CHASE M. BRAUN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF PALATINE and MICHAEL LICARI, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-3227
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
ARGUED MAY 13, 2021 — DECIDED DECEMBER 29, 2022
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 18 C 4850 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
Based on these signs of intoxicated driving, Officer Licari administered field sobriety tests. After observing Braun struggle with the tests, the officer arrested him. Though an ambulance had been dispatched to the scene, Braun said he was fine and declined medical assistance. When they arrived at the police station, Officer Licari administered a Breathalyzer test. Braun passed. But based on the presence of other indicators of intoxication, Officer Licari took him to a local hospital to collect blood and urine samples for more sensitive testing. When the booking process was completed, Braun was released. He suffered another seizure while still at the station.
Braun then sued Officer Licari under
Early in the litigation, the district judge dismissed the second Monell claim about widespread police misconduct. After discovery closed, the judge entered summary judg-
We affirm. Although Braun passed a Breathalyzer test at the station, other indicia of intoxication provided probable cause to arrest him for driving under the influence. And because Officer Licari neither knew nor had reason to know of Braun‘s initial seizure or other medical needs, his failure to provide medical care was not objectively unreasonable. With no underlying deprivation of a federally protected right, Braun‘s medical-care claim against the Village necessarily fails. Finally, Braun abandoned his Monell claim about widespread police misconduct. Though he moved to reinstate it almost a year and a half after it was dismissed, the judge reasonably concluded that the request came far too late.
I. Background
In September 2017 Braun was living in Chicago and working as an overnight pharmacist in suburban Cook County. He has a complicated medical history, including traumatic brain injury, seizures, anxiety, depression, and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. After completing his seventh consecutive ten-hour overnight shift on September 11, Braun felt ill and slept at his parents’ house in Park Ridge until the late afternoon. He then visited his girlfriend‘s condo in Palatine where he tried to eat some food
The next thing Braun remembers is waking up to two police officers shining flashlights into his car. He had crashed into a telephone pole. Although he would later discover that a seizure caused the accident, at the time he could not describe how the crash had happened. Officer Licari, the first officer to respond, opened the door to check on Braun. Initially Braun told the officer that he did not feel well and that he “need[ed] medical attention.”1 But a few minutes later, he said he was “fine.”
Officer Licari did not smell alcohol during this interaction, but Braun‘s behavior and appearance caused him to suspect that Braun was intoxicated. The officer observed that Braun was confused, slurred his speech, struggled with balance, and had bloodshot and glassy eyes. Braun made the odd statements that he was “not in an accident” and that he “live[d] in Chicago-Miami.” And he told the officers that he had consumed “one beer with [his brother] Scott” earlier that evening.2
Palatine police officers do not carry portable Breathalyzer devices, so Officer Licari administered standardized field sobriety tests. These included the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which assessed Braun‘s eye movement in response to an object being waved near his face; the walk-and-turn test, which had him take a certain number of heel-to-toe steps
The officers at the scene asked Braun if he was injured, needed medical care, or had any medical conditions. He replied “no” to all three questions and told them that he was “fine.” Braun neither informed the officers of his various medical conditions nor wore a medical bracelet or other indicator of his conditions. And although he was confused, struggled with balance, and had bloodshot eyes, Braun did not exhibit any physical injuries. As a result, Officer Licari concluded that he did not require medical assistance, so the officers waved off an ambulance that had been dispatched to the scene.
After the field sobriety tests, Officer Licari arrested Braun and took him to the police station for a Breathalyzer test. The test results did not show the presence of alcohol; the device registered 0.000. But based on the other signs of intoxication, Officer Licari took Braun to Northwest Community Hospital for a “DUI kit,” which uses blood and urine samples to test for the presence of “volatiles” (like alcohol) and drugs. A
After the samples were collected, Officer Licari took Braun back to the station to finish the booking process. Braun was released from custody when booking was completed, but he suffered another seizure while still at the station and was rushed to the hospital.6
The test results from the DUI kit came in months later. They showed that at the time of his arrest, Braun had no alcohol or drugs in his system other than diphenhydramine, which is a central nervous system depressant. In December 2017 the charges against him were dismissed.
In July 2018 Braun filed this
In August 2019—about 10 months later—Braun obtained leave to amend his complaint. The amended complaint included the Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim, the state-law false-arrest claim, and the
In January 2020 Braun moved to vacate the order dismissing the Monell claim about police misconduct so he could replead the claim. The motion, filed under
After completing discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the
II. Discussion
We review a summary judgment de novo. Pulera v. Sarzant, 966 F.3d 540, 549 (7th Cir. 2020). Braun had the burden to produce evidence sufficient to show “at least a triable issue on each element” of his claims; if he failed to do so, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate.
A. False-Arrest Claims Under Federal and State Law
Braun‘s claims for false arrest arise under the Fourth Amendment and
Probable cause to arrest exists “when the facts and circumstances that are known to [the officer] reasonably support a belief that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2007). This is a “common-sense inquiry requiring only a probability of criminal activity“; probable cause exists “whenever an officer ... has enough information to warrant a prudent person to believe criminal conduct has occurred.” Leaver v. Shortess, 844 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2010)).
Applying this common-sense standard, Braun‘s behavior and the circumstances of his accident easily provided proba-
Nor was probable cause eliminated because an innocent explanation for the crash and Braun‘s behavior emerged later. There is no requirement that “the officer‘s belief be correct or even more likely true than false, so long as it is reasonable.” Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999). And “the fact that the officer later discovers additional evidence unknown to [him] at the time of the arrest is irrelevant to whether probable cause existed at the crucial time.” Bailey v. City of Chicago, 779 F.3d 689, 695 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Qian, 168 F.3d at 953–54). Here, Officer Licari encountered a man who was in a single-car accident at about midnight, was confused and slurred his words, had bloodshot eyes and difficulty balancing, and struggled with
This is especially true because Braun gave the officers no reason to think that a medical problem had caused the accident. Although he initially suggested otherwise, he quickly changed course and told the officers that he was “fine.” He also responded “no” when they asked if he needed medical care or had any medical conditions. And he did not wear a medical bracelet or other indicator “that would have alerted the [o]fficers to his medical condition” as a potential explanation for the crash and his behavior. Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011).
Our decision in Qian is instructive on this point. There the police encountered a driver who had crashed his car and was slurring his speech and struggling to walk. 168 F.3d at 954. But he “showed no physical signs of injury” and “denied being injured.” Id. We held that this “overall setting easily support[ed] [the officer‘s] decision to arrest [the driver] on the scene,” id., even though the driver—like Braun—did not smell of alcohol, had no alcohol or drugs in his car, and later blew a 0.000 on a Breathalyzer test, id. at 952; see also Gutierrez v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1013 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[C]ertain behavior can be so extreme and dangerous that it can be inferred for purposes of probable cause that it resulted from alcohol or drug impairment, such as erratic driving leading to the loss of control of a vehicle and a serious crash. This is true even if the basis of impairment later proves to be something else.” (citations omitted)).
Braun presses several arguments on appeal, but none is persuasive. First, he argues that summary judgment was
Braun also argues that even if probable cause existed at the time of his initial arrest, his later 0.000 Breathalyzer result extinguished it and rendered the arrest unlawful. Not so. “[T]he probable cause analysis is an ex ante test,” Padula, 656 F.3d at 601 (quotation marks omitted), so the discovery of subsequent information that was unknown to Officer Licari at the time of the arrest does not speak to whether he had probable cause to arrest Braun. In assessing the legality of Braun‘s arrest at the scene of the crash, what matters is what Officer Licari knew then—not what he found out later. See Bailey, 779 F.3d at 695.
To the extent Braun contends that his continued detention after he blew a 0.000 was unlawful, that argument also falls short. The Breathalyzer result did not instantly negate the clear indications of intoxication that Officer Licari and the other officers observed at the crash scene. Cf. Seiser v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 647, 656 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that an individual‘s successful completion of “one or more field sobriety tests ... does not negate probable cause when other
Put another way, even if we assume that the Breathalyzer result should have informed Officer Licari that Braun had no alcohol in his system, there was still probable cause to believe that Braun had committed the crime of driving under the influence of drugs or another intoxicating substance that “render[ed] [him] incapable of driving safely.”
Given Braun‘s behavior and the circumstances of his accident, Officer Licari reasonably believed that he had com-
B. Failure to Provide Medical Care
Braun also challenges the judge‘s rejection of his
Because these events took place while Braun was under arrest and prior to a probable-cause hearing, the
Braun‘s claim falters on the first factor—notice. Whether Officer Licari knew or should have known about Braun‘s medical needs is critical to the analysis because “[t]he question on summary judgment is whether a jury could find that
With that principle in mind, we agree with the district judge that Officer Licari‘s response in the wake of Braun‘s crash was not objectively unreasonable. “Officers can be placed on notice of a serious medical condition either by word or through observation of ... physical symptoms.” Estate of Perry v. Wenzell, 872 F.3d 439, 454 (7th Cir. 2017). But neither words nor observation suggested to a reasonable officer in Officer Licari‘s position that Braun had just suffered a seizure or otherwise needed medical assistance. Although Braun initially told the officers that he did not feel well, he quickly changed course and said that he was “fine.” When asked if he was injured, needed medical care, or suffered from a medical condition, he responded “no.” And nothing that Officer Licari observed undermined these statements: Braun did not wear a medical bracelet or other indicator of his underlying conditions, and his physical symptoms were limited to those suggesting intoxication—confusion, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and difficulty balancing.
The “ultimate inquiry” is whether the officer‘s conduct “was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 453–54 (quotation marks omitted). Braun said he was not injured, did not suffer from any medical conditions, and did not need medical assistance. And his appearance and behavior were entirely consistent with intoxication. Under these circumstances, Officer Licari lacked notice that Braun needed medical care. His response was therefore objectively reasonable.
This conclusion also defeats Braun‘s claim that the Village is liable for failing to train its officers to recognize medical emergencies. This claim arises under Monell, which requires Braun to “prove that the constitutional violation was caused by a governmental ‘policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.‘” First Midwest Bank ex rel. Est. of LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). More specifically, Braun must “have evidence of ‘(1) an action pursuant to a municipal policy, (2) culpability, meaning that policymakers were deliberately indifferent to a known risk that the policy would lead to constitutional violations, and (3) causation, meaning the municipal action was the “moving force” behind the constitutional injury.‘” Pulera, 966 F.3d at 550 (quoting Hall v. City of Chicago, 953 F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir. 2020)). Here, the judge entered summary judgment for the Village because Braun provided no evidence from which the court or a jury could infer deliberate indifference.
But before these heightened requirements come into play for municipal liability under
As we have explained, Officer Licari‘s response to Braun‘s condition was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. That means that there was no “underlying constitutional violation by a municipal employee,” so the Village “cannot be liable under Monell” for failing to train Licari and its other officers. Sallenger v. City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2010); see also id. at 501 (“Because the officers did not violate [the plaintiff‘s] Fourth Amendment rights by the way in which they used [a device], the City itself cannot be liable under Monell for failure to properly train them in the use of the device.“). In other words, because “[a] failure to train
C. The Dismissed Monell Claim
Braun also raises several claims of error regarding the judge‘s dismissal of the second Monell claim, which alleged widespread unlawful conduct in the Palatine Police Department. Specifically, Braun challenges the judge‘s initial decision to dismiss this claim, the denial of his motion to reconsider, and the judge‘s refusal to reopen the dismissal to permit him to replead it.
When a judge dismisses a complaint in whole or in part for failure to state a claim, we normally review that order without deference to the district court. Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, however, the judge dismissed this claim based on Braun‘s failure to address it in his response to the motion to dismiss. The judge properly construed Braun‘s omission as a waiver. A litigant “waives an argument by failing to make it before the district court.” Id. at 721. This rule applies when “a party fails to develop arguments related to a discrete issue” and also when he “effectively abandons” the issue “by not responding to alleged deficiencies in a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 614 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding waiver because the plaintiff “did not present legal argu-
Braun‘s response to the motion to dismiss highlighted what he argued were contested facts relating to other claims but did not mention the Monell claim alleging widespread misconduct in the Palatine Police Department.8 He also argued that certain factual questions prevented a determination of probable cause at the pleading stage, which implicated only the false-arrest claims against Officer Licari. In short, Braun “effectively abandon[ed]” his Monell claim alleging widespread police misconduct by not addressing it in his response to the motion. Alioto, 651 F.3d at 721. And because Braun ignores on appeal the basis for the judge‘s decision to dismiss the claim—namely, that he never argued that it shouldn‘t be dismissed—he has “doubled down on his waiver by failing to grapple with that aspect of the district court‘s order.” Id.
Braun emphasizes that he quickly asked the judge to reconsider his dismissal decision and requested an opportunity to replead the claim. This argument overstates the record. Braun‘s reconsideration motion argued only that the complaint adequately stated a claim for failure to provide medical care. He cannot now argue that the judge erroneously denied the reconsideration motion with respect to a claim that was never mentioned.9 His later motion for leave to file
Finally, Braun argues that the judge wrongly denied his later motion under
As we‘ve explained, Braun filed his motion to vacate very late in the litigation—about fifteen months after the dismissal order and about five months after his motion for leave to amend the complaint. The judge deemed the motion untimely and denied it. That ruling is unassailable. A
The motion was also untimely if considered under the rubric of
We note for completeness that the motion was also substantively defective. Relief under
Instead, Braun sought to revive this claim almost a year and a half after it was dismissed and just days before the close of fact discovery. Under these circumstances, the judge was well within his discretion to deny the motion. See Pearson v. Target Corp., 893 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir. 2018) (describing
AFFIRMED