| New York Court of Chancery | May 13, 1833
The objections in this case are not raised by any of the parties. They are made by the purchasers only.
1. I do not see that the complainant, John B. Cheesman, is debarrred froto bringing a suit in partition simply because he is a trustee for ^another. He is, in his own right, a tenant in common; and, by staítiíe, both at law and in equity, he has this power. His being -a trustee cannot destroy or affect his individual vested rights. So far, therefore, I think the objections not tenable.
2. Then, as to the rights of persons not in esse. All from whom such after-corners can spring are before the court as parties. In looking at the statute, 1 see that those entitled to the reversion, rema.'nder or inheritance, after the termination 0f any particular estate, are bound by a judgment in partition: 2- R- 8- 322. § 35, and (by the 79 § p. 329,) a decree of this court is equally binding and conclusive. Indeed, if there were no statutory provision, the case of Wills v. Slade, 6 Ves. Jr. 498. would be an authority for a decree in such cases. The court decided there could be a partition although other persons might come in esse and be entitled; the Chancellor observing, that if it were not so, then in every case where there is a settled estate with remainders to persons who may come in esse, there never could be a partition. The limitations
3. There is nothing in the objection as to quantity. It often happens that land over runs the general description of a deed.
The buyers must complete their purchases. Order