157 Ga. 802 | Ga. | 1924
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
This ease is in this court upon a constitutional question. The constitutionality of section 26 of title 2 of the national prohibition act is vigorously assailed, on the ground that it violates the fifth alnendment to the constitution of the United States, which declares, among other wholesome doctrines, that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Civil Code (1910), § 6688. Properly construed, this section of this act does not deprive those who come within its purview of due process of law. This section contains these provisions: 1. The prohibition officer who discovers any person in the act of transporting, in violation of law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, shall seize such liquors. 2. After seizing the intoxicating liquors so illegally transported, the officer shall take possession of the vehicle and team, or automobile, boat, air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any person in charge thereof. 3. Then the “officer shall at once proceed against the person arrested, under the provisions of this title, in any court having competent jurisdiction ; but the said vehicle or conveyance shall be returned to the owner upon execution by him of a good and valid bond . . conditioned to return said property to the custody of said officer on the day of trial, to abide the judgment of the court.” 4. “The court, upon conviction of the person so arrested, shall order the liquor
From the above analysis of this section it will be seen that there is ample provision made for due process of law. If the person operating the vehicle transporting intoxicating liquors is arrested, and the liquors and the vehicle are seized, it is made the duty of the arresting officer to proceed against the defendant in a court of competent jurisdiction. This clearly contemplates that the person arrested shall have a trial in accordance with the procedure provided by the laws of the United States for the trial of persons charged with crime. If he is acquitted, that is the end of the matter. If he is convicted, then the court orders the liquor destroyed and the vehicle sold. Thus the person arrested, who is treated by the statute as the owner of the vehicle, is given notice and an opportunity to be heard upon the question of his guilt and upon the question whether the liquor and the transporting vehicle shall be forfeited. If other persons have liens upon the transporting vehicle, then provision is made for the establishment of such liens by intervention or otherwise at such hearing or by other proceeding brought for such purpose. If such liens are bona fide and were created without the lienors having any notice that the carrying vehicle was to be used for the illegal transportation of liquor, then
A proceeding in rem or one quasi in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants within the State, or notice by name to those outside the State, without violating the due-process clause of the State constitution. Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 (24 Sup. Ct. 390, 48 L. ed. 623). This principle applies to cases of undisclosed and unknown claimants. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 61 (31 Sup. Ct. 200, 55 L. ed. 82). The arrest of the person operating the vehicle transporting intoxicating liquors, his subsequent prosecution and conviction, the seizure of the vehicle, the judgment of the court upon his conviction, ordering the liquor destroyed and the vehicle forfeited and sold, the subsequent published proclamation of the taking of the vehicle with the description thereof, and the manifest purpose of this section to permit claimants of the vehicle, after such* publication, to come in and assert their title to the vehicle so seized, furnished ample and full due
But, for another reason, we think the judgment of the trial judge was contrary to law. The forfeiture of an automobile under the section of the national prohibition act, which we have under consideration, must be in strict pursuance of its terms.' United States v. Hydes (D. C.), 267 Fed. 471; The Goodhope, 268 Fed. 694. It has been held that “the following elements -are essential: (1) That an officer of the law discover some person in the act of illegally transporting liquor in the vehicle; (2) the seizure of the liquor so transported or possessed; (3) the seizure of the vehicle and arrest of the person; (4) that the officer proceed against the person and retain the vehicle, unless redelivered to the owner on giving bond; (5) conviction of the person and order of sale of the vehicle.” United States v. Slusser, 270 Fed. 818. It is not essential that an order of forfeiture or for the sale of the automobile should be made as a part of the judgment of conviction of the person arrested; but such order of sale may be made in an ancillary proceeding instituted by information or libel, alleging the fact of
It appears that the prohibition officer, without the arrest and conviction of the person in charge of the automobile in question, and without any order or judgment of the court declaring the vehicle forfeited or ordering it sold, advertised and sold the same, thinking he had authority to do so under this section of the national prohibition act. Under these circumstances the sale of the automobile was illegal and void, and the title of the seller thereto, under his contract retaining title until it was paid for, was not divested; and he was entitled to recover the same from the purchaser at such sale. Judgment reversed.