Frederick L. Clark (plaintiff) brought this tort action against Tracy L. Cheevers (defendant) seeking to recover for injuries allegedly sustained when plaintiff’s vehicle collided with defendant’s truck. According to the complaint, defendant was “parked improperlj on a highway while under the influence of alcohol. . . .” Consequently as plaintiff “proceeded east [on Highway 256], he drove around í curve and crashed into the rear of [defendant’s] vehicle which was parked on the highway.” In a separate count for punitive damages plaintiff alleged that defendant was aware that “the automobile colli sion should have been reported to the local law enforcement agency[ and that defendant] should remain at the scene until the reportinj officer arrived.” Nevertheless, defendant “did not contact any law en forcement agency [. . . and] left the scene of the wreck before a lav enforcement officer arrived.” The evidence adduced at a jury trial ii support of these allegations included defendant’s admission that h had been consuming alcohol throughout the day and that he had blood-alcohol content of .28 grams percent when he was arrested a his home approximately one hour after the collision.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury first awarded plaintiff $1,50 in compensatory damages and then returned a verdict against defenc ant awarding plaintiff $60,000 in punitive damages. Defendant af *867 peals from the judgment entered on these verdicts. Held'.
1. In his third enumeration, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the results of the intoximeter test performed on him because the arresting officer could not recall the precise wording in which he gave defendant his implied consent warnings.
Gene Jones, Chief of Police for the City of Poulon, testified that he gave defendant the following implied consent warning: “ ‘Georgia Code 40-5-55 requires you to submit to state administered chemical tests of the blood, breath, urine or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining alcohol or drug contents. The Georgia Code 40-6-392, you have the right to additional tests of the foregoing substances made by a person of your own choosing if you so desire. This additional test in no way satisfies your obligation to submit to the state administered chemical test. Should you refuse my request and sic] submit to the state administered chemical test your driver’s lí-jense will be suspended for a period of six months. Will you submit to ;he state administered test of your breath under the implied consent aw.’ ” Under cross-examination, Chief Jones affirmed that he did not enow “whether this was the revision that was in effect on July 21, .991, [. . . and] if it was a different revision and the wording changed he did not] know[.]” When the officer who administered the intox-meter test was asked to state the results, defendant interposed an Ejection “upon the grounds that the proper foundation has not been aid.”
“Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding aris-ng out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person in viola-ion of Code Section 40-6-391, evidence of the amount of alcohol or Irug in a person’s blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance at he alleged time, as determined by a chemical analysis . . . shall be idmissible.” OCGA § 40-6-392 (a). In order for such chemical analy-is to be admissible in evidence, “[a] defendant is ‘not entitled to a yarning which track(s) the
exact
language of the implied consent tatute. (Cit.)’
Ivie v. State,
2. In his second enumeration, defendant contends the trial court rred in charging the jury on the presumptions of intoxication at vari-us blood-alcohol levels established by OCGA § 40-6-392 (b). He ar-ues that the charge was not adjusted to the evidence because there
*868
was no testimony indicating his blood-alcohol level at the time of the collision. However, given that chemical analysis of defendant’s blood at the time of his arrest approximately one hour after the collision showed a blood-alcohol level of .30 grams percent, the jury was authorized to infer that defendant’s blood-alcohol at the time of the collision was .08 grams percent or greater. The absence of testimony about the metabolic rate of alcohol in the blood so as to permit a calculation of blood-alcohol content at the actual time of the collision does not render the evidence insufficient to support the desired inference.
Simon v. State,
3. Defendant contends in his first enumeration the trial court erred in giving jury instructions on negligence per se arising out oí defendant’s leaving the scene of an accident and his failure to report the accident. He argues that any evidence of his departure from the scene of the accident or his failure to report the accident to author! ties was irrelevant to the issue of liability or any other issue properlj raised during the first phase of the trial. However, this issue has beer determined adversely to defendant’s contentions.
“The conduct of a hit-and-run driver of an automobile in failinj to stop and give his name, etc., and render assistance to the person injured by him in the operation of his automobile along a public high way, may, in that it is in violation of a statute (Ga. L. 1927, pp. 226 238; Code § 68-308 [now OCGA § 40-6-270]), be regarded as negligence as a matter of law. Although when taken alone such conduc may have no causal connection with the act which caused the injuries the conduct of the driver in hitting, running, and failing to stop, etc is a circumstance which may be considered, in connection with hi other acts preceding the injury, as tending to establish his conduct ii causing the injury as being negligence.”
Battle v. Kilcrease,
4. In his fourth and fifth enumerations, defendant contends th trial court erred during the second phase of the trial in admitting ev dence of “defendant’s arrest for unrelated events, on the night of Se¡ tember 26, 1993.” He argues first that evidence of his subsequent ai rest for again driving while under the influence of alcohol, (“DUI” “consumed undue time, unfairly prejudiced jurors against the defencl ant, and diverted the jury’s attention to the resolution of a collateri issue.” Secondly, he claims that evidence of subsequent criminal con *869 duct is inadmissible “where the pending criminal charge had not been resolved and, therefore, no punishment or acquittal could be offered in mitigation or extenuation.”
“[D] riving under the influence of alcohol so as to cause personal injuries to another is an aggravating circumstance in the act which would authorize the jury to give punitive damages to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the act. The extent of the defendant’s wilful misconduct, wantonness and entire want of care in driving under the influence cannot be gauged solely by focusing on the incident in issue. . . . [E]vidence of pleas of guilty to subsequent DUI offenses is . . . admissible. [Cit.]”
Moore v. Thompson,
Nevertheless, defendant contends that it was fundamentally unfair to admit evidence of this subsequent offense prior to the resolution of any criminal proceedings, because he was denied an opportunity to plead any punishment (or acquittal) in mitigation of punitive damages such as he was able to plead with respect to the DUI charge arising out of the collision at issue.
In mitigation of any award of punitive damages, defendant introduced evidence of his guilty pleas to leaving the scene of an accident and impeding traffic as well as his pleas of nolo contendere to DUI and improper lights, indicating the fines and penalties imposed. The trial court further permitted defendant to read to the jury the provisions of OCGA § 40-6-392 (c), including the fines and penalties applicable to a second DUI conviction and the court instructed the jury that this Code section was to be considered as it “may bear upon the question of mitigation in this case.”
The early case of
“Cherry v. McCall,
Judgment affirmed.