51 So. 11 | Ala. | 1909
Plaintiff below, Avhich is also plaintiff in error, sued to recover “a certain lot of land in the town of Dothan on the north side of Main street, in a. triangular shape, being bounded on the south by said Main street, on the east by Appletree street, and being bounded on the northwest Avith the line of said lot 66 feet from the center of said survey locating said road, and said line running parallel Avith the center line of said survey.” By the road and survey mentioned in
Plaintiff claimed under a deed from defendant, which was in evidence and described the land conveyed in the following language: “All that certain lot in the town of Dothan on the north side of Main street, in a triangular shape and being off the southeast corner of what is known as the Watson lot, and being bounded on the south by said Main street, on the east by Appletree street, and being bounded on the northwest with the line of said lot 66 feet from the center of said survey
We are not prepared to say that the trial court misapprehended the meaning of the deed, or its duty in the premises, when it referred the question of the plaintiff’s right to recovery under the evidence to the jury. If the deed had described the land conveyed by referring to the parallel line 66 feet from the center of the railroad as constituting throughout its length, between the points where it touched Main and Appletree streets, the northwest boundary of the land, or had stated the length of this boundary line, there would be no doubt that such a description, being absolutely certain and of greater particularity than any other to be found in the deed, would on a familiar principle be conclusive in favor of plaintiff’s contention. In that event the' description, taken as a whole, defining with intelligible certainty the premises intended to be conweyed, there would be no occasion for resorting to ■parol evidence, and the conflict disclosed by the
- Not being able to reject, on the theory already no-diced, so much of the description as referred to the land conveyed as being off the southeast corner of what was known as the Watson lot, it was proper to receive evidence for the identification and definition of that lot. The court must put itself in the position of the parties. It must know what they knew, in order to ascertain,, not what they intended to put in writing, but what meaning they attached to the words used. The reference to “the Watson lot” conveyed no definite meaning to the court, but it had a meaning for the parties which it was necessary for the court to understand. To that end parol evidence was admissible.—Chambers v. Ringstaff, 69 Ala. 140; 2 Wendell’s Blackstone, 382, note. “Although parol evidence is not admissible to prove that the parties intended something different from that which the Avritten language expresses, or which may be the legal inference and conclusion to be drawn from it, yet is is always competent to give in evidence existing circumstances, such as the actual condition and situation of the land, buildings, passages, water courses, and other local objects, in order to give definite meaifing to language used in the deed, and to shoAV the sense in which particular words were probably used by the parties, especially in matters of description.”—Salisbury
How are the two clauses of the deed to which we have referred, to be construed together? If there were nothing in the context from which it could he inferred that the grantor used the words “triangular shape” in any other sense, it may be conceded — though doubtfully— that the strict sense contended for by appellant would be accepted; but these words, so interpreted, are at outs with that clause which refers to the Watson lot, and have no sensible meaning with reference to extrinsic •circumstances. The court must therefore look to those circumstances to see whether the meaning of the words be sensible in any secondary, looser, or more general sense, of which, with reference to those circumstances, they are capable. — Wendell’s Blackstone, supra. The principles and authorities adverted to and cited above made proper the ruling of the trial court in admitting parol evidence, and in refusing to the plaintiff the affirmative charge, and the other charge equivalent to the affirmative charge. The plaintiff’s right to recover was properly submitted to the jury. Accordingly the judgment of the court below will he affirmed.
Affirmed.