Lead Opinion
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
After plaintiff broke his arm in a fall and after defendant Sparrow Hospital
For reasons that we explain below, we hold that Michigan law does not impose a duty on a hospital to assist a discharged patient with transportation. And, because there is no duty, we need not address the causation issue, but we note that, were we to decide this issue, we would hold that plaintiff failed to prove that any of his damages were caused by Sparrow.
II. BASIC FACTS
In November 2010, plaintiff lived in New Jersey, worked for Disney in its Broadway musical touring
It was near midnight by the time plaintiff was admitted into the emergency department at Sparrow. Unable to do anything for plaintiff immediately, the Sparrow staff molded a splint for his left arm and told him to see an orthopedic surgeon the following day. Plaintiff testified that he did not want to be discharged because he was tired; he did not want to travel the 20 or 25 minutes to his hotel and preferred to sleep at the hospital. The doctor responded that the hospital could not use a bed as a place to spend the night and ultimately discharged plaintiff at 5:55 a.m. The medical records show that the doctor’s decision to discharge plaintiff was based on the following findings: plaintiffs condition had improved, plaintiffs pain was controlled, an exam of plaintiff showed him to be “stable,” and a repeat exam also showed that plaintiff was “stable.” Furthermore, the nurse in charge conducted a “fall risk assessment” and, after watching plaintiff stand up by himself and walk across the room, concluded that plaintiff passed the assessment. When discharged, plaintiff was offered a wheelchair, which he used.
A technician in the emergency department pushed plaintiff in the wheelchair to the emergency room waiting area and then left. Soon thereafter, the cab driver arrived and pushed plaintiff to the vehicle. Plaintiff was concerned with the driver’s ability to effectively assist, but the driver reassured him that he had done this before and “don’t worry about it.” After clearing out room in the front passenger seat, plaintiff
A few days later, plaintiff underwent surgery for his left arm, and two days after that, surgery was performed on his right elbow. These surgeries left plaintiff in a precarious state because he could not use either of his arms. After returning to his home in New Jersey, plaintiff saw an orthopedic surgeon, who prescribed six weeks of physical therapy for the right arm. After that six-week session was complete, the plan was for therapy to focus on the more severely injured left arm. After the therapy on the right arm, plaintiff was able to do “normal” things with it, but he nevertheless could not work anymore because of his inability to use his left arm.
In his suit, plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of Sparrow in failing to assist him into the taxi cab. Notably, he did not claim malpractice regarding his treatment or discharge at Sparrow. At the close of plaintiffs proofs, Sparrow moved for directed verdict on two grounds. First, Sparrow argued that it had no duty to assist a discharged patient into a waiting vehicle. Second, Sparrow argued that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of causation. Specifically, the
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied plaintiffs motion but stated that “[a]lthough the Court did give a detailed rationale as to why a directed verdict would have been appropriate regarding causation and damages, the primary issue and determining factor in this case was that Sparrow did not owe Plaintiff a duty.” The court noted that the evidence established that Sparrow did not have a policy requiring employees to assist discharged patients into awaiting vehicles and there also was no evidence that Sparrow assumed the responsibility of assisting such patients into vehicles.
Ill. ANALYSIS
On appeal, plaintiffs sole argument is that the trial court erred in its determination that Sparrow did not have a duty to assist plaintiff into the taxi cab. We disagree.
In a negligence analysis, the question of whether a duty exists is a question of law that we review de novo. Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC,
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the legal duty, (3) the plaintiff suffered damages, and (4) the defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages. [Loweke,489 Mich at 162 .]
Regarding the element of duty, “[a] negligence action may only be maintained if a legal duty exists which requires the defendant to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm.” Riddle v McLouth Steel Prod Corp,
Because the ultimate inquiry in determining whether a duty should be imposed involves balancing the social benefits of imposing a duty with the social costs of imposing that duty, we cannot decide whether a duty should be imposed without assessing the competing policy considerations. We must be concerned with whether it is appropriate public policy to impose liability. In fixing the bounds of duty, not only logic and science, but policy play an important role. There is a responsibility to consider the larger social consequences of the notion of duty and to correspondingly tailor that notion so that the illegal consequences of wrongs are limited to a controllable degree. In determining whether a duty exists, courts must be mindful of the precedential effects of their rulings, and limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree. Moreover, any extension of the scope of duty must be tailored to reflect accurately the extent that its social benefits outweigh its costs. [In re Certified Question,479 Mich at 518-519 (quotation marks, citations, brackets, and ellipses omitted).]
Furthermore, leaving the question of duty to juries to decide would result in inconsistent outcomes even when juries were confronted with factually indistinguishable circumstances. See Moning v Alfono,
Factors for a court to consider when deciding whether to impose a duty include the following: “the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the harm, the burden on the defendant, and the nature of the risk presented.” Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co,
Here, plaintiff asserts that Sparrow was negligent through nonfeasance, which is passive inaction or the failure to actively protect others from harm, and not misfeasance, which is active misconduct causing personal injury. Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc,
Furthermore, the analysis on the foreseeability factor is fatal to plaintiffs claim as well. Again, plaintiff was evaluated before being discharged, and it was determined that his condition had improved, his pain was controlled, and two exams showed that he was “stable.” Additionally, plaintiff had passed a “fall risk assessment” after being able to stand up and walk by himself across the room. These facts reveal that plaintiff was in better condition than he was when he arrived at the hospital and was capable of ambulating from a seated position. In light of these facts, it was not reasonably foreseeable that plaintiff would injure himself while being assisted into a cab. Consequently, we hold that Sparrow did not have a legal duty to assist plaintiff into an awaiting vehicle. Therefore, the trial court properly held that Sparrow had no duty to plaintiff and correctly granted a directed verdict.
A holding to the contrary would appear to be unprecedented. Plaintiff has failed to identify any caselaw in Michigan, or any other state, that provides that a hospital has a legal duty to assist its discharged patients into vehicles, and our research has not uncovered such precedent. In fact, what caselaw exists directly supports the conclusion that no such duty exists. See, e.g., Cameron v New York,
Affirmed. Sparrow, as the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
BOONSTRA, P.J., concurred with SAAD, J.
Notes
Because defendant Capitol Transport, L.L.C., was dismissed from the suit before trial began, Sparrow Hospital is the only defendant at issue in this appeal.
We also note that much of plaintiffs testimony focused on the fact that he thought he was not as capable as Sparrow had determined before he was discharged. However, to the extent that Sparrow did misevaluate plaintiffs condition at discharge, that would be a medical malpractice claim—not the ordinary negligence claim that is the issue in the instant case. Accordingly, the fact that plaintiff avers that he was not stable and not able to keep his balance after being discharged is not relevant for the pertinent analysis.
Although we have decided this case on the dispositive issue of duty, we note that even if a duty existed, reversal would not be required because, as the trial court alternatively ruled, there was no evidence that the injuries plaintiff suffered at Sparrow caused any of the work-loss damages he sought. Those damages, instead, were solely caused by plaintiffs prior injury to his left arm.
Sparrow filed a “cross-appeal” and in its raised issue claims that plaintiffs brief on appeal is inadequate to present his issue to this Court because it simply incorporated by reference plaintiffs prior submission to this Court in Docket No. 319518, in which Sparrow was the appellant and sought leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary disposition. Notwithstanding Sparrow’s label to the contrary, this issue is not a “cross-appeal.” It does not appeal or challenge anything that happened at the trial court. As such, we simply have treated it as an alternative argument for this Court to rule against plaintiff in his appeal. However, we decline to deem plaintiffs appeal waived or abandoned on this basis, especially in light of the fact that plaintiff did provide a thorough briefing in his reply brief.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in result).
I concur in the result only.