This is an appeal from a decision of the Indian Claims Commission dismissing appellants’ claims on the ground that they were individual (rather than group) claims, over which the Commission has no jurisdiction.
The main theme of the petition instituting the suit was that those Cherokee Freedmen whom appеllants represent were injured by the refusal of the Dawes Commission to enroll them as members of the Cherokee Nation under the legislаtion authorizing and directing that tribunal to hear and determine such applications for enrollment. See
After inquiring into the nature of the claims presented by appellants, the Indian Claims Commission concluded that they were all individual claims dependent upon the individual facts and circumstances pertinent to the particular person asserting that he (or his ancestor) was wrongfully denied enrollment. About ninеty percent of the Cherokee Freedmen rejected by the Dawes Commission were found wanting because it was determined that thеy had not timely returned to Cherokee Territory within the six-month limit set by Article IX of the Treaty of 1866, between the United States and the Cherokees, 14 Stаt. 799, 801 (which provided generally that the Cherokee Freedmen, as defined, were to “have all the rights of native Cherokees”). The othеr rejected applicants were turned down for similar personal reasons. We agree with the Indian Claims Commission that claims of this type are individual and not group claims. Their resolution would depend upon individual proof as to each Freedman that he was qualified, under the general standards laid down in the 1866 Treaty, to be enrolled as a Cherokee. There is no common right or group interest. Since the claims are individual, they could be prosecuted singly, in a proper forum, without involving other Freedmen or any entity; combining them into one proceeding does not transform such individual claims into group claims cognizable by the Claims Commission, or change their basic individual character.
Moreover, to the extent that these claims (founded on the actions of the Dawes Commission) could be viеwed as belonging to a group or entity, they would be barred, on the principle of res judicata, by the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation and United States v. Whitmire, supra,
Accordingly, we affirm the deсision of the Indian Claims Commission insofar as it dismissed appellants’ petition that relief be granted on account of the failure of thе Dawes Commission to enroll those Cherokee Freedmen whom appellants represent.
However, appellants alsо press upon us another contention which is claimed to be adequate to keep them in court.
Appellants emphasize that this claim to other funds, if valid, has а special significance at the present time. The Indian Claims Commission has approved a stipulation awarding the Cherokeе Nation over $14,000,000 additional compensation for the sale of the Cherokee “strip”. The Cherokee Nation v. United States,
We do not pass at the prеsent stage upon the validity of this argument but remand the case to the Indian Claims Commission (which has not yet dealt with the contention) so that it mаy consider this new aspect. If the Commission finds that this part of the claim is available and has merit, it should make an appropriate disposition. It might, for instance, wish to permit the appellants to intervene in its Docket No. 173 or it might consolidate the present cаse with No. 173. We leave the course of the further proceedings to
Affirmed m fart; remanded in fart for further frooeedings.
Notes
It is not clear whether or not this contention was explicitly urged before the Indian Claims Commission.
Tie argument is that no proof of individual facts would be necessary. All persons on the Kern-Clifton roll would, without more, be entitled to participate. All of the Freedmen represented by appellants appeared on the Kern-Clifton roll (or their ancestors did).