Chastain appeals his conviction of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act by trafficking in cocaine. The cocaine was found in his automobile after he was stopped at a police “courtesy roadblock.” He contends the trial court erred by denying his motion tо suppress the cocaine and admitting in evidence a statement he made to the pоlice. Held:
1. Chastain’s first enumeration alleges the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the drugs seized because he did not consent to the search, and the search was conducted thrоugh the use of pretext. He maintains the search was illegal because he was stoppеd at a police roadblock, was told that his car was going to be searched and was not asked for his consent, and was not told the purpose or scope of the search.
The State contends, however, that Chastain was lawfully stopped at the roadblock, was detаined for further investigation because he apparently hid something as he approaсhed the roadblock, and was asked for and gave his consent before his car was searched. Further, he voluntarily assisted in the search and did not at any time during the search withdraw his consent. The Stаte also contended that once Chastain consented to the search of the car, there was no requirement to obtain his consent each time a container in the car was searched.
This court’s responsibility in reviewing the trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress is to ensure that there was a substantial basis for the decision.
Brown v. State,
Contrаry to Chastain’s assertions, the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the roadblock was not conducted as a pretext for a search of his car, and that the roadblock was аuthorized.
State v. Golden,
Moreover, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Chastain voluntarily consented to a search of the car. Therefore, the officers were authorized to search the car and its contents unless Chastain withdrew his consent or limited the scope of the search. See
Borda v. State,
The record is sufficient to support the finding that the State met its burdеn of demonstrating that Chastain voluntarily consented to the search, and that his consent was not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. See
Lombardo v. State,
2. Chastain also asserts that the trial court erred by admitting in evidence the statement he made to the police to the effect that he was only keeping thе cocaine for someone who asked him to hold it until after Christmas. At trial he argued that the statement should not be admitted because the police had not followed the usual procedures for taking statements since there was no signed rights waiver and the statement was not reduced tо writing, and he was offered the hope of reward or benefit for making the statement. See OCGA § 24-3-50. The trial court, however, found the testimony of the police witnesses more creditable than Chastаin’s, and, therefore, found the required warnings had been given, Chastain understood his rights, and voluntarily waived them without hope of reward or benefit.
Although inconsistent with Chastain’s testimony, the trial court’s *52 findings are based uрon the testimony of the various law enforcement officials in the Jackson-Denno hearing, and there is evidenсe of record supporting each of the findings.
On appeal, where the evidence is in conflict, the trial court’s findings on factual determinations and сredibility will be upheld unless clearly erroneous.
Short v. State,
Judgment affirmed.