189 U.S. 408 | SCOTUS | 1903
CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION
v.
DENSON.
Supreme Court of United States.
*413 Mr. Robert Pritchard and Mr. T.B. Sizer for petitioner.
Mr. Oscar W. Underwood and Mr. William H. Denson for respondents.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented by the case is, did the loan made by petitioner and the taking for security the note and mortgage under the circumstances presented by the record constitute a doing of business in the State, within the meaning of the constitution and laws of the State?
It was said by the Supreme Court of Alabama, Beard v. The Union & American Publishing Company, 71 Alabama, 60, that to constitute a doing of business within the State "there must be a doing of some of the works, or an exercise of some of the functions, for which the corporation was created." It was held, however, that receiving a subscription to a newspaper, or collecting the money therefor was not doing business in the State "within the principle." In a subsequent case, Dudley v. Collier & Pinckard, 87 Alabama, 431, the court announced that "a loan or borrowing of money by or from" a foreign corporation is a doing of business within the State, and "is an unlawful act, subjecting both the agents and company to a heavy penalty." The provisions of the statute prescribing penalties were considered, and their effect was declared to be not only to punish offenders against the statute but to render *414 their contracts void. Many cases were cited in support of the conclusion as a proper deduction from the imposition of the penalties. And the principle was applied to make illegal a contract with an agent for services rendered in procuring a loan for the use of the corporation.
In Farrior v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 88 Alabama, 275, it was said that the constitution prohibited the making of a single contract or the doing of a single act of business by a foreign corporation in the exercise of a corporate function, as well as the engaging in or carrying on its business generally. To the same effect are Mullens v. American Freehold Land Mortgage Co., 88 Alabama, 280; Ginn v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 92 Alabama, 135; Sullivan v. Sullivan Timber Co., 103 Alabama, 371.
These cases constitute an interpretation of the constitutional and statutory provisions, and clearly hold that any act in the exercise of corporate functions is forbidden to a foreign corporation which has not complied with the constitution and statute, and that the contracts hence resulting are illegal and cannot be enforced in the courts.
The petitioner is a building and loan association. Its corporate purpose is to lend money to its stockholders. The respondent Denson was one of its stockholders, and manifestly, regarding the essence of the transactions between them, they constituted a doing of business within the State of Alabama. But, it is insisted, that on account of the form and terms of the instruments and by operation of law the loans must be regarded as having been made in Tennessee. It is said: "The note and mortgage were drawn in Tennessee, and by their express terms were payable there. The note is dated on its face at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and expressly stipulates that it `is made with reference to and under the laws of Tennessee.'" And further, that the petitioner's part of all the transactions was performed in the State of Tennessee, "and only those acts which the borrower was required to do as a condition precedent to the loan of the money to him were performed in Alabama." It is hence deduced that the business done must be regarded as having been done in Tennessee.
*415 Counsel has discussed at some length the situs of contracts and by the law of what place their obligation is determined. We think, however, that the discussion is not relevant. It withdraws our consideration from the constitution and statute of Alabama; and, it is manifest, the contention based upon it, if yielded to, would defeat their purpose. The prohibition is directed to the doing of any business in the State in the exercise of corporate functions; and there can be no doubt that petitioner considered that it was exercising such functions in the State. Its secretary testified that "at the time the loan to defendant Denson was made complainant association had been for some time soliciting subscriptions to stock and receiving applications for loans in the State of Alabama, and had paid a tax or license fee required under the laws of the State of Alabama for foreign corporations proposing to do business in that State, and complainant's officers supposed and understood that the payment of this fee or tax was the only condition with which it was necessary for them to comply in order to be entitled to do business in that State." The application of Denson was presumably solicited as other applications were, and if what was done in pursuance of it did not constitute doing business in the State, the effect would be, as expressed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, that petitioner "and other foreign associations engaged in the same business of loaning money on real security, may safely flood the State of Alabama with soliciting agents, make all the negotiations for loans, take real estate securities therefor, and fully transact all other business pertaining to their corporate functions as though incorporated therein, and yet neither be obliged to have a known place of business or any authorized agent within the State, nor pay any license tax or fee, as required of non-resident corporations doing business therein."
The case of Fritts v. Palmer, 132 U.S. 282, does not relieve from the effect of the Alabama decisions and from the necessity of following them. The action was ejectment to recover certain real property in Colorado. The title of one of the parties was derived through the Comstock Mining Company, a Missouri corporation, which, before its purchase of the property, had been engaged *416 in the prosecution of its mining business in the State, but it had not complied with the constitution and statutes of the State prescribing the terms upon which foreign corporations might do business in the State. The constitutional provision was substantially like that of Alabama, but the statutes were materially different, and, besides, there had been no decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado interpreting the statutes. The only penalty expressed in the statutes was the imposition of personal liability upon the officers, agents and stockholders of the corporation for any and all contracts made within the State during the time the corporation was in default. It was held that the fair implication was that "in the judgment of the legislature of Colorado, this penalty was ample to effect the object of the statutes." And it was said that it was not for the judiciary, at the instance of or for the benefit of private parties, to forfeit property which had been conveyed to the corporation and by it to others. Fritts v. Palmer, therefore, was but the interpretation of a particular statute, and there is not a word in it which denies or questions the power of a State to make void the contracts of a foreign corporation which is doing business in the State in violation of its laws.
It is urged by petitioner that it thought it had complied with the law of Alabama, and it was not an intentional offender against it, and, therefore, should not be "repelled from court." But the latter consequence has been decided to result from non-compliance with the statute, and we cannot grant an exemption from it. The statute makes no distinction between an inadvertent and a conscious violation of its provisions, and a familiar legal maxim precludes a defence based on that distinction. Nor can the payment of the license fee be urged as a justification for omitting to comply with the statute. Such payment was one condition to be performed by a foreign corporation; the designation of a known place of business and an authorized agent was another, and was of so much importance as to be enjoined by the constitution of the State.
It is contended that this case cannot be distinguished from Bedford v. Eastern Building & Loan Association, 181 U.S. 227, and must be ruled by that case.
*417 We think there is a marked distinction. In the Bedford case the contract was legally entered into and was entitled to be enforced. In the case at bar the contract was made in violation of the statute of Alabama, and it cannot, therefore, claim the protection given to the contract in the other case.
Decree affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissents.