Charnes v. Robinson

62 consecutively nonexisting impermissibly speculative.

to run to a sen- case was not imposed might thereafter be tence which We reverse the court of and re- 690, pending in a case.” Id. at mand the case with instructions to rein- added)); (emphasis Nebraska v. Blev- imposed by 760 state the sentence the district 864, ins, 223 394 N.W.2d 663 Neb. court.

(“[I]t sentencing impermissible sentence, require

court to that a otherwise

properly imposed, shall be served consecu-

tively possible to a future sentence on

pending charges disposed criminal 865, sentencing.” at the time of the Id. at added)); (emphasis

394 N.W.2d at 664 Ore- Mastrilli, 464, 465, Or.App. gon 62 661 CHARNES, Director, Alan N. Executive 124, (1983)(“Imposing 124 P.2d a sentence Revenue, Department of Motor Vehicle yet consecutive to an as unexecuted sen- Division, Colorado, Petitioner, State of impermissible.”). tence is Illinois addressed this issue Illinois v.

Freeman, Ill.App.3d 50 Ill.Dec. ROBINSON, Larry Respondent. L. Freeman, 420 N.E.2d 163 No. 87SC320. awaiting parole defendant her revoca- Supreme Colorado, Court of when the trial court ordered En Banc. her concurrently new sentence to run with sentences the cases for which she April parole. upheld was on The Illinois court sentence, concluding though that even prior “her status as the con- final insofar victions were concerned had not been de- sentencing

termined at the time of in the case,” accept-

instant action court’s point

able because essential ... “[t]he prior sentences have not ex- been

punged or altered. It remains to be seen

only in they what manner will be served.” 301-02, 849-50,

Id. at 50 Ill.Dec. at added). (emphasis

N.E.2d at 166-67 parole

The Colorado statute period imposed

that the reincarceration

parole revocation cannot exceed six

months, sentencing so a court knows that parole

at the defendant’s revocation hear-

ing pa- the defendant will either have his continued,

role have the conditions of his modified,

parole returned to the insti- period

tution for a of reincarceration not to

exceed six months. parole,

Based on the nature of the fact parolee already

that a has been convicted

and sentenced and is in “constructive custo-

dy” parole, while on and the limited conse-

quences parole

statute, we conclude that the information sentencing

on which the court relied in this Woodard, Gen., Atty. Charles B.

Duane Howe, Gen., Deputy Atty. Richard H. Chief Holmes, Forman, Gen., Bradly J. Asst. Sol. Denver, Gen., petitioner. Atty. for Young, Tooley, R. Thomas C. Wendell Jones, Lakewood, respon- for Stephen A. dent.

MULLARKEY, Justice.

The Motor Division of Colora Vehicle (DMV)appeals Department do of Revenue unpublished de appeals’ from court Charnes, No. cision in Robinson v. 4, 1987) (Colo.Ct.App. June 85CA1542 affirm reversed the district court’s which Larry L. Rob ance of DMV’s revocation accepted cer- license. We inson’s driver’s tiorari to determine whether properly relied on the so-called officer finding support his that Robinson rule” a blood had driven a motor vehicle with higher. of .150 or alcohol content agree with the court upon in rule” cannot relied revoca However, find hearings. because we there was sufficient sup exclusive of the rule” record port officer’s determination license, driving we re revoke Robinson’s judgment of the court verse the judgment of the trial direct that the court be reinstated.

I. 7, 1984, Robinson was November On Thompson of stopped by Officer Clifford Valley Police the Columbine sign. failing stop stop at a On for requesting his approaching Robinson registra- automobile license and driver’s strong tion, Thompson detected Officer police, obtained assumption the first test score that if rule" refers 1. The "20% supports the first test rather test result obtained from a second test result a second refuting it. sample range than preserved in a within 20% falls beverage sample preserved from the of an alcoholic on Robin- obtained for odor backup officer sum- Robinson. son’s breath. arrived, Thompson Robinson moned Kier, testimony by After the Robinson’s perform roadside maneuvers directed witness, closing argument and the complete satisfac- he was unable to counsel, Robinson’s ad- torily. dressed the issues raised counsel. With respect between two was arrested Robinson results, intoxilyzer hearing test officer transported Arapa- to the

the influence and stated: County Department. Sheriffs Robin- hoe intoxilyzer to an breath test matter

son As to the of the second test result submitted p.m., obtained, conducted 10:24 within this office personally which was at has been professional colleague informed a stop. an hour of the traffic The test result Kier’s, gentleman equally Dr. a also rec- indicated Robinson’s blood alcohol content ognized expert as an in the same field in (BAC) grams per 210 to be .181 of alcohol state, Dr. Wingeleth, this Dale C. that a sample A liters of breath. second breath second test result of the within first 20% preserved and taken for Robinson. result test that first test result. then was a summons for Robinson issued It does not refute it. matter under the and influence up, quick arithmetic, came I did a little license. notice of revocation of his driver’s gentlemen. A result below .181 20% contested revocation at a Robinson be a would .1448. The result obtained hearing held on 1985. At the January here, range, .149 within that and as I hearing, Thompson Officer testified to the it, consider as supporting the result ob- facts which occurred the time of the at tained, refuting not it. arrest, including the BAC result of the .181 hearing officer discussed other Thompson intoxilyzer test. Officer also issues raised and “Having concluded: packet of identified a documents labeled as the testimony therefore heard and evidence A which Exhibit included the notice revo- that has come forward at this and cation, complaint the summons issued arguments regarding raised Counsel Robinson, report providing an offense I preponderance the matter ... would summary happened brief as at the what find that the sustain evidence would revo- stop, receipt an for the traffic respondent’s cation of the license and driv- gel containing pre- silicone tube Robinson’s ing privilege....” sample, print- intoxilyzer served breath sought judicial Robinson review showing BAC, out of .181 result district court which the affirmed briefly Influence Report Alcohol appeals officer’s decision. The court of summarized the officer’s of the observation reversed revocation order and remand- maneuvers, roadside a checklist com- ed the case with instructions reinstate intoxilyzer pleted operator while ad- Robinson’s driver’s license. ministering test. The court of ruled that the use Kier, recognized Dr. Lawrence as an ex- rule” reliability to bolster the pert toxicology in the area of blood and, impermissible of the first test was analysis, breath testified on behalf of Rob- reason, ruling analyzed inson that he had second capricious. The court of sample according breath to Colorado De- that, appeals further ruled because the test partment regulations of Health and ob- equal weight, results were the DMV grams results of tained test .149 of alcohol proof failed to meet its burden of per 210 liters of breath. In addition to his therefore the revocation could stand. findings, result Kier test also testified potential about sources of error which granted certiorari to review might explain between the appear there because to be inconsistent rul- results obtained the time of the ings by appeals concerning test and the test he had arrest result which rule.” In Schocke Revenue, personally “expert” informed 361 was P.2d ap (Colo.Ct.App.1986),the the rule. We have been directed Finding rule.” plied the “20% supporting this rule professional literature results was the two test between variance methodology how this came into exist- 20%, hearing officer refused less than resolving in- ence for differences between second test results of the to consider the appar- toxilyzer readily is not test results license. Id. at the driver’s and revoked than the brief mention in ent. Other The court reversed. 362-363. case, Schocke, Harvey, and the we presumed It tests were found both have found no reference rule” had conducted correct because both been methodologies that di- or similar statistical Depart with the Colorado State accordance results be inter- rect how different test will regulations. Health rules and Id. ment of as evidence preted when considered other than the Because no evidence hearing. test introduced and because results was weighed evenly, ap the court of clear, however, the It is rule” “20% department peals failed held that the applied by officers as has been proof by preponder the its burden of meet having force and effect of law. In the Therefore, court ance the evidence. the applied, to be so rule” must order “20% in officer erred re ruled that statute, by a rule be authorized or decision. Harvey In voking the license.2 Id. statutes, however, governing contain The Charnes, (Colo.Ct.App.1986), 728 P.2d 373 proceed- principle. such Administrative no im appeals ruled that was court involving ings the revocation of drivers’ reliability proper to measure the subject Adminis- licenses are State police performed by a offi intoxilyzer test (APA). trative Procedure Act See cer a rule” because rule “20% 42-2-122.1(10), (1984). 17 C.R.S. Under the record. based on evidence outside 24-4-104(2), (1988) 10A C.R.S. section However, the was held to be harm error APA, making any agency a determina- less since there was sufficient evidence as to revocation of license shall during the excessive blood alcohol level solely criteria, upon stated do so “based i.e., requisite period, one BAC test exceed statute, terms, reg- purposes of the or .15, driving in an erratic ed the driver was thereunder, promulgated ulations manner, she had the odor of alcoholic regula- interpreting such statutes and law breath, her beverage on her she slurred is is- pursuant to which license tions sobriety speech, and failed the roadside she case, required.” or In the sued test. Id. 374. application of the court of found (1984) 42-2-122.1(8)(c),17 C.R.S. Section capricious rule” “20% statutory provides the criteria for analysis error apply

but did not a harmless pursuant mandatory of a license revocation Harvey. We will consider both it did 42-2-122.1(l)(a)(I), 17 C.R.S. to section application of validity the “20% only states that: hearings rule” in license driver’s issue at the shall be The sole application of error and the harmless by a of the evi- preponderance whether this context. person a vehicle dence the drove II. the amount of alcohol such state when grams person’s 0.15 or more blood was origins rule” un The “20% per 100 milliliters of blood or of alcohol Schocke, certain at best. grams per 210 or more of alcohol 0.15 hearing officer referred to the time of the com- Here, liters of at the breath policy. department rule” as a “20% alleged offense as shown only he mission of the officer indicated against question proof prepon- of fact must resolve the party er If a has a burden of proof. People having party the burden of and the evidence of the evidence derance sides, (Colo.1980). Taylor, weighs evenly presented find- 618 P.2d 1127 on both interpretation analysis person’s prior of such consistent which had by chemical breath_3 upheld appeal, on been blood change held that the board could not or similar statistical rule” Since interpretation adjudicating in the course of statute, adopted by procedure has been appeal fir- employee’s an individual of her adopted if rule can be valid ing. required proceed by The board was rulemaking adjudi- through agency’s rulemaking change if it its wished rule. powers. cative jurisdictions Other have reached the same regulation embodying No rule” See, e.g., Department result. Labor v. promulgated by the Director of has been Co., 102 N.J. 504 A.2d Titan Constr. pursuant of Revenue to his (1985) (invalidating adjudicatory expan- 42-1-204, rulemaking authority in section department department sion of of labor ap- rule” thus 17 C.R.S. officers); Crema, provisions corporate pears developed applied to have been (invalidating adjudicatory 463 A.2d 910 solely hearings. in the course of revocation adoption conceptual ap- of a review and that, recognize general, proval process proposed residential de- through policy adjudi make either its velopments). Underlying these decisions is rulemaking However, catory power. or its adjudicato- a concern for the fairness of the in Home Builders Association v. Public ry process. requires Fairness that rule- Commission, (Colo. 720 P.2d 552 Utilities making power be used to stan- establish 1986), agency’s we noted that the discretion dards which an intends to enforce rulemaking adjudi to choose between by adjudication parties so that all cation is limited. We held that the Public proceeding game.” know the “rules of the Utility adoption Commission’s of a method Co., Titan Constr. 504 A.2d at 14. calculating monetary for the amount of a deposit adjudicatory proceeding in an Policymaking in adjudicatory nothing “agency less than an statement of setting principally provide guide serves to general applicability and future im effect agency’s position adjudica to the in future plementing declaring policy.” As [and] tory proceedings. See NLRB v. Bell Aero such, policy regulation was a rule or Co., 267, 294, 1757, space 416 U.S. 94 S.Ct. meaning within the of the APA and the 1771-72, (1974); 40 134 L.Ed.2d NLRB v. agency compli decision was void for lack of Co., 759, Wyman-Gordon 394 U.S. 764- rulemaking procedures ance with 766, 1426, 1428-1430, 89 S.Ct. 22 L.Ed.2d APA. Id. at 561. See also Crema v. New (1968) (plurality opinion). 709 Establish Protection, Jersey Dep’t Envtl. 94 N.J. of policymaking through ment of adjudication 286, (1983) (where 463 A.2d 910 contem justified in agen is circumstances an where plated appli action is intended to have wide cy anticipated must treat matters neither prospective effect, rulemaking cation previously by agency nor dealt with or proceeding). becomes the suitable mode of extremely matters that are complex and Mayberry University incapable being of Colo. reduced to a formalized of Sciences, 427, (Colo. Health policy. statement of Chenery See SEC v. Ct.App.1987), court of appeals Corp., 194, 202-203, 1575, con 332 U.S. 67 S.Ct. policymaking by adjudication 1580-1581, sidered Policy- L.Ed. 1995 change in making through invalidated Personnel Board is adjudication done when change policy because the made any generalized is doubtful whether “[i]t in adjudicatory hearing board an without standard could be framed which would rulemaking. marginal resort to formal utility.” At issue was have more than Bell interpretation Co., 294, the board’s of Aerospace one its 416 U.S. at 94 S.Ct. at rules. Where the board had the rule 1772. 42-2-122.1(8)(c) person any

3. Section was amended in 1988 did not consume alcohol between testing driving testing_" to lower the BAC to 0.10 and allow the time of and the time 42-2-122.1, prepon- "within two hours after if the See Ch. sec. 1988 Colo. derance of the evidence establishes that such Sess.Laws general applicability complex, sult in a rule of description of unan This involving be en the same issue of patterns which cannot future cases ticipated fact general fairly Foreseeability rule not compassed in a does test results. hearings. DMV revocation application adopted characterize future an method- such DMV revo agency decisions Home Builders finding in ology key was a hearings published not are are cation Association which led us to hold that the readily public, to the such available adopted Com- policy by the Public Utilities appro are not adjudicatory proceedings proceeding in adjudicatory mission development agency priate for forum comply with the APA void for failure to policy. Parties such administrative rulemaking procedures set out in section prior hearings likely are not to be aware 24-4-103. 720 P.2d at 562. agency in criteria and stan cases is policy established either Whether a result, and, will adopted as a be dards were rulemaking adjudication, each method or prepare adequately unable participation form of requires some commentator has present their cases. One input policy to determining in stated: 24-4-103, 10A adopted. Section C.R.S. knowledge agency criteria [Without (1988), requires APA that when a standards, lawyers representing li- through regulation promulgated rule- perform censing their clients cannot public made making, a announcement is properly. If decision factors functions public rulemaking, proposed unknown, appeal may be a court vir- are held, persons and interested are afforded tually judges where sus- useless states data, opportunity written submit administrative decisions on basis tain pro- arguments. Only after views administra- of substantial evidence and the information cess is followed ob- attorney But the record reviewed. tive permitted adopt is the tained protecting his client’s inter- is assisted proposed regulation. known, he if ests criteria judicial evaluation of the criteria obtain regard participation and in With their 24-4-105, put adjudication, 10A section of his case. facts part pertinent C.R.S. Reese, Power, People: A Policy, Study J. that: Licensing Driver Administration proceeding of (7) [Ejvery party to the ... (footnote omitted). (1971) right have to his or shall the adoption documentary rule” was not The “20% evi- defense oral adjudicatory evidence, an set- appropriately dence, done in to submit rebuttal ting it was foreseeable the because such cross-examination as to conduct evidence of breatha- DMV true required for a full and dis- may be lyzer introduced revoca- results would be of the facts. closure of hearings fact tion triers how to required to determine

would be gener- of agency An take notice Here, differences. the statu- resolve the al, technical, scientific within its or facts that, specifically tory scheme knowledge, only the so noticed if fact but the influ- prosecution for the brought or is to specified in the record alcohol, shall be of “the defendant ence parties before final the attention to offer direct circumstantial entitled every party is afforded decision disparity that there is a evidence to show controvert the facts so opportunity to the tests show other between what noticed. could infer the trier of fact facts so that promul- rule” was not Because “20% way in some defective the tests were gated statutory rulemaking pursuant 42-4-1202(1.5)(b), 17 or inaccurate.” opportunity procedures, for there was (1988 Supp.). It also was foreseea- C.R.S. challenge pur- the basis and public agency’s adoption of a method- ble that adjudi- pose Similarly, re- of the rule. differences would ology to resolve test catory Robinson proceeding, support hearing was not able dence to officer’s deci premise Div., to refute or attack statistical sion. DeScala Motor Vehicle validity (Colo.1983); P.2d 1360 “20% Glasmann v. De rule,” i.e., Revenue, than partment (Colo. whether variance of less 719 P.2d 1096 Ct.App.1986). leads to a that two different 20% conclusion supportive results of one test another question presented by The this case is applica- specific or whether the statistical whether there is substantial evidence in the appropriate, type data support record to the revocation of Robin hearing officer, effect, presented. The license, despite son’s judicial alleged of an took notice scientific Here, erroneous use of the rule.” “20% fact that “a test result second within 20% our review the record convinces us that of the first test first result prove there is sufficient the one 24-4-105(8), to section Contrary result.” fact, i.e., salient that Robinson drove a Robinson was an opportunity not afforded greater. with .15 po vehicle BAC or to controvert the fact noticed. performed lice breath test accord required procedures ance with and Rob In summary, the rule” is a inson’s BAC was measured as .181. Evi or regulation meaning rule within presented by dence also was Officer the APA promul and because it was not Thompson which showed that Robinson gated according rulemaking authori stopped committing for a traffic in Revenue, ty delegated to the Director of fraction, he had the odor of an alcoholic is invalid. The officer erred beverage breath, on speech his his applying the rule” to differ resolve perform slurred and he was unable satis ences between two results test factorily physical roadside maneuvers. See he when determined whether Robinson’s Charnes, Harvey Thus, 728 P.2d at 374. BAC pursuant was above the .15 level evidentiary there support for the revo 42-2-122.1(l)(a). section cation of Robinson’s driver’s license. III. Because we find the clearly evidence is though Even the hearing im uphold agency sufficient to action re- support license, used the rule” to his voking Robinson’s it is not neces- findings, argues sary DMV that there was for us to reverse and remand the case substantial evidence within the record to reconsideration officer. support findings reviewing officer A power, court’s under these that Robinson driven a had motor vehicle circumstances to affirm action high with blood content of alcohol .15 remanding, without is well established: basis, urges er. On this the DMV us to on relies a number of uphold the license. Robinson’s findings, one or more of which are erro- agree. neous, we must and only reverse remand significant when there is a chance that statutory judicial standard for re- the agency might but for errors the have reviewing view that a court reached a different result. When it is reverse the DMV’s revocation of a license clear that based on findings the valid the “department if it finds that the exceeded agency would have reached the same ul- its statutory authority, constitutional or result, timate not improperly we do in- interpretation made an erroneous province vade the by administrative af- law, arbitrary acted in an capricious and firming. manner, or made a determination is which unsupported by the evidence in the Project States, Salt River v. United 762 42-2-122.l(9)(b). 1053, record....” To deter- (D.C.Cir.1985). F.2d 1061 § n. 8 Ac mine that a officer’s decision Supply cord Consolidated Gas v. Federal arbitrary capricious, and reviewing Commission, court Energy Regulatory 606 F.2d 323, must convinced from the (D.C.Cir.1979), denied, record as a 329 cert. 444 1073, 1018, whole that there not evi- substantial U.S. 100 S.Ct. 62 L.Ed.2d 755

69 view, my re- In the officer acted in an is to (1980) (“The appropriate standard capricious manner sum- only arbitrary and of error when for correction mand marily the rule” and fail- applying that the adminis- substantial doubt there is ing by appropriate standards re- evaluate the agency have reached trative would the the two test re- between materi- reference to the sult it did absent sults. I would remand to the Koch, Accordingly, Law al.”). 2 also Administrative See appeals court of directions to return (“In- with 8.12, (1987 Supp.) at 7 and Practice § Department the case to the of Revenue for when, deed, should not remand the court whether, applying a determination the finding, though rejects even some standards, proper Robinson’s blood-alcohol findings the upon there are valid which higher. content 0.15 or ulti- reached the same agency would have result.”). O’Leary v. Brown- mate proceedings, In administrative revocation Cf. 508, Inc., 504, Maxon, S.Ct. 340 U.S. 71 officer decisions judicial review 470, (1951),where, 472, 483 in an 95 L.Ed. the is limited to of whether evaluation Frankfurter, the Su- opinion by Justice con Department of “exceeded its Revenue the case to preme Court declined remand statutory authority, stitutional or made agency law, and the Court interpretation administrative acted erroneous manner, arbitrary capricious to assess the itself examined the record in an and unsupported sufficiency of evidence because “we made a determination in evidence record.” and the relevant stan- have a slim record 42-2-122.1(9)(b), 17 C.R.S. think apply; not difficult we dard is presented in evidence is “Where litigation terminate now.” had better hearing, credibility an administrative Thus, usurp authority do the DMV’s we not weight their witnesses and to be affirming on the the license revocation province within the testimony decisions grounds suggested by agency. Lobato, agency.” v. 743 Charnes Accordingly, that the hear- we conclude 27, (Colo.1987); P.2d 32 see also G G& ing to revoke officer’s determination Comm’n, v. 745 Trucking Co. Public Util. capricious not license was (Colo.1987); 211, Delivery 216 Acme P.2d in re- and that the court of erred Cargo Freight Sys., 704 P.2d Serv. remand versing the revocation order. We (Colo.1985). acting capaci in its di- the case with however, fact, an adminis ty the trier the case to the district rections to remand to deference trative entitled court for reinstatement of criteria in re applies when it correct order. solving evidentiary conflicts. See Gon Comm’n, zales Industrial LOHR, J., part in concurs (Colo.1987). Therefore, inquiry into ERICKSON, part, J., dissents applied proper whether dissent. joins in the concurrence and evaluating principles of law LOHR, Justice, concurring part simply before it is forestalled because dissenting part: agency’s the record ultimate findings. Id.; see Power Re also Electric agree majority I II of the with Part County City Inst. v. Den search explicating policymaking au- opinion, ver, (Colo.1987). P.2d 825-26 Revenue, de- thority of termining rule” cannot be that the “20% Lobato, upheld we license revo- used in administrative driver’s determining exercise of discretion compliance proceedings absent with cation although conflicting of results intoxi- 24-4- rulemaking procedures of section weighed evenly, preponder- lyzer tests (1988), concluding that 10A C.R.S. re- ance of the evidence issue should be hearing by applying erred officer of nearer to solved in favor the test re- resolve the rule” to the time that offense intoxilyzer tests involved of alcohol committed. sults the two the influence However, Lobato, reaching respectfully I dis- 743 P.2d at 30-34. case. this noted that majority opinion. this conclusion we sent III of the from Part erroneous). [m]any hearing Nothing sug- enter into a factors the record gests hearing gave officer’s decision that one test is more any officer another, including than but the types reliable consideration to factors equip- appropriate limited such variables as the deemed resolving Lobato for used, intoxilyzer results, ment and chemical standards conflicts between test witness, experience any concerning of each and the or to cir- other evidence blood- particular surrounding cumstances alcohol Consequently, content.1 is a usurpation test. The determination as to which test agency’s of the role this greater reliability credibility weigh result has and de- court to assess testi- greater weight agen- mony serves reaching within other evidence in a deter- cy’s issue finding discretion not an to be mination that the record analyzed appellate on preponderance review. of the evidence that Robinson’s blood-alcohol content was 0.15 Lobato, P.2d at 33. higher. I would therefore hold that the case, majority opinion In the instant hearing officer’s determination to revoke despite hearing concludes that officer’s capri- Robinson’s license was rule,” erroneous of the “20% cious and remand there was sufficient evidence the record with directions return the upon hearing officer could make Department of Revenue for reconsidera- a determination that Robinson drove a ve- tion. hicle with least a 0.15 blood-alcoholcon- opinion, In my tent. the record contains no J., ERICKSON, joins in this hearing indication officer based his concurrence and dissent. on anything determination other than the tests, results intoxilyzer of the two and the Indeed, transcript rule.”

hearing ruling on the blood-alcohol only

content issue consists of a few re-

marks directed toward be- intoxilyzer tween the two tests. These re- COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS hearing marks reveal officer found COMMISSION, Petitioner, that the results of intoxilyzer the second supported test rather than refuted those of the first The hearing clearly test. officer Gargano Stephen Dominic J. S. by operation reached this conclusion Reffel, Complainants, maj. op. p. (quoting rule.” See full text of officer’s remarks on issue). the blood-alcohol content NORTH WASHINGTON FIRE DISTRICT, PROTECTION way knowing We have on the basis Respondent. this record whether the would have reached the same ultimate re No. 87SC432. sult without the benefit of the “20% rule.” Colorado, Supreme Court of States, Project Salt River v. United Cf. En Banc. (D.C.Cir.1985)

762 F.2d 1060-61 n. 8 April 1989. (affirming agency action without remand ing agency clearly where would have

reached the same ultimate result had it on findings

relied those that were not transcript working administrative used prop- to conduct the first test was erly, contains a brief operated discussion correctly, offi- and was registered cer of the "matter of the certification of the and certified the State of Colorado [intoxilyzer] operator.” required device and How- various Colorado ever, finding apparently Regulations. finding entered in Health any way This does not in response to Robinson's comparative reliability contention that the state address the failed to the two tests.

Case Details

Case Name: Charnes v. Robinson

Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado

Date Published: Apr 10, 1989

Citation: 772 P.2d 62

Docket Number: 87SC320

Court Abbreviation: Colo.