Chenshiang D. Lin, Appellant, v. Department of the Air Force, Agency.
Docket No. CH-0752-15-0340-I-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
January 9, 2023
2023 MSPB 2
Jeffrey Silverstein, Esquire, Dayton, Ohio, for the appellant. Daniel J. Dougherty, Esquire, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, for the agency.
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
OPINION AND ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which affirmed his removal under the agency‘s Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratory Personnel Management Demonstration Project, 75 Fed. Reg. 53076-01 (Aug. 30, 2010) (Lab Demonstration Project), applicable to individuals, like the appellant, employed in the agency‘s Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). For the reasons that follow, we GRANT the appellant‘s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Central Regional Office for
BACKGROUND
¶2 As further detailed in the initial decision, the appellant most recently held the position of Senior General Engineer, DR-III, for the AFRL. Lin v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-15-0340-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9, Part 1 at 19-20; Lin v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-15-0340-I-2, Refiled Appeal File (AF-2), Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2.1 In this position, he was subject to a contribution-based compensation system (CCS), rather than the traditional performance-based system. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 9, Part 3 at 9-10.
¶3 In the CCS that applies in this appeal, contribution in engineering positions such as the appellant‘s are assessed in four “factors,” which are averaged to determine an individual‘s overall CCS score: (1) Problem Solving; (2) Communication; (3) Technology Management; and (4) Teamwork and Leadership. 75 Fed. Reg. at 53090, 53093, 53102-04. For each factor, the Lab Demonstration Project contains detailed descriptions of four “broadband levels” of contribution, levels I through IV. Id. at 53084, 53086, 53102-04. An individual‘s broadband level and pay dictates his expected level of contribution. Id. at 53084, 53086. For instance, the appellant held a DR-III broadband level position, so his contribution on the four factors was determined based on his DR-III broadband level, with some variance based on his actual pay
¶4 When the agency determines that an employee is inadequately contributing, one option provided in the CCS is a Contribution Improvement Plan (CIP), which is comparable to a performance improvement plan (PIP) under chapter 43. 75 Fed. Reg. at 53093-94. If an employee fails to demonstrate increased contribution during the CIP, or if his “contribution increases to a higher level and is again determined to deteriorate in any area within two years” from the start of the CIP, the Lab Demonstration Project provides management with discretion to reduce the pay of or remove the employee without a new CIP. Id. at 53093.
¶5 In January 2013, the agency placed the appellant on a 120-day CIP, citing contribution scores of 3.0 for Problem Solving, 2.9 for Communication, 2.0 in Technology Management, and 3.0 in Teamwork and Leadership for the appraisal year ending in September 2012, which resulted in an overall contribution score of 2.73, below the 3.05 score expected of him. ID at 12; IAF, Tab 9, Part 2 at 222-31, Part 3 at 4-8. In September 2013, the agency advised him that he had satisfactorily completed the CIP, but remained subject to the 2-year period in which the Lab Demonstration Project allowed for his removal if his contribution deteriorated. ID at 12; IAF, Tab 9, Part 2 at 220-21, Part 3 at 36-37; 75 Fed. Reg. at 53093.
¶7 The administrative judge held the appellant‘s requested hearing and issued an initial decision, affirming his removal. ID at 1-2, 54; IAF, Tab 6 at 2. In determining that the agency proved its contribution-based charge, the administrative judge applied the standard applicable to a chapter 43 performance-based action, with some adjustments to account for differences between a chapter 43 appeal and the Lab Demonstration Project. ID at 5-6, 9-44. She found that the appellant failed to prove his affirmative defenses of age discrimination and reprisal for engaging in equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity. ID at 44-54.
¶8 The appellant has filed a petition for review. Lin v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-15-0340-I-2, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3.3 The agency has filed a response, and the appellant has replied.4 PFR File, Tabs 5-6.
ANALYSIS
The appeal must be remanded for further analysis of the charge and affirmative defenses.
¶9 A tenured Federal employee like the appellant may appeal a contribution-based reduction in pay or removal under the agency‘s Lab Demonstration Project to the Board. IAF, Tab 9, Part 1 at 19; 75 Fed. Reg. at 53094 (citing
¶10 When the initial decision was issued, the Board‘s case law stated that, in an appeal of a typical performance-based removal under chapter 43, the agency was required to prove the following by substantial evidence: (1) OPM approved
¶11 However, while this case was pending on review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) recognized for the first time that an agency must prove an additional element to support an adverse action under chapter 43. Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-61; Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 14. Specifically, the agency “must justify institution of a PIP” by proving that the employee‘s performance was unacceptable before the PIP. Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-61; Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 14. The court noted that
The administrative judge correctly determined that chapter 43 was generally applicable to the agency‘s proof of its charge.
¶12 The administrative judge analyzed the agency‘s proof of its charge as if the appellant was unsuccessful in completing a PIP under chapter 43. ID at 5-6, 9-44. She modified the elements of a chapter 43 charge of unacceptable performance to account for the specific requirements of the Lab Demonstration Project. In particular, she found that the agency was required to prove by substantial evidence that (1) OPM approved the contribution system, (2) the agency communicated to the appellant his four contribution factors and expected level of contribution, (3) the four contribution factors were valid, (4) the agency warned the appellant that his contribution was inadequate and gave him a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate adequate contribution during the 2-year period following the CIP (specifically, in the instant case from October 1, 2013, to September 30, 2014), and (5) his contribution remained deficient. ID at 9-44. The parties do not dispute the administrative judge‘s formulation of the agency‘s burden to prove the charge. We agree that she appropriately began her analysis of the charge with the factors set forth in chapter 43.
¶13 In the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1111, 1185 (codified in pertinent part at
¶14 Congress later specifically required the Secretary of Defense to implement demonstration projects in certain military laboratories, including the AFRL. National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1107, 122 Stat. 3, 357-58 (requiring the Secretary of Defense to implement demonstration projects at certain Department of Defense laboratories (referencing
¶15 The Lab Demonstration Project in this matter contains specific provisions for “[d]ealing with [i]nadequate [c]ontribution.” Id. at 53093-94. It waives Title 5 statutes and regulations, including
¶17 Given the parallels between the requirements of an action under chapter 43 and those under the agency‘s Lab Demonstration Project, we find that the application of chapter 43 standards to the appellant‘s removal, generally, is not inconsistent with the CCS. In instances when chapter 43 diverges from the Lab Demonstration Project, we find that the administrative judge properly eliminated or modified the chapter 43 requirements to the extent necessary to allow the agency to implement its CCS. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 53098-99. For example,
¶18 We note that one chapter 43 element is not applicable here. Specifically, OPM‘s approval is not required for a Lab Demonstration Project, and therefore we disagree with the administrative judge‘s determination that the agency was required to prove this element of a chapter 43 performance-based charge. ID at 9; 2001 NDAA, Pub. L. No. 106-398, app. § 1114(a), 114 Stat. 1654A-315. In any event, the administrative judge found that OPM approved the Lab Demonstration Project, and the parties do not dispute this finding on review. Id.; 75 Fed. Reg. at 53077. Therefore, any error was harmless. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party‘s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).
We must remand this appeal for further adjudication in light of Santos.
¶19 Next, we must determine the extent to which Santos, 990 F.3d 1355, applies to this appeal. The holding in Santos that an agency must prove that an employee‘s performance was unacceptable before instituting a PIP was grounded in
¶20 Because the parties did not have an opportunity to address this element of the agency‘s burden below, we remand the appeal for further adjudication. See Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16. On remand, the administrative judge shall accept evidence and argument, and hold a supplemental hearing if appropriate, on whether the agency proved by substantial evidence that the appellant‘s pre-CIP contribution was inadequate. Id., ¶ 17. The administrative judge shall then issue a new initial decision consistent with Santos. Id. If the agency makes the additional showing required under Santos on remand, the administrative judge may incorporate into her remand initial decision the prior findings from the initial decision on other elements of the agency‘s case with the exception of the matters discussed below. Id.
We further remand for the administrative judge to determine whether the CIP period provided the appellant an adequate opportunity to improve and to apply the correct evidentiary standards for his affirmative defenses.
¶21 On review, the appellant disputes the administrative judge‘s findings that the agency proved by substantial evidence that it provided him with a reasonable opportunity to improve. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5-8. In particular, he argues that he lacked the training and background he needed to perform his assigned functions, and was disadvantaged in his performance because English was not his
¶22 In some instances, such as here, an employee is able to perform at an acceptable level while on an improvement plan, but his performance subsequently deteriorates and again becomes unacceptable. Sullivan v. Department of the Navy, 44 M.S.P.R. 646, 656 (1990), overruled on other grounds, as recognized in Thomas v. Department of Defense, 117 F. App‘x 722, 724-25 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Such an individual is known as a “roller coaster” employee. Id. An agency that has implemented a PIP generally is not required to give a roller coaster employee a new PIP prior to removing him provided it takes its action based on instances of unacceptable performance in the same critical elements for which the PIP was imposed that occurred within 1 year from the inception of the PIP.5 See id. at 659 (stating that an agency may take an action based on instances of unacceptable performance following successful completion of a PIP that occur within 1 year after the advanced notice of the PIP);
¶23 In finding that the agency provided the appellant with a reasonable opportunity to improve, the administrative judge assessed the wrong period of time. Specifically, she considered October 2013 to September 2014, the period of inadequate contribution on which his removal was based, instead of the period of the CIP. ID at 15-33. While considering this period is appropriate for determining whether the appellant‘s performance again deteriorated after the CIP, the proper period for assessing the appellant‘s opportunity to improve is the CIP period itself, from January 14 to May 13, 2013. IAF, Tab 9, Part 2 at 220-22. It is unclear whether the CIP provided an adequate opportunity for the appellant to improve, as the administrative judge did not make any findings on this subject.
¶24 The administrative judge who oversaw the proceedings below and issued the initial decision is no longer employed by the Board. When there is conflicting testimony on a material issue, and a new administrative judge will decide the case, the testimony should be heard again to permit her to make credibility determinations based on witness demeanor. Stinson v. Department of Justice, 4 M.S.P.R. 521, 523 (1981). A factual dispute is “material” if, in light of the governing law, its resolution could affect the outcome. Oram v. Department of the Navy, 2022 MSPB 30, ¶ 9 n.5. Because the appellant disputes that he was given an adequate opportunity to improve, on remand, the administrative judge should accept evidence and argument, and hold a supplemental hearing, to determine if the CIP provided the appellant with this opportunity. If the agency makes the additional showing required under Santos on remand, and proves that the CIP provided the appellant with an adequate opportunity to
¶25 Finally, the appellant presented claims of age discrimination and EEO reprisal below, which the administrative judge found unproven. ID at 44-53. The parties do not challenge this determination on review. Nonetheless, on remand the administrative judge must further adjudicate these claims. The Federal Circuit held in Santos, 990 F.3d at 1363-64, that the Board must consider an appellant‘s pre-PIP performance in the context of an affirmative defense when, as here, the validity of the agency‘s proffered reason for taking the performance-based action is a factor in analyzing that claim. Pridgen v. Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 28 (holding that in determining whether the agency has afforded the appellant a reasonable opportunity to improve in a chapter 43 action, relevant factors include the nature of the duties and responsibilities of the appellant‘s position, including whether assignments of work were made in a discriminatory manner). Further, in the period since the administrative judge issued her initial decision, we clarified the evidentiary standards and burdens of proof for age discrimination and EEO reprisal claims in Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-25, 30-33. In the proceedings on remand, the administrative judge should advise the parties of the standards set forth in Pridgen, provide them with an opportunity to present argument and evidence, and hold a supplemental hearing on the appellant‘s affirmative defenses to permit the parties to address these standards, as well as any claims regarding his pre-CIP performance. She should then apply the standards set forth in Santos and Pridgen in the remand initial decision.6 ID at 21-22, 24; PFR File, Tab 3 at 7.
ORDER
¶26 For the reasons discussed above, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND this case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this Opinion and Order.
FOR THE BOARD:
/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
