delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе question presented in this appeal is whether a wife, named as the beneficiary of a $3,000 group life insurance policy upon the life of her husband, is disqualified from recovering the proceeds by reason of the fact that she killed her husband, was tried on a charge of murder, and was found not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter. The case arises upon an interpleader filed in the equity court by the insurer, against the wife and the decedent’s daughter, who had been appointed administratrix of the husband’s estate. By stipulation, the parties agreed that the oral opinion and verdict of Judge Tucker, sitting without a jury in the criminal case, “be * * * adopted as the entire statement of *566 facts in connection with the trial of issues in the * * * case of interpleader.”
The facts, as found by Judge Tucker, may be briefly stated. The couple occupied an apartment, fоr which the husband paid rent. She received support from him and from no other source. It was his habit to drink heavily over the week ends, and he appeared to have been of a rather violent disposition when drinking. On several occasions over the preceding two years he had chased his wife out of the apartment with a “rather dаngerous looking weapon,” but there were many occasions when he stayed at the apartment over week ends, invariably got drunk, but did not threaten his wife. On the particulаr occasion, there was no evidence that he had any weapon in hand. He did, however, slap his wife and make threatening gestures with his fists. He followed her into the bedroom, where she picked up a knife, which had a “very sharp and thin blade * * * apparently caused by honing.” The depth of the stab-wound which caused his death was inches. Judge Tucker did not believe her story that she held the knife stationary and he lunged into it, but found that she stabbed him with “some force.” He found that she was not required to resort to a killing in order to рrotect herself, and that the stabbing was not accidental. On the other hand, he found that the defendant’s acts were not malicious, but that she used excessive means to dо what she thought was necessary for her protection. “Under the circumstances she was probably justified in picking up the knife in order to scare the deceased.” Thе deceased had no weapon. “All he had done was to slap the defendant, and, according to the evidence, he had done that a lot of times. * * * there wаs no reason for her to believe this time that it was necessary for her to mortally wound the man in order to protect herself from death or serious bodily injury.”
In
Price v. Hitaffer,
In the analogous situation where a claim is made by the beneficiary of a policy upon the life of the victim, the courts have had less difficulty in reaching the result that the killer is disqualified. Indeed, the decisions appear to be uniform on the point. See Wade,
supra,
and
N. Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong,
The appellant does not challenge thе principles stated, but contends that a line should be drawn between murder and manslaughter. She relies heavily on Restatement,
Restitution,
§§ 187 and 189. These sections state that a murderer may not inherit, or take as the beneficiary of a life policy, but in § 187,
Comment
e, it is said that the rule is not applicable where the slayer is guilty of manslaughter. It is noted, however, that, in somе states, statutes have been interpreted to apply to all cases of unlawfully or feloniously causing the death of another, including manslaughter as well as murder, citing Wаde,
supra.
The cases, however, generally hold that the line should be drawn, not between murder and manslaughter, but between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. We shall not attempt to rеview them all but see Vance,
Insurance
(3d ed.), § 117, p. 718;
Hull v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
26 Pa. Dist. 197;
Schreiner v. High Court of I. C. O. of F.,
In
United States v. Burns,
It is well settled that manslaughter, under the Maryland law, is a felony, and distinguished from murder by the presence or absence of malice aforethought.
Stansbury v. State,
The appellant contends that, according to the weight of authority, an unintentional killing, even though unlawful and felonious, is not a bar to recovеry. Cf. Vance, supra. We do not reach that question, for we think it clear that the killing in the instant case was intentional. For present purposes we may assume that malice aforethought was not shown. Nevertheless, the Chancellor specifically found on the facts that the stabbing was intentional. It is true that Judge Tucker did not designate the crime of which he found her guilty as voluntary manslaughter, but simply as manslaughter. Even if he had acquitted her, the holding would probably have not been conclusive on the Chancellor, but in any event, the stipulated facts stated in Judge Tucker’s opinion clearly sup *570 port a finding that the stabbing was intentional. Judge Tucker found that it was not accidental or in self-defense, and that thе means used to repel violence were excessive. There is no room for a contention that the stabbing was merely negligent and unintended. Where the lolling is both felonious and intentional, we think the beneficiary cannot prevail and the order of the Chancellor directing the payment of the proceeds of the policy to the administratrix must be affirmed.
Order affirmed, with costs.