98 Mass. 224 | Mass. | 1867
In considering the several grounds of demurrer to the declaration in the present case, it is to be borne in mind that, under the rules of pleading established by statute in this Commonwealth, essential changes have been made in the forms of declarations at common law, especially in actions of tort brought for alleged slander and libel. Gen. Sts. c. 129, §§ 2,87. The more material of these alterations in their bearing on the present case are, that innuendoes are no longer necessary, it being sufficient simply to aver that the alleged libellous or slanderous words were published or spoken of and concerning the plaintiff; and that the inducement or introductory matter, and the colloquium,, including the reference to the inducement or prefatory statement, when it is necessary to an understanding of the alleged libellous or slanderous matter, are not required to be set forth with technical accuracy, but only in such manner as to make the words relied on intelligible to the court and jury in the same sense in which they were spoken or written.
It seems to us, in the light of these provisions, which were designed to abrogate the nice distinctions which the application of the strict rules of pleading at common law to declarations for slander and libel had created, that the first two grounds of demurrer- insisted on at the bar are not tenable.
2. The second ground of demurrer is similar to that already considered, and must be disposed of on like grounds. It is
3. The third ground of demurrer relates to matters of substance, and not to merely formal errors or defects. The objection is, that, taking all the facts set out in the declaration as true, and assuming that they relate to the plaintiff, and are intelligible as being connected together and as having reference to the conduct ( of the plaintiff in relation to one and the same transaction, nevertheless the publication is not actionable. This position rests on the familiar principle that a plaintiff cannot found an action upon any cause or subject matter which renders it necessary for him, in order to maintain the action, to prove that he was engaged in a violation of law. It is urged that the proper application of this principle to actions of slander and libel leads to the conclusion that no action will lie for defamatory words, either spoken or written, which merely relate to the conduct of a party while engaged in unlawful dealings or transactions. But we fail to see that this principle can be properly applied to the case stated in the declaration. The defendant’s counsel seems . to concede that to bring the case at bar within the rule it must appear from the averments that the publication was made concerning the plaintiff and his doings while he was knowingly participating in a transaction intended to accomplish a purpose forbidden by law. It seems to us, on an analysis of the allegations set forth in the declaration in connection with the preliminary statements, that they do not set forth any criminal or unlawful intent or act on the part of the plaintiff or any participation in the illegal purpose or doings of another. It is to be borne in mind that the question is not what the actual transaction was which took place between the plaintiff and the storekeeper and other officers of the United States in relation to the
But, if we are wrong in this view of the case, we are clearly of opinion that the action is maintainable on another ground. If the conduct of the plaintiff in connection with the transaction to which the publication relates was open to comment and criticism for the reason that he participated in acts which were contrary to law, and in consequence thereof no action can be maintained for a libellous publication which relates solely to the plaintiff’s connection with such unlawful acts, nevertheless there is a limit beyond which such immunity from liability for defamatory words cannot be carried. Unless the matters set forth in a declaration are of a nature which indicates that the plaintiff’s acts and conduct in connection therewith necessarily involved moral turpitude, or might fairly be held to affect his general character in any particular, a publication which held a party up to contempt and reproach as wanting in integrity or as otherwise culpable in his general conduct or character would be