Chauca v Abraham
2017 NY Slip Op 08158
Court of Appeals
November 20, 2017
30 NY3d 325
Garcia, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected through Wednesday, January 31, 2018
v
Jamil Abraham et al., Respondents.
Argued October 10, 2017; decided November 20, 2017
Garcia, J.
The New York City Human Rights Law makes clear that punitive damages are available for violations of the statute, but does not specify a standard for when such damages should be awarded. The Second Circuit has, by certified question, asked us to determine the applicable standard. We conclude that, consistent with the New York City Council‘s directive to construe the New York City Human Rights Law liberally, the common-law standard as
I.
Plaintiff, a physical therapy aide, sued her former employer and two supervisory employees for sex and pregnancy discrimination under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (
“[t]here is nothing here that supports punitive damages . . . .
“There is no showing of malice, reckless indifference, that there was an intent to violate the law. They may have violated the law, which is what you are going to try to prove, but there is certainly no evidence of intent.”
The jury found defendants liable for pregnancy discrimination and awarded plaintiff $10,500 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in pain and suffering.
Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in importing the title VII standard. After noting that the NYCHRL “does not articulate a standard for a finding of employer or employee liability for punitive damages,” the Second Circuit acknowledged that the passage of the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005 (
II.
The NYCHRL prohibits an employer from “refus[ing] to hire” or “discharg[ing]
A.
The “starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof” (Matter of Shannon, 25 NY3d 345, 351 [2015]). It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that words of technical or special meaning are used by the legislature, “not loosely, but with regard for their established legal significance, and in construing a statute a technical meaning should
“Punitive damages“—as used in
Plaintiff, relying almost exclusively on the legislative intent of the NYCHRL and the Restoration Act, argues that she should be entitled to a punitive damages charge upon any showing of liability. Under plaintiff‘s approach, any discrimination case that goes to a jury would be accompanied by a punitive damages charge without any guidance as to when to award such damages. In plaintiff‘s view, punitive damages should be available in any situation where
We reject that approach. Punitive damages differ conceptually from compensatory damages and are intended to address “gross misbehavior” or conduct that “wilfully and wantonly causes hurt . . . to another” (Thoreson v Penthouse Intl., 80 NY2d 490, 497 [1992]). Indeed, this Court has noted that “[n]ot only do [punitive damages] differ in purpose and nature from compensatory damages, but they may only be awarded for exceptional misconduct which transgresses mere negligence” (Sharapata v Town of Islip, 56 NY2d 332, 335 [1982]). Punitive damages represent punishment for wrongful conduct that goes beyond mere negligence and are warranted only where aggravating factors demonstrate an additional level of wrongful
Plaintiff‘s assertion that the mitigation provisions discussed in
B.
Defendants contend that the title VII standard for punitive damages, employed by the Second Circuit in Farias, should apply (see 259 F3d at 102). We reject this approach as contrary to the intent of the Council.
In Farias, the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff must show that a defendant engaged in intentional discrimination with malice or reckless indifference to a protected right in order to obtain punitive damages under the NYCHRL (id. at 101; see also Kolstad v American Dental Assn., 527 US 526, 529-530 [1999]). The title VII standard requires “intentional discrimination . . . with malice or with reckless indifference to the . . . protected rights of an aggrieved individual” and the Supreme Court has specified that “[t]he terms ‘malice’ or ‘reckless indifference’ pertain to the employer‘s knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination” (Kolstad, 527 US at 529-530, 535 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
In 2016, the City Council again amended the construction provision of the NYCHRL to provide additional guidance, identifying cases, including Albunio, that had “correctly understood and analyzed the liberal construction requirement . . . and that have developed legal doctrines accordingly that reflect the broad and remedial purpose of this title” (
In contrast to the approach in Kolstad, the standard articulated in Home Ins. requires neither a showing of malice nor awareness of the violation of a protected right, representing the lowest threshold, and the least stringent form, for the state of mind required to impose punitive damages. By implementing a lower degree of culpability and eschewing the knowledge requirement, applying this standard adheres to the City Council‘s liberal construction mandate while remaining
Moreover, NYCHRL violations, by their very nature, inflict serious harm “to both the persons directly involved and the social fabric of the city as a whole” (Rep of Comm on Gen
IV.
We hold, therefore, that the standard for determining punitive damages under the NYCHRL is whether the wrongdoer has engaged in discrimination with willful or wanton negligence, or recklessness, or a “conscious disregard of the rights of others or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard” (see Home Ins. Co., 75 NY2d at 203-204).3
Accordingly, the certified question should be answered in accordance with this opinion.
Chauca v Abraham
Wilson, J. (dissenting).
I agree with my colleagues’ conclusion that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 title VII standard for punitive damages does not govern discrimination cases brought under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL). We part ways, however, on how the New York City Council chose to supplant it. I do not agree that the Council adopted New York‘s common-law standard, which is not mentioned anywhere in the NYCHRL or its legislative history. Instead, I agree with Ms. Chauca that the City Council amended the NYCHRL to
I.
In the 1991 revisions, which effected a complete overhaul of that law, the City Council made clear that the NYCHRL not only served an important humanitarian objective, but also was designed to further nearly every traditional governmental purpose. Those revisions reemphasized the New York City Council‘s earlier finding that there is “no greater danger to the health, morals, safety and welfare of the city and its inhabitants than the existence of groups prejudiced against one another and antagonistic to each other because of their actual or perceived differences, including those based on . . . gender” (
To better combat those ills, the 1991 revisions supplemented the preexisting administrative enforcement mechanism. Under
Despite clear instructions, courts interpreting the NYCHRL failed to construct it liberally and independently, instead importing narrowing constructions of title VII and the Executive
Those reiterated admonishments proved only partially effective. In 2016, finding that only “some judicial decisions ha[d] correctly understood and analyzed the requirement of section 8-130,” the Council patiently fired a third salvo in its fight to protect the NYCHRL from being subverted by the courts (Local Law No. 35 [2016] of City of NY § 1). The purpose of that year‘s revisions was “to provide additional guidance for the development of an independent body of jurisprudence for the New York [C]ity [H]uman [R]ights [L]aw that is maximally protective of civil rights in all circumstances” (
II.
The majority follows that interpretive guideline partway, and I join the portion of its opinion that considers and rejects
That interrelated set of provisions demonstrates the Council contemplated precisely what the plain language of
Absent an automatic charge, the provisions’ assumption that punitive damages are available to be mitigated in any employment discrimination case, but can only be eliminated in a subset of cases, cannot make sense. In addition, using either
The majority, like the Second Circuit, disputes the relevance of these provisions because, “even if [Ms.] Chauca were correct that the mitigation and avoidance provisions establish the presumption that punitive damages are always available in cases of imputed liability, this would not answer the question of the punitive damages standard for liability based on an employer‘s own actions” (Chauca v Abraham, 841 F3d 86, 91 n 3 [2016]; see also majority op at 332 [“that section applies only to employers’ vicarious liability once the punitive damages standard has been met and cannot be read to address the standard itself“]). The consequence of their argument, however, is that employers would be automatically subject to punitive damages when they are merely vicariously liable for discrimination pursuant to
Finally, as reflected in
Although the preceding interpretation is in derogation of the “well-established principle of statutory construction that words of technical or special meaning are used by the legislature, ‘not
Alternatively, one could understand the NYCHRL not as departing from the common-law standard for when punitive damages may be awarded, but as making a legislative finding that—in line with the “Restoration Act principle that the discrimination violations are per se ‘serious injuries’ “—employment discrimination per se satisfies that standard (Williams, 61 AD3d at 77-78 [quoting the 2005 Report‘s finding that discriminatory acts “cause serious injury, to both the persons directly involved and the social fabric of the City as a whole, which will not be tolerated” (2005 NY City Legis Ann at 537)]). Home Ins. Co. v American Home Prods. Corp.‘s description of the harms for which punitive damages may be awarded tracks the outrage toward discrimination and its injurious effects on society expressed in
III.
I believe the above interpretation is compelled by the statutory language and the legislative history. Suppose that I am wrong.
As long as the preceding interpretation is even “reasonably possible,” it becomes incumbent on the courts to adopt it over the one offered by the majority (Albunio, 16 NY3d at 477-478; see
As an initial matter, there is no reason to exempt an interpretation imported from our common law from the same scrutiny as one imported from federal or state statutes. Although the 1991 and 2005 revisions had focused on preventing the rote application of statutory law, the three cases cited in the construction provision (as well as the 2016 legislative history, which draws on them at some length) suggest that the City Council sought to free the NYCHRL from the strictures of statutory and decisional law. The 2016 committee report described the most recent revisions as requiring courts to apply the liberal construction provision “in every case and
The present case illustrates the merits of the City Council‘s decision to slip the bonds of the common law. The idea that there is a static common law is an even greater “fallacy” than the idea that there is a “fixed body of ‘federal law’ ” (see Gurian Testimony at 6). The common law may, like the state and federal civil rights laws, be transformed over time. As the discordant parade of increasingly severe cases cited by the majority makes clear, our common-law standard has suffered exactly that fate in the 27 years since Home Ins. (and may now, in many instances, fall below the floor established by title VII) (see majority op at 331-332; see also Marinaccio v Town of Clarence, 20 NY3d 506 [2013]; Dupree v Giugliano, 20 NY3d 921 [2012]; Ross, 8 NY3d 478)—a fact the majority recognizes in walling off its decision from today‘s punitive damages jurisprudence (majority op at 334 n 2).6 Indeed, any invocation of “the” common-law standard glosses over the reality that our courts’ application of punitive damages is “confusing” and “far from uniform,” varies—perhaps with good reason—by whether an action sounds in tort
In fact, the 2005 Restoration Act modeled an amendment to
Because the mandates of the NYCHRL are as clear as they are uniquely broad and remedial, and because discrimination is “a profound evil that New York City, as a matter of fundamental public policy, seeks to eliminate,” I would answer the certified question consistent with this dissent (Bennett, 92 AD3d at 38). It would be far better to have the City Council tell us we have gone a bit too far than to have it admonish us a fourth
Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Stein, Fahey and Feinman concur; Judge Wilson dissents in an opinion.
Notes
“[w]hile examining the specific language of statutory provisions is part of our inquiry, we must also look to the underlying purpose and the statute‘s history as we are mindful that in the interpretation of statutes, the spirit and purpose of the act and the objects to be accomplished must be considered. The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle” (92 AD3d at 35 n 2 [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted], quoting Matter of Meegan v Brown, 16 NY3d 395, 403 [2011]).
“would make the City‘s law unique among civil rights laws in that the standards are designed not only to deter discriminatory conduct by holding employers accountable but, of equal significance, they are designed to provide employers with an incentive to implement policies and procedures that reduce, and internally resolve, discrimination claims . . .
“Employers could mitigate their liability for civil penalties or punitive damages or liability for the act of an employee or agent” (1991 Report, Section-by-Section Analysis at 19-20).