Charming Shoppes of Delaware, Inc., and Charming Shoppes, [nc. appeal from the trial court’s denial of thеir motion to set aside a default judgment. We conclude that the motion should have been ranted and reverse.
Plаintiffs Tammy and Reginald Parrish filed a personal injury ac-ión against a defendant styled “Charming Shoppes, c/o Registered gent CT Corporation System,” alleging that Tammy Parrish fell on he premises of Charming Shoppes. The uncontradicted evidеnce in he record shows that “Charming Shoppes, Inc.” is the ultimate par-mt corporation of Fashion Bug No. 2028, the corporation which eased and occupied the premises in question. However, Charming hoppes, Inc. is nоt registered to do business in Georgia and has no egistered agent for service in Georgia. A separate and distinсt corpo-ation, Charming Shoppes of Delaware, Inc., does business in Georgia nd designates CT Corporatiоn System as its registered agent, but it as no ownership interest in the premises on which Parrish allegedly *730 fell.
CT Corporation System, whiсh received a copy of the summons and complaint, apparently forwarded the papers to Charming Shoppes, Inc. The summons and complaint were delivered to a mailroom employee of Charming Shoppes, Inc. who was not authorized to accept service of process and did not forward them to anyone authorized to handle them. Upon expiration of the time for answer, the Parrishes sought and obtained entry of default judgment against “defendant, Charming Shoppes.”
Charming Shoppes, Inc. filed a motion to set aside the judgment. The trial court declared that Charming Shoppes, Inc. was not a proper party to the case and determined its motion to be “moot” because it was no longer a party. The court then amended the default judgment to substitute Charming Shоppes of Delaware, Inc. as the defendant.
“[OCGA § 9-11-60] (d) and (f) provide[s] that a judgment is subject to being set aside at any time by a motion premised upon a lack of jurisdiction over the person. Further, unless a party has waived lawful serviсe of process (which our present appellant[s have] not), such service is essential to give a court jurisdiction over that party’s person. [Cit.]”
Benton v. Modern Finance &c. Co.,
Service of process was not perfected on Charming Shoppеs, Inc., because as a foreign corporation not doing business in Georgia it should have been served under the provisions of OCGA § 14-2-504. While CT Corporation System acts as registered agent for Charming Shoppes of Delaware, Inc., thаt entity was not named as a defendant. The substitution of another corporation as defendant and judgment debtor imрoses judgment upon an entity that was not named as a defendant in the original action.
In
Ciprotti v. United Inns,
As in
Ciprotti,
service of process in this action was insufficien I because the named defendant was never properly served. Howevei I here the corporate defendant against which the Parrishes eventual! I sought and obtained a default judgment was never named in the cоm I plaint, even in the limited sense of “a/k/a” or “d/b/a.” “[S]ervice o: I
*731
the proper party is the responsibility of the plaintiff, not the individual accepting service.”
This is not a case of mere misnomer of a party. “Correction of a misnomer involves no substitution of parties and does not add a new and distinct party.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Northgate Village Apts. v. Smith,
Nor is this a case of corporations shown to be so closely related by ownership or interlocking assets as to justify service on an “alter ego.” The Parrishes did not present evidence that would constitute “piercing the corporate veil” or a showing that “Charming Shoppes,” “Charming Shoppes, Inc.” or “Charming Shoppes of Delaware, Inc.” were alter egos of one another.
Plaintiffs should not obtain a default judgment based on an apparent failure to investigate fully and the resulting ambiguity created by naming the wrong defеndant or improperly serving the named defendant. The trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion to set aside the default judgment.
Judgment reversed.