CHEMICAL TRANSPORTER INC., as owner of the SS CHEMICAL TRANSPORTER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. READING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 402 and 403, Dockets 33647 and 33648.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Jan. 8, 1970. Decided May 6, 1970.
William J. Troy, New York City, for plaintiff-appellee. Timothy A. Hanan, New York City (Macklin, Hanan & McKernan, New York City, on the brief), for defendant-appellant. Before LUMBARD, Chief Judge, FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge, and MANSFIELD, District Judge.* * Sitting by designation.
These cross-appeals both question the judgment of the district court which was based on findings that two vessels in collision in the Kill Van Kull in the early morning of February 10, 1964, were equally at fault. Upon a review of such evidence as is undisputed, and accepting the factual findings of the district court, we believe that the district court‘s conclusions were clearly erroneous. We find that the SS Chemical Transporter was solely at fault, and accordingly, we reverse the judgment.
In the early morning of February 10, 1964, the 525 foot long T-2 tankship SS Chemical Transporter, having proceeded down New York harbor and rounded Robbins Reef into Kill Van Kull which separates Staten Island from New Jersey, headed up the Constable Hook Range, west northwest at 290 degrees. Meanwhile the tug Shamokin, with the loaded coal barge Tracy Barge No. 117 tied to her port side, was proceeding east, a few degrees north, near mid-channel, on the Staten Island side of the Kill. Also heading east in the Kill was the tug Latin America, parallel to the Shamokin, but on the north side of the Kill. Thus, just before the Transporter sounded its first two blast signal, Transporter was port to port with Shamokin and starboard to starboard with the Latin America. Had the Shamokin and the Transporter followed the applicable rules in such situations, the Transporter and Shamokin would have passed port to port and the Transporter and Latin America would have passed starboard to starboard — i. e., the Transporter would have passed between the Shamokin on her port and the Latin America on her starboard.
In any event, at 2:37 A.M. the Transporter blew a two whistle blast, with the Shamokin only half a mile away. The court found that this signal was directed at the Shamokin to indicate that Transporter intended to effect a starboard to starboard passing. However, as Latin America was to the north and already on a starboard to starboard position with Transporter, Captain Dentz of the Shamokin quite properly assumed that the Transporter‘s signal was intended for the Latin America. Accordingly, the Shamokin did not answer the signal. As the Transporter attempted to pass Shamokin starboard to starboard, finally putting her engines in full reverse, while Shamokin continued on her course with the barge in tow, the inevitable occurred at 2:40 A.M. when the Transporter collided with the port bow of Tracy Barge No. 117. The Transporter immediately thereafter ran aground on the Staten Island shore and sustained damages which the district court computed at $48,448.12.
On these facts we think it clear that Transporter was solely at fault. None of the rules of navigation for inland or harbor waters justified the Transporter in seeking to make a starboard to starboard passing with the Shamokin. The general rule is that ships must pass port to port whenever they are head to head (
or oblique (
Inasmuch as Transporter was solely responsible for initiating the maneuver which caused the collision, and since Shamokin was under no obligation to answer the two-blast signal, we must conclude that Transporter was solely at fault. In view of our conclusion, we need not consider the claim of the Reading Company that the trial court had before it no competent evidence on the issue of damages.
The judgment is reversed with direction to enter judgment for the Reading Company, owner of the Shamokin.
FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge (dissenting):
It is not clear to me that, in light of Article 27 of the Inland Rules,
I would affirm the judgment dividing damages and return the case to the district court for a better assessment of their amount.
