CHAS. L. HARNEY, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant, v. CONTRACTORS’ STATE LICENSE BOARD et al., Respondents.
S. F. No. 18224
In Bank
Sept. 23, 1952.
39 Cal. 2d 561
The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and J. Albert Hutchinson, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents.
GIBSON, C. J. — This appeal was taken from a judgment on the pleadings for defendants in an action for declaratory relief, and the sole question to be determined is whether plaintiff corporation has alleged facts which entitle it to a declaration of its rights and duties.
The complaint alleges that plaintiff is licensed as a general engineering contractor and is qualified to perform all types of construction requiring special skill, including all classifications of “specialty contract work” as defined in the
There is no statute which requires licensed general engineering contractors to obtain additional specialty licenses as a condition to performing the types of jobs which are listed in rule 732, and it is not claimed that the rule requires such additional licenses where the general engineering contractors undertake specialty work as a part of a larger project which they are entitled to perform. The rule, however, operates to prohibit a licensed general contractor from undertaking any contract which involves specialty work alone, unless the general contractor first obtains the appropriate specialty license.
Section 1060 of the
Plaintiff corporation is qualified to perform specialty work, but it is prohibited by rule 732 from undertaking any contract therefor without obtaining a specialty license, unless the work is part of a general project. It is, therefore, an interested party within the meaning of the sections cited above. Defendants contend, however, that plaintiff has failed to show that an actual controversy exists because there is no allegation that it has bid or intends to bid on work for which a specialty license is required by the board. Although plaintiff does not specifically allege that it intends to bid on such work, it is clear from a reading of the complaint as a whole that it desires to do so. With respect to plaintiff‘s failure to allege that it has bid on specialty work, we are of the view that such an allegation is unnecessary. As we have seen, plaintiff as an interested party is entitled under section 11440 of the
Since the complaint is legally sufficient and sets forth facts and circumstances showing that a declaratory adjudication is appropriate, it was error for the trial court to enter a judgment for defendants on the pleadings. (Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 26 Cal.2d 753, 762 [161 P.2d 217, 162 A.L.R. 747].)
The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J. — I concur in the judgment of reversal solely upon the ground that judgment on the pleadings should not have been granted without leave to amend. As I read the complaint, it does not state any facts showing that Harney has a sufficient legal interest to maintain the action. However, the plaintiff should not have been foreclosed from a further attempt to state facts justifying the relief sought. (MacIsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal.2d 809, 815-816 [161 P.2d 449].)
Only an “interested person” may obtain declaratory relief to determine the validity of an administrative regulation. (
To allow Harney by its present pleading to obtain a determination as to the validity of the rule of the administrative agency in effect provides a convenient method for securing an advisory opinion from this court. This is beyond the scope of the statute and contrary to established judicial procedure.
Notes
“(a) General engineering contracting.
“(b) General building contracting.
“(c) Specialty contracting.”
At the time this action was commenced,
