*1 Jr., for Alden CHAVOUS, individually as Guardian ad Litem Alden Minor, Wayne Chavous, III, Respondent BROWN and v. Herman Brown, Joanna Petitioners. 98)
(396 S.E. Supreme Court Brown, both of Brown & Murphy, C. and J.R. Robert Woods, Columbia, petitioners. ASken, Diggs, respondent.
D. Lester 4,1990. June Heard
Decided Aug. Chief Justice:
Gregory, *2 a writ of certiorari to review the This case is before us on 398, at 299 S.C. 385 S.E. reported Court of decision Appeals’ (Ct. 1989). (2d) is The issue for our determination App. 206 Kentucky, whether Batson v. 79,106 1712, S. Ct. 90 (2d) action. hold it does (1986), L. Ed. 69 a civil We applies not and reverse. Batson, the
In the United States Court held Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend Equal to a state in a crimi applies prohibit prosecutor ment challenges racially nal case from exercising peremptory Clause Equal manner. Since the Protection discriminatory discriminatory by the may only prohibit be invoked to State,1 the is whether the exercise of dispositive question in a civil case peremptory by private attorney quali strikes fies as state action.2 (2d) (11th Dykes, on Fludd v. F. 822 Cir. 863
Relying Co., 860 F. 1989), and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete (2d) (5th con 1988), Appeals Cir. the Court of 1308 jury pro the trial involvement in the selection judge’s cluded action to extend Batson to necessary cess the state provides decision, to the Court of Subsequent Appeals’ civil cases. Appeals Fifth Circuit Court of however, the United States the Edmonson decision en banc and held the reconsidered the state ac supply required function does not judge’s trial Co., 895 F. (2d) v. Leesville Concrete 218 tion. Edmondson (5th 1990). conclusion. Cir. We with this agree Oil Co., 457 v. Edmondson 922, 102 U.S. Lugar
Under
(2d)
(1982),
a two-
2744,
employ
73 L. Ed.
we
S. Ct.
alleged
whether
the
dis
analysis to determine
part
attributable
to the State
criminatory
fairly
conduct
First,
the discrimination must be
purposes.
equal protection
by
or
created
right
privilege
caused
the exercise of some
merely
against
no shield
“[The Fourteenth] Amendment erects
Kraemer,
wrongful.” Shelley
conduct,
discriminatory
however
or
1161, 1180
1, 13, 68
836, 842, 92 L. Ed.
U.S.
party
presented where the State is a
to
address the situation
We do not
litigation.
civil
at
S. Ct. at
73 L. Ed.
at
the State. 457 U.S.
Second,
charged
495.
with the discrimination must
party
may
be considered a state actor either
person
fairly
be a
who
with or
official,
together
he is a state
or he acted
ob
because
officials,
aid from state
or his conduct is oth
significant
tained
to the State.
Since the statute is neutral on its we must the State’s on the discrimina imprimatur otherwise discover The trial the state tory peremptory challenges. judge use of official involved in counsel’s exercise of strikes. trial Yet, judge performs merely ministerial function excusing jurors against whom counsel exercises these strikes. *3 There no discretion involved. the State judicial Ordinarily, only will be held for a decision when it has responsible exercised coercive or has such en power provided significant the choice couragement that must be deemed that of the Yaretsky, State. Blume v. 991, 1004, 102 2777, 457 U.S. (1982). (2d) 534, 546 Here, judge L. the trial holds Ed. 2786.73 power regarding private jurors no coercive counsel’s choice of to be struck.
Shelley Kraemer,3 upon v. which respondents rely for sup- in port, contrary does not mandate a conclusion this case. The were African American landowners who Shelleys purchased to parcel that, them, subject of land unbeknownst was to a re- that not of prohibited “any person strictive covenant the Cau- period fifty years. casian race” from it for a of occupying to the parcels subject owners of the other covenant com- Shelleys taking menced an action to restrain the from posses- them of title. sion of the and to divest property found state in The United States Court Supreme judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenant. that Noting
3Supra note 1. it to the willingly sold property of the the former owners observed: Shelleys, the Court of the state active intervention that but for the
It is clear
of state power, [the
the full
courts,
panoply
supported
occupy
property
been free to
would have
Shelleys]
restraint.
without
question
L. Ed. at 1183. The Court
845,
Ct. at
19,
Nor is the exercise of that it renders counsel’s stantial” Ser Collection See Tulsa strikes state action. Professional L. 1340, 1346, 99 478, 487, 108 S. Ct. Pope, vices Ser Collection In Tulsa Ed. Professional vices, probate held the Court the United States to a activating a time bar involvement” court’s “intimate of the purposes action for constituted state creditor’s claim a distinction be The Court noted Amendment. Fourteenth typical at issue and a nonclaim statute the Oklahoma tween invoke does not of limitation which statute “self-executing” at 485-86, 108 S. Ct. 485 U.S. at state action. *4 the Oklahoma
(2d) to bar a claim under right The at 575-76. pursued until an individual into effect spring statute did not whereas for that purpose, court proceedings certain probate limitation statute of general under a to bar a claim right the merely administered itself and is the statute exists under the court. through the judicial proceeding, that of a the context is
Here, while the neces- exists without strikes peremptory to exercise right in order to remedy judicial a particular first sity pursuing of 312 judge’s merely
secure it. Because the trial function is to ad- minister the exercise of a we find no state ac- statutory right, tion for of the Fourteenth Amendment. purposes
Finally, statute, counsel’s action to a with private pursuant out him “something more,” is not sufficient to characterize as a state actor. See Lugar, 939, 102 2754-55, 457 U.S. at S. Ct. at (2d) nothing 73 L. Ed. at 496-97. We find that converts pri in vate counsel into a state actor these circumstances. Cf: Dodson, County Polk v. 312, 102 445, 70 454 U.S. L. Ed. (2d) (1981) (a lawyer not, by being is virtue of an officer of § court, the a state actor for of 1983 claims. Because purposes State, there is no to the we discriminatory chargeable hold Batson does not in civil actions. apply
Reversed.
Harwell, Toal, JJ., Chandler and concur. in
Finney, J., dissenting
separate opinion.
Justice,
Finney,
dissenting:
my
I
dissent.
In
the
respectfully
opinion,
reasoning
the
conclusions of
South Carolina Court of
are based
Appeals
upon
legal precedent,
sound
and I would affirm holding.
its
majority
asserts
that
dispositive
question
whether
the exercise of
strikes
at-
by
private
torney
qualifies
view,
in a civil case
as state action. In
my
is whether a state
fa-
dispositive question
approval
court’s
cially racially
by
motivated
strikes
at-
torney
a civil action
state action.
constitutes
“That the action of state courts and of
judicial officers
their official
is to
capacities
regarded
be
as action of
State
Amendment,
within the
of the Fourteenth
meaning
proposition
which has
been established
decisions of
long
Court.” Shelley Kraemer,
1, 14,
this
68 S. Ct.
(1948).
843,
Attorney T. Travis Asst. Gen. Jr., Columbia, Coombs, Rapoport, and Norman Mark M. Dunn, respondent. O. Sol. James Conway, 23,1990. May Heard 17, 1990. Sept.
Decided Justice:
Toal, process due in this case whether Jackson’s The sole issue driving prosecuted when he was were violated rights