CHASE v SABIN
Docket No. 95889
Supreme Court of Michigan
Argued January 11, 1994. Decided May 17, 1994.
445 Mich 190
In an opinion by Chief Justice CAVANAGH, joined by Justices LEVIN, BOYLE, and MALLETT, the Supreme Court held:
In a cause of action for the negligent acts of a hospital and its agents, the discovery rule governs when the cause of action accrues.
- A statute of limitation should provide plaintiffs with a reasonable opportunity to commence suit. The term “wrong” as stated in the accrual statute, designates the date on which the plaintiff was harmed, as opposed to the date the defendant acted negligently. Because statutes of limitation do not evidence a legislative intent to extinguish a cause of action before the plaintiff is aware of the possible cause of action, the discovery rule was adopted.
- In this case, while the plaintiff‘s claim lies in negligence, the essence of the hospital‘s alleged wrong is substantially similar to medical malpractice. In malpractice cases, the period of limitation does not begin to run until the date the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have
discovered, the wrongful act. Because a statute of limitation is not a statute designed to abrogate a common-law cause of action, it must afford a reasonable time within which suit may be brought. - Statutes of limitation are intended to afford plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to bring suit, to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend, to relieve a court system from dealing with stale claims, and to protect potential defendants from protracted fear of litigation. In this case, the twenty-six-year-old negligence claim is stale; however, it is inappropriate to prohibit the plaintiff‘s suit for circumstances beyond his control. The hospital and its agent were in a superior position to recognize the occurrence of the negligent act. They controlled the evidence as well as the plaintiff‘s knowledge of the evidence. While the plaintiff was aware that he lost his eye, because of the representation by Dr. Sabin and the silence of the hospital and nurse, he was ignorant that improper anesthetization may have caused the deterioration of his eye.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Justice RILEY, joined by Justices BRICKLEY and GRIFFIN, dissenting, stated that, absent allegations of a duty to disclose or acts of fraudulent concealment, on balance, the policies behind the statute of limitations bear in favor of finding this claim stale because of the defendant‘s inability to adequately defend, thus making it inappropriate to impose the discovery rule.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS — NEGLIGENCE — HOSPITALS — DISCOVERY RULE — ACCRUAL OF CAUSES OF ACTION.
In a cause of action for the negligent acts of a hospital and its agents, the discovery rule governs when the cause of action accrues.
Charfoos & Christensen, P.C. (by David R. Parker), for the plaintiff.
Bridges & Houghton (by Caroline Bridges) for the defendant.
CAVANAGH, C.J. In this appeal, we are asked to determine when a cause of action for the negligent
I
The plaintiff, Durward Chase, Jr., underwent consecutive eye surgeries on April 12 and April 17, 1963, to remove cataracts, apparently caused by job-related welding flashes. Defendant, Dr. Fred C. Sabin, performed both surgeries while the plaintiff was a patient at the defendant hospital.
In 1963, the removal of cataracts required two procedures. During the first procedure, the surgeon broke up the lens of the eye, allowing the lens to dissolve so it could be washed out of the eye during the second procedure. While the first procedure was generally performed in a hospital, only a local anesthetic was used. Dr. Sabin administered the local anesthetic and completed the first procedure without incident.
Despite Dr. Sabin‘s instructions that the anesthetist keep the plaintiff asleep, the plaintiff awoke soon after the operation began.4 At this point, the plaintiff involuntarily squeezed the eye hard enough that some of the vitreous humor5 came out of the eye and the cortex extruded. After this incident, Dr. Sabin completed the operation as best as he could.
After the operation, the doctor did not inform the nineteen-year-old plaintiff or his father about the loss of vitreous humor because such a loss was not necessarily incompatible with a successful result. The doctor never informed the plaintiff, who was treated by the doctor until 1988, of the loss despite the fact that the plaintiff‘s eye rapidly deteriorated, resulting in the removal of the eye one year after the procedures. Instead, Dr. Sabin informed the plaintiff that a detached retina, which he opined resulted from the plaintiff‘s fall
In 1988, during the pursuit of a worker‘s compensation claim, the plaintiff‘s attorney obtained a hospital record of the surgery that indicated that during the second procedure the plaintiff lifted his hand and squeezed his eye. In April 1989, the plaintiff commenced suit against Dr. Sabin and the defendant hospital.6 The plaintiff alleged that the loss of anesthetic control led the partially conscious plaintiff to damage his eye and eventually lose his vision.
The trial court granted the defendant hospital‘s motion for summary disposition on the ground that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff‘s negligence claim.7 The Court of Appeals affirmed in a two to one unpublished per curiam opinion.8 This Court granted plaintiff‘s application for leave to appeal.9
II
The statute governing the plaintiff‘s claim affords a plaintiff three years from the date the
The policy prompting the Court to utilize the discovery rule generally centers on our attempt to avoid the premature bar of a cause of action and to provide, instead, a reasonable time to bring suit.
A
A statute of limitation should provide plaintiffs with a reasonable opportunity to commence suit. For over one hundred years, this Court has sought
The general power of the legislature to pass statutes of limitation is not doubted. The time that these statutes shall allow for bringing suits is to be fixed by the legislative judgment, and where the legislature has fairly exercised its discretion, no court is at liberty to review its action, and to annul the law, because in their opinion the legislative power has been unwisely exercised. But the legislative authority is not so entirely unlimited that, under the name of a statute limiting the time within which a party shall resort to his legal remedy, all remedy whatsoever may be taken away.... It is of the essence of a law of limitation that it shall afford a reasonable time within which suit may be brought . . . . [Price v Hopkin, 13 Mich 318, 324-325 (1865).]
Our adherence to this principle resulted in our holding that the term “wrong,” as stated in the accrual statute, designated the date on which the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant‘s negligent act, as opposed to the date the defendant acted negligently. Connelly v Paul Ruddy‘s Equipment Repair & Service Co, 388 Mich 146; 200 NW2d 70 (1972). Necessity dictated such a conclusion because an opposite interpretation could potentially bar a plaintiff‘s legitimate cause of action before the plaintiff‘s injury.
Similarly, because statutes of limitation do not evidence a legislative intent to extinguish a cause of action before the plaintiff is aware of the possible cause of action, we have adopted the discovery rule in the appropriate instances. Last term, in Moll, supra at 13, we held that the discovery rule controls the date a pharmaceutical products liability action accrues. “If the three-year period of limitation began to run at the time of the defen-
B
While the plaintiff‘s claim lies in negligence, the essence of the hospital‘s alleged wrong is substantially similar to medical malpractice. In fact, under the current statutory scheme,12 an action for the identical alleged wrong would be correctly characterized as a medical malpractice action. In light of the similarity, it is beneficial to review our resolution of analogous medical malpractice cases.
In Johnson, supra, the plaintiff, experiencing post partum complications, relied on her doctor‘s advice that nothing could be done for her condition. Despite a three-year lapse from the date of the doctor‘s alleged wrong to the date the plaintiff filed suit, the Court held that the two-year medical malpractice period of limitation did not bar the
The limitation statute or statutes in malpractice cases do not start to run until the date of discovery, or the date when, by the exercise of reasonable care, plaintiff should have discovered the wrongful act. [Id.]
In Dyke, supra, we examined whether the discovery rule, as applied to malpractice cases, continued to have effect in light of the Legislature‘s codification of the last treatment rule.14 Because a
C
We would be remiss if we examined the issue presented without considering the additional policies prompting the adoption of statutes of limitation. While one policy is to afford plaintiffs a reasonable opportunity to bring suit, statutes of limitation are also intended to “‘compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend‘; ‘to relieve a court system from dealing with “stale” claims, where the facts in dispute occurred so long ago that evidence was either forgotten or manufactured‘; and to protect ‘potential defendants from protracted fear of litigation. ‘” Bigelow v Walraven, 392 Mich 566, 576; 221 NW2d 328 (1974).
Admittedly, the plaintiff‘s twenty-six-year-old negligence claim is stale; however, we deem it inappropriate to prohibit a plaintiff‘s suit for circumstances beyond his control. The evidence that a plaintiff will generally rely on to pursue a negligence claim against a hospital is the hospital and
The statute of limitations furthers the sound public policy of establishing a time frame beyond which defendants will not be forced to defend. However, in our quest to fulfill this purpose, we will not allow questionable acts, of which patients are unaware and which are followed by silence, to combine with the passage of time to bar suit. Similar to the situation in a medical malpractice case, the hospital and its agent are in a superior position to recognize the occurrence of a negligent act. Furthermore, these defendants generally control the evidence, as well as the plaintiff‘s knowledge of the evidence.
This conclusion is readily supported by a review of the facts in this case. While plaintiff Chase was aware that he lost his eye, he, like the plaintiff in Johnson, was ignorant, because of representations by Dr. Sabin and the silence of the defendant hospital and Nurse Neff, that improper anesthetization may have caused the deterioration of the eye. The plaintiff was unconscious at the time and has never had any recollection of the committed negligence. The information was in the hands of the doctor, nurse, and hospital, noted in the records, yet the plaintiff was unaware of the possible wrongdoing. The plaintiff had no reason to be skeptical or distrustful of Dr. Sabin‘s explanation for his eye‘s deterioration.
Our sense of fair play in providing plaintiff with a reasonable opportunity to bring suit, along with
III
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the discovery rule governs the accrual date of the plaintiff‘s cause of action. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.16 We
LEVIN, BOYLE, and MALLETT, JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, C.J.
RILEY, J. (dissenting). In this case, we must decide whether a discovery rule should be applied to the 1963 statute of limitations for negligence actions. Because I believe the instant claim is stale, so that it cannot be reasonably defended, I would decline to extend the discovery rule in the instant case. Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision, albeit on different grounds.
I
The facts of this case reflect a rather unfortunate event — one certainly deserving of sympathy. Plaintiff lost the use of his eye, allegedly because of the negligence of a nurse anesthetist who improperly administered anesthesia during surgery
Accordingly, I believe the Court should conduct a two-step inquiry when deciding whether to impose the discovery rule in the instant action where the statute clearly does not impose such a rule. First, the Court should consider whether plaintiff had a reasonable time to file suit, a policy implicit in any statute of limitations.1 To satisfy this requirement, courts have traditionally looked to whether the plaintiff could allege all the elements of his claim within the statute of limitations. See Moll v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 13; 506 NW2d 816 (1993). If the plaintiff could not allege all the elements of his claim, then the Court should balance the plaintiff‘s right to have a reasonable time to file suit against the remaining policies behind the statute of limitations to determine whether the discovery rule is appropriate for the instant case. Id. at 13-14. In the case at bar, I agree that plaintiff could not have discovered the causal connection between the injury and the alleged negligence within the three-year statute of limitations. However, I disagree with the majority‘s conclusion that the discovery rule would not offend the other policies behind this statute of limitations. Accordingly, it is on this basis that I dissent.
II
While one purpose of a statute of limitations is
one of fairness to the defendant. There comes a time when he ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a claim when ”evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” [Developments in the law — Statutes of limitations, 63 Harv LR 1177, 1185 (1950). Emphasis added.]
Over the years, this Court has described the various policies in the following manner:
They encourage the prompt recovery of damages, Buzzn v Muncey Cartage Co, 248 Mich 64, 67; 226 NW 836 (1929); they penalize plaintiffs who have not been industrious in pursuing their claims, First National Bank of Ovid v Steel, 146 Mich 308; 109 NW 423 (1906); they “afford security against stale demands when the circumstances would be unfavorable to a just examination and decision,” Jenny v Perkins, 17 Mich 28, 33 (1868); they relieve defendants of the prolonged fear of litigation, Bigelow, supra [at] 576; they prevent fraudulent claims from being asserted, Bailey v Glover, 88 US (21 Wall) 342; 22 L Ed 636 (1875); and they “‘remedy . . . the general inconvenience resulting from delay in the assertion of a legal right which it is practicable to assert.” Lenawee County v Nutten, 234 Mich 391, 396; 208 NW 613 (1926). [Lothian v Detroit, 414 Mich 160, 166-167; 324 NW2d 9 (1982).]
In the instant case, plaintiff brings this claim twenty-six years after the alleged negligence. As does the majority, I believe this renders the claim stale. However, unlike the majority, I believe the reasons for finding the claim stale and thereby
However, the majority attempts to minimize this concern by contending that plaintiff will primarily rely on documentary evidence in pursuing his claim, thereby lessening the need for testimonial evidence. Ante at 199-200. This same argument was made and accepted in Moll, supra at 14, a products liability suit. However, the instant action is substantially different from Moll, and thus the rationale employed therein is inapposite. Unlike a products liability action, the instant negligence action does not rely primarily on documentary evidence, especially where there is only one notation by Dr. Sabin indicating inadequate anesthesia. Instead, the more traditional and prudent approach to proving or defending the action is via testimony regarding the standard of care, breach,
Furthermore, unlike a products liability action, the passage of time will not increase the accuracy of the evidence, but instead reduce its accuracy. Id. The death of the primary tortfeasor and the loss of memory by Dr. Sabin clearly evidence this fact. Consequently, I believe the instant action implicates a problem with lost or inaccurate information, one of the primary purposes behind the statute of limitations.
Moreover, I cannot accept the majority‘s conclusion that defendant‘s primary control of the evidence renders it appropriate to apply the discovery rule. There are no allegations that the hospital or Dr. Sabin prevented plaintiff from discovering this information, and there certainly are no allegations supporting the theory that the hospital or Dr. Sabin had a duty to disclose possible negligence. Indeed, there is no duty to disclose one‘s negligence.
Furthermore, I do not accept the majority‘s contention that “plaintiff had no reason to be skeptical or distrustful of Dr. Sabin‘s explanation for his eye‘s deterioration.” Ante at 200. This is not the test to be used in deciding whether to impose the discovery rule or for overcoming the policy justifications behind the statute of limitations. The test is whether (1) the plaintiff can allege all the elements of the offense, and (2) whether the discovery rule would offend the other
Moreover, the majority‘s reasoning leads to its implied conclusion that Dr. Sabin fraudulently concealed a known negligence by some affirmative representation. See, e.g., Buchanan v Kull, 323 Mich 381; 35 NW2d 351 (1949); Eschenbacher v Hier, 363 Mich 676; 110 NW2d 731 (1961). As previously indicated, the hospital or Dr. Sabin did not have a duty to disclose. Apparently realizing this fact, the majority couches the hospital‘s and Dr. Sabin‘s actions in terms of “questionable acts . . . followed by silence.” Ante at 200. However, the majority misses an important distinction; the plaintiff never claimed fraudulent concealment. If plaintiff had alleged such an action, there would be no need to apply a discovery rule in this case because the Legislature already provided the discovery rule by statute:
If a person who is or may be liable for any claim fraudulently conceals the existence of the claim or the identity of any person who is liable for the claim from the knowledge of the person entitled to sue on the claim, the action may be commenced at any time within 2 years after the person who is entitled to bring the action discovers, or should have discovered, the existence of the claim or the identity of the person who is liable for the claim, although the action would otherwise be barred by the period of limitations. [
MCL 600.5855 ;MSA 27A.5855 .]2
III
Accordingly, absent allegations of a duty to disclose or acts of fraudulent concealment, I believe that on balance, the policies behind the statute of limitations bear in favor of finding the instant claim stale because of defendant‘s inability to adequately defend. On this basis, I deem it inappropriate to impose the discovery rule in this case.
BRICKLEY and GRIFFIN, JJ., concurred with RILEY, J.
Notes
The liability of the hospital is premised upon the negligence of a certified registered nurse anesthetist. In 1963, any negligence by a nurse or a hospital was considered ordinary negligence, and not medical malpractice. Kambas v St Joseph Hosp, 389 Mich 249; 205 NW2d 431 (1973). While not controlling in this case, the Legislature has since characterized the negligence by a nurse or hospital as medical malpractice.
For review purposes only, I reject defendant hospital‘s claim that plaintiff should have discovered his claim in December of 1963 when he lost his eye; if a discovery rule were available, I would have no hesitancy in holding that plaintiff did not discover or have good cause to discover negligence on the part of the hospital until October of 1988, when his worker‘s compensation attorney obtained the medical records from the 1963 procedure.
* * *No person may bring or maintain any action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to himself or to someone through whom he claims, he commences the action within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
(7) The period of limitations is 3 years for all other actions to recover damages for injuries to persons and property. [
1961 PA 236 ,MCL 600.5805 ;MSA 27A.5805 .]
“Actions . . . for malpractice of physicians . . . shall be brought within 2 years from the time the cause for action accrues and not afterwards.” [Johnson at 371, quoting
1956 CL 609.13 ;Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.605 .]
Section 5805 provided:
* * *No person may bring or maintain any action to recover damages for injuries to persons . . . unless, after the claim first accrued . . . he commences the action within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
Section 5838 provided:(3) The period of limitations is 2 years for actions charging malpractice.
A claim based on the malpractice of a person who is, or holds himself out to be, a member of a state licensed profession
A cause of action for personal injuries accrues when a plaintiff can allege, in a complaint, each element of the asserted claim. Generally, a well-pleaded claim for personal injury must allege that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the duty, (3) the defendant‘s breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff‘s injuries, and (4) damage. Connelly at 150. However, in a pharmaceutical products liability action, as in other cases in which we have applied the discovery rule, the defendant‘s duty and breach generally predate the plaintiff‘s awareness of an injury and of its cause. Accordingly, under the discovery rule, the plaintiff‘s claim accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the two later occurring elements: (1) an injury, and (2) the causal connection between plaintiff‘s injury and the defendant‘s breach. See, generally, Caldwell, Polgar, and Larson, supra. [Moll at 15-16. Emphasis added.]