Chase Hunter v. Jay Bradford

Apr 28, 2016

15-1811

Versions:

Chase Hunter, Fredricksburg, VA, pro se.

Anne Michelle Milligan, Gordon & Rees, Portland, OR, Cynthia Ann Morales, Attorney General‘s Office, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

In this interlocutory appeal, Virginia resident Chase Hunter challenges the district court‘s¹ denial of her motions for appointment of counsel, and for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent defendants from revoking her Arkansas insurance agent license.

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Hunter‘s motion for appointment of counsel, as the legal issues were not technical or complex, and there was no indication that Ms. Hunter was unable to investigate the facts or present her claims on her own. See Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir.1998) (standard of review and applicable factors); Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 588-89 (8th Cir.1984) (denial of appointment of counsel is immediately appealable). We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over the denial of Ms. Hunter‘s motion for a TRO. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (interlocutory appeal of TRO is available only if litigant shows that order had practical effect of refusing injunction, and that litigant would suffer “serious, perhaps irreparable consequence” that could only be effectually challenged by immediate appeal; if permanent injunctive relief may be obtained after trial, interlocutory order is not appealable).

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of appointed counsel. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

Joseph Lopez Wilson, Omaha, NE, for Petitioner.

Christopher Buchanan, Jessica Dawgert, Karen Yolanda Drummond, Carl H. McIntyre, Anthony John Messuri, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Mexican citizen Victor Vargas Gomez petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge‘s decision denying his application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (permitting cancellation of removal for alien (1) physically present in the United States continuously for at least 10 years immediately preceding application, (2) with good moral character during that period, (3) not convicted of certain offenses, and (4) whose removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to alien‘s spouse, parent, or child, who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident). Vargas Gomez argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he did not have the requisite continuous physical presence and that he did not establish that his removal would result in an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his United States citizen sons. We lack jurisdiction to review the discretionary determination that Vargas Gomez had failed to establish an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See Solis v. Holder, 647 F.3d 831, 833 (8th Cir.2011). Under the conjunctive language of section 1229b(b)(1), Vargas Gomez had to meet all four prerequisites for cancellation of re-

Notes

The Honorable Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.