West, 47 F.3d 985, 988 (8th Cir. 1995). We proceed with caution when deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate in
The ADA рrohibits employers from discriminating “against a qualified individual with a disability because of [that] disability.”
To establish a claim of intentional discrimination under the ADA, we employ the burden-shifting scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973). See Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-Am., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1996). First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff “must show that she is disabled within the meaning of the Act; [that] she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and [that] she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.” Webb v. Mercy Hosp., 102 F.3d 958, 959-60 (8th Cir. 1996). After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that the employer‘s stated reason was in fact pretextual. See id. at 804. This requires proof that the employer‘s articulated reason for the adverse employment action was false and that discrimination was the real reason. See St. Mary‘s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).
Adam‘s Mark, however, is able to satisfy its burden in the next step of our inquiry by articulating legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Christopher‘s termination. Adam‘s Mark asserts that Windsor believed that Christopher lacked the skills she represented on her resume; that Christopher was unable or unwilling to learn the duties of her job; and that Christopher was combative, resentful, and resistant towards her supervisors and co-workers. Adam‘s Mark thus has rebutted the presumption of discrimination raised by Christopher‘s primа facie case.
The burden shifts back to Christopher to show that Adam‘s Mark‘s articulated reasons are a pretext for discrimination. As evidence of pretext, Christopher first alleges that Windsor admitted it normally takes three weeks to train a new secretary, but that Christopher had worked for less than one week when she was terminated. The record shows, however, that Windsor actually said it may take up to three weeks to understand the comрany‘s terminology and routing procedures, but that new secretaries are expected to be proficient in word processing skills when they start work. Windsor
Christopher next alleges that previous sales secretaries began the same job with less experience than she had, and Adam‘s Mark therefore afforded them more training. She contends she should hаve been offered additional training, notwithstanding her experience. The evidence shows, however, that Christopher received the same training as did the previous secretaries--the secretary whom Christopher wаs to replace, Lambertson, sat at Christopher‘s side and gave her computer instruction. This was exactly how Lambertson had been trained. Moreover, Lambertson testified that she told Christopher that WordPerfect tutorials and computer manuals were available for her use and that she reminded Christopher there was a template above the function keys explaining their usage.
Christopher next contends that Adam‘s Mark had worked with and givеn additional time to other secretaries with performance problems in an attempt to salvage their employment. Russell did acknowledge that Adam‘s Mark had worked with one secretary in the sales department who had exhibited performance problems. Russell went on to testify, however, that the secretary‘s performance problem was more one of routing paperwork than a deficiency in technical word prоcessing skills. Russell also added that, unlike Christopher, the secretary showed a commitment to learn, improve, develop, and progress.
Finally, as evidence of pretext Christopher points to the fact that Windsor examined Christopher‘s personnel file within the first few days of her employment and that the disclosure of her disability was contained therein. Apparently Windsor requested Christopher‘s file because she was questioning Christopher‘s computer skills.
Christopher argues that in granting summary judgment the District Court did not apply the correct standard. We disagree. “[A] trial judge [is allowed] to decide on a motion for summary judgment that the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer discrimination even though the plaintiff may have created a factual dispute as to the issue of pretext.” Rothmeier v. Investment Advisors, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1335 (8th Cir. 1996). Here, the District Court correctly applied the Rothmeier standard and determined that Christopher had failed to create a submissible case as to pretext. We agree with the District Court that Christopher‘s evidence is insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer discrimination. We therefore affirm the order of the District Court granting summary judgment to Adam‘s Mark.
A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.