*1 “peculiar are to it as a transferee of applicable under federal statutes
FDIC certainly
rule It is reasonable of law.” six-year the federal limitation
conclude that
period “right” “peculiar” is a which
Bank as a successor interest of One Jackson,
FDIC. See the record before trial court
Based on temporary injunction hearing, time of
we it was within trial believe enjoin temporarily fore GFS’s
discretion theory proceedings on the the “Sell
closure Rights”
er’s clause the six- Retained includes
year pertaining to the of limitations statute Cadle, and deed of trust.
Blubaugh note Cf. possibili n. 2 (recognizing at 179
ty may have extended that seller reserved sale period agreement). loan
limitations
Therefore, to the extent that trial court injunction on the basis that Bank
issued the may
One retained the loan sale have
agreement rights its under section
1821(d)(14), they pertain as to the note and GFS,
deed of trust sold to we hold that the
trial its court did abuse discretion be- interpretation agreement of the
cause this
provides concluding a reasonable basis for
that Meacham and Practice have a Place
probable limitations defense to collec- GFS’s
tion efforts under the state limitations stat-
ute. above,
For the reasons stated we affirm granting
the order of the court Meacham and injunctive prayer for
Practice Place’s relief injunction. temporary CHAVEZ, Appellant,
Elfida OF the
HOUSING AUTHORITY CITY PASO, Appellee.
ELOF
No. 08-93-00422-CV. Appeals
El Paso.
April *2 Fernandez-Gonzalez, Legal El Paso
Justo
Assistance,
Paso,
appellant.
El
Dunbar,
Crowley,
Michael C.
Edward
Barill,
Paso,
appellee.
El
Dunbar &
timely
signed if a
mo-
judgment is
after the
ON MOTION
OPINION
by any party
filed
for new trial has been
tion
REHEARING
FOR
any party
has
ifor
PER CURIAM.
of law
and conclusions
of fact
jury.” [Emphasis
in a case tried without
THE CASE
NATURE OF
*3
Tbx.R.App.P. 41(a)(1).
in-
In the
added].
an ad-
appealed
Appellant Elfida Chavez
timely request for
cause,
a
filed
stant
Chavez
entry and
jury
in a forcible
verse
verdict
conclusions;
filed no motion
findings
she
and
county
by trial de novo to
detainer case
for new trial.
grant-
county court at law
court at law. The
El
summary judgment
in favor of the
ed
in Tex.
emphasized provision
The
(“EPHA”)
Authority
and Cha-
Housing
Paso
R.App.P. 41(a)(1)
clearly
relates
Tex.
Appellant’s Mo-
appealed to this Court.
vez
296,
party to
only entitles a
which
R.Civ.P.
Rehearing
granted;
is
we withdraw
tion for
in
conclusions of law
findings of fact and
9,
and substitute
opinion of March
1995
our
county court
in the district or
cases “tried
appeal for
following.
dismiss the
jury.” A
is “tried” when
a
case
without
of
want
evidentiary hearing
before
there is an
Besing
conflicting
v.
upon
evidence.
court
PROCEDURAL STATEMENT
(Tex.App.
Moffitt,
tional to all treat seeking
seeking judgment, that or to assail it, extending appellate
elaboration on as view, my ques
deadlines. In the technical might legal a motion
tions of what effect held,
have, whether “a trial” has been named, pleading appropriately
what a is most pitfalls. These
serve to create technical rule, in stark contrast to the liberal
stand Linwood, any
also relied “bona attempt” perfecting appeal
fide invokes If appellate there is distinction, escapes
a sound reason for this it Nevertheless, Supreme opin
me. I concur.
ion binds us. *6 Wayne MORRIS, Appellant,
Darren Texas, Appellee.
The STATE of
No. 08-93-00301-CR. Appeals of
Court of
El Paso.
April
