1:97-cv-01348 | D.N.M. | Dec 15, 1998
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UN/TED FILE
lN THE UNITED sTATEs DISTRICT Cot£ibrwg’; TES D/S m
l…E FW/CTECOUHT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO DEC l 5 799 E/CX
H. ANTHONY CHAVEZ and UNITED C[_ ER
TRANSPORTATION UNION, LOCAL 1745, K
Plaintiffs,
vs. No. CIV 97-1348 JP/RLP
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, et. al.,
Defendants.
RECQMMENDED DI§PO§ITIQ!§
THIS MATTER is before the Court pursuant to a referral by the Honorable James A. Parker
of Plaintifi‘s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Awarding Rule ll Sanctions, filed March 30,
1998 (Doc. No. 23).1 On September 8, 1998, l issued and Analysis and Order to Show Cause, which
is incorporated herein as Attachment “A.” l recommended that Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration be granted because of the City of Albuquerque’s ("City") failure to comply with the
procedures required by Rule ll of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, further, that Judge
Parker‘s March 19, 1998 order be withdrawn
Notwithstanding that recommendation, l found that sanctions could still be imposed against
attorney Paul Livingston ("Livingston") under Fed. R. Civ. P. ll(c)(l)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, or
1 Within ten (10) days after a party is served with a copy of this Recornrnended Disposition, that
party may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), tile Written objections to such recommendation. A party
must tile any objections Within the ten-day period allowed if that party Wants to have appellate review of
the Recommended Disposition. If no objections are tiled, no appellate review will be allowed.
under the Court's inherent power. A court, may on its own initiative impose Rule ll sanctions if it
finds, after giving a party notice and an opportunity to be heard, that a claim, defense or other legal
contention advanced by that party is not warranted by existing law. Rule l l(c)(l)(B). For example,
sanctions were deemed appropriate in instances where a "lawyer pursues a path that a reasonably
careful attorney would have known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound, [and] the conduct is
objectively unreasonable and vexatious." In Re TCI Ltd., 769 F.2d 441" date_filed="1985-08-27" court="7th Cir." case_name="In Re Tci Limited">769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985).
Similarly, sanctions Were imposed where counsel employed the "ostrich-like tactic of pretending that
potentially dispositive authority against a litigant's contention does not exist." FredA. Smith Lumber
Co., v. Edz'a'in, 945 F.2d 750" date_filed="1991-09-17" court="4th Cir." case_name="United States v. Lily Borromeo">945 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1988)(citing Hill v. Norfolk and Wester Ry. Co., 814 F.2d
l 192, 1198 (7th Cir. 1987)).
I directed that attorney Livingston show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for his
naming Edward Benavidez, a City personnel hearing officer, as a defendant in a lawsuit in light of
clear Tentli Circuit precedent showing this to be improper. Livingston also was directed to address
why he failed to file a response to the City's Motion to Dismiss, despite the admonition to respond
to dispositive motions given to Livingston in another case by Chief Judge Conway. Solid Waste
Drivers' Assn. v. City of Albuquerque, Civ. No. 96-1421 JC/LFG Memorandum Opinion, filed
March ll, 1997. Livingston filed a response to my Order to Show Cause on Septernber 23, 1998.
In the instant action, attorney Livingston pressed a claim against Defendant Edward
Benavidez that was not warranted by existing law. Nor was Livingston seeking to extend, modify
or reverse existing law or seeking to establish new law. When Livingston named Benavidez as a
defendant, Livingston knew that the identical issue of whether a city personnel hearing officer could
be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had previously been argued by him in other cases, and, in those
2
instances, the hearing officer was dismissed as a defendant because of absolute immunity.
Moreover, Livingston named Benavidez as a defendant even though Livingston knew that a lOth
Circuit case clearly held a hearing officer was immune from liability. Saavedra v. City of
Albuquerque, 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525 (lOth Cir. 1996). Tenth Circuit holdings are binding precedent in this
district. Ute Indian Tribe of the Vintah and Ouray Reservation v. State of Utah, 114 F.3d 1513" date_filed="1997-05-08" court="10th Cir." case_name="Ute Indian Tribe of The Uintah v. State of Utah Duchesne County">114 F.3d 1513,
1520-21 (lOth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1034 (1998), Heath v. Varily Corp., 71 F.3d 256" date_filed="1995-11-30" court="7th Cir." case_name="Allan T. Heath v. Varity Corporation">71 F.3d 256,
257 (7th Cir. 1995).
Livingston goes into elaborate detail seeking to distinguish the case at bar from the Circuit's
decision in Saavedra. These attempts are unavailing Moreover, Livingston's response does not
address the precedental value of Saavedra, and, in particular, the Tenth Circuit's grant of absolute
immunity to the City’S hearing officer. Likewise, Livingston makes no mention of the other district
decisions cited to in the Court’s September 9, 1998 analysis where defendants similarly situate to
Benavidez were dismissed on the ground of absolute immunity. The closest Livingston comes in
his explanation for not responding to the City's Motion to Dismiss is that he has repeatedly lost the
argument in other cases. His rationale is somewhat startling. Simply put, it is Livingston's
insistence in pressing a claim which he has repeatedly lost, and which he knows is not supported by
law, that forms the basis for the Court’s conclusion that Livingston engaged in unsound,
unreasonable and vexatious litigation conduct. This conduct is santionable.
In evaluating whether Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate, the court considers the effect of the
improper conduct on the litigation process in terms of time spent and expenses incurred; whether the
person responsible for the misconduct is trained in the law; and the degree of sanctions necessary
to deter similar activity in the future. 5A, Wright Miller, Fed. P. & Pro. 2d, § 1336 (1998 Pocket
3
ae r~f\
Part).
Livingston was not just familiar with the district court and appellate rulings on this issue,
he was counsel of record in the prior cases where Saavedra was applied and hearing officers were
given absolute immunity. Each of these dismissals took place prior to the filing of the instant action.
See Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, Civ. 96-1741 RLP/JHG; Lara v. City of Albuquerque, Civ. 95-
366 LH/LCS, Jinzo v. City of Albuquerque, Civ. 96-1581 MV/LFG. When he named Benavidez as
a party, Livingston was well aware that City hearing officers had been granted absolute immunity
in Section 1983 litigation. Naming Benavidez as a party resulted in the City being put to the time
and expense of motion practice to dismiss what Livingston knew was an improper claim. The City’s
motion practice would have been unnecessary had Livingston analyzed his proposed claims in the
light of binding circuit precedent and prior district decisions. Livingston’s litigation tactic
needlessly increased the costs of litigation and delayed the ultimate disposition of the case in
contravention of the goals of the Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. So, too,
Livingston needlessly interfered with Benavidez’ right to be free from vexatious and frivolous
claims. Livingston sued Benavidez in his individual capacity, and, thus, until dismissal of the claims
against him, there hung a cloud of uncertainty and worry that Benavidez’ personal assets were at
risk.
Livingston cannot argue that he didn’t know better or that the complexities of the law caused
him to misapprehend the circuit’s decision in Saavedra. The Court takes judicial notice that iri an
unrelated Rule 11 sanction hearing held September ll, 1998, Livingston established that he is
knowledgeable in law. lndeed, he considers himself to be an experts on res judicata and collateral
estoppel. (See Attachment “B”). Thus, this is not an instance where one, untrained in law, acted out
4
of ignorance, mistake or inadvertence Livingston’s decision to hale Benavidez into court was a
deliberate, intentional decision made with knowledge that the law didn’t support the claim.
Livingston's actions compelled the City to incur the additional expense of motion practice and
consumed precious judicial resources. None of this was necessary. The Court concludes that
Livingston's actions constituted an abuse of the judicial process.
The adversary system is further burdened by Livingston's failure to respond to dispositive
motions. If Livingston does not oppose the relief requested, the rules of practice require that he
consent to the proposed relief. Had Livingston complied with this practice requirement, time and
legal expense could have been saved. The local rules for the District of New Mexico provide for the
filing of a motion and submission of an approved order when the motion is uncontested. Here,
because Livingston did not consent to the motion, opposing counsel had to bear the expense of
preparing a motion and a memorandum of supporting authorities Even then, Livingston needlessly
delayed the court process by not filing a response. Even though Livingston remained silent, the
Court, in tum, was required to devote time and to give consideration to the merits of the motion and
issue a ruling. The Court construes Livingston’s failure to respond as his acknowledgment and
recognition that the City’s requested relief was appropriate
The Court is mindful of and, indeed, commends Livingston for his successful representation
of clients with their Fourth and Fourteen Amendment claims against the City. The Court does not
wish to chill an advocate's zeal, but a lawyer may not, in the name of advocacy, violate his
responsibilities under the law, the rules of procedure or the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Having concluded that Livingston’s conduct was improper, the Court next considers an appropriate
sanction. A monetary sanction is frequently utilized. However, having reviewed Livingston’s
5
obj ections, it is not apparent that a simple fine will serve as an effective deterrent. lndeed,
Livingston was previously sanctioned with a fine, to no lasting avail. See, e.g. , Senior Judge
Campos’ order in Chavez v. Bennett Propp et al. , CIV 96-1656 SC/JHG. Imposition of a fine, while
proper, may serve only to cause economic hardship on Livingston without the benefit of a long-
lasting change in the manner in which Livingston comports himself as a practitioner in federal couit.
Instead of a monetary sanction, l recommend that attorney Livingston be formally reprimanded by
the U.S. District Court for his actions and that each judge in this district be apprised of the reprimand
and reasons therefor. In addition, I recommend that Livingston be strongly admonished that if he
persists in this type of misconduct in another case, the judicial officer to whom that case is assigned
could impose punitive sanctions and will submit Livingston’s name to the federal and state
disciplinary committee for proceedings to determine his fitness to practice law.
'J@//¢;»~“-
Lorenzo F. Garcia
United States Magistrate Judge
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS:
Paul Livingston, Esq.
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS:
Charles W. Kolberg, Esq.
H
11
iN THE uNiTED sTATEs DisrRiCT coURr j~;‘.'“~{i-:.};,j v
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
H. ANTHONY CHAVEZ and
UNITED TRANSPORTATION
UNION, LOCAL 1745,
Plaintiffs,
vs. No. CIV 97-1348 JP/RLP
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE et al.,
Defendants.
ANALY IS AND RDER H W
THIS MATTER carrie before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Order
Awarding Rule 11 Sanctions, filed March 30, 1998 [Doc. 23]; upon Defendants’ response, filed
April 20, 1998; and upon Plaintiffs' reply, filed April 30, 1998. Plaintiffs move the Court to
reconsider and reverse the March 19, 1998 order, which found that attorney Paul Livingston
("Livingston") violated Fed. R. Civ. P. ll(B)(2) by presenting a claim to the Court against
Defendant Edward Benavidez ("Benavidez") that was either not warranted by existing law or was
a frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment
of new law. The Honorable James A. Parker referred the instant motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b) for report and recommendation, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary.
mm
Plaintiff H. Anthony Chavez (“Chavez”) was a bus driver employed by the City of
Albuquerque ("City"). Chavez was terminated after he tested positive on a drug test. He brought
ATTACHl\/IENT "A"
This was an incorrect interpretation of the order. Put another way, electronic filing does riot obviate
a party’s need to respond within the time frame prescribed by the local rules, and the failure to
respond is viewed as consent to the relief requested
In any event, the Court accepted the City’s recitation that no response had been timely served
and granted the motion on March 19, 1998 for the same reasons set forth in the December 1997
order, to wit: the failure to respond constituted consent and because the motion had merit.
The Court’s order specified that the Rule 1 1(b)(1) sanctions ran against attorney Livingston
and not his clients. Finally, the Court set a hearing for March 30, 1998 to consider the nature of
sanctions prescribed by Rule 11(c)(2).1
The issuance of the March 19, 1998 order resulted in a flurry of motions filed by Plaintiffs.
For example, on March 23, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a response to Benavidez’ motion for sanctions and,
in the same pleading, a cross-motion for Rule 11 sanctions On the eve of the hearing, Plaintiffs
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Rule ll Sanctions. Notwithstanding the late motions filing,
the hearing went forward. Attending the hearing were Livingston, his clients, and Rosemary
Cosgrove for the City. The Court questioned Livingston at length about his failure to respond to the
1 Rule 11(C)2) provides in pertinent part that “A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others
similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or
include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion
and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the
reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation of
subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court’s initiative unless the court issues its
order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party
which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to constitute
a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanctions imposed.
4
motion for dismissal and the motion for sanctions,
On April 1, 1998, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for Rule 11 sanctions because
of the requirement that a motion for Rule 11 sanctions be made separately and not combined as part
of another motion. Here, it was made part of a responsive pleading. Plaintiffs subsequently filed
a Notice of Withdrawal of its cross-motion and filed a notice that attorney Livingston’s clients
authorized and took part in the filing of the March 30, 1998 Motion for Reconsideration. In light
of Plaintiffs’ decision to go forward with the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court set a briefing
schedule. Briefing was completed as of April 30, 1998, The matter was referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge on June 15, 1998 for report and recommendation On July 28, 1998, the parties
attended a Rule 16 settlement conference before the Honorable Robert DeGiacomo and reached a
compromise of the disputed claims. The terms of the settlement make clear that the Rule 11 issue
remains ripe for adjudication and the result will not change the settlement
§tangard of Review for Mgtion for Becon§ideration
In Sithon Maritime Company v. Holiday Mansion, 177 F.R.D. 504" date_filed="1998-01-07" court="D. Kan." case_name="Sithon Maritime Co. v. Holiday Mansion">177 F.R.D. 504 (D. Kan. 1998), the court
described the standard for this type of motion:
A motion for reconsideration is the opportunity for the court to (a) correct
manifest errors of law or fact, (2) review newly discovered evidence, or (3)
review a prior decision in light of a recent change in the law. Appropriate
circumstances for a motion to reconsider are Where the court has obviously
misapprehended a party’s position on the facts or the law, or the court has
mistakenly decided issues outside of those the parties presented for
determination A party’s failure to present its strongest case in the first
instance does not entitle it to a second chance in the form of a motion to
reconsider. The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for
reconsideration is committed to the Court’s discretion. (citations omitted).
177 F.R.D. 504" date_filed="1998-01-07" court="D. Kan." case_name="Sithon Maritime Co. v. Holiday Mansion">177 F.R.D. at 509.
Plaintiffs argue that the March 19, 1998 order was improvidently entered based on the
Court’s mistaken belief that Plaintiffs failed to respond and based on the belief that the procedural
requirements of Rule 11 had been met. Plaintiffs posit that the City failed to comply with the safe
harbor provision of Rule 1 l. Plaintiffs assert that the rule specifies that a motion for sanctions be
served and that the responding party be given twenty-one days to either withdraw, correct or remedy
the situation. Here, Plaintiffs contend that no such motion was served and that there has been no safe
harbor period. Instead, the City gave notice via a letter and never served a sanction motion that
would trigger the running of the safe harbor. Moreover, Plaintiffs posit the City did not even wait
twenty-one days before serving its Motion to Dismiss on the ground of absolute immunity. Plaintiffs
further argue that once the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss, it was too late for the City to seek
sanctions on the same grounds, because with the dismissal of Benavidez as a party, Plaintiffs were
no longer in a position to take corrective action. Plaintiffs submit that the timing of the sanctions’
motion was contrary to the spirit of safe harbor. The City, on the other hand, contends that
Plaintiffs’ response was untimely, and that the City, in fact, complied with the Rule 11 safe harbor
requirements.
The Court must first determine the proper weight to be given the October 21, 1997 letter
from the City to Livingston advising of the City’s intent to file a Rule 11 motion in the event that
Benavidez was not dismissed from the case at bar. Fed. R. Civ. P. ll(c)(l)(A) provides that a
motion for sanctions must be served on the opposing party before it is filed with the court, The
motion should not be filed with the court unless the opposing party received twenty-one days to
correct the error complained of and failed to do so. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993
Amendments to Subdivisions (b) and (c) provide illumination:
6
The revision leaves for resolution on a case-by-case basis,
considering the particular circumstances involved, the question as to
when a motion for violation of Rule 11 should be served and when,
if filed, it should be decided.
Ordinarily the motion should be served promptly after the
inappropriate paper is filed, and, if delayed too long, may be viewed
as untimely . . . . Given the “safe harbor” provisions discussed
below, a party cannot delay serving its Rule 11 motion until
conclusion of the case (or judicial rejection of the offending
contention).
The rule provides that requests for sanctions must be made as a
separate motion, i.e., not simply included as an additional prayer for
relief contained in another motion. The motion for sanctions is not
however, to be filed until at least 21 days (or such other period as the
Court may set) after being served . . . . If during this period, the
alleged violation is corrected, as by withdrawing (whether formally
or informally) some allegation or contention, the motion should not
be filed with the court. These provisions are intended to provide a
type of “safe harbor” against motions under Rule 11 in that a party
will not be subject to sanctions as the basis of another party’s motion
unless, after receiving the motion, it refuses to withdraw that position
or to acknowledge candidly that it does not currently have evidence
to support a specified allegation. Under the former rule, parties were
sometimes reluctant to abandon a questionable contention lest that be
viewed as evidence of a violation of Rule 11, under the revision, the
timely withdrawal of a contention will protect a party against a
motion for sanctions To stress the seriousness of a motion for
sanctions and to define precisely the conduct claimed to violate the
rule, the revision provides that the “safe harbor” period begins to run
only upon service of the motion. In most cases, however, counsel
should be expected to give informal notice to the other party, whether
in person or by a telephone call or letter, of a potential violation
before proceeding to prepare and serve a Rule 11 motion.
Thus, it is clear that sending a letter is not the equivalent of serving a motion. The rule and
official commentary make it clear that there must be a motion. In addition, the motion must be
served as soon as practicable after discovery of the potential pleading problem, and that the party be
given twenty-one days to take the requested corrective steps before filing of the motion is
7
permissible lndeed, Plaintiffs correctly characterize the October 21, 1997 letter as informal notice.
Courts have routinely found that sending notice by way of letter, instead of serving a motion, is
inadequate and Rule 1 1 sanction requests have been denied because the procedural requirements of
Rule ll were not met. See Howell v. Nesbit, 149 F.3d 1168 (4th Cir. 1998); Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
v. Sears Really Co, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 392" date_filed="1996-07-22" court="N.D.N.Y." case_name="Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Sears Realty Co., Inc.">932 F. Supp. 392, 408 (N.D.N.Y. l996)(finding that letter by counsel
requesting withdrawal of motion does not constitute sufficient notice within the meaning of safe
harbor); Weeks Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Raymond Inter. Builders, lnc,, 174 F.R.D. 301" date_filed="1997-06-06" court="S.D.N.Y." case_name="Weeks Stevedoring Co. v. Raymond International Builders, Inc.">174 F.R.D. 301 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
This situation is similar to proceedings described in Lancaster v. Zu/Ie, 170 F.R.D. 7" date_filed="1996-11-26" court="S.D.N.Y." case_name="Lancaster v. Zufle">170 F.R.D. 7
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). The court there granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on July 29,
1996; and, on October 18, 1996, defendants moved for Rule ll sanctions The Rule ll motion was
based on earlier letters sent on March 28, 1996 to plaintiffs’ counsel seeking dismissal of the same
claims that were dismissed by summary judgment The court denied the sanction motion because
movant had not complied with Rule 11. Likewise, in Barber v. Miller, 146 F.3d 707" date_filed="1998-06-12" court="9th Cir." case_name="Pamela Barber v. Jim Miller">146 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1998),
movant advised of potential Rule 11 violations through a letter and followed up by filing a motion
to dismiss instead of a motion for Rule 11 sanctions Opposing counsel did not respond to the
motion to dismiss, so the court granted the motion. Movant, thereafter, filed for Rule 11 sanctions
The court denied the motion. Of import here, the court did so because, “it is abundantly clear that
Imageware gave Carlson repeated notice of that deficiency. Unfortunately for Imageware, however,
it did not follow the procedure required by Rule 1 1(C)( 1)(A).” Id. at 710. The same holds true here.
The City did not follow the procedures outlined in Rule 11.
Although the Court commends the City for giving Plaintiffs informal notice via the letter
8
about sanctions, the letter is not the same as a motion Service of the motion triggers the twenty-one
day safe harbor. It appears that Livingston took no immediate action in response to the letter. The
Court is cognizant of the City’s sense of frustration, but even if the letter had been a motion, the City
needed to wait twenty-one days before filing what would have been a sanction motion as well as any
dispositive motion Instead, the City waited fourteen days before serving the Motion to Dismiss.
The City obtained the relief requested and then sought Rule 11 sanctions This is not a situation in
which the City circulated the sanctions’ motion, and, while it was still outstanding, the Court took
judicial action on the pending dispositive motion In that case, sanctions would still be available,
pursuant to Rule ll(b)(l), notwithstanding that judicial action had been taken and corrective action
would be futile. In Powell v. Squire, Sariders & Dempsey, 990 F. Supp. 541" date_filed="1998-01-14" court="S.D. Ohio" case_name="Powell v. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey">990 F. Supp. 541 (S.D. Ohio 1998), the
court found the defendant’s motion for Rule 1 1 sanctions timely, even though it was filed fourteen
days after the court entered final judgment because defendant complied with the safe harbor
provision of Rule ll by serving the proposed motion for sanctions as well as a motion for summary
judgment almost four months before dismissal 'l`he court observed:
All the rule requires is that the party be given the full and meaningful
benefit of the twenty-one day period after service of the motion for
sanctions and prior to the decision on the matter in contention in
which to consider the motion and correct the problem.
Id. at 545. This was not done in the case at bar
In conclusion, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider is well-taken The:City
did not follow the procedures required by Rule 11. Sanctions were improvidently awarded against
the Plaintiffs and the March 19, 1998 order should be withdrawn
Our inquiry does not end here, however. While sanctions pursuant Rule 1 1(c)(1)(A) are not
appropriate, the Court may, on its own initiative, impose sanctions under Rule 11(c)(1)(B)2, under
28 U.S.C. §19273, or under the Court’s inherent power to sanction against attorney Livingston4
Situations where sanctions have been found appropriate include instances where a “lawyer pursues
a path that a reasonably careful attorney would have known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound,
the conduct is objectively unreasonable and vexatious.” In Re TCILtd., 769 F.2d 441" date_filed="1985-08-27" court="7th Cir." case_name="In Re Tci Limited">769 F.2d 441 , 445 (7th Cir.
1985), or when counsel employs the “ostrich-like tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive
authority against a litigant’s contention does not exist.” F red A. Smith Lumber Co. v. Edidin, 945
F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1988)(citing Hill v. Norfolk and Wester Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192" date_filed="1987-05-13" court="7th Cir." case_name="Morton M. Hill, Jr. v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company">814 F.2d 1192, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1987)). This aptly described what took place in the case at bar. While Livingston’s clients
joined in the motion for reconsideration the Court finds that the sanctions discussed below are
properly directed against attorney Livingston,
The Court directs Livingston to show cause, if any he has, why sanctions should not be
imposed for naming Benavidez as a defendant iri light of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Saavedra.
(Attachment C). This is not a situation in which counsel was unaware of the Tenth Circuit’s
decision or, for that matter, of district court decisions dismissing similarly-situated defendants based
2 Rule 11(c)(1)(B) provides that “[o]n its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney
. . . to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.”
3 A court may impose sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 against an attorney where that attorney
has acted in an objectively unreasonable manner by engaging iri a “serious and studied disregard for the
orderly process ofjustice,” or where a “claim [is] without a plausible legal or factual basis and lacking
justification ”
4 The court’s inherent power to sanction includes the authority to sanction where “a party has
`acted iii bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reason.”’ Hotel St. George Associates v.
Morgenstern, 819 F. Supp. 310" date_filed="1993-04-20" court="S.D.N.Y." case_name="Hotel St. George Associates v. Morgenstern">819 F. Supp. 310, 322 (1993) (quoting Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32" date_filed="1991-08-02" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.">501 U.S. 32, 111 S. Ct. 2123,
2132-33).
10
on the Saavedra decision See Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, Civ. 96-1741 RLP/JHG,
Memorandum Opinion, filed 4-4-97 (Attachment D); Ji'nzo v. City of Albuquerque, Civ. 96-1581
MV/LFG, Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed 4-24-97 (Attachment E); Lara v. City of
Albuquerque, Civ. 95-366 LH/LCS, Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed 8-2-95 (Attachment F).
In each of these cases, Livingston was counsel of record, and the knowledge of those other decisions,
made well before October 1997, was imputed to him. He should be fully versed iri the law as he was
counsel of record in the precedent setting case, It appears from the March 30, 1998 hearing that
Livingston disagrees with the Tenth Circuit’s decision However, he did not seek reconsideration
of the decision by the Tenth Circuit or seek further review by the United States Supreme Court, and
the Saavedra decision is binding precedent in this circuit.
The Court anticipates that Livingston will argue the unfairness of Saavedra, and that it serves
as an injunction However, as discussed above, it is the law not only of this circuit, but its holding
regarding absolute immunity for personnel hearing officers has been noted by New Mexico state’s
judiciary. See Chavez v. Cin ofAlbuquerque, 123 N.M. 428" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">123 N.M. 428, 434, 941 P.2d 509, 513 (Ct. App.
1997) (Attachment G). Livingston appears to ignore the significance of legal precedence and that
the onus was on him as attomey of record in Saavedra to seek reconsideration or to appeal the Tenth
Circuit’s decision lt is not the responsibility of opposing counsel to continually go to the expense
of moving to dismiss a party who should not have been named in the first instance. Similarly? it is
an inefficient use of j udicial resources to have to dismiss a party who never should have been named.
It is Livingston’s repeated attempts to name an improper party that call his litigation style into
question
Livingston should also address why no response was filed to the motion to dismiss The
11
Court takes judicial notice that Livingston has been warned in the past about the necessity of
responding to a dispositive motion See Soli'd Waste Drivers 'Assn. v. City ofA]buquerque, CIV No.
96-1421 JC/LFG, Memorandum Opinion, filed March 11, 1997 (Attachment H).
Livingston’s response to the order to show cause is due within fifteen days of date of entry
of this order. The Court will then supplement this analysis before making a final recommendation
to Judge Parker. The objection times contained iri 28 U.S.C. § 636(h)(1) will not commence until
the filing of the final analysis and recommended disposition
w€,,@/. /a,a.;t
Lorenzo F. Garcia
United States Magistrate Judge
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS:
Paul Livingston, Esq.
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS:
Charles W. Kolberg, Esq.
12
c i 'r y o i=
buquerque
A_l
Legal Department
P.O. Box 2248 ° Albuquerque, NM 87103
Manin J_ Ch.évez' Mayor (505) 768-4500 ° FAX (505) 768-4525
Robert M. Whlte, City Attorney
October 21 , 1997
lVlr. Paul Livingston
Attorney at Law 4
P.o. Box 90908 ’
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87199
Dear lVlr. Livingston:
On October 15, 1997, a lawsuit filed by you on behalf of lVlr. H. Anthony "
Chavez and United Transportation Union, Loca| 1745, was served on lVlr. Edward
Benavidez. | represent lVlr. Benavidez. The lawsuit asserts causes of action against
lVlr. Benavidez arising out of his position as a hearing officer for the City of
Albuquerque.
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, you are asked to_
Withdraw the complaint because it is a pleading unwarranted by existing laW. Rule
1 1 (b)(2). lVlr. Benavidez is absolutely immune from the lawsuit filed by you. Saavedra
y. Albuquergue, 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525 (10th Cir. 1996).
|f you do not withdraw the complaint and dismiss lVlr. Benavidez, he will have
no option but to pursue sanctions against you and your clients under Rule 1 1. _
Very truly yours,
LFDW-W\”A (N°§(/
Rosemary A. Cosgrove
Assistant City Attorney
RAc/dlw - EXHlBlT
cc: lVlr. Edward Benavidez
lVlr. Victor Lopez l
Good for You. Albuquerquei
Attachment ft
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DlSTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
JoE riNzo,
Piaimiff, APR l 7 '997
vs. civiL No. 96_1581 Mv/LFG
cirY oi= ALBUQUERQUE et ai.,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF POTEN'I`IAL VIOLATIONS
THIS MATTER is before the Court sua sponte. At the Rule 16 conference conducted
on April 15, 1996, the Court advised Plaintiff’s counsel that he has named improper parties in
this lawsuit. For example, the City Employee Assistance Program and is not a suable entities
It has no separate legal identity apart from the City of Albuquerque. It is merely a vehicle
through which the City of Albuquerque carries out its municipal functions As such, it is an
improper party and separate claims against it should be dismissed.
This situation is analogous to § 1983 lawsuits against a police department The Tenth
Circuit has held that when a police department is an integral part of city government and is
merely the vehicle through which government fulfills its policing function it may not be sued
as a separate entity Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424" date_filed="1985-08-22" court="10th Cir." case_name="Francisco Eugenio Martinez v. Fred Winner">771 F. 2d 424 (lOth Cir. 1985), modified in part 778
F.2d 553; remanded on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1138" date_filed="1986-04-28" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Murphy v. Holland">475 U.S. 1138, vacated on other grounds, 800 F.2d 230" date_filed="1986-08-29" court="10th Cir." case_name="Francisco Eugenio Martinez v. Fred Winner">800 F.2d 230;
sg also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F. Supp. 1131" date_filed="1990-11-15" court="S.D. Fla." case_name="Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale">750 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Williams v.
Dayton Police Dept., 680 F. Supp. 1075" date_filed="1987-06-10" court="S.D. Ohio" case_name="Williams v. Dayton Police Department">680 F. Supp. 1075 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Boren bY and through Boren v. CitY
of Colorado Springs, 624 F. Supp. 474" date_filed="1985-12-31" court="D. Colo." case_name="Boren by & Through Boren v. City of Colo. Springs">624 F. Supp. 474 (D. Colo. 1985).
nimth h
Similarly, in reference to Plaintiff’s claims against the City Personnel Board and its
chairman the Court advised Plaintiff’s counsel that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
specifically held that members of administrative boards who perform judicial functions are
absolutely irrirnune from liability when acting in their official capacities Vakas v. Rodriguez,
728 F.2d 1293" date_filed="1984-03-07" court="10th Cir." case_name="John Vakas v. Paul Rodriquez">728 F.2d 1293 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981" date_filed="1984-11-05" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Crowder v. Orr">469 U.S. 981 (1984). Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel
has been apprised of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque, 73 F.3d
1525 ~(10th Cir. 1996), where the court held that the City of Albuquerque Personnel Board was
absolutely immune from suit. Similarly, district decisions in the District of New Mexico have
uniformly upheld the concept of absolute immunity. See, e.g., Garv Chavez v. Citv of
Albuguergue et al., CIV No. 96-1741 RLP/JHG, Memorandum Opinion, filed April 4, 1997;
Robert Lara v. City of Albuguergue, CIV No. 95-0366 LH/LCS, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, filed August 2, 1995.
Rule 11 provides that an attomey’s signature on a paper submitted to the Court
constitutes his certification that, to the best of that person’s knowledge, information and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances the claims advanced are warranted
by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law, and that factual contentions and allegations have
evidentiary support.
Pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of Rule 11, Plaintiff has twenty-one days within
which to act. Plaintiff is not obligated to voluntarily dismiss any claims, causes of action or
defendants However, should Plaintiff not act, and the Court subsequently determines on motion
or later that these claims were improper or that improper parties were sued, Defendants may
request an award of costs and attorney fees
v£,p/@W`~
LorenzovF. Garcia
United States Magistrate Judge
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF:
Paul Livingston, Esq.
A'I'l`ORNE¥S FOR DEFENDANTS:
Judy K. Kelley, Esq.
Carl J. Butkus, Esq.
William D. Winter, Esq.
Morton S. Simon, Esq.
j73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525
ll lER Cases 588 7
(ct¢e am 73 F.3d 1523
Stanley SAAVEDRA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
ALBUQUERQUE, The CITY OF; Albuquerque
Personnel Board; The City of
Albuquerque Employee Health Center; Arthur A.
Blumenfeld, Chief Administrative
Of`f`icer; Linda Logan-Condon, Former
Chnirperson of the Personnel Board; T.
Zane Reeves, Personnel Hearing Off`icer,
Defendaints-Appellees.
No. 94-2220.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
Jan. 17, 1996,
Firefighter/ mergency medical technician who was
discharged after he tested positive for drugs brought §
1983 action against city, personnel board, and
personnel hearing officer (PHO). The United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, Juan
G. Burciaga, J., 859 F. Supp. 526" date_filed="1994-07-27" court="D.N.M." case_name="Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque">859 F.Supp. 526, entered summary
judgment in favor of city, board, and PHO, and
appeal was taken The Court of Appeals, Barrett,
Senior Circuit Judge, held that city had reasonable
suspicion to test firefighter for drug use and thus,
dnlg test undertaken by city did not violate
firefighter's Fourth Amendinent right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures
Affinned.
[1] FEDERAL COURTS @776
17OBk776
Court of Appeals reviews district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standards employed by district court. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.
[2] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE @2470
l70Ak2470
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.
[2] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE @:’2470.4
170Ak2470.4
Sunimary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and movant is
Page 7
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A.
[3] CIVIL RIGHTS @214(8)
78k214(8)
Personnel hearing officer (PHO), city personnel
board, and chair of board were entitled to absolute
judicial immunity with respect to § 1983 action
brought by firefighter who was discharged after he
tested positive for drugs 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[4] SEARCHES AND SEIZURES @°23
349k23
Normally, search is considered reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment only if it is supported by a
warrant issued on probable cause and therefore,
reasonable suspicion, standing alone, is insufficient.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[5] SEARCHES AND SEIZURES l<‘WM
349k24
Even where warrant requirement is relaxed, existence
of probable cause is required to make a full-scale
search constitutional. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[6] SEARCHES AND SEIZURES @42.1
349k42.1 _
No warrant nor probable cause is required by the
Fourth Amendment when special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make warrant and
probable- cause requirement impracticable U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
[7] SEARCHES AND SEIZURES @42.1
349k42.1
Court evaluates constitutionality of a "special needs"
search, for which no warrant or probable cause is
required, under the Fourth Amendment‘s more
general requirement of reasonableness by balancing
the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails and whether particular search is
reasonable depends on context within which search
takes place; appropriate inquiry in each case is
whether goverruiient's need outweighs individual's
privacy interest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[8] SEARCHES AND SEIZURES @978
349k78
City had reasonable suspicion to test firefighter/
emergency medical technician for drug use and thus,
drug test undertaken by city was not in violation of
firefighter's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
A+iatl/)let/i/if C-
1
73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525
(Cite ass 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525)
unreasonable searches and seizures; firefighter was
employed in safety-sensitive position, firefighter self-
referred himself to city's employee health center for
an evaluation, firefighter had wamed his supervisors
that he might become violent if provoked, and
firefighter had lost his temper while in uniform and
had engaged in public altercation with his girlfriend.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[9] CONSTITUT[ONAL LAW @3251.6
92k251.6
Essential elements of due process are notice and
opportunity to respond. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5,
14.
[l 0] CONSTTTUTIONAL LAW @251.6
92k251.6
Opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in
writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a
fundamental due process requirement. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amends. 5, 14.
[11] OFFICERS AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES@
72.12
283k72.12
Tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written
notice of the charges against him, explanation of
employer's evidence, and opportunity to present his
side of the story; to require more than this prior to
termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on
govemment's interest in quickly removing
unsatisfactory employee.
[ll] OFFICERS AND PUBLIC EN[PLOYEES@
72.16(1)
2831<72.16(1)
Tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written
notice of the charges against him, explanation of
employer's evidence, and opportunity to present his
side of the story; to require more than this prior to
temiination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on
govemment's interest in quickly removing
unsatisfactory employee.
[12] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW @7"278.4(5)
92k278.4(5)
City which temiinated employee after he tested
positive for drugs did not deny employee his due
process rights; city provided employee with
pretermination notice and hearing where he was
represented by president of his union, employee
participated in city's posttemiination grievance
process which included opportunity to present
Page 8
evidence and to cross-examine witnesses, and
although defendant had opportunity to challenge
validity of dmg test during both his pretermination
and posttemlination hearings, he opted not to do so.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[12] MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS @218(8)
268k218(8)
City which terminated employee after he tested
positive for drugs did not deny employee his due
process rights; city provided employee with
pretermination notice and hearing where he was
represented by president of his union, employee
participated in city's posttermination grievance
process which included opportunity to present
evidence and to cross-examine witnesses, and
although defendant had opportunity to challenge
validity of drug test during both his pretermination
and posttermination hearings, he opted not to do so.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[13] FEDERAL COURTS @762
170Bk762
Court of Appeals is free to affirm district court on any
grounds for which there is a record sufficient to
pemlit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied
upon by district court.
[14] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCEDURE @501
l$AkSOl
Principle that losing litigant deserves no rernatch after
a defeat fairly suffered in adversarial proceedings on
an issue identical in substance to the one he
subsequently seeks to raise holds true when court has
resolved issue and should do so equally when issue
has been decided by administrative agency, be it state
or federal, which acts in judicial capacity.
[14] JUDGMENT @715(1)
228k715(l)
Principle that losing litigant deserves no remar_ch after
a defeat fairly suffered in adversarial proceedings on
an issue identical in substance to the one he
subsequently seeks to raise holds true when court has
resolved issue and should do so equally when issue
has been decided by administrative agency, be it state
or federal, which acts in judicial capacity.
[15] ADMINiSTRATiVE LAW AND
PROCEDURE <".’WS(H
15Ak501
Constitutional claims raised in former city employee's
Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
` 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525
(Cite as: 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525)
§ 1983 action in federal district court were barred
under the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel
on those issues identical in substance to those
considered during city's posttenuination proceedings.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[15] MUNTC[PAL CORPORATIONS @213(8)
268k218(8)
Constitutional claims raised in former city employee's
§ 1983 action in federal district court were barred
under the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel
on those issues identical in substance to those
considered during city's posttermination proceedings.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
*1527 Paul S. Livingston, Albuquerque, New
Mexico, for appellant.
Randy M. Autio, Assistant City Attorney,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, for appellee City of
Albuquerque.
Todd M. Stafford (David A. Rammelkamp with him
on the brien of Kelly, Rammelkamp, Muehlenweg &
I_ucero, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for appellees
City of Albuquerque Personnel Board, Linda Logan-
Condon and T. Zane Reeves.
Before BRISCOE, COFFIN [FN*] and BARRETT,
Circuit Judges.
FN* The Honorable Frank M. Coffin, Senior Judge,
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit. sitting by designation.
BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge.
Stanley Saavedra (Saavedra), plaintiff-appellant,
appeals from orders of the district court granting
summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees,
T. Zane Reeves, the Personnel Hearing Officer
(PHO), the Albuquerque Personnel Board (Board) and
the City of Albuquerque, New Mexico (City), and
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint.
Facts
Saavedra commenced working for the City as a fire-
fighter and emergency medical technician on or about
September 20, 1982. His employment with the City
was governed, in part, by the City's Merit System
Ordinance (MSO) adopted pursuant to N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 3-13-4 (1978), and a collective bargaining
Page 9
agreement between the City and the International
Association of Firefighters Local 244 (Union). Under
the collective bargaining agreenient, "[a]ll actions
involving discipline and terminations shall provide due
process as described by the Merit System Ordinance
and existing applicable law." (Appellee's
Supplemental Appendix, Vol. l at 000063).
Section 2-9-25(D) of the City's MSO provided in
part: management actions questioned by an employee
which result in dismissal *1528 are designated as
Class I grievances; PHO's have the authority to hear
and render decisions in Class 1 grievances; a PHO's
decision is reviewable by the Board; and, "[t]he
decision of the Personnel Board shall be reviewable in
District Court....” § 2-9-25(D)(5). Under the City's
MSO, "safety-sensitive" employees, such as
Saavedra, could be dismissed for justifiable cause,
including testing positive for drugs.
In March, 1991, Saavedra suffered some personal
and emotional problems. He self-referred himself to
the City's Employee Health Center for an evaluation,
Saavedra gave a urine sample. A specific gravity test
applied to the sample indicated that it was essentially
the same as water. Saavedra, at the request of City,
gave a second urine sample several days later which
tested positive for the presence of metabolites of
marijuana.
On March 27, 1991, Albuquerque Fire Department
Chief Montoya notified Saavedra in writing that he
had tested positive for drug use in violation of the
City's regulations On April 2, 1991, Chief Montoya
conducted a pre-termination hearing. Saavedra
attended the hearing and was represented by Roman
Velarde, his Union president. Saavedra was
terminated on April 8, 1991, solely because he had
tested positive for the presence of metabolites of
marijuana in his urine. Thereafter, Saavedra filed a
grievance challenging his temiination.
Saavedra was provided with a post-temiination
grievance hearing in accordance with the City's MSO.
PHO Reeves presided. During the course of the
hearing, which was conducted on four one-day
sessions in July, September, and October, 1991,
Saavedra was represented by counsel. Saavedra
appeared in person and was allowed to present
evidence and to confront and examine adverse
witnesses. The City also presented evidence.
Following the hearing, PHO Reeves prepared
Copr. © West 1998 No Claiul to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
` 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525
(Cire mr 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525, *1523)
detailed written findings of` fact, conclusions, and
recommendations to the Board in which he
recommended that Saavedra's grievance be denied and
his discharge be upheld on the basis of just cause,
The Board upheld PHO Reeves' recommendations by
a 5-0 vote. Although § 2-9-25(D)(5) of the City's
MSO provided that "[t]he decision of the Personnel
Board shall be reviewable in District Court [w]here
tbe decision is in violation of applicable constitutional
provisions or is otherwise illegal," Saavedra did not
appeal to a New Mexico district court, Rather, he
filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
federal district court against PHO Reeves, the Board
and the City seeking, inter alia, “declaratory and
compensatory relief for violations of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments" and "relief for substantive
and procedural due process violations arising from the
pre-termination and post-termination administrative
proceedings." (Appellant's Appendix, Vol. I at
000001).
PHO Reeves, Linda Logan-Condon, Chair of the
Board, and the Board (hereinaf`ter collectively
referred to as "individual appellees") moved for
summary judgment on Count lV, Negligent and
Tortious Conduct, and Count VII, Punitive Damages.
lndividual appellees argued that the PHO and
members of the Board who bad adjudicated
Saavedra's grievances were entitled to absolute
immunity from personal liability for quasi-judicial
acts. Individual appellees argued, alternatively, that
their actions were shielded by qualified immunity.
Tbe City moved for summary judgment on Count I,
Violation of the Fourth Amendment, and Count II,
Violations of Due Process Rights. The City argued
that it had reasonable suspicion to believe that
Saavedra was engaging in drug activity and that it
was, accordingly, justified in compelling him to
submit a urine sample. [FNl] The City also argued
that Saavedra was provided with all the process he
was due.
FNl. Apparently, the City requested Saavedra
submit a urine sample for a drug test pursuant to its
reasonable suspicion drug testing policy. (Appellee
City's Answer Brief at 5).
On July 27, 1994, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the individual appellees on
Counts IV and VH finding that since individual
appellees were acting in their "adjudicative capacities
and perfonuing quasi- judicial acts, [they] are entitled
Page 10
to absolute immunity." Saavedra v. City of
Albuquerque, *1529 859 F. Supp. 526" date_filed="1994-07-27" court="D.N.M." case_name="Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque">859 F.Supp. 526, 531
(D.N.M.1994). The district court noted that if
Saavedra "is correct in his contention that the City's
procedures failed to satisfy requirements of due
process, he may still pursue relief against the City."
Id.
On August 25, 1994, the district court entered a final
judgment in which it granted the City summary
judgment on Counts 1 and lI. The court found, inter
alia, that: the City had reasonable suspicion to test
Saavedra for drug use after he had admitted smoking
marijuana, exhibited erratic behavior, and threatened
violent behavior toward his supervisors; Saavedra
"cannot now be heard to complain that he wasn't
given a chance to contest the outcome of the dnlg test
when it was his own admission which confirmed its
validity," (Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II at 000259);
and the post-temiination grievance process accorded
Saavedra pursuant to the City's MSO provided
Saavedra all the due process that he was entitled to
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
district court dismissed, sua sponte, the remaining
counts.
Issues
On appeal, Saavedra contends that the district court
erred in: (1) granting absolute judicial immunity to
the Board members; (2) granting the City summary
judgment on Count I; and (3) granting the City
summary judgment on Count II.
[l][2] We review the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal
standards employed by the district court, Gehl Group
v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528" date_filed="1995-08-16" court="10th Cir." case_name="The Gehl Group v. Thomas Koby">63 F.3d 1528, 1533 (lOth Cir.1995).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Hagelin for President Committee of Kan. v. Graves,
25 F.3d 956" date_filed="1994-06-07" court="10th Cir." case_name="Dr. John Hagelin For President Committee of Kansas v. Bill Graves">25 F.3d 956, 959 (lOth Cir.1994), cert. denied, ---
U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 934" date_filed="1995-01-23" court="SCOTUS" case_name="United States Lines Reorganization Trust v. United States">115 S.Ct. 934, 130 L.Ed.Zd 880 (1995).
Disposition
I.
Saavedra contends that the district court erred when
it granted absolute immunity to the individual
appellees .
Saavedra argues that the grant of absolute immunity
Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
'73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525
(Cice a<: 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525, *1529)
to the individual appellees was unnecessary, unwise
and improper and "[b]ecause the Personnel Board
Defendants lack any judicial or adjudicatory power or
abilify, the extension of absolute judicial immunity to
them makes little sense and sets a very dangerous
precedent." (Opening Brief` of Plaintiff-Appellant at
7). Saavedra states that under Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 507, 98 S. Ct. 2894" date_filed="1978-06-29" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Butz v. Economou">98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911, 57 L.Ed.2d 895
(1978), absolute immunity is to be granted only in
those "exceptional situations where it is demonstrated
that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of
public business," and since the individual appellees
did not meet that burden, they have not justified an
entitlement to absolute immunity.
Saavedra further argues that: PHO's are private
individuals who contract with the City and whose
services consist primarily of taking testimony,
conducting hearings and relaying the testimony in the
form of a report to the Board; PHO's lack
independence and fail to exercise any degree of
independent judgment; the Board performs no judicial
function; the Board has limited authority to approve,
overtum, modify or remand; the City does not
consider the Board's decisions binding since the City
can appeal any adverse decision to a state district
court; the powers of the Board, far from being
judicial, are administrative and advisory; the Board
performs no judicial functions; and the grievance
resolution process set forth in the City's MSO was not
at all adversarial.
lndividual appellees respond that: they are entitled to
absolute judicial immunity because their functions are
similar to those in the judicial process; they properly
exercised their adjudicative power and authority;
their right to absolute immunity is firmly rooted in
both Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit jurispnrdence
as set forth in Butz and Horwitz v. State Bd. of
Medical Examiners of Colo., 822 F.2d 1508" date_filed="1987-07-07" court="10th Cir." case_name="Lenord Horwitz v. The State Board of Medical Examiners of The State of Colorado Robert Lederer">822 F.2d 1508 (lOth
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 964" date_filed="1987-11-30" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Leighton v. Uniroyal, Inc.">484 U.S. 964, 108 S. Ct. 453" date_filed="1987-11-30" court="SCOTUS" case_name="United Auto Workers, Local 422 v. Tosti">108 S.Ct. 453, 98
L.Ed.2d 394 (1987); and the district court followed
Butz and Horwitz in concluding that they were entitled
to absolute immunity. We agree.
*1530 ln granting individual appellees‘ motion for
summary judgment, the district court found/
concluded:
Proceeding to the matter of contention, the next
issue is whether Defendant Reeves and members of
the Board are entitled to absolute immunity from
liability.... ln Butz v. Economou the Supreme
Court held that federal hearing officers are
Page l"‘l
examiners and administrative judicial officials are
entitled to absolute immunity. 'l'he Court noted the
longstanding absolute immunity protection accorded
to judges.... and found the same rationale equally
applicable to administrative judicial officers.
'Judges have absolute immunity not because of their
particular location within the Govemment but
because of the special nature of their
responsibilities.' [Butz at 511, 98 S. Ct. 2894" date_filed="1978-06-29" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Butz v. Economou">98 S.Ct. at 2913].
* * >1¢ * * *
Absolute immunity applies, therefore, where (1) the
defendant's duties and the procedures employed are
functionally comparable to those of a court of law;
(2) maintenance of the impartiality and effectiveness
of the adjudicatory process in question requires
eliminating any threat of personal liability; (3) the
defendant's actions are more likely than other
governmental actions to result in disappointed
parties' institution of lawsuits; and (4) procedural
safeguards exist and are ad equate to correct or
prevent erroneous or intentional constitutional
violations. See Horwitz v. Bd. of Med. Examiners,
822 F.2d 1508" date_filed="1987-07-07" court="10th Cir." case_name="Lenord Horwitz v. The State Board of Medical Examiners of The State of Colorado Robert Lederer">822 F.2d 1508, 1513 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 964 [108 S. Ct. 453" date_filed="1987-11-30" court="SCOTUS" case_name="United Auto Workers, Local 422 v. Tosti">108 S.Ct. 453, 98 L.Ed.2d 394] (1987).
Application of these principles to the case at bar
compels the conclusion that the Defendants' acts are
shielded by absolute inununity. .
The hearing before the PHO is adversary in nature.
Employees have the right to counsel and the
opportunity to present evidence, provide testimony,
and cross-examine witnesses. The PHO is a
professional hearing officer, is not considered an
employee of the City, and is sufficiently
independent. His decisions are insulated from
political pressure. The PHO makes written findings
of fact and issues a recommendation. The Board's
review of the PHO's determination is limited to the
record. The Board either affimis, denies, modifies,
or remands the PHO's decision, similar to a
reviewing court of law. The nature of the process is
such that the terminated employee will often~_have a
strong incentive to sue the PHO or the Board should
either issue an adverse decision, and therefore a
strong likelihood of lawsuits could deter others from
desiring to perform these functions and might
produce a hidden bias in favor of the aggrieved
employee. ln any event, constitutional violations
can be corrected on appeal to the state district court.
Notwithstanding Plaintiff's contrary assertions, all
of the factors deemed dispositive in Butz are present
here, The PHO and the Board must be free to
exercise their discretion uninhibited by a looming
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ll |
ll
73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525
(Cite as: 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525, *1530)
threat of personal liability.
859 F. Supp. 526" date_filed="1994-07-27" court="D.N.M." case_name="Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque">859 F.Supp. at 529-31.
[3] We hold that the district court properly applied
Butz and Horwitz in granting individual appellees
absolute judicial immunity.
H.
Saavedra contends that the district court erred when
it granted summary judgment in favor of the City on
his Fourth Amendment claims set forth in Count I of
his complaint, i.e., that the suspicionless drug test-
urinalysis, undertaken by the City, was in violation of
his right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures.
At the time Saavedra self-referred himself to the
City's Employee Health Center, he was asked to give
a urine sample. The specific gravity test applied to
his first urine sample established that the sample was
essentially the same as water. Saavedra gave a
second urine sample several days later which tested
positive for the presence of metabolites of marijuana.
He was subsequently terminated solely because his
urine sample had tested positive for the presence of
metabolites of marijuana.
*l$3l Following Saavedra's post-termination
hearing, PHO Reeves concluded that the City had just
cause to discharge Saavedra based on several
aggravating factors, including the fact that Saavedra
had "wamed his supervisors that he might become
violent if provoked and only a few months earlier [he]
had lost his temper while in uniform and had engaged
in a public alteration with his girlfriend," and that "a
reasonable person assessing the preponderance of the
evidence would conclude that [Saavedra] substituted
or diluted his first urine sample with tap water."
(Appellee's Supplemental Appendix, Vol. I at
000056).
ln Count l of his complaint, Saavedra alleged that a
"suspicionless drug test will not be upheld unless it is
reasonable under the circumstances and the legitimate
govemmenta| interests involved are sufficiently
compelling to outweigh the employee's right to
privacy." (Appellant's Appendix, Vol. l at
000005~6). He further alleged that since the City was
”unable to enunciate any real, valid, or reasonable
purpose for testing its employees in general and
Stanley Saavedra in paxticular.... the drug test [was]
in violation of his right to be free of unreasonable
Page 12
search and seizure as protected by the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 6.
ln granting the City summary judgment on
Saavedra's Fourth Amendment claims, the district
court found, inter alia:
When Plaintiff provided his first urine sample, he
filled the cup with water in lieu of` urine. Plaintiff
does not dispute this fact, by affidavit or otherwise
in his response to Defendant's motions for summary
judgment.... the City directed Plaintiff to provide
another urine sample. He did so and the test
revealed the previous use of marijuana. When
asked about the positive test result, Plaintiff
admitted smoking marijuana.
Plaintiff does not dispute these facts amounting to
reasonable suspicion. Instead, Plaintiff contends that
"reasonable suspicion testing should only have
been based on observable phenomena, such as direct
observation of drug use or possession and/or
physical evidence of Plaintiff being under the
influence. . . . "
* * * * * \k
Plaintiff's position might have merit in the case of
public employees who are not performing safety-
sensitive functions.... however Plaintiff does not
dispute Defendant's characterization of Plaintiff as a
safety-sensitive employee.
* * * * * *
The Court finds that the City had reasonable
suspicion to test Plaintiff for drug use. Plaintiff
admitted to smoking marijuana, and he exhibited
erratic, and even threatened violent, behavior
towards his supervisors.
(Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II at 000253).
[4][5] Normally, ‘a search is considered reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment only if it is supported
by a warrant issued on probable cause; therefore
reasonable suspicion, standing alone, is insufficient
See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 619, l09 S.Ct. 1402, 1414, 103 L.Ed.Zd
639 (1989). Even where the warrant requirement is
relaxed, the existence of probable cause is required to
make a full-scale search constitutional. New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325" date_filed="1985-01-15" court="SCOTUS" case_name="New Jersey v. T. L. O.">469 U.S. 325, 340, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742, 83
L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). To this general rule requiring a
search warrant on probable cause, or exigent
circumstances justifying a probable cause based
warrantless search, the Supreme Court has recognized
a "special needs" exception. Skinner, 489 U.S. at
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73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525
(Cite as: 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525, *1531.)
619, 109 S. Ct. 1384" date_filed="1989-03-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab">109 S.Ct. at 1414.
[6][7] Under the exception recognized in Skinner, no
warrant nor probable cause is required by the Fourth
Amendment "when ‘special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable.' " ld.
(quoting Griffm v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868" date_filed="1987-06-26" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Griffin v. Wisconsin">483 U.S. 868, 873,
107 S.Ct. 3164, 3168, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)). We
evaluate the constitutionality of a "special needs"
search under the Fourth Amendment's more general
requirement of reasonableness, National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656" date_filed="1989-03-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab">489 U.S. 656,
665-66, 109 S. Ct. 1384" date_filed="1989-03-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab">109 S.Ct. 1384, 1390-91, 103 L. Ed. 2d 685" date_filed="1989-03-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab">103 L.Ed.2d 685
(1989), by "balancing the need to search *1532
against the invasion which the search entails." Romo
v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013" date_filed="1995-01-31" court="10th Cir." case_name="Johnnie Romo v. Ron Champion Bill Mckenzie Gary Maynard Oklahoma Highway Patrol Osage County Sheriff'S Office Pawhuska County Sheriff'S Office">46 F.3d 1013, 1017 (lOth Cir.) (quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387
U.S. 523, 537, 87 S. Ct. 1727" date_filed="1967-06-05" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco">87 S.Ct. 1727, 1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930
(1967)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S. Ct. 387" date_filed="1995-10-30" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Riggins v. Walter">116 S.Ct. 387, 133
L.Ed.2d 309 (1995). Whether a particular search is
”reasonable depends on the context within which [thel
search takes place." T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325" date_filed="1985-01-15" court="SCOTUS" case_name="New Jersey v. T. L. O.">469 U.S. at 337, 105
S.Ct. at 740. Thus, the appropriate inquiry in each
case is ”whether the govemment's need outweighs the
individual's privacy interest." Romo, 46 F.3d 1013" date_filed="1995-01-31" court="10th Cir." case_name="Johnnie Romo v. Ron Champion Bill Mckenzie Gary Maynard Oklahoma Highway Patrol Osage County Sheriff'S Office Pawhuska County Sheriff'S Office">46 F.3d at 1017
(quoting Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188" date_filed="1989-08-01" court="10th Cir." case_name="Terry Darnell Dunn v. Thomas White">880 F.2d 1188, 1193 (lOth
Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059" date_filed="1990-01-22" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Pierce v. United States">493 U.S. 1059, 110 S.Ct.
871, 107 L.Ed.Zd 954 (1990)). We assess whether
the asserted government interest “justifies the privacy
intrusions at issue absent a warrant or individualized
suspicion." Skinner, 489 U.S. 656" date_filed="1989-03-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab">489 U.S. at 621, 109 S.Ct. at
1415.
In Skinner, the Court, after concluding that urinalysis
testing of railroad employees for alcohol and drugs
constituted the search of a person subject to the
Fourth Amendment, held that the regulations
authorizing the tests were reasonable even though
there was no requirement of a warrant or reasonable
suspicion that an employee might be impaired,
because the compelling governmental interest
outweighed the employee's privacy concerns. 489
U.S. at 633. The Court noted that it was undisputed
that the covered employees were engaged in safety-
sensitive tasks and that the restrictions necessary to
procure the urine sample were quite minimal when
compaer to significant restrictions in freedom of
movement the employees consented to as part of their
jobs. ld. at 620, 624, 109 S. Ct. 1384" date_filed="1989-03-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab">109 S.Ct. at 1414-15, 1417.
See also Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347" date_filed="1994-03-02" court="10th Cir." case_name="Anthony Lucero v. Frank Gunter">17 F.3d 1347 (lOth
Cir.l994) (Holding that a random urine collection and
testing of prisoners is a reasonable means of
Page 13
combating the unauthorized use of narcotics and does
not violate the Fourth Amendment).
ln Von Raab, the Court reached a similar conclusion.
There the Court upheld suspicionless drug testing of
certain United States Customs Agents where there
was no triggering event. 489 U.S. 656" date_filed="1989-03-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab">489 U.S. 656. The Court
approved drug testing of Customs Service employees
having a direct involvement in drug interdiction or
those required to carry a firearm. ld. at 677, The
Court weighed the govemment's interest on the one
hand, against the Customs Service employees'
expectations of privacy on the other, and struck the
balance in favor of the govemment. Id.
There can be little doubt that the search conducted by
the City in this case was executed pursuant to special
needs independent of traditional criminal law
enforcement. However, the district court did not rely
upon or address the "special needs" standard;
instead, the court relied upon the City's own
reasonable suspicion drug testing policy and found
that the City had reasonable suspicion to test Saavedra
for drug use.
[8] Accordingly, we hold that the district court did
not err in finding that the City had reasonable
suspicion to test Saavedra for drug use, nor did the
district court err in granting summary judgment in
favor of the City on Saavedra's Fourth Amendment
claims. We reject Saavedra's contentions that the
City's claim of reasonable suspicion was not based on
objective, specific observations or findings when, as
here, it is uncontested that Saavedra was employed in
a safety-sensitive position, Saavedra self-referred
himself to the City's Employee Health Center for an
evaluation, Saavedra had warned his supervisors that
he might become violent if provoked, and Saavedra
had lost his temper while in uniform and had engaged
in a public altercation with his girlfriend.
Significantly, Saavedra acknowledges that "[o]f
course the Fourth Amendment allows reasonable
suspicion drug testing of safety- sensitive employees. "
(Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 28).
III.
Saavedra contends that the district court erred when
it granted the City's motion for summary judgment on
his Count II due process claims.
The City's substance abuse policy provided in part
that if an "employee fails the substance abuse test, he/
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73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525
(Cite as: 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525, *1532_)
she may appeal the results to City's Medical Review
Officer whose determination regarding the results
*1533 shall be final. A positive drug test shall
result in the termination of the employee."
On appeal, Saavedra argues that “[b]ecause there was
nothing [he] could do or say that would mitigate or
alter the City's use of the positive test to terminate his
employment, he was denied a meaningful hearing"
and that the "opportunity to offer explanations for the
positive test presented by the pre- termination and
post-termination hearings was nothing more than an
exercise in futility.” (Opening Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant at 41). He also contends that: the City's
hearing policy, whereby the grievant goes first as the
moving party, violates conunon notions of adequate
due process; the use of a non- rebuttable presumption
(there was just cause for temiination based on the
positive test for metabolites of marijuana) placed an
unconstitutional burden on him.
'I'he City responds that: Saavedra's contentions fail
factually; although Saavedra could have challenged
the validity of the drug test at his pre- termination
hearing or during the course of his four-day post-
temiination hearing, he opted not to do so;
Saavedra's assertion that he was not allowed to
challenge his termination is simply untrue and belied
by the procedure provided him; and when PHO
Reeves inquired into Saavedra's dnig use, Saavedra
admitted that he smoked marijuana just a few days
prior to the test,
[9][10][11] The essential elements of due process are
notice and an opportunity to respond, Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532" date_filed="1985-03-19" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill">470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S.Ct.
1487, 1495, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494" date_filed="1985-03-19" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill">84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985):
The opportunity to present reasons, either in person
or in writing, why proposed action should not be
taken is a fundamental due process requirement....
The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or
written notice of the charges against him, an
explanation of the employer's evidence, and an
opportunity to present his side of the story.... To
require more than this prior to termination would
intrude to an unwarranted extent on the
govemment's interest in quickly removing an
unsatisfactory employee.
[12] We hold that the district court properly applied
Loudermill in granting the City's motion for summary
judgment on Saavedra's due process claims. The City
provided Saavedra with pre-termination notice and
Page 14
hearing where he was represented by the president of
his Union. Thereaffer, Saavedra participated in the
City's post-termination grievance process which
included hearings, the benefit of counsel, the
opportunity to present evidence, and the opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses.
Saavedra was terminated solely because he tested
positive for marijuana use. Even though Saavedra
had the opportunity to challenge the validity of the
drug test during both his pre-termination and post-
termination hearings, he opted not to do so. In this
regard, the district court found that "the reason
Plaintiff in all likelihood did not take such measures to
challenge the positive test result is because he openly
admitted to smoking marijuana. Plaintiff cannot now
be heard to complain that he wasn't given a chance to
contest the outcome of the drug test when it was his
own admission which confirmed its validity."
(Appellant's Appendix, Vol. II at 000259).
IV.
[13] The City argues that Saavedra's constitutional
claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. Saavedra responds that res
judicata and collateral estoppel principles do not
preclude his constitutional claims because l -"[t]he
District Court niled only on the City's Motions for
Summary Iudgment on Counts l and ll, and expressly
found that the City's Motion for Summary Iudgment
on Collateral Estoppel [and] Res Judicata were
moot." (Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 14 n. 3).
Although the district court did not reach this issue, it
was raised by the City and "we are free to affirm a
district court on any grounds for which there is a
record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even
grounds not relied upon by the district court." United
States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537" date_filed="1994-07-07" court="10th Cir." case_name="United States v. Miguel Sandoval">29 F.3d 537, 542 n. 6 (10th
Cir.1994) (citation omitted).
As set forth, supra, § 2-9-25(D)(5) of the City's MSO
provided that "[t]he decision of *1534 the Personnel
Board shall be reviewable in District Court [w]here
the decision is in violation of applicable constitutional
provisions or is otherwise illegal." Notwithstanding
this section, Saavedra did not appeal his tennination
to a state district court. Rather, he brought this action
in federal district court seeking declaratory and
compensatory relief for alleged violations of his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and
substantive due process.
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73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525
(Cite as: 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525, *1534)
The City argues that under University of Tenn. v.
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788" date_filed="1986-07-07" court="SCOTUS" case_name="University of Tennessee v. Elliott">478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d
635 (1986) (`Elliott ), Saavedra's failure to appeal his
discharge in state district court bars consideration of
his constitutional claims in federal district court. In
Elliott, when the University of Tennessee (University)
informed Elliott, a black employee, that he would be
discharged for inadequate work performance and
misconduct on the job, Elliott requested an
administrative hearing Prior to the commencement
of the hearing, however, Elliott filed a Title VIl action
in federal district court. The federal district court
allowed the administrative proceedings to go forward.
'l'he administrative proceedings resulted in an
administrative law judge (ALD ruling, affirmed by a
University Vice-President on appeal, that Elliott's
proposed discharge was not racially motivated. Elliott
did not seek state court review of the administrative
proceedings. Rather, he retumed to federal district
court.
ln federal district court, the University moved for
summary judgment asserting that principles of res
judicata prevented relitigation of claims of racial
discrimination in federal court. The district court
granted the University's motion and entered judgment
in its favor. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed,
holding that the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 [FNZ] "does not require federal courts to defer
to the unreviewed findings of state administrative
agencies." Elliott v. University of Tenn., 766 F.2d
982, 990 (6th Cir.1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 478 U.S. 788" date_filed="1986-07-07" court="SCOTUS" case_name="University of Tennessee v. Elliott">478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635
(1986).
FN'.Z. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 provides in part: Such acts,
records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated shall have the same full faith and credit
in every court within the United States as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State
from which they are taken.
On appeal, the Court held:
A state Administrative Law Judge determined that
petitioner University of Tennessee was not
motivated by racial prejudice in seeking to discharge
respondent. 'l`he question presented is whether this
finding is entitled to preclusive effect in federal
court where respondent has raised racial
discrimination claims under various civil rights
laws, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
* * * * * *
Page 15
[W]e hold that when a state agency "acting in a
judicial capacity resolves disputed issues of fact
properly before it which the parties have had an
opportunity to litigate," federal courts must give
the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect
to which it would be entitled in the State's courts.
(Emphasis added).
Elliott, 478 U.S. 788" date_filed="1986-07-07" court="SCOTUS" case_name="University of Tennessee v. Elliott">478 U.S. at 790, 799, 106 S.Ct. at 3221-22,
3226.
"To summarize the holding in Elliott, a federal
district court in a proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
must give a state agency's factfinding the same
preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the
state‘s court if the state agency” while acting in a
judicial capacity resolved disputed issues of fact
properly before it and the parties had an adequate
opportunity to litigate the issues in dispute. Atiya v.
Salt Lake County, 988 F.2d 1013" date_filed="1993-03-12" court="10th Cir." case_name="Manya Atiya v. Salt Lake County">988 F.2d 1013, 1019 (10th
Cir.1993) (emphasis original).
[14] Similarly, courts "have long favored application
of the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as
to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those
determinations of administrative bodies that have
attained fmality." Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v.
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104" date_filed="1991-06-10" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino">501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 2166,_2169,
115 L.Ed.Zd 96 (1991). The principle that "a losing
litigant deserves no rematch after a defeat fairly
suffered in adversarial proceedings, on an issue
identical in substance to the one he subsequently seeks
to *1535 raise.... holds true when a court has
resolved an issue, and should do so equally when the
issue has been decided by an administrative agency,
be it state or federal which acts in a judicial
capacity." Id. at 107-08, 111 S.Ct. at 2169.
[15] Under Solimino, the constitutional claims raised
in Saavedra's federal district court action are barred
under the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel
on those "issue[s] identical in substance to"_ those
considered during the City's post-termination
proceedings. However, inasmuch as our appellate
record does not include an adequate record of the
administrative proceedings, we cannot determine what
constitutional claims may have been asserted by
Saavedra, if any. See King v. Unocal Corp., 58 F.3d
586, 587-88 (10th Cir.1995) (failure to include trial
transcript necessary to review challenge to jury
instructions); United States v. Janus Indus., 48 F.3d
1548, 1559 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116
S.Ct. 87, 133 L.Ed.2d 44 (1995) (failure to include,
and reference to, portion of record wherein
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73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525 Page 16
(Cite as: 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525, *1535)
objections, properly preserving issues for appeal, may
be found),
AFFTRMED .
END OF DOCUMEN'I`
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»http://lO.l.TZ 16.2:8844/...y/lRL/\ D»l.tmp,"S 'dne'hody littp://lOéZ l6.2:8844/lSYSqner_v/IRLAD4.lmp/8/doc’body
CHAVEZ V. C`ITY OF A/.I)’U()UI:`R()UE, ET AL.
O()-l 74 l
CIVHJ
CHAVEZ V. CITY OF ALBUOUEROUE, ET AL.
Richard L. l"ug_iisi
1097/04/04
IN THE UNITI`;D STATES DlSTRICT COURT
FOR,TI~I’E DIS`l"RlC`T Ol" NEW MEXICO
GARY CHAVEZ,
Plaintif`f`,
vs. CIVIL NO. 96-!741 RLP/JHG
CITY OF AI,IS`U()(/'I?I\‘()(/'lf‘
LAWRENCE l-‘\AF,l ,, Chiet` /\dininistrative
Officer, DE\V`EY C.»\VE, Solid Waste
Department Dircctor, CITY PERSONNEL
BOARD and J/\l\“lES FOI-EY, Chairman,
Defendants
MEMORANDUi\'l OP|NION
THIS MATTER came on l`or consideration ofthe Defendants' City Personnel Board's and James Foley's
Motion to Disiniss on Gronnds ot`Absolute Immunity (Docket No. 10) and Defendants' Motion to Strike
Plaintiff's Untimely Responsc to l\/lotion to Dismiss O)ocket No. 15). The Court has reviewed the
motion, the memoranda submitted by the parties and the relevant authorities 'l`he Court finds that
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Absolute Immunity is well taken and shall be granted
The Court further finds that Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Untimely Response to Motion to
Dismiss shall be denied
FACTU['\[. Bi\Cl\'(iROl .i§\é[)
'l`he Plaintil`l`lili;d his Co:npl;iint against the City Personnel Board and its chairman, James Foley, and
other defendants on December 12` 1996, The PlaintiH`was employed as a mechanic with the City's Solid
Waste l\lanagement Department The City terminated his employment after the State suspended his
tom A_\__\,_a (/VW¥W + D 07/23/93 09;43;07
thPI//lO-\:.`.zl6.2!88~l~l/...)'/'ll{l ',\l) l_litip*$ 'Lliig 'i416 U.S. 232" date_filed="1974-04-17" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Scheuer v. Rhodes">416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
The district court should not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim unless it appears the
plaintill`can prove no set ol" facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to any relief. Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 4" date_filed="1957-10-14" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Arkansas Public Service Commission v. United States of America and Interstate Commerce Commission">355 U.S. 4 l, 45-46 (l057). The defense ofabsolute immunity
is properly presented pursuant to a motion to dismiss under FedR.Civ.P. lZ(b)(6). Sawyer v_ County of
Creek, 908 F.2d 663" date_filed="1990-07-18" court="10th Cir." case_name="Leona Sawyer v. County of Creek">908 F.2d 663 (lOth Cir. l990). ,
The defendants ("it_\' Personnel Board and James Foley claim they are immune from suit on grounds of
absolute immunity /\ government official may invoke one oftwo types ot`immunity from suit: absolute
or qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has adopted a "functional" approach to immunity, so that
whether an official is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity will depend on the hinction performed by
that official in a particular context Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219" date_filed="1988-01-12" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Forrester v. White">484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); see also Archie v.
Lanier, 95 F.3d 438" date_filed="1996-09-11" court="6th Cir." case_name="Vivian Ann Archie, Lisa Darlene Golden, Lisa G. Couch, Anthony Wayne Couch v. David W. Lanier, Reed Riley">95 F.3d 438 (6th C`ir. l996).
The question before the Court is simply whether the §Qg Personnel Board
and Mr. Foley, its chairperson` have absolute immunity for their decisions properly under their
jurisdiction This issue was presented squarely to the late Judge Juan Burciaga in the case ofSaavedra v.
Qy Ofi-'|//)uq.'l_c_'_)_'qy_¢_z 859 F. Supp. 526" date_filed="1994-07-27" court="D.N.M." case_name="Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque">859 F.Supp. 526 (D...NM 1994), affd, 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525 (lOth Cir. 1996). ln355 U.S. 41" date_filed="1957-11-18" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Conley v. Gibson">355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188" date_filed="1989-08-01" court="10th Cir." case_name="Terry Darnell Dunn v. Thomas White">880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir.
1989), cert denied 493 U.S. 1059" date_filed="1990-01-22" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Pierce v. United States">493 U.S. 1059 (1990). The Court must accept all factual allegations of the
Complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Zilkha Energy
Co. v. Leighton, 920 F.2d 1520" date_filed="1990-12-10" court="10th Cir." case_name="Zilkha Energy Company v. Arthur Leighton, Verna Leighton, George W. Leighton, Susan Kay Stansberry, Ann E. Thompson, and Michael Frank Thompson">920 F.2d 1520, 1523 (10th Cir. 1990). The defense of absolute immunity may
be properly raised in a motion to dismiss Sawer v. Coung; of Creek, 908 F.2d 663" date_filed="1990-07-18" court="10th Cir." case_name="Leona Sawyer v. County of Creek">908 F.2d 663 (10th
Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
The City Personnel Board and its chairman, James Foley, content that they are entitled
to absolute immunity from liability in this suit for decisions made that are within their
jurisdiction 'I`his issue has been squarely addressed by'the Tenth Circuit case of Saavedra v.
City of Albuguergue, 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525 (10th Cir 1996). In M, the Court held that the Board
and its chairman were absolutely immune from suit for decisions made within their jurisdiction.
Id_. The Tenth Circuit’s analysis and holding is clearly applicable to this case. Therefore, the
Court holds that the City Personnel Board and Chairman James Foley are absolutely immune
from liability in this suit.
WHEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants City of Albuquerque Personnel Board’s and
James Foley’s Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Absolute Immunity and Insufficient Process,
filed January 24, 1997 [Doc. No. 8] is GRANTED and the Complaint shall by DISMISSED
WI'I'H PREJUDICE as to the City of Albuquerque’s Personnel Board and James Foley.
7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' City of Albuquerque Personnel Board’s
and James Foley’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Untiinely Response to Motion to Dismiss, filed
February 28, 1997 [Doc. No. 13 ] is DENIED.
/%a/;;¢M
UNITED/ Ari=,s DisTchT JUDGE
http://IO.S.Z16.2:8844/.../1111.1\])»l.lnip"ll/doc body
l ial-2
LAiRA v. cirv 0_F ALBUQUERQUE
95-03 66
CIVlL
LARA v_ CITY OF /ILBUOUEROUE
C, l.el“\oy Hansen
1995/08/02
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DlSTRlCT OF NEW MEXICO
ROBER'I` LAR.‘\, (FlLED 08/02/95)
Plaintiff,
vs. No. CIV 95-0306~LH/LCS
CITY OF AI,IiU()UEROUE, LA\VRENCE
RAEL, Chief/\dministrative
Officer, in his official capacity,
CITY PERSONNEL BOARD, and PATRICK
BINGHAM,
Defendants
MEMORANDUl\l OPINTON AND ORDER
hltp://l().X.Zl6.2:8844/'1SYSquery/lRLAD¢l.lmp/l l/'doc/body
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Patrick Bingham's and Q‘_ig of Albuquerque
Personnel Board's l\lotion to Dismiss on Grounds of
Absolute Immunity (Docl859 F. Supp. 526" date_filed="1994-07-27" court="D.N.M." case_name="Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque">859 F.Supp. 526 (D.N.M. 1994). Defendants Patrick Bingham and the ge Personnel Board are
absolutely immune from liability for claims arising out oftheir quasi-judicial fiinction of adjudicating
personnel grievances for the City ofA/buguergue. Id.
Attaehwwi/ii l;
07/28/98 09.'44:39
7http:'/l0,8.2l6.2:884»l/.../llll,r\l)l.lmp |l/doe'l)ody hltp://lO.B.Z l6.2:884~1/lSYSquery/1RLAD4.tmp/l l/doc/bo@_y
l'I' IS, TllERl§l`-ORF., CRDERED that Defendant Patrick Bingham's and
Board`s l\lotion to Dismiss on Grounds ofAbsolut-e
Immunity lS GRANTED
Qy of Albuquerque Personnel
United States District Judgee
2 of2 07/28/98 09:44:41
941 P.'ld 509
l997-NMCA-054
(Cite as: 123 N.M. 428" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">123 N.M. 428, 941 P.Zd 509
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
JOSeph CHAVEZ, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 17356.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
April l, 1997.
City appealed from Personnel Board's decision,
based on recommendation of hearing officer, to
reverse city's temiination of corrections officer. The
District Court, Bemalillo County, W. Daniel
Schneider, J., remanded for new hearing. After
granting officer's application for interlocutory appeal,
the Court of Appeals, Flores, J., held that: (l)
Personnel Board's decision was not entitled to
deference due to Board's lack of notice regarding
city's allegations of bias on part of hearing officer; (2)
city had right to fair hearing under city's merit system
ordinance; and (3) city made sufficient showing that
hearing officer should have disqualified himself for
bias.
Affirmed.
[l] ADMINTSTRA'I`IVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
@7-’683
15Ak683
Court of Appeals reviews appeals from administrative
agency decisions under same standard as district
Court.
[2] PRlSONS @7
3l0k7
Personnel Board's decision to reverse city's
termination of corrections officer, based on
recommendation of hearing officer, was not entitled to
deference, where city had sought to disqualify hearing
officer for bias, and Board had never been put on
notice of city's allegations of hias.
[3] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW @278.4(5)
92k278.4(5)
City did not have constitutional right to fair grievance
hearing before personnel hearing officer. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14.
[3] MUNiCiPAL CoRi>oRATioNS 123 N.M. 428" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">123 N.M. 428, 941 F.2d 509)
about whether hearing officer could be fair, it is
inappropriate for hearing officer to hear case, and
hearing officer should disqualify himself or herself for
bias.
**Sll) *429 Robert M. White, City Attorney, Bruce
T. Thompson, Assistant City Attomey, Albuquerque,
for Petitiouer-Appellee.
ira Bolnick, Fitzpatrick & Bolnick, Albuquerque, for
Respondent-Appellant.
OPINION
FLORES, Judge.
l. Joseph Chavez (Chavez), a corrections officer for
the City of Albuquerque (the City), was terminated
from his employment. After a hearing, the hearing
officer ultimately recommended, and the Personnel
Board (the Board) approved, reversal of Chavez's
**$ll *430 termination. The City appealed to the
district court, which found that the hearing officer
"was not impartial," and remanded for a new hearing,
On interlocutory appeal, we take this opportunity to
address when, as a matter of law, a hearing officer
should disqualify himself or herself on an issue of
bias, and by what standard a court should review that
decision for error. We affimi the district court and
remand for a fair hearing,
I. FACTUAL AND
BACKGROUND
PROCEDURAL
2. The City terminated Chavez from his position as a
corrections officer at the Bernalillo County Detention
Center (BCDC) for applying excessive force to a
prisoner. In the early morning hours of July 13,
1994, Chavez was recorded on BCDC surveillance
video running toward a prisoner from behind, striking
the prisoner, and propelling the prisoner's upper body
into the wall. At the time of this incident, the
prisoner was on the phone with his back to Chavez,
and was moving away from Chavez, apparently
unaware of his approach. Several other guards
became involved in the altercation that ensued.
Following the struggle, the video shows Chavez
carrying the prone prisoner by the handcuffs, shackled
and face down, into a holding cell. ln Chavez's
report of the incident filed later that same night, he
stated that he applied force because the prisoner
"advanced toward me in an aggressive manner.”
3. The director of BCDC terminated Chavez after an
Page 2
independently-contracted internal affairs investigation,
and a pre-determination hearing based on Chavez's
conduct, his prior record of similar conduct, and the
conflict between the video record and Chavez's report
of the incident.
4. Chavez challenged his termination. Pursuant to
the City's Merit System Ordinance (MSO), see
Albuquerque, N.M., Rev. Ordinances ch. 3, ait. I, §§
3-1-1 to -25 (1978 & Supp.l989), the grievance was
set for a hearing before an independent personnel
hearing officer (hearing officer). [FNI] At the
beginning of the hearing and in the context of
discovery motions, the City moved to disqualify the
hearing officer. The City based its motion both on the
fact that Chavez's trial attomey, Paul Livingston,
immediately prior to a discovery proceeding in the
case, served the hearing officer with a "courtesy
copy" of a separate lawsuit Livingston had filed
against the hearing officer, and on Livingston's
continued reference to that suit "throughout that
hearing, every time that there was any kind of a real
dispute." The City noted that this lawsuit against the
hearing officer stemmed from his role as the hearing
officer in a similar case, and specifically involved the
hearing officer's ridings on discovery motions. The
City also noted that the hearing officer (l) expressed
concern for the personal financial impact the suit
would have on him; (2) asked Livingston to
reconsider suing him; and (3) admitted to Livingston
that "[q]uite frankly, you intimidate me. I have never
been sued before." The hearing officer denied the
City's motion, responding "I know I can be
objective." The City renewed its motion to disqualify
at least three times over the course of the hearing and
each time the hearing officer responded that he
believed he could be fair.
FNl. The City's MSO Gricvance Resolution
Procedure directs an employee aggrieved by
termination first to discuss the issue with her or his
supervisors, then make a formal written complaint to
the Chief Administrative Officer. MSO §
3~l-23(D)(l). lf` the employee is unsatisfied with the
Chief Administrativc Officer's decision, he or she
may request a hearing from the Personnel Board, §
3-1-23(D)('.l), which refers the matter to an
independent Personnel Hearing Officer for hearing, §
3-l- 23(D)(3).
5. After the hearing, the hearing officer presented to
the Board a summary of his findings and conclusions,
and recommended that the Board reverse the City's
decision to terminate and instead reinstate Chavez
Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
941 P.2d 509" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">941 P.2d 509
(Cite as: 123 N.M. 428" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">123 N.M. 428, *430, 941 P.Zd 509, **Sll)
with a sixty-day suspension. The hearing officer
made no reference to the City's repeated motions for
his disqualification in his report and recommendation
to the Board. Further, the stenographic record of the
hearing was not fillly transcribed until after the Board
had approved the hearing officer's recommendation.
Cf. Littlefield v. State ex rel. Taxation & Revenue
Dep't, Motor Vehicle Div., 114 N.M. 390" date_filed="1992-07-13" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="Littlefield v. State Ex Rel. Taxation & Revenue Department">114 N.M. 390, 395, 839
F.2d 134, 139 **512 *431 (Ct.App.l992) (board that
had access to record and concurred with hearing
officer's recommendation not required to have
reviewed the record in order to meet due process
requirements).
76. The City appealed to the district court, arguing
that the decision to reverse Chavez's termination was
arbitrary and capricious, and altematively, that the
hearing officer should have been disqualified for bias.
The district court reviewed the entire record, and
found that the hearing officer "was not impartial," and
remanded for a new hearing before an unbiased
hearing officer. The district court then certified the
case for interlocutory appeal, and this Court granted
Chavez's application for an interlocutory appeal.
Il. DISCUSSION
7. This case involves two intertwined issues. The
first issue relates to the standard of review this Court
should apply when reviewing an administrative
adjudication for possible bias. The second issue
pertains to the question of what constitutes bias to
warrant remand for a new hearing. The second issue
is complicated by the fact that the tests New Mexico
courts have developed to determine when bias in an
administrative tribunal is impermissible have been
constructed for the purpose of protecting the
constitutional right to due process, whereas in this
case the City, which has no such constitutional right,
seeks protection from bias.
A. Standard of Review
[1] 8. We review appeals from administrative agency
decisions under the same standard as the district
court. See Downtown Neighborhoods Ass'n v. City
of Albuquerque, 109 N.M. 186" date_filed="1989-11-07" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="Downtown Neighborhoods Ass'n v. City of Albuquerque">109 N.M. 186, 189, 783 P.Zd 962,
965 (Ct.App.1989). Here, the MSO specifies that the
Board's decisions are reviewable in the district court;
(a) Where the decision is arbitrary or capricious and
is unsupported by substantial evidence; or
(b) Where the decision is in violation of applicable
constitutional provisions or is otherwise illegal; or
Page 3
(c) Where the decision is in excess of the statutory
authority or jurisdiction of the Board,
MSO § 3-1-23(D)(5)(a)-(c).
B. Deference to Administrative Board
[2] 9. The parties dispute the proper standard of
review; specifically, they dispute how much, if any,
deference this Court should give to the decision of the
Board and hearing officer. Chavez argues that this
Court should give deference to the decision of the
Board to reverse the City and reinstate Chavez. The
City argues that because the issue of bias was not
presented to the Board, deference to the Board is
misplaced. We agree with the City.
10. ln this case, the decision under review is the
decision of the Board to adopt the hearing officer's
recommendation and reinstate Chavez. The record
reveals that the Board was never put on notice of the
City's allegations of bias. Although the City at
numerous times raised the motion to disqualify the
hearing officer, the hearing officer made no reference
to this issue in his statement of the case, his findings
and conclusions, or his recommendation to the Board,
The MSO prohibits the Board from considering any
information beyond what is submitted by the hearing
officer. See MSO § 3-1-23(D)(4)(a). Although the
Board had authority to require the hearing officer to
submit a complete transcript, see MSO § 3-1~23(D)(3)
(hear'ing officer shall transmit to personnel board at
least a summary record of the hearing, findings of
fact, and his or her recommendation); MSO §
3-1-23(D)(4)(a)(3) (board may remand matter to
hearing officer for further hearing or a more detailed
report ), the Board was not required to do so if it
followed the hearing officer's recommendation.
Compare Littlefield, 114 N.M. 390" date_filed="1992-07-13" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="Littlefield v. State Ex Rel. Taxation & Revenue Department">114 N.M. at 395, 839 P.2d at
139 (board that had access to record and concurred
with hearing officer's recommendation not required to
have reviewed the record in order to meet due
process), with Board of Educ. v. New Mexico State
Bd. of Educ., 106 N.M. 129" date_filed="1987-06-25" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="Board of Education v. New Mexico State Board of Education">106 N.M. 129, 131, 740 F.2d 12" date_filed="1984-08-07" court="8th Cir." case_name="Samuel E. Haley, Jr. v. Donald Wyrick, Warden and William Armontrout, Associate Warden, Missouri State Penitentiary">740 F.2d 12`3, 125
(Ct.App.1987) (fair hearing requires that board
review the hearing officer's record before adopting a
decision contrary to hearing officer's recommendation
because **513 *432 credibility of witnesses key to
Board's decision). Here, because the Board had no
occasion to consider bias, it makes no sense to defer
to the Board when reviewing that issue. Accordingly,
our review for bias is conducted without deference to
the Board.
Copr. 413 West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
9941 P.2d 509" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">941 P.2d 509
(ciie tie 123 N.M. 428" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">123 N.M. 428, *432, 94i P.2d 509, **513)
C. Was the City Denied a Fair Hearing Because of
Hearing Officer Bias?
11. The City argues that bias on the part of the
hearing officer denied the City a fair hearing. This
case differs from the line of cases dealing with
allegations of bias in administrative proceedings in
New Mexico, because those cases have each involved
an aggrieved person alleging denial of a fair hearing
by an arm of the state. See, e.g., Santa Fe
Exploration Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 114
N.M. 103, 835 P.2d 819" date_filed="1992-07-27" court="N.M." case_name="Santa Fe Exploration Co. v. Oil Conservation Commission">835 P.2d 819 (1992) (oil drillers appealed
commission's decision to impose production
restrictions based in part on possible commission
member bias); Lujan v. New Mexico State Police
Bd., 100 N.M. 149" date_filed="1983-08-04" court="N.M." case_name="Lujan v. New Mexico State Police Board">100 N.M. 149, 667 P.2d 456 (1983) (state police
employee appealed police board decision upholding
his termination based on chaimian's possible bias);
Reid v. New Mexico Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry,
92 N.M. 414" date_filed="1979-01-15" court="N.M." case_name="Reid v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry">92 N.M. 414, 589 P.2d 198 (1979) (optometrist
appealed board revocation of his license based on
possible board member bias). In these cases, New
Mexico courts have used as their analytical starting
point the constitutional right to due process, Santa Fe
Exploration Co., 114 N.M. 390" date_filed="1992-07-13" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="Littlefield v. State Ex Rel. Taxation & Revenue Department">114 N.M. at 109, 835 P.2d 819" date_filed="1992-07-27" court="N.M." case_name="Santa Fe Exploration Co. v. Oil Conservation Commission">835 P.2d at 825;
Lujan, 100 N.M. 149" date_filed="1983-08-04" court="N.M." case_name="Lujan v. New Mexico State Police Board">100 N.M. at 150, 667 P.2d at 457; Reid, 92
N.M. at 415-16, 589 P.2d 198" date_filed="1979-01-15" court="N.M." case_name="Reid v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry">589 P.2d at 199-200. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees that a person like Chavez with interests
terminated by an arm of the state receive a fair,
adjudicative- style hearing, Reid, 92 N.M. 414" date_filed="1979-01-15" court="N.M." case_name="Reid v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry">92 N.M. at 416,
589 P.2d at 200; Board of Educ., 106 N.M. 129" date_filed="1987-06-25" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="Board of Education v. New Mexico State Board of Education">106 N.M. at 132,
740 P.2d at 126. The inquiry New Mexico courts
have shaped to determine when a hearing is or is not
fair due to bias is therefore designed for the purpose
of protecting a person's constitutional right to a fair
hearing,
[3][4] 12. The City, however, is considered an arm
of the state, and not a ”person," within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend.
XIV; see also John E. Nowak et al., Constitutional
Law 415-16 (Zd ed. 1983) (“persons" protected by
fourteenth amendment consist of individuals, including
aliens and corporations); id. at 415 (fourteenth
amendment protects individuals by restricting power
of states, and "all lesser governmental units such as
county, city, or other local governments are
considered to be a part of the state"). As such, the
City has no constitutional right to due process, and
therefore no constitutional right to a fair hearing.
[51[6] 13. However, the city is nonetheless
Page 4
guaranteed a fair hearing by statute. The MSO, in its
terms and its structure, and the niles promulgated
under it for the conduct of grievance hearings, are
framed to protect both an aggrieved individual's due
process rights and the City's strong public policy
interest in a fair and expeditious process for
terminating "problem" employees. The City is
entitled to a fair hearing both to ensure the smooth
functioning of government and to, as here, ensure that
agents of the City do not violate the civil rights of
other individuals. We hold that the same test applies
` whether an individual or the State claims to have been
denied a fair hearing because of bias.
[7] 14. The City's MSO, adopted pursuant to NMSA
1978, Section 3-13-4 (Repl.Pamp.1995), is a
comprehensive statutory scheme designed to insulate
the grievance decision-maker from improper
interference. See MSO § 3-1-23(A)(2) ( "The purpose
of the Grievance Resolution Procedure is to secure, in
an atmosphere of courtesy and cooperation, a prompt
and equitable resolution at the lowest possible
administrative level of problems which may arise
within the course of employment with the city.");
MSO § 3-1-23(]) ("The entire grievance resolution
procedure shall operate without discrimination,
restraint, coercion or reprisal on the part of any
supervisor or employee."). In addition, several
provisions of the MSO are designed to ensure that the
hearing officer not be subject to improper influence.
See, e.g., MSO § 3-1~25(E) ("No person shall attempt
to influence a Personnel Hearing Officer's findings
and conclusions pursuant to this article *433 **514
except when doing so openly during a hearing.");
MSO § 3~1-25(D) ("A Personnel Hearing Officer shall
not be actively involved in partisan political activities
or the political affairs of the city."). Lastly, the
operating rules for hearing officers promulgated under
this scheme require the personnel hearing officer to be
impartial. See Albuquerque, N.M., Personnel Board
Rules of Procedure for Class l Grievance Hearings,
Rule 9(N) (revised lan. 10, 1995) ("The hearing
officer shall not participate in any adjudicatory
proceeding if, for any reason, the hearing officer
cannot provide a fair and impartial hearing to either
party.") (emphasis added); see also id. Rule 9(0)
(”No person shall discuss the merits of any pending
adjudicatory proceeding with the designated hearing
officer unless both parties or their representatives
are present."). A personnel hearing officer who is in
fact impermissibly biased is in violation of the MSO
and its rules. Therefore the alleged bias, if it exists,
renders the ultimate grievance decision "arbitrary or
Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
941 P.2d 509" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">941 P.2d 509
(Cite as: 123 N.M. 428" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">123 N.M. 428, *433 , 941 P.2d 509, **513)
capricious,“ and/or "otherwise illegal." See MSO §
3~1~23(D)(5)(a)-(c) (judicial review of Board decision
appropriate where decision is arbitrary or capricious,
otherwise illegal, or beyond its statutory authority);
Las Cruces Prof'l Fire Fighters v. City of Las
Cruces, 123 N.M. 239" date_filed="1997-02-19" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="Las Cruces Professional Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces">123 N.M. 239, 245, n. 3, 938 P.2d 1384" date_filed="1997-02-19" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="Las Cruces Professional Fire Fighters v. City of Las Cruces">938 P.2d 1384,
1390 n. 3 (Ct.App.1996) (bias that would violate due
process would also render resulting decision
"arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion").
D. Objective Test for Bias
[8] 15, We take this opportunity to clarify when a
personnel hearing officer should disqualify himself or
herself, or when a reviewing tribunal should order a
disqualification for possible bias. Chavez argues that
the mere appearance of bias, without more, is not a
sufficient basis for disqualification of the hearing
officer. Chavez also argues that because in this case
the hearing officer concluded, and the City
specifically failed to dispute, that the hearing officer
could be fair, the city cannot show actual bias as a
matter of law. The City argues that because the
record reveals what a reasonable person would
perceive as bias on the part of the hearing officer, he
should have disqualified himself, subjective beliefs
aside. We agree with the City's position.
[9] 16. In order to guarantee that the City receives a
fair hearing, we hold that where a reasonable person
would have serious doubts about whether the hearing
officer could be fair, it is inappropriate for the hearing
officer to hear the case. '[liis "objective appearance
of faimess" test originates with Reid, in which our
Supreme Court stated:
The inquiry is not whether the Board members are
actually biased or prejudiced, but whether, in the
natural course of events, there is an indication of a
possible temptation to an average man [or woman]
sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or
against any issue presented to him [or her].
92 N.M. 414" date_filed="1979-01-15" court="N.M." case_name="Reid v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry">92 N.M. at 416, 589 P.2d at 200. This "objective"
test is referred to in a line of cases following Reid,
See, e.g., Santa Fe Exploration Co., 114 N.M. at
109, 835 P.2d 819" date_filed="1992-07-27" court="N.M." case_name="Santa Fe Exploration Co. v. Oil Conservation Commission">835 P.2d at 825 (quoting the same language from
Reid ); Varoz v. New Mexico Bd. of Podiatry, 104
N.M. 454, 459, 722 P.2d 1176" date_filed="1986-07-25" court="N.M." case_name="Varoz v. New Mexico Board of Podiatry">722 P.2d 1176, 1181 (1986) (citing
the test from Reid but noting that bias issue not
preserved for appeal); Lujan, 100 N.M. 149" date_filed="1983-08-04" court="N.M." case_name="Lujan v. New Mexico State Police Board">100 N.M. at 150, 667
P.2d at 457 (citing the ”appearance of bias” and
"possible temptation to try the case with bias”
standard from Reid ); Board of Educ., 106 N.M. at
132, 740 P.2d at 126 (citing to Reid test, although not
Page 5
reaching the bias issue). This standard is in essence a
paraphrase of a federal statute governing the
disqualification of judicial branch judges, see 28
U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994) (A judge "shall disqualify
himself [or herself] in any proceeding in which his [or
herl impartiality might reasonably be questioned. "), as
well as New Mexico’s Code of Judicial Conduct
dealing with disqualification of state judges, see
NMRA 1997, 21-400(A) ("A judge is disqualified and
shall recuse hinu~'.elf or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned....").
17. Finally, we note that the Tenth Circuit recently
held that personnel hearing officers who hear
grievances under the City's MSO are entitled to
absolute immunity from damages actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 **515 *434 (1994). Saavedra v.'City
of Albuquerque, 73 F.3d 1525" date_filed="1996-01-17" court="10th Cir." case_name="Stanley Saavedra v. Albuquerque">73 F.3d 1525 (10th Cir. 1996). The
Tenth Circuit based its holding on the fact that a
hearing officer's "duties and the procedures employed
are functionally comparable to those of a court of
law." ld. at 1530. Saavedra and similar federal cases
granting absolute immunity to administrative hearing
officers are also illustrative of the important policy of
protecting the city, like individuals, from
impermissible hearing~officer bias. ln Saavedra, the
Tenth Circuit reasoned that administrative hearing
officers are due immunity because "[t]he nature of the
process is such that [a| terminated employee will often
have a strong incentive to sue the [Personnel Hearing
Officer] or the Board should either issue an adverse
decision, and therefore a strong likelihood of lawsuits
. might produce a hidden bias in favor of the
aggrieved employee." Id. The Tenth Circuit held that
this potential "hidden bias” constituted one of those
”exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that
absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of
public business." Id. at 1529 (quoting Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478" date_filed="1978-06-29" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Butz v. Economou">438 U.S. 478, 507, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911,
57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)). The same policy that led the
court in Saavedra to grant immunity to hearing
officers justifies our holding today. -
18. We do not agree with Chavez that a party must
show actual bias. An analysis of the hearing
proceedings in this case illustrates why that standard
is simply too difficult to meet. The City moved for
the hearing officer's disqualification early in the
hearing, arguing to the hearing officer that "the
appearance of bias" was a sufficient basis for the
hearing officer to disqualify himself, based on Reid.
At this point in the proceedings the City had no way
Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
941 P.2d 509" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">941 P.2d 509
(Cite as: 123 N.M. 428" date_filed="1997-04-01" court="N.M. Ct. App." case_name="City of Albuquerque v. Chavez">123 N.M. 428, *434, 941 P.2d 509, **515)
of knowing, much less proving, whether "actual"
prejudice due to bias would result. If we were to
adopt Chavez's argument and require the City at the
hearing below to prove to the hearing officer that the
hearing officer was actually biased, we would be
essentially requiring the City, already in the unsavory
position of attempting to persuade the factfinder that
he was unsuited for the task, to convince the hearing
officer he was wrong in his subjective opinion that he
could be fair. Altematively, under Chavez's standard
we might require the City to go through the entire
hearing process and then on appeal attempt to prove
"actua|" bias resulted. In contrast, by adopting an
"objective" test for bias, we provide both the hearing
officer below and a reviewing court with a workable
standard. Therefore we hold that the City, like an
individual, can expect a hearing officer to disqualify
Page 6
himself or herself for bias when a reasonable person
would have serious doubts about whether the hearing
officer could be fair. This standard was met in this
case, and the hearing officer should have disqualified
himself.
llI. CONCLUSION
19. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district
court and remand for a fair hearing before another
hearing officer.
20. I'l` IS SO ORDERED.
HARTZ, C.J., and WECHSLER, J., concur.
END OF DOC UMENT
Copr. © West 1998 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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SOLID WASTE DRIVERS' ASSN. VS. ALBUQUERQUE, CITY OF
96-1421
CIVIL
SOLID WASTE DRIVERS' ASSN. VS. ALBUQUERQUE, CITY OF
John E. Conway
1997/03/11
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 0
SOLID WASTE DRIVERS' ASSOCIATION,
DAVID A. WI-HTTEN, Chairman, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs. CIV 96-1421 JC/LFG
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, et al.,
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
THIS MATTER came on for consideration of (l) Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment as to PlaintiH`s' 4th Amendment Claims; (2) Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Claims ofPlaintiff`s Who Are Not Solid Waste Department Drivers Subject to Random
Drug Testing; (3) Defendants' Motion for Summary Iudgment on Count II for Alleged Denial of Due
Process and Equal Protection; and (4) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Individually
Named Defendants, all filed February 19, 1997, The Court has reviewed the motions, the memoranda
submitted by Defendants and the relevant authorities. The Court has not reviewed any memoranda on the
behalf of Plaintiffs because Plaintiff`s' counsel has failed to submit response briefs The Court finds that
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment as to Plaintifi`s' 4th Amendment Claims and on Count II for
Alleged Denial of Due Process and Equal Protection are well taken and will be granted Defendants'
remaining two motions will be denied as moot.
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' l program on the basis that it constitutes an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment, as well as being
violative of their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights
Analysis
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide that it is the movant's burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317" date_filed="1986-06-25" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrett">477 U.S. 317, 321-323 (1986). Once the movant has made such a
showing, the adverse party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [ their] pleading[s],
[they] must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
In reviewing a summary judgment motion, "[t]he evidence must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Frandsen v. Westinghouse Corp., 46 F.3d 975" date_filed="1995-01-23" court="10th Cir." case_name="John W. Frandsen v. Westinghouse Corporation">46 F.3d 975, 977
(10th Cir. 1995), even when it is produced by the moving party." Buchanan v. Sherrill, 51 F.3d 227" date_filed="1995-03-31" court="10th Cir." case_name="Juanita Buchanan v. Penny Sherrill">51 F.3d 227, 228
(10th Cir. 1995). " Summary judgment is only appropriate if `there is [not] sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.'" Biester v. Midwest Health Services,
Inc., 77 F.3d 1264" date_filed="1996-02-26" court="10th Cir." case_name="70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (Bna) 397 v. Midwest Health Services">77 F.3d 1264, 1266 ( lOth Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242" date_filed="1986-06-25" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.">477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986)). "Thus, to defeat a summaryjudgment motion, the non-movant
`must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."' Id.
(citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574" date_filed="1986-03-26" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation">475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986)). If the evidence
is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477
at 249-250 (citations omitted).
B. Defendants' Mori`on for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' 4th
Amendment Claims
Plaintiffs claim that the City's random drug testing program violates the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution. The City first responds that Plaintiffs' cause of
action based upon the New Mexico Constitution is pre~empted by federal law. Second, the City maintains
that their random drug testing program is a valid constitutional search under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
l. Pre-emption
The United States Constitution and the laws promulgated thereunder are the supreme law of the land.
U.S. Const. art. VI. "The underlying rationale of the pre-emption doctrine . . . is that the Supremacy
Clause invalidates state laws that interfere with or are contrary to the laws of congress" Chicago & N.W.
'I`ransp. Co. v. Kalo Brick and Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311" date_filed="1981-03-09" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.">450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981). The supremacy of federal law
overrides state constitutional provisions as well as state statutes Id. It is important to note that a "state
provision is only pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." Dalton v. Little
Rock Family Planning Servs., ___ U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 1063" date_filed="1996-03-19" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Dalton v. Little Rock Family Planning Services">116 S. Ct. 1063, 1064 (1996).
The City argues that its random drug testing policy is mandated by the Omnibus Transportation Act of
1991 (Act). See 49 U.S.C. § 31306 ( Secretary of Transportation must prescribe regulations regarding
drug and alcohol testing of commercial drivers). Pursuant to the Act, the Federal Highway Administration
promulgated rules requiring drug and alcohol testing of drivers Who possess a commercial driver's license.
These rules apply to all employers, including States "that owns . . . a commercial vehicle or assigns
employees to operate a commercial motor vehicle." 49 C. F.R. § 382. 107 (1995). The Act contains
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j z employees to operate a commercial motor vehicle " 49 C. F.R. § 382.107 (1995). The Act contains
30f6
express pre-emption language It states that:
A State or local government may not prescribe or continue in effect a law, regulation, standard or order
that is inconsistent with a regulation prescribed under this section. However, a regulation prescribed
under this section may not be construed to preempt a State criminal law that imposes sanctions for
reckless conduct leading to loss of life, injury or damage to property
49 U.S.C. § 31306(g). The pre-emptive language of this statute is clear, and any provisions in conflict
with it are thus pre-empted. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims based upon the New Mexico Constitution are
pre-empted and shall be dismissed
2. The Fourth Amendment
Since 1989, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of` drug testing and the Fourth Amendment three
times See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602" date_filed="1989-03-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.">489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656" date_filed="1989-03-21" court="SCOTUS" case_name="National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab">489 U.S. 656 (1989); and Veronia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, ___ U.S.
__, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). In each case, the Court weighed the governmental interest in conducting the
search against the individual privacy interest implicated by the search to determine whether the search
was constitutional.
In Skinner, the Federal Railroad Administration promulgated regulations that mandated drug and alcohol
testing of certain employees who had been involved in train accidents In determining that the search did
not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded that the governmental interest of ensuring safety
could present a special need justifying a departure from the usual warrant and probable cause
requirements for a search. 489 U.S. at 620. Further, the Court held that in limited circumstances where
the privacy interests implicated by the search were minimal and where an important governmental_interest
was furthered, a search could be reasonable despite the absence of individualized suspicion . Id. at 624. In
essence, the Court in Skinner found that the governmental interest in enhancing and protecting public
safety was compelling enough to allow drug testing without individualized suspicion.
Similarly, in this case, the governmental interest is the protection of the public. The Solid Waste
Department trucks weigh approximately 40,000 pounds and operate on practically every street in the city,
the two federal highways that pass through the city, and certain roads outside the city limits Clearly these
trucks outweigh the vast majority of cars with which they share the road. From the years 1990 to 1996,
Solid Waste Department trucks were involved in thirteen accidents, seven of which resulted in fatalities
One of these fatalities was a Department driver whose body showed traces of marijuana and cocaine.
Further, between 1994 and 1996, fourteen employees tested positive for either drug or alcohol use,
including one employee who had been involved in a serious accident ~
This governmental interest of public safety must be balanced against the drivers' privacy interest Since all
of these drivers possess a commercial driver's license, they are already required to submit to a drug test
every time their license is renewed Nonetheless, this is different from the City's plan of random drug
testing Under the City's plan, drivers could be summoned to give a drug test with no more than two
hours' notice. Moreover, since the selection is totally random, one driver could be selected repeatedly
while another not selected at all. This all leads to the conclusion that random drug testing is in fact
intrusive. However, the question is not whether it is intrusive, but rather whether the governmental
interest in random drug testing outweighs the individual's privacy interest. In this case, it is clear that the
City's substantial governmental interest in protecting not only the public, but its own drivers as well,
outweighs the limited intrusion on the drivers' privacy interests Therefore, Defendants' Motir)n for
Summary Judgment as to
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f _ _Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment Claims shall be granted
C. Summary Judgment On Count II For Alleged Denial of Due Process and Equal Protection
1. Equal Protection
Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause
"The equal protection clause is triggered when the government treats someone differently than another
who is similarly situated." Buckley Constr., Inc. v. Shawnee Civic & Cultural Dev. Auth., 933 F.2d 853" date_filed="1991-05-14" court="10th Cir." case_name="Buckley Construction v. Shawnee Civic & Cultural Development Authority Charles Henry James Bradshaw Dr. Joe Taron Clarke Bohan Jim Hudgens">933 F.2d 853,
859 (10th Cir. 1991). It is unclear from the Complaint or the pleadings what Plaintif’f`s' basis is for their
claim. In actuality, the Complaint is entirely devoid of any reference to an equal protection violation
except to say that the City's actions deprived them of their constitutional equal protection rights While it
is true that being a member of a "suspect class" is not a prerequisite to an equal protection claim, some
description of unequal treatment is necessary. Plaintif’f`s' mere conclusory allegations fail to state a cause
of action for violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Therefore, Plaintitfs' equal
protection claim shall be dismissed
2. Due Process
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges two types of violation of their procedural due process rights The first claim
alleges that an employee is terminated upon a positive drug test without due process of law. The second
deals with drivers not being able to challenge their classification as employees in a "safety sensitive"
position.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law . U.S. Const. amend XIV. In examining a procedural due
process claim, the Court must conduct a two-step inquiry. "The first question is whether the plaintiff has
a property or liberty interest protected by the Constitution." Russo v. White, 775 F. Supp. 639" date_filed="1991-10-08" court="S.D.N.Y." case_name="Russo v. White">775 F. Supp. 639, 644
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). If Plaintiffs do have a protected interest, "the second step is to detemiine whether the
defendant deprived the plaintiff of that interest." Id.
a. Termination after Positive Drug Test
In this matter, the first question is easily answered that, yes, Plaintiffs do have a protected interest Their
property interest is that of maintaining their employment However, when examining whether the City has
deprived Plaintiffs of their protected interest, the answer is no. If a driver has not tested positive for drugs
or alcohol, then he has not been deprived of his interest because he has not been terminated from his
employment Consequently, Plaintiffs who have not tested positive fail to satisfy the test for a violation of
their procedural due process rights Therefore, their due process claims shall be dismissed
In addition, the due process claims of all Plaintiffs who have tested positive shall be dismissed Not one
Plaintiff who has tested positive was fired Instead, all received a twenty-day suspension and were
enrolled in the City's Employee Assistance Program for counseling Further, not one of these Plaintiffs
attempted to exhaust his procedural rights by appealing the sanction. Therefore, the procedural due
process claims for all Plaintiffs who have tested positive shall be dismissed
b. Challenging Designation
Plaintiffs‘ next procedural due process claim is that they are not allowed to challenge their classification as
employees in "safety sensitive" positions This assertion is plainly wrong To the contrary, Administrative
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5 employees in "safety sensitive" positions This assertion is plainly wrong To the contrary, Administrative
Instruction No. 7-1-1M specifically allows employees who are designated as "safety sensitive" thirty days
to appeal such designation to the Director of the Human Resources Department In fact, two Solid Waste
Department drivers who were designated as "safety sensitive" have appealed that decision. Since Plaintiffs
are allowed to challenge their designation, and some drivers already have, it is clear that there is no
procedural due process violation. Therefore, Plaintiffs' due process claims for not being able to challenge
their designation shall be dismissed
D. Remaining Motions
Since this Court will grant summary judgment against Plaintiffs on their
substantive claims, Defendants' remaining motions are moot, and will therefore be denied as such.
E. Local Rule
As of this date, Plaintifi`s’ counsel has failed to file a response brief in opposition to Defendants' motions.
Local Rule 7.5(b) provides that "[f] ailure to serve (or file, if required by these rules) a response in
opposition to any motion constitutes consent to w the motion. In
essence, the Court did not have to engage in its detailed analysis of the issues in order to gLnt
Defendants' motions. However, given the
significance of the constitutional issues presented, the Court independently examined the issues in order
to ensure Plaintiffs of a judgment on the merits Having said this, Plaintiff`s' counsel is put on notice that
this type of behavior is not acceptable and will not be tolerated in the fi.iture.
An order in accordance with this opinion shall be entered
C}HEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT IUDGE
Counsel for Plaintiffs:
Paul Livingston
Albuquerque, NM
Counsel for Defendants:
Charles Kolberg
Assistant City Attorney
Albuquerque, NMUNI'I`ED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
SOLID WASTE DRIVERS' ASSOCIATION,
DAVID A. WH]TTEN, Chairman, et al.,
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Plaintiff`s,
vs. CIV 96-1421 JC/LFG
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, et al.
’
Defendants
ORDER
TH]S MATTER came on for consideration of Defendants' various Motions for Summary Judgment, filed
February 19, 1997. A memorandum opinion was entered this date
Wherefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiffs' 4th Amendment Claims be, and hereby is, granted and Count I of Plaintiffs' Complaint is~
dismissed with prejudice
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
On Count II For Alleged Denial of Due Process And Equal Protection be, and hereby is granted and
Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed with prejudice
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
As To Claims of Plaintiffs Who Are Not Solid Waste Department Drivers Subject to Random Drug
Testing be, and hereby is, denied as moot.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion To Dismiss
Individually named Defendants be, and hereby is, denied as moot.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the trial set for March 17, 1997 be, and hereby is, vacated
DATED ]uly 28, 1998 , July 28, 1998.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGEE
07/28/98 11:34:02
12»’07/98 MON 13234 FAX @002
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
BENJAMTN J. CHAVEZ and
VIOLA F. CHAVEZ,
PlaintiB`s,
vs. No. CIV 96-1656 SC/JHG
BENNETT PROPP, CARMELITA HOUTMAN, and
DEBI McNEIL,
Defendants
MAGISTMTE JUDGE’S PROPQSED FlNDINGS
AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
This matter was referred by the Honorablc Santiago E. Campos, United States District Judge,
to thc undersigned to conduct a show cause proceeding to determine whether this lawsuit was filed
for an improper purpose On September 11, 1998, Plaintiffs and Mr. Livingston were ordered to
appear and show cause why Mr. Livingston had not violated Rule 1 l(b). Paul livingston and Gerald
Hopkins appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs John McCall appeared on behalf of Mr. Livingston.
Cindy Lovato-Farmer and Michael Gross appeared on behalfol` the Defendants
On August 19, 1997, Judgc Campos granted defendant’s motion to dismiss On September
18. 1997, Defendants filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988 and plaintiffs filed
a notice of appeal On October l(), 1997, Judge Campos granted Defendants’ motion for attorney
fees finding the complaint was frivolous unreasonable and without foundation Judge Campos
ordered Defendants to submit briefs, aEdavits and exhibits in support of their claim for attorney fees
and allowed Plaintiffs the opportunity to respond In response Plaintiffs filed a suggestion of lack of
ATTACHMENT " B- "
121/07/98 MoN 13:35 FAX luna
jurisdiction due to their notice of appeal. ln the October 10, 1997 Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Judge Campos also referred the case to the undersigned to make findings and recommendations as
to possible sanctions under Rule 11. Defendants have not filed a motion for Rule ll sanctions
On May 7, 1998, Judge Campos found the District Court has jurisdiction to act on attorney
fees and Rule 1 1 sanctions while the appeal is pending After disallowing some of the claimed hours
and costs, Judge Campos awarded the defendants $5.871.50 in attorney fees and costs Judge
Campos stated “[o]n the sanctions issue, it is my intent that the magisth judge will conduct a show
cause proceeding to determine whether this lawsuit was filed for an improper purposc." Judge
Campos stated the issue to be determined in the Rule 1 1 proceeding is “ whether plaintiffs and/or their
counsel filed this ease in federal court for the purpose of harassing the defendants or to cause needless
expense."
Judge Campos noted if Rule l l violations are found, an appropriate sanction against
Plaintili`s’ attorney would be the payment ofDefendants’ attorney fees and costs in this case He also
observed that while many hours were disallowed some of those hours might appropriately be ordered
paid as sanctions He stated “[b]ecause there might be some overlap between the sanctions and the
fees and because the culpability of counsel may exceed that of the clients, I will stay the imposition
of a fee award pending the determination of appropriate sanctions under Rule l 1, if any are found"
On May 26, 1998, Plaintiffs appealed the May 7, 1998 Memorandum Opinion and Ordcr.
On May 29, 1998 , the first show cause hearing was held. At the first hearing, Mr. Livingsth
argued the order setting the hearing was not a show cause order and failed to specify which party had
the burden of production and proof Therefore, the undersigned ordered the attorneys to submit
simultaneous briefs on whether an Order to Show Cause is required and who has the burden of going
12/'07/`98 MON 13:35 FAX .004
forward at hearing Defendants submitted a brief and Plaintiffs submitted a brief and response After
analyzing the briefs and response the undersigned determined Plaintiffs and Mr. Livingston had the
burden of going forward to show. by a preponderance of the evidence why sanctions should not be
imposed for violation of Rule 1 1 (b). Fed.R.Civ.P. l 1 (c)(l)(B). Therefore, a second order to show
cause was cntcred, reiterating Judge Campos’s directives describing the specific conduct at issue and
directing Mr. Livingsth to show cause why he has not violated Rule 11 (b). Fed.R.Civ,P_ 1 1
(c)(l)(B); Merriman v. Securizy Ins. of Hartford, 100 F.3d 1187" date_filed="1996-12-10" court="5th Cir." case_name="Merriman v. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford">100 F.3d 1187, 1191 (Sth Cir. 1996). The second
order to show cause clearly stated Plaintiffs and Mr. Livingston had the burden of going forward to
show by a preponderance of the evidence why sanctions should not be imposed The second show
cause hearing was held on September 1 l, 1998.
Judge Campos found the “complaint was frivolous unreasonable and without foundation"
and stemmed from a "fundamental lack of evidentiary support for their federal claims, rather than a
mere technical failure capable of being remedied by amcndment.” The issue therefore at the second
show cause hearing was whether plaintiffs and/or their counsel filed this case in federal court for the
purpose of harassing the defendants or to cause needless expense
At the hearing, Mr. Livingston testified he had been an attorney since 1982, and was familiar
with the federal rules of civil procedure Transeript of Hearing of September l 1, 1998, (Trr) 1 01 - 102.
Mr. Livingston testified he believed the procedures in the First Judicial District Court of New Mexico
to be “truly corrupt." Tr. 103. He testified he had tried between 40 and 50 civil rights cases and had
read hundreds of cases on the subject of civil rights Tr. 130; 134. Mr. Livingston considered himself
to be one of the experts on rcsjudicata and collateral estoppel `l`r. 149-150. Mr. Livingston testified
he did not appeal the state court adverse rulings because such an appeal would have been “liitile.”
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Tr. 130
ln evaluating whether Rule 1 l sanctions are appropriate the court should consider the effect
of the improper conduct on the litigation process in time or expense. whether the person responsible
is trained in the law, and the degree of sanctions necessary to deter similar activity in the t`uture. 5A,
Wright, Miller, Fed. P. & Pro 2d § 1336 (1998 Pocket Part). It is axiomatic that the federal district
court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Razatos v.
Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d 1429" date_filed="1984-10-29" court="10th Cir." case_name="Peter Razatos v. The Colorado Supreme Court">746 F.2d 1429, 1432 (10th Cir. 1984). lt was not proper for Mr.
livingston to tile the complaint in federal court merely because he considered the state court
procedures “truly corrupt.” Moreover, the undersigned notes Mr. Livingston’s characterization of
the procedures of the First l udicial District Court as corrupt is beyond the bounds of propriety and
should not be tolerated 'I`he federal complaint was clearly frivolous, unreasonable and without
foundation Mr. Livingston’s improper filing of the complaint in federal court had the result of
causing unnecessary and excessive expenses to Dcfendants, their attorneys and this Court. Mr.
Livingston, as an experienced attorney trained in the law, should have been aware the federal
complaint was frivolous and without foundation when he filed it. Mr. Livingston filed this case in
federal court for the purpose of causing needless expense
In order to deter Mr. Livingston ii'orn filing hivolous lawsuits in the future, he should be
sanctioned Judge Campos noted if Rule ll violations were found, an appropriate sanction against
Mr. Livingsth would be the payment of some of the disallowed attorney fees and costs in this case.
The undersigned agrees. An additional $2,000.00 in attorney fees would be suHicicnt to deter Mr.
Livingsth from filing frivolous lawsuits in the future Therefore, sanctions in the amount of
$2,000.00 in attorney fees should be assessed against Mr. Livingston pursuant to Rule l l.
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In arriving at the figure of $2,000.00, the undersigned followed the lodestar method of
multiplying the hours counsel reasonably spent on the litigation by a reasonable hourly ratc. Jane L.
v, Bangerrer, 61 F.3d 1505" date_filed="1995-08-02" court="10th Cir." case_name="Jane L. v. Norman Bangerter">61 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1995). The undersigned finds an award for an additional
fourteen hours of Ms. Lovato-Farmer's time spent on the underlying litigation is reasonable under
the circumstances The undersigned further finds an award of an additional tivc hours of Mr. Gross’
time spent on the underlying litigation is reasonable under the circumstances
In an adidavit in support of Defendants’ Brief in Support of Reasonable Attorney Fees filed
October 24, 1997, Mr. Gross averred his hourly rate was 5120.00 and Ms. Lovato-Farmer’s hourly
rate was $100.00 and these were the prevailing market rates in the Albuquerque, New Mexico
community for attorneys of similar experience Judge Campos has determined these rates are
reasonable and in accordance with the prevailing market rates in the community The undersigned
billy concurs with this determination Multiplication of the applicable reasonable rates to the
additional reasonable hours pursuant to the lodestar method results in the amount of $2,000.00 as
additional attorney fees. This amount should be assessed as sanctions against Mr. livingston pursuant
to Rule ll.
The Plaintiffs acted on advice of their attorney, Mr. Livingston with respect to filing the
complaint in federal court. Testimony adduced at the second hearing established that the Plaintiffs are
not trained in the law. The attorney fees and costs already assessed by Judge Campos should be
adequate to deter any future abuse ofthe legal process by Plainti&”s. Therefore, additional Rule ll
sanctions should not be imposed on the Plaintiffs
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RECOMMENDATION
Mr. Livingsth should pay $2,000.00 in attorney fees to the Defendants as sanctions pursuant
to Rule l l. This amount should be in addition to. and independent fi'om, the attorney fees and costs
awarded to Defendants by Judge Campos
%_r
. GALVAN
ED STATES MAGlSTRAT JUDGE
NOTICE
Within ten days after a party is served with a copy of these proposed findings and
recommended disposition that party may, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(l), tile written objections
to such proposed findings and recommended disposition A party must tile any objections Within the
ten day period allowed if that party wants to have appellate review of the proposed findings and
recommended disposition If no objections are filed, no appellate review will be allowed